Republic of the Philippines vs. Agbulos

Trial in absentia is valid after arraignment where the accused has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified; an accused who jumps bail and remains at large during the pendency of his appeal forfeits his right to seek appellate relief.

Joselito Agbulos was charged, upon complaint of Angelita P. Bangit, with forcible abduction with rape. The proceedings were governed by Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution, which authorized trial in absentia after arraignment where the accused had been duly notified and his failure to appear was unjustifiable, and by Rule 124, Section 8 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permitted dismissal of an appeal where the appellant escapes, jumps bail, or flees during its pendency.

Upon complaint filed by Angelita P. Bangit, Joselito Agbulos alias Lito was charged with forcible abduction with rape. On January 23, 1981, Agbulos was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case on April 25, 1984.

After the prosecution rested, Agbulos failed to appear at scheduled hearings. On August 13, 1984, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest for failure to appear. On September 24, 1984, the arrest order was recalled and set aside because notice had been sent to the wrong bonding company; the hearing was reset to November 5, 1984, and Agbulos was notified at his home address. On November 5, 1984, Agbulos again failed to appear, and his arrest was again ordered. The bonding company was given 30 days to produce him and to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against its undertaking.

On December 18, 1984, the trial court, upon motion of the Fiscal, ordered judgment against the full amount of the bond because the bonding company had failed to produce Agbulos within the specified period. On motion of defense counsel, over the Fiscal's vigorous objection, the continuation of trial for the defense was cancelled and reset to January 30, 1985. The order warned that if Agbulos still failed to appear and present evidence at the next setting, he would be deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and the case would be submitted for decision on the evidence on record. The court also ordered Agbulos's arrest at his address in Cabanatuan City.

On January 30, 1985, Agbulos still failed to appear. His counsel manifested in court that he was adopting prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo as evidence for the accused, and the defense rested its case. On June 15, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding Agbulos guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua; he was also ordered to indemnify Angelita Bangit in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs. On July 11, 1985, judgment was rendered against the bonding company for failure to produce the accused and to explain why the amount of its undertaking should not be forfeited. On August 16, 1985, counsel for Agbulos filed a notice of appeal.

The record shows that after arraignment and during trial, Agbulos jumped bail and had not been apprehended to date. His last appearance in court was on April 25, 1984, when the prosecution rested its case. The rest of the trial was held in absentia and resulted in the judgment of conviction. He remained at large even as he hoped that his appeal would succeed and that he could then appear before the Court to claim his victory.

• Validity of Trial in Absentia: Whether the trial court validly proceeded with trial in absentia after Agbulos failed to appear, despite his absence and alleged lack of notice.
• Waiver of Notice and Right to Be Present: Whether an accused's escape or failure to appear waives his right to notice and to be present at trial, making his failure to appear unjustified.
• Forfeiture of Right to Appeal: Whether an accused who jumps bail and remains at large during the pendency of his appeal forfeits his right to appeal and may have the appeal dismissed.

• Validity of Trial in Absentia: Yes. Trial in absentia was valid under Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution, reproduced in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, because Agbulos had been arraigned, duly notified, and his failure to appear was unjustified.
• Waiver of Notice and Right to Be Present: Yes. Escape is deemed a waiver of the right to be present and of notice of subsequent hearings; the court may continue trial, and the escape makes the failure to appear unjustified.
• Forfeiture of Right to Appeal: Yes. Under Rule 124, Section 8 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appellant who escapes, jumps bail, or flees during appeal loses standing and waives any right to seek relief unless he surrenders or submits to jurisdiction.

• Validity of Trial in Absentia: The 1973 Constitution, Article IV, Section 19, allowed trial to proceed after arraignment notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided he had been duly notified and his failure to appear was unjustifiable. The purpose was to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, which could previously be indefinitely deferred or abandoned because of the defendant's escape. The old rule in People vs. Avanceña required the accused's presence at certain stages and allowed escape to operate to the fugitive's advantage; the Bill of Rights modified that doctrine by permitting trial in absentia. The requisites are: (a) arraignment; (b) due notice of trial; and (c) unjustified failure to appear. Agbulos had been arraigned, had been notified, and failed to appear; his escape made his absence unjustified. The right to be present may be waived except at the stage where the prosecution presents witnesses who will identify the accused. Escape is deemed a waiver of the right to be present and of notice of subsequent hearings, so the court's inability to notify him did not prevent continuation of trial; he was deemed to have received due notice, and his escape made his failure to appear unjustified.

• Waiver of Notice and Right to Be Present: Escape cannot be a legal justification. The fugitive is deemed to have waived notice precisely because he escaped, and it is the escape that makes his failure to appear unjustified. The court may continue trial in his absence. The right to be present may be waived except at the identification stage. The prosecution had already rested its case on April 25, 1984, and the subsequent proceedings concerned the defense; the trial court could therefore proceed and render judgment despite Agbulos's continued absence.

• Forfeiture of Right to Appeal: Rule 124, Section 8 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. Jurisprudence holds that once an accused escapes, jumps bail, or flees, he loses his standing in court and, unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief. Agbulos jumped bail after arraignment and during trial, had not been apprehended, and remained at large during the appeal. His hope that the appeal would succeed and that he could later appear to claim victory was in vain. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

• Trial in absentia — Trial may proceed after arraignment notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The rule aims to speed up the disposition of criminal cases and prevent the accused from thwarting prosecution by escaping. It was applied because Agbulos had been arraigned, notified, and failed to appear without justification.
• Waiver of right to be present and notice by escape — The right to be present at trial may be waived except at the stage where the prosecution presents witnesses who will identify the accused. Escape is deemed a waiver of the right to be present and of notice of subsequent hearings; the court may continue trial, and the escape makes the failure to appear unjustified. It was applied because Agbulos's escape waived notice and justified trial in absentia.
• Forfeiture of right to appeal by jumping bail — Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal, he loses his standing in court and, unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief. It was applied because Agbulos jumped bail and remained at large, leading to dismissal of his appeal.

• "However, after arraignment, trial may proceed not withstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." — This is the constitutional basis for trial in absentia, stating the three requisites later applied to Agbulos.
• "Now the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified." — This passage compresses the requisites for valid trial in absentia and explains the policy against allowing escape to defeat prosecution.
• "The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law." — This states the doctrine that escape waives notice and the right to be present, and renders the accused's absence unjustified.
• "We have held that once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court." — This is the ratio for dismissing the appeal of an accused who remains at large.

• People vs. Avanceña, 32 O.G. 713 — Cited as the old doctrine requiring the accused's presence at certain stages of trial, which allowed escape to operate to the fugitive's advantage; the decision notes that this doctrine was modified by the Bill of Rights to allow trial in absentia.
• Aquino vs. Mil. Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546; People vs. The Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269 — Cited for the rule that the right to be present at trial may now be waived except at the stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.
• People vs. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79 — Cited for the rule that once an accused escapes, jumps bail, or flees, he loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief unless he surrenders or submits to jurisdiction.

• Article IV, Section 19, 1973 Constitution — Provided that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused if he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It was the constitutional basis for the trial in absentia.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Reproduced verbatim the trial-in-absentia provision of the 1973 Constitution. The decision noted this continuity in the constitutional rule.
• Rule 124, Section 8, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Authorized the court, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, to dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. It was applied to dismiss Agbulos's appeal.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.