Remitere vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo

A complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action; allegations that a contract or sale is "void" without stating the facts showing its invalidity are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirements of pleading. The essential elements of a cause of action are the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendant, and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

The plaintiffs-appellants, Alfredo Remitere, et al., filed a complaint against Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The dispute concerned Lots Nos. 35 and 52 of the Cadastral Survey of Isabela, which were originally registered in the name of Gregorio Remitere under Cadastral Decrees Nos. 69518 and 69515. The properties had passed through a series of transfers following a public auction sale conducted by the provincial sheriff in 1918, ultimately reaching the possession of the defendant-appellee.

Gregorio Remitere was declared and registered owner of Lots Nos. 35 and 52 of the Cadastral Survey of Isabela, with areas of 4.4731 and 29.7398 hectares, respectively, pursuant to Cadastral Decrees Nos. 69518 and 69515 issued by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on August 21, 1918. Original Certificates of Title Nos. 10894 and 10898 were issued for these lots under the Land Registration Act. Upon Gregorio Remitere's demise on January 1, 1914, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1661, appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, which included the two lots in question.

During this period, the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental conducted a public auction sale over the parcels of land, and on September 23, 1918, issued a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, for the total consideration of P20,000.00. A series of cancellations of the Original Certificates of Title followed: they were first cancelled by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2819 and 2820, registered in the name of Mariano C. Yulo; these were in turn cancelled by R-T 602 and R-T 4706 by virtue of reconstitution of titles; and these were cancelled by T-532 and T-2979 by virtue of deeds of sale registered in the name of Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo, the defendant-appellee.

The plaintiffs-appellants alleged that the public sale was "absolutely a void sale" and did not pass titles and ownership of the lots, and that by reason of its invalidity, all benefits that the transferees had acquired from the parcels of land should be indemnified to the plaintiffs. The complaint prayed that the defendants be ordered to reconvey the two lots to the plaintiffs, that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of title in the name of the defendant Remedios Montinola Viuda de Yulo and issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs, and that the defendants pay the costs. The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause of action had prescribed. The lower court dismissed the complaint on both grounds, and the plaintiffs-appellants appealed.

• Lack of Narration of Facts: Plaintiffs-appellants contended that the trial court erred in declaring that the complaint contains no narration of facts.
• Existence of Cause of Action: Plaintiffs-appellants contended that the trial court erred in holding that the complaint states no cause of action.
• Prescription: Plaintiffs-appellants contended that the trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, had already prescribed.

• Lack of Cause of Action: Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action.
• Prescription: Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on the ground that even assuming a cause of action exists, the same has already prescribed.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: Whether the complaint states a cause of action for reconveyance, given that its allegations of a "void sale" were mere conclusions of law.
• Prescription: Whether the plaintiffs-appellants' cause of action, if any, had already prescribed.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: No. The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it did not allege the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs' legal right, the defendants' correlative obligation, and the defendants' act or omission violating that right, as required by Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• Prescription: Not reached. Because the dismissal for lack of cause of action was correct, the Court deemed it unnecessary to discuss whether the lower court correctly ruled on prescription.

• Sufficiency of the Complaint: The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face of the complaint, and only the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered. A reading of the complaint revealed no ultimate facts constituting the basis of the plaintiffs-appellants' rights that had been violated, nor allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees constituting a violation of the plaintiffs' rights. The allegations in paragraph 3 were mere averments or recitals of facts that did not establish any right or claim on the part of the plaintiffs; they did not state any connection the plaintiffs had with the deceased Gregorio Remitere, nor what connection or claim the plaintiffs had on the properties left by the deceased. The allegation about the sale at public auction did not state in what way the rights or interests of the plaintiffs had been affected or prejudiced by that sale. The averment in paragraph 5 that the public sale "was and still is absolutely a void sale" was a conclusion of law or an inference from facts not stated in the pleading. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law. Allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. The Court defined a cause of action as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, with essential elements being the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendant, and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. Ultimate facts are the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action — important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. Because the complaint's allegations did not fulfill the requirements of Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, the lower court correctly ruled that the complaint did not narrate facts constituting a cause of action.
• Prescription: Having concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, the Court deemed it unnecessary to discuss whether the lower court had correctly ruled that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, had prescribed.

• Cause of Action — A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other. Its essential elements are: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff, (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. The Court applied this definition to find that the complaint failed to allege these elements.
• Ultimate Facts — The term "ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action; a fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant; the term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the complaint's allegations were mere conclusions of law, not ultimate facts.
• Conclusions of Law in Pleadings — Allegations that a contract is valid or void, or that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law. The Court applied this doctrine to the plaintiffs' allegation that the public sale was "absolutely a void sale."

• "A reading of the complaint in this case will readily impress one that no ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs-appellants rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees which constitute a violation of the rights of plaintiffs-appellants." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi: the complaint failed to allege the essential elements of a cause of action.
• "The averment that 'the public sale . . . was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownerships of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants . . .' is a conclusion of law or an inference from facts not stated in the pleading." — This passage defines the distinction between ultimate facts and conclusions of law, which is the controlling principle of the decision.
• "A cause of action has been defined by the Supreme Court as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligations of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." — This passage provides the canonical definition of cause of action, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., L-1539, Dec. 30, 1947 — Cited as controlling authority for the definition of "cause of action" and its essential elements.
• Montemayor vs. Raborar, et al., 53 O.G. No. 19, p. 6596 — Cited as authority for the definition of "ultimate facts," citing Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 5th Ed., sec. 420.

• Section 3, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court — Requires that a complaint contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." The Court held that the complaint failed to comply with this requirement.
• Section 1, Rule 6, former Rules of Court — The predecessor provision to Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, cited as the source of the same pleading requirement.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Sanchez concurred. Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., took no part.