Relampagos vs. Cumba

The COMELEC may issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases only in aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction; Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in force for that limited purpose. A motion for execution pending appeal filed after the appeal is perfected is void because perfection divests the trial court of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Emmanuel M. Relampagos and private respondent Rosita C. Cumba were rival mayoralty candidates in Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The COMELEC’s claim of authority rested on the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which it said allowed it to hear petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases; prior rulings in Garcia vs. De Jesus, Uy vs. Commission on Elections, and Veloria vs. Commission on Elections had rejected that claim. The Omnibus Election Code’s repealing clause and the temporary character of B.P. Blg. 697 were the statutory backdrop to the dispute.

The mayoralty contest in Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections pitted petitioner Emmanuel M. Relampagos against private respondent Rosita C. Cumba. Cumba was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over Relampagos. Unwilling to accept defeat, Relampagos filed an election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte, assigned to Branch 2 in Butuan City.

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, through Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found Relampagos to have won with a margin of six votes over Cumba and rendered judgment in his favor, declaring him the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Copies of the decision were sent to and received by Relampagos and Cumba on 1 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, Cumba appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, Relampagos filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which Cumba opposed on 22 July 1994. On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the motion for execution pending appeal, and the corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, Cumba filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution, and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.

Cumba then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the trial court’s order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was docketed as EAC No. 108-94; the two cases were not consolidated. On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. It declared the RTC order of 3 August 1994 null and void, lifted the writ of execution issued on 4 August 1994, and ordered Cumba restored to her position as municipal mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte pending resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC in EAC No. 108-94. Relampagos then filed the instant special civil action.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC resolution should be set aside and nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Effect of Prior Rulings and Temporary Statute: Petitioner contended that the COMELEC’s position, though inherently compelling, deserved scant consideration in view of Garcia vs. De Jesus, Uy vs. Commission on Elections, and Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, and because B.P. Blg. 697 was intended solely to govern the 14 May 1984 Batasang Pambansa election and was a temporary statute that self-destructed after that election.

• Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 as Statutory Basis: Respondent COMELEC maintained that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly vested it with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases; that the law was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code and was not inconsistent with it; and that it did not self-destruct after the 1984 Batasang Pambansa election.
• Inherent Power in Aid of Appellate Jurisdiction: Respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, postulated that it issued the challenged resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by private respondent, unlike in Garcia and Uy, and therefore acted in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; it argued that it possessed inherent powers to employ means necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court, and that no statutory grant was needed for that purpose.
• Preservation of Subject of Appeal and Status Quo: Respondent COMELEC argued that annulling the RTC’s order of execution did not exceed its jurisdiction because its action was necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final outcome of its review of the appealed decision.
• Private Respondent’s Position: Respondent Rosita C. Cumba opposed the petition by invoking the very arguments adduced by the COMELEC in its challenged resolution and the dissenting opinion in Garcia and Uy.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction over Extraordinary Writs: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
• Effect and Repeal of B.P. Blg. 697, Section 50: Whether the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in force and effect after the 14 May 1984 Batasang Pambansa election and was not repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal and issuing the writ of execution after the appeal had been perfected.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction over Extraordinary Writs: Yes. The last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect, but only in cases where the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution; its authority to issue certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is only in aid of that appellate jurisdiction.
• Effect and Repeal of B.P. Blg. 697, Section 50: Yes. Section 50 was not repealed by the Omnibus Election Code; the latter’s general repealing clause did not expressly repeal it, no irreconcilable inconsistency existed, and the grant was not restricted to the 1984 election.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Yes. The RTC acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion because the motion for execution pending appeal was filed on 12 July 1994, after the appeal was perfected on 6 July 1994, and the trial court had already been divested of jurisdiction.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction over Extraordinary Writs: The SC first rejected the Office of the Solicitor General’s contention that the COMELEC resolution was issued as an incident of the ordinary appeal. The COMELEC had docketed the certiorari petition as a special relief case, SPR No. 1-94, separate from the ordinary appeal, EAC No. 108-94, and the two were not consolidated; the challenged resolution was issued in the special relief case. The SC then re-examined Garcia, Uy, and Veloria. It held that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly vests the COMELEC with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases. That authority, however, is limited to cases where the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution; it is only in aid of appellate jurisdiction. The SC thus abandoned the contrary rulings and upheld the COMELEC’s assumption of jurisdiction over SPR No. 1-94.
• Effect and Repeal of B.P. Blg. 697, Section 50: The SC agreed that B.P. Blg. 697 contains provisions whose lifetime goes beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. The last paragraph of Section 50 is not restricted to a specific period, and in light of the absence of such jurisdiction under Pimentel, the grant was intended as remedial legislation to eliminate the incongruity or splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in Justice De Castro’s dissent in Pimentel. On repeal, the Omnibus Election Code’s repealing clause has a general second sentence; a general repealing clause is not an express repeal because it identifies no act and merely predicates repeal on a substantial conflict. The SC found no inconsistency between the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 and the Omnibus Election Code. The repealing clause did not show an intent to codify all prior election statutes and replace them; it reserved prior statutes not inconsistent. The presumption against implied repeal and the rule of strict construction applied, and the failure to specifically mention B.P. Blg. 697 indicated no repeal absent irreconcilable inconsistency. Section 50 therefore remained in force.
• Execution Pending Appeal: The SC found palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in the RTC’s grant of execution pending appeal. Both parties received the RTC decision on 1 July 1994, so the appeal period was five days, or until 6 July 1994. Private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the fees on 4 July 1994. Under Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which had supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure under Rule 43, the appeal was deemed perfected on the last day for any party to appeal, or 6 July 1994. On 8 July 1994 the RTC gave due course and ordered elevation. Upon perfection, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction. The motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, after perfection, so the RTC could no longer validly act on it. The COMELEC therefore correctly set aside the execution order and writ.

• COMELEC’s extraordinary writ jurisdiction is only in aid of appellate jurisdiction — Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly grants the COMELEC authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases, but the SC limited that authority to cases where the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution; it does not confer general original jurisdiction. Applied: the COMELEC could annul the RTC’s execution order in an election case pending on appeal before it.
• Implied repeal is not favored; a general repealing clause is not an express repeal — A general repealing clause that does not identify the statute repealed cannot effect an express repeal and merely predicates implied repeal on a substantial conflict. Applied: the Omnibus Election Code’s repealing clause did not repeal the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 because no irreconcilable inconsistency was found.
• A statute is not functus officio as to provisions intended to operate beyond a specific election — B.P. Blg. 697 was enacted for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa election, but its last paragraph of Section 50 was not restricted to a specific period and was intended as remedial legislation. Applied: the grant of writ authority survived the 1984 election.
• Perfection of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction; execution pending appeal must be sought before perfection — Under Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, an appeal is deemed perfected on the last day for any party to appeal, and after perfection the trial court cannot act on a motion for execution pending appeal. Applied: the motion filed on 12 July 1994, after the 6 July 1994 perfection, was void.

• "The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases." — This is the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, the statutory basis the SC held remained in force but only in aid of the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction.
• "Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." — This is the SC’s canonical formulation of the limited scope of the COMELEC’s writ authority after abandoning Garcia, Uy, and Veloria.
• "Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction over the case." — This states the procedural rule that made the RTC’s subsequent grant of execution pending appeal invalid.
• "Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon." — This applies the divestiture rule to the facts and explains why the COMELEC correctly annulled the execution order and writ.

• Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections, 206 SCRA 779 (1992) — Consolidated cases previously holding that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over extraordinary writs; abandoned by this decision.
• Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 101 SCRA 769 (1980) — Prior ruling that neither the Constitution nor any law conferred on the COMELEC jurisdiction to issue the writs; cited as context, with Justice De Castro’s dissent referenced as the reason for the remedial grant.
• Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 211 SCRA 907 (1992) — Reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine; abandoned here.
• Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. East Molasses Corp., 198 SCRA 689 (1991) — Cited for the rule that an appeal is deemed perfected on the last day for any party to appeal.
• Fortune Life & General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 829 (1993) — Cited for the rule that perfection of the appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction.

• Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 — Its last paragraph vests the COMELEC with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases; the SC held it was not repealed and remains in force only in aid of the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction.
• Section 1, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction; the SC used paragraph (2) of this provision to limit the COMELEC’s writ authority to cases within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
• Section 282, B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Its general repealing clause did not expressly repeal Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697; the SC found no irreconcilable inconsistency and applied the presumption against implied repeal.
• Section 23, Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 — Provides that an appeal is deemed perfected on the last day for any party to appeal; applied to hold that the appeal was perfected on 6 July 1994 and the RTC lost jurisdiction before the motion for execution pending appeal was filed.
• Rule 43, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Made the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 supplementary to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; applied in fixing the date of perfection of the appeal.
• Section 3, Rule 22, in relation to Section 20, Rule 35, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Fixed the five-day period to appeal from the RTC decision, which the SC counted from receipt on 1 July 1994.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner.