Republic of the Philippines vs. Aguirre

A marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of a false affidavit of cohabitation is void ab initio where the parties failed to live together continuously and exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years immediately preceding the celebration, as required for exemption under Article 34 of the Family Code.

Boots Rodel R. Aguirre and Alma T. Aguirre are contracting parties who sought to marry without obtaining a marriage license. Article 34 of the Family Code dispenses with a marriage license for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years without legal impediment to marry, upon execution of the required affidavits.

Boots Rodel R. Aguirre and Alma T. Aguirre were an exclusively dating couple in the early 2000s. According to Boots, from 2001 to 2004, prior to his departure abroad, they lived separately while pursuing their respective studies and work. At most, they temporarily stayed for less than five months in a rented apartment or boarding house in Jaro, Iloilo City, sharing the same room with Boots' brother and cousins and Alma's cousins, without conducting themselves as husband and wife. Boots also served as Sangguniang Kabataan President in Hamtic, Antique and went back and forth to Antique, while Alma worked in the Municipality of Hamtic and generally went home to Bugasong, staying only occasionally, once or twice a month, at Boots' house in Buhang.

On May 24, 2006, Boots left for Israel to work and remained there until May 3, 2009, when he returned to the Philippines to marry Alma. To facilitate marriage without a license, they executed an Affidavit of Cohabitation on May 6, 2009 attesting that they had lived together as husband and wife since December 2003 and were residents of Barangay Egaña, Sibalom, Antique. On May 8, 2009, they were married at St. Joseph Cathedral in San Jose de Buenavista, Antique, officiated by Fr. Victor S. Baguna, who certified that the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. After the wedding, they lived together until June 2, 2009, when Boots returned to Israel. They communicated for about two months thereafter but eventually ceased contact.

On March 19, 2013, Boots filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Alma for lack of a marriage license, asserting that the Affidavit of Cohabitation was false since he had been abroad from May 2006 to June 2009. Although summons and copies were served upon Alma, she did not file an Answer. Upon RTC directive, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique investigated and confirmed the absence of collusion between the parties. At trial, Boots admitted that he and Alma were not residing in Egaña as stated in the affidavit, had never lived together as a couple alone, and had not conducted themselves as husband and wife before marriage.

• Continuity Despite Physical Absence: Petitioner argued that Boots and Alma truthfully executed the Affidavit of Cohabitation and that Boots' work in Israel from 2006 to 2009 did not render it false, because cohabitation is characterized by exclusivity and continuity, not necessarily physical presence under one roof at all times, and there was no intent to sever ties.
• Meaning of Cohabitation: Petitioner maintained that cohabitation means assuming marital relations and holding themselves out publicly as husband and wife, even if circumstances temporarily separate them.
• Inapplicability of Dayot: Petitioner argued that Republic vs. Dayot is inapplicable because, unlike therein where the affidavit was fabricated after only brief cohabitation, Boots and Alma had lived together since 2003, making their affidavit truthful.
• Estoppel and Sanctity of Marriage: Petitioner argued that Boots is estopped from repudiating his voluntary declaration relied upon by the solemnizing officer and civil registry, and that allowing repudiation would undermine the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution and open floodgates to nullification.
• Compliance with Article 34: Petitioner maintained that all requisites were met — no legal impediment, executed affidavit of cohabitation, and priest's certification of compliance — so the marriage should be deemed valid despite absence of a license.

• Absence of Five-Year Cohabitation: Respondent maintained that the marriage does not fall under Article 34 because he left for Israel on May 24, 2006 and returned only on May 3, 2009, making uninterrupted cohabitation for five continuous years immediately preceding the marriage impossible.
• Falsity Beyond Mere Irregularity: Respondent argued that the Affidavit of Cohabitation was false as confirmed by the RTC and CA, that Dayot applies, that exceptions to the license requirement must be strictly construed, and that falsity fabricated to circumvent the law cannot be treated as a mere irregularity.
• Imprescriptibility: Respondent rejected estoppel, asserting that actions for declaration of nullity of marriage are imprescriptible and may be raised at any time.
• Void for Lack of Formal Requisite: Respondent insisted that failure to secure a marriage license rendered the marriage void ab initio under Articles 3, 4, and 35(3) of the Family Code.

• Validity of Article 34 Exemption: Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's nullification of respondents' marriage upon the finding that the Affidavit of Cohabitation was false and thus cannot be used as basis for the marriage license exemption in Article 34 of the Family Code.

• Validity of Article 34 Exemption: No. The exemption did not apply because continuous and exclusive five-year cohabitation immediately before the marriage was not established, the affidavit was false and ineffectual, and a marriage celebrated without a valid license is void ab initio under Articles 3(2), 4, and 35(3) of the Family Code.

• Validity of Article 34 Exemption: For Article 34 to apply, five requisites must concur: (a) living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; (b) no legal impediment to marry; (c) absence of impediment present at the time of marriage; (d) affidavit stating five-year cohabitation and absence of impediment; and (e) sworn statement by the solemnizing officer that qualifications were ascertained and no impediment found. The controversy centered on the first requisite. Following Niñal vs. Bayadog, the five-year period is counted back from the celebration and contemplates common-law cohabitation — a legal union in all respects except the marriage contract — characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party at any time, and continuity, meaning unbroken. While temporary absence by mutual consent for convenience, health, business, or other reason without intent to abandon does not interrupt continuity, such presupposes that cohabitation as husband and wife was first established and intended to continue, as shown by common residence, shared expenses, and deportment as spouses. Here, from 2001 to 2004 the parties lived separately, stayed together at most intermittently for less than five months in a shared boarding-house room with relatives, never alone as a couple, and admittedly did not conduct themselves as husband and wife; Alma generally resided in Bugasong and visited only once or twice monthly, and neither resided in Egaña as averred. From 2005 to 2009 Boots remained in Israel without intent to return even occasionally to live with Alma, with no evidence they deported themselves as husband and wife while apart. Intermittent and occasional stays do not amount to cohabitation marked by regularity at bed and board in the same house. Boots' testimony, though from an interested party, constituted an admission against interest exposing him to possible perjury liability and was thus given probative weight. As an exception to the general rule requiring a valid license, Article 34 must be strictly construed, and a false affidavit is a mere scrap of paper without force and effect, as if no affidavit existed, per Republic vs. Dayot and Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson. The case was distinguished from Laguda vs. Manguardia, where the petitioner gave an inconsistent account and there was proof the putative husband regularly returned home whenever possible, unlike the inadequate evidence here.

• Requisites for Article 34 Exemption — Five requisites must concur: first, living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; second, no legal impediment to marry; third, absence of impediment present at time of marriage; fourth, execution of an affidavit stating five-year cohabitation and absence of impediment; and fifth, sworn statement by the solemnizing officer that qualifications were ascertained and no impediment found. Applied to deny exemption because the first requisite of five-year cohabitation was not satisfied.
• Five-Year Exclusive and Continuous Common-Law Cohabitation — Article 34 refers to common-law cohabitation where the only missing factor is the marriage contract, counted back from the date of celebration for the years immediately before marriage, characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party at any time within five years and continuity meaning unbroken. Applied to hold that intermittent dating, shared boarding with relatives, and prolonged overseas stay without common residence did not qualify.
• Temporary Absence Not Interrupting Continuity — Temporary absence or physical separation does not interrupt continuity provided it was by mutual consent or for convenience, health, business, or other reason, with no intent to abandon or desert, as demonstrated by retained common dwelling, common residence, joint accounts, shared expenses, and deportment as spouses. Applied to reject the Republic's claim because prior cohabitation as husband and wife and intent to continue it were never established, and Boots' absence was not merely temporary.
• False Affidavit as Mere Scrap of Paper — Where the essential matter in the sworn affidavit regarding five-year cohabitation is false, the affidavit has no force and effect, as if none existed, and cannot take the place of a marriage license; to permit otherwise would allow abject circumvention of the law. Applied to void the marriage celebrated sans license on the strength of respondents' false declaration.
• Strict Construction of License Exemption — Marriage being a special relationship, its requirements must be strictly observed and no exemption from securing a license allowed unless circumstances clearly fall within Article 34. Applied to sustain nullity where the statutory conditions were not clearly met.
• Admission Against Interest — The act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him or her, and no man would declare anything against himself unless true. Applied to credit Boots' testimony admitting falsity despite his interest, as it exposed him to possible perjury liability.

• "five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union" — States the Niñal vs. Bayadog formulation of the five-year common-law cohabitation period, requiring exclusivity and continuity immediately before marriage.
• "There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception." — Articulates the strict-construction rule for Article 34 exemptions, decisive in denying validity to the license-less marriage.
• "If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all." — Provides the canonical Dayot rationale, reiterated in Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson, for treating a false affidavit of cohabitation as ineffectual to supply the license requirement.
• "to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." — Sets the evidentiary basis for finding voidness where the contract itself shows exceptional character without a license and no contrary proof is presented.

• Niñal vs. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) — Controlling precedent defining Article 34's five-year exclusive and continuous common-law cohabitation, counted back from celebration, and requiring strict observance; followed.
• Republic vs. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553 (2008) — Controlling precedent holding that a marriage without license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character is void and a false affidavit is a mere scrap of paper; followed.
• Diaz-Salgado vs. Anson, 791 Phil. 481 (2016) — Reiterated Dayot and the apparent-absence-of-license test on the marriage contract; followed to void the present marriage.
• Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 406 Phil. 434 (2001) — Source of the five enumerated requisites for Article 34 exemption; applied.
• De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, 568 Phil. 724 (2008) — Cited by the CA for the proposition that a false affidavit cannot substitute for a license; affirmed in reasoning.
• Laguda vs. Manguardia, G.R. No. 279718, January 29, 2026 — Distinguished because therein petitioner was inconsistent and there was proof of regular home returns, unlike the inadequate evidence of continuous cohabitation here.

• Article 34, Family Code — Dispenses with a license for a man and woman who lived together as husband and wife for at least five years without legal impediment, upon affidavit and solemnizing officer's oath; applied but held unsatisfied for lack of five-year exclusive and continuous cohabitation.
• Article 3(2), Family Code — Lists a valid marriage license, except in Chapter 2 cases, as a formal requisite; applied to require a license absent a valid Article 34 exception.
• Article 4, Family Code — Provides absence of any essential or formal requisite renders marriage void ab initio except as stated in Article 35(2); applied to void the license-less marriage.
• Article 35(3), Family Code — Declares void from the beginning marriages solemnized without license except those covered by the preceding Chapter; applied as the ground for nullity.
• Section 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Allows a party's act, declaration, or omission as to a relevant fact in evidence against him or her; applied to credit Boots' admissions of falsity.
• Article 183, Revised Penal Code — Punishes knowingly untruthful statements under oath or affidavit on material matter; cited to show Boots' admissions were against interest and thus probative.

Caguioa, Acting C.J. (Chairperson), Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concur.