Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Andres R. Amante, Jr., et al.

An order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution is not appealable; the proper remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. A judgment on a bail bond, however, is a final order appealable under Rule 122, and an appeal from such judgment is civil in nature, requiring payment of docket fees under the RIRCA.

Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. is a duly organized insurance firm that could act as a surety on bail bonds under the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Bail bonds purportedly issued in its name became the subject of criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, presided over by Judge Andres R. Amante, Jr. The Rules of Criminal Procedure then in force governed the forfeiture of bail bonds and judgments against bondsmen, while the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA) governed appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds. The Insurance Commission also figured in the controversy because Reliance claimed the bonds were spurious and the RTC believed the matter involved the Commission’s administrative and adjudicatory powers.

Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. is a duly organized insurance firm. In five criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, bail bonds were purportedly issued in Reliance’s name. Reliance later claimed these bonds were false and spurious and had been issued by Evelyn Tinio, against whom it had lodged a criminal case for falsification of official and public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49717 with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City. The Insurance Commission sent Reliance letters dated June 11, 1997, July 11, 1997, and May 7, 1998, enclosing copies of orders, judgments, and writs of execution against bail bonds allegedly issued by Reliance. These writs covered: (a) Rogelio Andres, et al., Criminal Case No. 3012 (A.F.), writ dated Jan. 19, 1995, liability of P10,000.00; (b) Adelina Vidal, Criminal Case No. 5822 (A.F.), writ dated Sept. 25, 1996, liability of P20,000.00; (c) Naldy Jimenez and Geminiano Roxas, Criminal Case No. 6035 (A.F.), writ dated Aug. 6, 1996, liability of P10,000.00; (d) Dolores P. Posadas, Criminal Case No. 6320-AF, writ dated June 25, 1997, liability of P13,000.00; and (e) Melania Dagdagan, writ dated Jan. 19, 1998, liability of P8,000.00. All were issued by the RTC, Third Judicial Region, Branch 23, Cabanatuan City. Reliance replied to the Insurance Commission that the bonds were false and spurious.

The writs of execution were issued between January 19, 1995 and January 19, 1998. They stated that copies were furnished to the Manager of “Reliance Surety and Insurance Company, 8th Floor Equitable Bank Bldg., 262 Juan Luna St., Manila,” the same business address used by Luisa Agat, Manager of the Marine and Bonds Department of Reliance, in her affidavit attached to Reliance’s motion. Notices were served separately on Evelyn Tinio, whose authority to represent Reliance Reliance had subsequently disputed. Although Reliance purported to be surprised upon learning of the writs from the Insurance Commission, it did not expressly disavow receipt of the copies directly furnished to its Manila office. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed thus arose.

Reliance filed its motion to set aside the orders/writs of execution only on October 5, 1998, or nine months after the last writ of execution had been issued and four years after the first. It did not refer at all to the judgments on the bail bonds that would have preceded the writs of execution, apparently conceding the validity of those judgments. The RTC could not be faulted for its aversion to indulging Reliance’s sudden appearance in the criminal cases, considering that the criminal cases had apparently been long terminated.

In its motion, Reliance alleged that the bonds were false and spurious and that they had been issued by Evelyn Tinio. Reliance entered its special appearance in each of the criminal cases and sought to set aside the writs of execution. The City Prosecutor did not interpose any objection to Reliance’s motion. Respondent judge conducted a hearing, and Reliance submitted documentary evidence. On April 21, 1999, the RTC denied the motion. It stressed that the controversy revolved on the “tri-sided relationship of movant Reliance Surety; Alfredo Wy and Evelyn Tinio and the Insurance Commission” and could only be resolved with authority and finality by the Insurance Commission under its administrative and adjudicatory powers. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, Reliance filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 1999. On July 15, 1999, the RTC disallowed the Notice of Appeal for failure to pay the corresponding appeal fee under Section 1(c), Rule 50, in relation to Section 4, Rule 41. Reliance’s motion for reconsideration was denied on August 24, 1999, with the RTC characterizing the pending incident as having a “civil nature,” not subsumed by the criminal nature of the cases.

Reliance then filed a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of Appeals, praying that the orders disallowing the Notice of Appeal be declared null and void and that respondent judge be ordered to transmit the complete records and the Notice of Appeal. The Office of the Solicitor General initially filed a Manifestation concurring with Reliance’s position. On December 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals Twelfth Division dismissed the petition, citing Section 7, Rule 5 of the RIRCA, which treats appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds as appeals in civil cases, and Section 3, Rule 5 of the same Rules, which requires no docketing and other legal fees in criminal cases except in petitions for review of criminal cases and appeals from confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds. Before the Supreme Court, the OSG reversed its earlier concurrence and sought dismissal of Reliance’s petition, endorsing the validity and enforceability of the challenged RIRCA provisions.

• Spurious Bail Bonds: Reliance alleged that the bail bonds were false and spurious and had been issued by Evelyn Tinio, against whom it had filed a criminal case for falsification; it sought to set aside the orders and writs of execution on that basis.
• No Appeal Fees in Criminal Cases: Reliance argued that nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires payment of appeal fees in criminal cases, and that the rules cited by the RTC pertained to civil actions, not criminal cases.
• Invalid RIRCA Provisions: Reliance asserted that the RIRCA could not supplant, amend, or modify the Rules of Court, and that the cited provisions requiring docket fees were null and void.
• Reliance on Clerk’s Advice: Reliance noted that the RTC Clerk of Court had accepted the Notice of Appeal without requiring payment of the appeal fee, and that respondent judge, petitioner, and the OSG were aware of the RIRCA provisions.
• Alternative Payment: Reliance submitted that if the Court ruled that an appeal fee was required, it should be allowed to pay such fee.

• Validity of RIRCA: The OSG, representing the People, argued that the Court of Appeals acted within the bounds of its discretion in dismissing the petition and endorsed the validity and enforceability of the challenged RIRCA provisions, as they were approved by the Supreme Court.
• Dismissal of Petition: The OSG sought dismissal of Reliance’s petition before the Supreme Court, reversing its earlier concurrence with Reliance’s position before the Court of Appeals.

• Appealability of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Writ: Whether appeal lies from an order denying a motion to set aside orders or writs of execution issued to enforce a judgment on a bail bond.
• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to compel the RTC to transmit the records and give due course to a notice of appeal after disallowing it for nonpayment of docket fees.
• Validity of RIRCA Docket Fee Provisions: Whether Sections 3 and 7, Rule 5 of the RIRCA, requiring payment of docket fees for appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds, are valid and applicable.
• Civil Nature of Bail Bond Liability: Whether an appeal from a judgment on a bail bond is civil in nature, such that docket fees are required.
• Relief on Allegedly Spurious Bonds: Whether Reliance may obtain relief from liability on allegedly spurious bail bonds despite its failure to timely challenge the judgments on the bonds and the writs of execution.

• Appealability of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Writ: No. Appeal lies only from judgments or final orders; an order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution is not appealable, and the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65.
• Propriety of Mandamus: No. Mandamus cannot compel the RTC to transmit records for an appeal that does not lie, especially where the judgment on the bail bonds had become final.
• Validity of RIRCA Docket Fee Provisions: Yes. The RIRCA was issued under the Court of Appeals’ rule-making authority and approved by the Supreme Court; it validly requires docket fees for appeals from confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds.
• Civil Nature of Bail Bond Liability: Civil. The surety’s liability arises from contract, not from a penal provision; an appeal from a judgment on the bail bond is civil in nature and requires docket fees.
• Relief on Allegedly Spurious Bonds: No. Even assuming the bonds were spurious, Reliance failed to timely challenge the judgments on the bonds or the writs and pursued improper remedies, barring relief.

• Appealability of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Writ: The Court applied the rule that appeal avails only against judgments or final orders, whether in civil or criminal procedure. A final order is one that disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. A judgment on a bail bond is a final order and may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, with the appeal to be taken within fifteen days from notice under Section 6 of the same Rule. A writ of execution may immediately issue from such judgment and need not be effected through a separate action. However, the order denying Reliance’s motion to set aside the writs of execution arose at the execution stage. The motion did not submit a new incident for resolution; it segued from the earlier final judgments or orders sought to be satisfied through the challenged writs. There can be no two independent final judgments or orders in the same incident, except where multiple appeals are allowed. Thus, appeal could not be undertaken from the RTC Order denying the motion to set aside the writs. The only permissible mode of review was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC could not be faulted for refusing to give cognizance to the Notice of Appeal, as appeal was unavailing.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Mandamus serves to compel a respondent who fails to perform a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office to do the act required to protect the rights of the petitioner. Since appeal was not the proper remedy, the RTC could not be compelled to transmit the records to the higher court for review on appeal, especially considering that the judgment on the bail bonds had long lapsed into finality. Reliance resorted to mandamus not as a direct mode of judicial review by the Court of Appeals in respect to the assailed RTC Order, but merely to petition the appellate court to give due course to the appeal. It utilized mandamus on the erroneous notion that the RTC Order was appealable, or on the mistaken premise that the RTC had the corresponding duty to elevate the records to the appellate court. The end result of Reliance’s mandamus petition would simply be the elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals, not reversal of the RTC Order on the merits.

• Validity of RIRCA Docket Fee Provisions: The Court of Appeals is empowered to promulgate its own rules or orders pertaining to its operations under Section 12, B.P. No. 129 (1980). The RIRCA is the by-product of this vested authority. The provisions which Reliance assailed, Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 5, were in place as early as 1994, when the RIRCA was amended, and retained in the 1999 revision. Reliance could not disavow knowledge of the RIRCA; that the rules are called “internal” does not mean they are secret. Both the 1994 and 1999 editions have been widely disseminated, available upon demand from the Court of Appeals, and even replicated in private collations or annotations of laws. Nor could Reliance validly assert that the RIRCA provisions supplanted the Rules of Court. The RIRCA necessitated the approval, which was obtained, of the Supreme Court prior to its effectivity, the very Supreme Court which promulgated or amended the Rules of Court. The Court cannot be precluded from amending its own issuances, or issuing supplementary or clarificatory procedural rules such as the RIRCA. The RIRCA, vested with the requisite imprimatur of the Supreme Court, is effectively an issuance of the Court. A challenge to the RIRCA is akin to challenging one of the Court’s very own issuances.

• Civil Nature of Bail Bond Liability: The assailed provisions of the RIRCA are ultimately correct in characterizing the appeal from a judgment on the bail bond as inherently civil in nature. The liability of the bondsmen on the bail bond arises not from the violation of, or an obligation to comply with, a penal provision of law. It emerges instead from a contract, the bond subscribed jointly by the accused and the surety or bondsmen. The obligation of the accused on the bond is different from that of the surety in that the former can be made to suffer a criminal penalty for failure to comply with the obligations on the bail bond. However, the surety is not under a similar pain of punishment, as its liability on the bail bond would merely be civil in character. Nothing in the Rules of Court authorizes the imprisonment of the surety for the failure to produce the accused when called for in court, the surety’s obligation being contractual in source and character. In keeping with the civil nature of the appeal from the judgment on the bail bonds, the Court of Appeals acted properly in prescribing the payment of docket fee for such appeal as in an appeal in civil cases.

• Relief on Allegedly Spurious Bonds: Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the presence of the accused is required, the bondsman is notified to produce him; if the accused fails to appear, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty days to produce their principal and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them. Failing these two requisites, judgment is rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bond. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so. Reliance had the opportunity, prior to the rendition of judgment on the bond, to argue before the RTC that the bond was spurious, and such argument could have been deemed meritorious under the rule of liberality in acceptance of the bondsmen’s explanation. Even if the trial court had refused to admit such explanation and rendered judgment against Reliance, the bonding company still had the opportunity to file an appeal within fifteen days from the judgment on the bond. This Reliance failed to do. The “notice of appeal” it did file could not be construed as taken from the five judgments on the bond, since it was undertaken more than a year after the last judgment and more than four years after the first, and was expressly made in respect to the writs of execution. Even indulging the presupposition that Reliance was unaware of the judgments, the writs of execution stated that copies were furnished to its Manila office, and the presumption of regularity of official duty was not disputed. Reliance should have done something within a reasonable period to challenge the writs if there were good reasons to assail them. Instead, it did nothing. Its motion was filed only nine months after receipt of the most recent writ and four years after the first, and it did not refer to the judgments on the bail bonds, apparently conceding their validity. The RTC’s denial of the motion to set aside the writs was discretionary and entitled to great respect. Had the RTC been sufficiently convinced that the bail bonds were spurious, there would have been grounds in equity to set aside the writs, but the RTC preferred to await definitive word from the Insurance Commission. Ultimately, however, the case did not pivot on whether the RTC correctly refused to set aside the writs; even if the motion had merit, Reliance pursued the wrong remedy by filing a Notice of Appeal instead of a special civil action for certiorari. Equitable relief is not the supremacy of pity but the entitlement of due process previously denied the litigant; one who fails to avail of the prescribed legal steps despite repeated opportunities has no reason to expect anything other than due condemnation.

• Final Order vs. Interlocutory Order — An order is final when it disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Only final judgments or orders are appealable. In this case, a judgment on a bail bond was a final order and could be appealed, but the order denying a motion to set aside the writ of execution was not appealable; the proper remedy was certiorari under Rule 65.

• Procedure for Forfeiture of Bail Bond — Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the accused fails to appear, the bond may be summarily declared forfeited. The bondsmen are then given thirty days to produce the principal and to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of the bond. Failing these two requisites, judgment is rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bond. Judgment cannot be entered unless preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity to produce the accused or adduce satisfactory reason. The Court applied this to show that Reliance had ample opportunities to challenge the allegedly spurious bonds before judgment, but failed to do so.

• Civil Nature of Surety’s Liability on Bail Bond — The surety’s liability on a bail bond is contractual in source and civil in character. It arises from the bond subscribed jointly by the accused and the surety, not from a penal provision. The accused may suffer a criminal penalty for failure to comply with the obligations on the bail bond, but the surety cannot be imprisoned for failure to produce the accused. The Court applied this to hold that an appeal from a judgment on a bail bond is civil in nature and requires payment of docket fees under the RIRCA.

• Rule-Making Authority of the Court of Appeals and Validity of the RIRCA — Under Section 12, B.P. No. 129 (1980), the Court of Appeals is empowered to promulgate its own rules or orders pertaining to its operations. The RIRCA is the by-product of this authority and was approved by the Supreme Court before its effectivity. It cannot supplant the Rules of Court, but the Supreme Court may amend its own issuances or issue supplementary or clarificatory procedural rules. A challenge to the RIRCA is akin to challenging one of the Supreme Court’s own issuances. The Court applied this to uphold the RIRCA provisions requiring docket fees for appeals from confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds.

• Mandamus — Mandamus serves to compel a respondent who fails to perform a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an entitled right or office to do the act required to protect the rights of the petitioner. It does not lie to compel an appeal where no appeal is available. The Court applied this to hold that Reliance’s mandamus petition was not accessible because the RTC had no duty to transmit records for an appeal that did not lie.

• Motion to Quash Writ of Execution — Courts have the inherent power to correct errors of their ministerial officers and to control their own process. While the Rules of Court make no express reference to a motion to quash a writ of execution, the jurisdiction of courts to entertain such motions has long been upheld. Grounds for quashal are entrenched in jurisprudence, but quashal rests largely in the discretion of the court, to be exercised in the furtherance of justice. The Court applied this to hold that the RTC’s denial of Reliance’s motion was discretionary and entitled to great respect.

• Presumption of Regular Performance of Official Duty — Official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed. The Court applied this to presume that the writs of execution, which stated that copies were furnished to Reliance’s Manila office, were indeed sent to that office, especially since Reliance did not expressly disavow receipt.

• Equitable Relief and Due Process — Equitable relief is not the supremacy of pity but the entitlement of due process previously denied the litigant. One who fails to avail of the prescribed legal steps despite repeated opportunities has no reason to expect anything other than due condemnation. The Court applied this to deny relief despite the possibility that Reliance might be condemned to an obligation it did not contract.

• "Appeal may have been properly available from the five judgments on the bail bonds in the five criminal cases, as such judgments would have constituted as the final orders on the matter whether Reliance should be held liable on these bonds. However, appeal cannot be undertaken from the RTC’s Order, arising as it did, at the execution stage." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on appealability: a judgment on a bail bond is a final order subject to appeal, but an order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution issued pursuant to that judgment is not appealable.

• "The liability of the bondsmen on the bail bond arises not from the violation of, or an obligation to comply with, a penal provision of law. It emerges instead from a contract, the bond subscribed jointly by the accused and the surety or bondsmen." — This passage defines the contractual and civil character of the surety’s liability on a bail bond, which underpins the Court’s holding that an appeal from a judgment on the bond is civil in nature.

• "In keeping with the civil nature of the appeal from the judgment on the bail bonds, the Court of Appeals acted properly in prescribing the payment of docket fee for such appeal as in appeal in civil cases." — This passage affirms the validity and applicability of the RIRCA provisions requiring docket fees for appeals from bail-bond forfeitures.

• "Equitable relief is not the supremacy of pity but the entitlement of due process previously denied the litigant. One who fails to avail of the prescribed legal steps despite repeated opportunities has no reason to expect anything other than due condemnation." — This passage encapsulates the Court’s rationale for denying relief notwithstanding Reliance’s claim that the bonds were spurious, because Reliance repeatedly failed to avail of the prescribed remedies.

• Bagtas vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 905 (1955) — Cited for the principle that once bail is assumed, the bondsman or surety becomes in law the jailer of the accused and is subrogated to all the rights and means which the government possesses to make control of the accused effective.
• U.S. vs. Addison, 27 Phil. 562 (1914) — Cited alongside Bagtas for the same principle on the surety’s custodial role and subrogation.
• U.S. vs. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1 (1912) — Cited for the rule that judgment against bondsmen on a bail bond is a final order and that a writ of execution may immediately issue.
• People vs. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220 (1927) — Cited to support that a judgment on a bail bond may be subject to appeal.
• Belfast Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. People, 197 Phil. 361, 371 (1982) — Cited for the availability of appeal from a judgment on a bail bond and the exceptional availability of certiorari to assail a judgment of forfeiture.
• De Ocampo vs. Republic, 118 Phil. 1276, 1280 (1963) — Cited for the definition of a final order as one that disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates the proceeding, leaving nothing but execution.
• People vs. Caparas, G.R. No. L-37707, 9 March 1988, 158 SCRA 524 — Cited for the established rule of liberality in accepting the bondsmen’s explanation.
• Vda. de Dimayuga vs. Raymundo and Nable, 76 Phil. 143, 146 (1946) — Cited for the court’s inherent power to quash a writ of execution and the discretionary nature of quashal.
• Limpin vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-70987, 30 January 1987, 147 SCRA 516, 521-523 — Cited for grounds entrenched in jurisprudence for quashal of a writ of execution.
• Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456 — Cited for the rule that appeals in criminal cases avail only from a judgment or final order.
• U.S. vs. Carmen, 13 Phil. 455, 462 (1909) — Cited for the rule that a writ of execution need not be effected through a separate action.

• Section 21, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs forfeiture of bail bond: summary forfeiture upon the accused’s non-appearance; bondsmen given thirty days to produce the principal and show cause why judgment should not be rendered; judgment against bondsmen if they fail. The Court used this to show Reliance had opportunities to challenge liability before judgment.
• Section 1, Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Appeals in criminal cases avail only from a judgment or final order. Applied to hold that a judgment on a bail bond was appealable, but an order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution was not.
• Section 6, Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Appeal must be taken within fifteen days from notice of the final order appealed from. Reliance failed to appeal the judgments on the bonds within this period.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure — Certiorari is the proper remedy for an order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution, where the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines mandamus as compelling a respondent who fails to perform a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from a right or office. The Court held it unavailable because no appeal lay.
• Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Applied to presume the writs of execution were served on Reliance’s Manila office.
• Section 12, B.P. No. 129 (1980) — Empowers the Court of Appeals to promulgate its own rules or orders pertaining to its operations. Basis for the validity of the RIRCA.
• Sections 3 and 7, Rule 5, RIRCA — Section 3 provides no docketing and other legal fees in criminal cases except petitions for review and appeals from confiscation or forfeiture of bail bond; Section 7 treats appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail bonds as civil appeals. Applied to require docket fees.
• Section 1(c), Rule 50, in relation to Section 4, Rule 41 — Cited by the RTC to disallow the Notice of Appeal for nonpayment of appeal fee. The Court noted these provisions plainly apply only to civil cases and not to criminal appeals.
• Section 10, Rule 114, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Allows a licensed surety corporation to provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an authorized officer. Cited for the contractual source of the surety’s obligation.

Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.