Regidor, Jr. vs. People

Falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is established upon proof of three elements — that the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; that he takes advantage of his official position; and that he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in the article — and neither the idea of gain nor the intent to injure a third person need be shown, because what is punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in the document. A local chief executive's concurrence in an ordinance or resolution is not the simple mechanical act of signing but an exercise of the veto power requiring the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence; accordingly, a city mayor who affixes his signature to resolutions that were never deliberated upon by the sanggunian takes advantage of his official position.

Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. assumed the office of City Mayor of Tangub City on May 5, 1988, while Aniceto T. Siete was the incumbent Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod; Camilo B. Zapatos served as a member of that body and, at the relevant times, as its Temporary Presiding Officer, and Marlene L. Mangao, a clerk in the Office of the Mayor, was designated Acting Secretary of the City Council for the period covered by the charges. It had been the practice in the city government that proposals for resolutions and ordinances originated from the Mayor or his office, so that when a proposal was placed on the sanggunian's agenda, a prepared resolution was already available and the Council could simply accept or adopt it. The acts charged were committed while Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983, governed the powers of local officials, including the city mayor's power to approve or veto ordinances and resolutions under Section 180 thereof.

Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. assumed the office of City Mayor of Tangub City on May 5, 1988, while Aniceto T. Siete was the incumbent Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod; Camilo B. Zapatos served as a member of that body and as its Temporary Presiding Officer, and Marlene L. Mangao, a clerk in the Office of the Mayor, was designated Acting Secretary of the City Council for the period corresponding to the alleged commission of the crimes. It had been the practice in the city government that proposals for resolutions and ordinances originated from the Mayor or his office, so that when a proposal was placed on the sanggunian's agenda, a prepared resolution was already available and the Council could simply accept or adopt it.

During the session of July 27, 1988, the Council was presented with the minutes of the sessions held on June 23, June 30, July 14 and July 21, 1988. Those minutes reflected that the sanggunian had taken up, deliberated upon and passed Resolution No. 50-A on June 23; Resolution Nos. 56 and 56-A on June 30; Resolution Nos. 63 and 61 on July 14; and Resolution Nos. 64 and 68 on July 21. The actual copies of the resolutions, appropriations and ordinances all bore the signatures of the four accused.

Some council members, however, questioned the validity of the resolutions and ordinances, alleging that they had neither been taken up, deliberated upon, nor passed on the dates indicated. Roberto O. Taclob, a former council member, testified that the questioned resolutions were not taken up and could not therefore have been deliberated upon or passed, and his testimony was corroborated by Estrelita M. Pastrano, Elizabeth L. Duroy Albarico and Agustin L. Opay, all former members of the sanggunian. Although the questioned resolutions were subsequently ratified by the sanggunian through Resolution No. 94, dated October 15, 1988, by a vote of five to four with the four complaining witnesses abstaining, the council members still filed a complaint with the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) charging the four accused with misconduct in office and neglect of duty. The councilors claimed that they had been prevented from attending the sessions of the sanggunian for seven months because the schedule of sessions was randomly changed without notice to them. Mayor Regidor and his co-accused were preventively suspended from July to September 1989 but were subsequently not found guilty by the DILG. Despite executing an affidavit of desistance, the complainants pursued the criminal cases against the four accused, and trial ensued on January 8, 1992.

For his part, Mayor Regidor testified that before approving resolutions or ordinances he consulted his legal counsel to check for irregularities and to determine whether the measures would benefit the City of Tangub. He stated that he did not attend or participate in the sessions of the City Council and that, as Mayor, he did not in any way influence the deliberations of the sanggunian, which he stressed was totally independent of his office; as the approving officer, he relied on the certification of the Presiding Officer that the resolutions and ordinances were valid and lawful before affixing his signature. He contended that he signed the questioned resolutions in good faith and in the belief that they had been deliberated upon and passed, and that the minutes of the sessions were inaccurate because the entire proceedings had not been completely and accurately taken down by the stenographer or Council Secretary present, so that the deliberations on the questioned resolutions were not entirely recorded. In support of the claim of inaccuracy, he cited the complainants' own affidavit of desistance, in which they admitted that although the matters taken up during the sessions they attended were discussed and deliberated upon, they were not sure whether those deliberations and discussions were recorded in the minutes. Regidor's testimony was corroborated by Rogelio Taburada, then a Councilor of Tangub City. Camilo B. Zapatos opted not to take the witness stand and instead adopted the evidence of his co-accused.

The Sandiganbayan found that the defenses of good faith and lack of intent failed to cast doubt on the prosecution's allegations, and that the assailed resolutions and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses established the moral certainty required for conviction. It gave great weight and credence to the testimonies of Taclob, Pastrano, Duroy and Opay, all former members of the City Council during the terms of the accused, and found that the accused had caused it to appear in the resolutions that members of the sanggunian had participated in the sessions, deliberations and passage of the questioned measures, including their unanimous approval thereof, when the evidence showed otherwise. Taburada, who had initially affirmed that the minutes faithfully recorded all matters deliberated upon during the sessions of June 23, June 30, July 14 and July 21, 1988, claimed only after a recess called by the Sandiganbayan that the minutes did not contain all the matters taken up, particularly the deliberation and approval of the assailed resolutions. The minutes of the July 27, 1988 session, however, showed that the sanggunian went into a closed-door session upon Taclob's motion and conducted a nominal vote on whether the resolutions had been brought before the session for deliberation; the majority voted "no," while Taburada and Zapatos both answered "no comment," Taburada because he had not actually read the minutes although he had signed them. Two documents were likewise noted: a Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Office of the Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod on August 12, 1988, recalling all SP resolutions not duly passed and/or approved by a majority of the members thereat, and Resolution No. 94 dated October 15, 1988, by which the sanggunian chose to re-approve the assailed resolutions alleged to have been implemented but not discussed rather than move for the amendment of the minutes.

• Absence of Falsification under Article 171(2): Petitioners asseverated that there was no falsification under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code because they did not cause it to appear that other persons participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; the private complainants physically and actually participated in passing the assailed resolutions, and Mayor Regidor's participation came only after the assailed resolutions were submitted to him for approval.
• Absence of Falsification under Article 171(7): Petitioners submitted that paragraph 7 involves the falsification of a non-existent document where the falsifier produces one purporting to be the original, whereas in this case they passed and approved authentic, genuine and original documents.
• Insufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Petitioners maintained that the prosecution's evidence was too weak to warrant conviction because it miserably failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the evidence was incredible insofar as it claimed that the accused took advantage of their position.
• Affidavits of Desistance and DILG Dismissal: Petitioners opined that the DILG's dismissal of the administrative complaint and the private complainants' execution of affidavits of desistance should be given weight, and that the complainants' pursuit of the criminal cases despite their desistance, coupled with the DILG's exoneration, should at least create a serious and reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
• Regidor's Lack of Participation: Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan erred in not appreciating Regidor's testimonial evidence that he had no participation in the preparation of the resolutions, his role as City Mayor being limited to approving them; he signed in good faith and with the belief that the resolutions had been deliberated and passed upon.
• Credibility of Taburada and the Defective Minutes: Petitioners contended that Taburada's testimony should have been accorded more weight and credence than Taclob's, since Taburada, a former member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, clearly testified that he was present when all the assailed resolutions were deliberated upon and approved, while Taclob's testimony was not credible considering that he executed two affidavits of desistance; Taburada's testimony was not at all discussed by the Sandiganbayan, so its decision was not supported by evidence. Petitioners reiterated that the minutes were defective and inaccurate.
• Absence of Intent to Gain and Bad Faith: Petitioners argued that intent to gain and/or bad faith were not shown, as some of the assailed resolutions did not involve money matters.
• Failure to Establish Conspiracy: Petitioners asserted that conspiracy was not established.

• Purely Questions of Fact: Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, claimed that the issues raised by petitioners were purely questions of fact because they would entail a review of all the pieces of evidence and an evaluation of their weight and probative value, and that the Petition should be denied outright since it is not the function of the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to re-examine the evidence duly submitted by the parties.
• Direct Connection of the Offices Held to the Assailed Resolutions: The OSP argued that petitioners, by virtue of their respective offices and functions, held positions directly connected with the proposal, deliberation, passage and approval of the assailed resolutions, as found by the Sandiganbayan and duly supported by evidence.
• Intent to Gain and Bad Faith Inconsequential: The OSP alleged that intent to gain and/or bad faith is inconsequential, as the law punishes the act of falsification as a violation of public faith.
• Concealment of Falsity: The OSP alleged that petitioners deliberately attempted to and, in fact, did conceal the falsity of the documents by making it appear that the assailed resolutions were valid on their face, as the same were approved and signed by the petitioners.
• DILG Ruling and Affidavits of Desistance of No Moment: The OSP posited that the DILG ruling dismissing the administrative complaint and the affidavits of desistance executed by the private complainants were of no moment.
• Overwhelming Prosecution Evidence: The OSP submitted that the prosecution's evidence was overwhelming and sufficient to prove the guilt of the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(2) and (7): Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised Penal Code, given their claim that no falsification was committed because the private complainants actually participated in the passage of the assailed resolutions and because the documents they passed and approved were authentic, genuine and original.
• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to prove petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the claim that it was too weak and incredible.
• Affidavits of Desistance and the DILG's Dismissal: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving weight and value to the complainants' affidavits of desistance and to the DILG's exoneration of petitioners from the administrative charge.
• Regidor's Participation as Approving Officer: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in not appreciating Regidor's testimonial evidence that, as City Mayor, he had no participation in the preparation of the resolutions and that his role was limited to approving them.
• Credibility of Taburada's Testimony and the Minutes: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in disregarding Taburada's testimony and in relying on the minutes of the sanggunian's sessions, which petitioners claimed were defective and inaccurate.

• Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(2) and (7): Yes. All three elements of the offense concurred, and the falsification was committed both by causing it to appear that persons participated in proceedings when they did not in fact so participate and by issuing in authenticated form documents purporting to be copies of originals that did not exist.
• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Yes. The prosecution presented documentary and testimonial evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the Sandiganbayan's factual findings, absent any of the recognized exceptions, are binding and conclusive on the Court.
• Affidavits of Desistance and the DILG's Dismissal: No. Affidavits of desistance are viewed with suspicion and cannot prevail over the affiants' categorical statements, and the dismissal of the administrative complaint does not affect criminal liability under the threefold liability rule.
• Regidor's Participation as Approving Officer: No merit. Under Section 180 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the mayor's concurrence in a resolution is not a mere mechanical act of signing but an exercise of the veto power requiring the application of judgment, so Regidor took advantage of his official position.
• Credibility of Taburada's Testimony and the Minutes: No error. Taburada's material inconsistencies, pitted against the private complainants' testimonies and the documentary evidence, proved fatal to petitioners' cause, and the minutes do not reflect any deliberation or approval of the assailed resolutions.

• Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(2) and (7): Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by any of the enumerated acts. Three elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the enumerated acts. It is not necessary that the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person be present, because in the falsification of a public document what is punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Petitioners were charged under paragraphs 2 and 7 of Article 171, and the Court held that all the elements were present. First, petitioners were public officers at the time of the commission of the offenses: Regidor was then Mayor of Tangub City, while Zapatos was a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and its Temporary Presiding Officer. Second, they took advantage of their respective official positions because they had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of, the document, or had the official custody of the document which they falsified. Zapatos, as a member and at the time Temporary Presiding Officer of the sanggunian, had the duty to make or prepare or intervene in the preparation of the assailed resolutions. Third, the prosecution's evidence established that the accused caused it to appear that members of the sanggunian participated in the sessions, deliberations and passage of the questioned resolutions, and issued in authenticated form documents purporting to be copies of original documents when no such originals existed.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: The Sandiganbayan's conviction had ample factual mooring after the prosecution presented both documentary and testimonial evidence. The Court reiterated that it is not a trier of facts and defers to the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan, which had more opportunity and facilities to examine and evaluate the evidence presented. Findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are binding and conclusive absent a showing that they fall under the established exceptions: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (6) when the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. The Court found none of these exceptions present.

• Affidavits of Desistance and the DILG's Dismissal: Petitioners' reliance on the affidavits of desistance failed to impress the Court. A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation, and the Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court; an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable and deserves only scant attention, because such affidavits can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration, and recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which, coupled with the retraction, raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. The affidavits of desistance cannot prevail over the categorical statements of the private complainants, the very same affiants who executed them; based on their testimonies, they merely executed the affidavits after the DILG dismissed the administrative complaint and after Mayor Regidor asked them to do so, because they had the impression that the DILG ruling would in one way or another be binding on the Sandiganbayan, and they simply wanted to avoid spending for their fare in going to the Sandiganbayan for trial. As to the DILG's dismissal, the Court applied the fundamental principle that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal liability; a simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others, under the threefold liability rule. Absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa, so the dismissal of the administrative cases would not necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints.

• Regidor's Participation as Approving Officer: Mayor Regidor could not claim that as mayor he had no participation in the making or preparation of, nor any intervention in, the assailed resolutions. Under Section 180 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983 then in effect, the city mayor had the power to veto the ordinances and resolutions enacted or adopted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Contrary to his submission, the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution as a requisite to its enforceability; the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.

• Credibility of Taburada's Testimony and the Minutes: While petitioners' witness Taburada testified that he was present during the sanggunian's deliberations of the assailed resolutions, private complainant Taclob also testified that the resolutions were not discussed and approved during the respective sessions, and the minutes of the sessions do not reflect any deliberation and/or approval by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the assailed resolutions. Initially, when Taburada was asked whether the minutes faithfully recorded all the matters deliberated upon during the sessions of June 23, June 30, July 14 and July 21, 1988, he readily affirmed it; but after the Sandiganbayan called for a recess when the counsel for the parties had a heated discussion, Taburada claimed that the minutes of the sessions on said dates did not contain all the matters taken up, particularly the deliberation and approval of the assailed resolutions. Yet the resolutions were questioned precisely because the alleged deliberation and voting thereon were not at all conducted as reflected in the minutes of the July 27, 1988 session, during which the sanggunian, upon Taclob's motion, went into a closed-door session and conducted a nominal vote on whether the resolutions were brought before the session for deliberation or whether their nature was reflected in the minutes; the majority of the members voted "no," while Taburada answered "no comment" because he did not actually read the minutes at the time although he signed them, and Zapatos likewise answered "no comment." These material inconsistencies in Taburada's testimony, pitted against the testimonies of the private complainants and the documentary evidence, proved fatal to petitioners' cause. The Court also relied on the doctrine that the minutes are the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding, and found no reason to deviate from that ruling. Weighing further against petitioners were the Memorandum of Agreement of August 12, 1988, by which the Office of the Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod recalled all SP resolutions not duly passed and/or approved by a majority of the members, and Resolution No. 94 of October 15, 1988, by which the sanggunian opted to re-approve the assailed resolutions alleged to have been implemented but not discussed rather than move for the amendment of the minutes; had the minutes merely omitted any mention of the discussion on, and approval of, the subject resolutions, there would have been no need to resubmit them for the sanggunian's approval, and it would have been more convenient to simply effect the correction of the minutes.

• Elements of falsification of public documents under Article 171, Revised Penal Code — For falsification of a public document to be established, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article 171. The Court applied the test to both petitioners, finding that Regidor and Zapatos were public officers at the time of the commission of the offenses, that they took advantage of their respective official positions because they had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of, the document, or had its official custody, and that they committed the acts of falsification under paragraphs 2 and 7 of the article.

• Falsification of public documents requires neither intent to gain nor intent to injure — In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, because in the falsification of a public document what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. The Court used this principle to reject petitioners' argument that intent to gain and bad faith were not shown, noting that some of the assailed resolutions did not involve money matters.

• The local chief executive's concurrence is an exercise of the veto power, not a mechanical act of signing — Under Section 180 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the city mayor had the power to veto ordinances and resolutions enacted or adopted by the sangguniang panlungsod. The veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution as a requisite to its enforceability; the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well. This doctrine defeated Mayor Regidor's claim that, as approving officer, he merely relied on the Presiding Officer's certification and had no participation in the preparation of the assailed resolutions.

• Minutes as the official repository of proceedings — The Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding. Minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, and such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records, which gives the Court more reason to accord them great weight. In light of conflicting claims, the Court relies on the minutes to ascertain the truth; here, the minutes of the sessions did not reflect any deliberation and/or approval of the assailed resolutions, and the sanggunian's subsequent re-approval of the resolutions rather than correction of the minutes belied petitioners' claim of mere inaccuracy.

• Affidavits of desistance and recantations are viewed with suspicion — A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation, and the Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. An affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable and deserves only scant attention, because such affidavits can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration, and recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which, coupled with the retraction, raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld. The affidavits of desistance cannot prevail over the categorical statements of the private complainants, the very same affiants who executed them.

• Threefold liability rule — It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others. Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The Court applied the rule in holding that the DILG's dismissal of the administrative cases against petitioners would not necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them.

• Findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are binding on the Supreme Court — Findings of fact of trial courts, particularly the Sandiganbayan, especially in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are binding upon the Court absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error. The Court will not disturb such findings unless one of the established exceptions is shown: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (6) when the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. The Court found none of these exceptions and accordingly deferred to the Sandiganbayan's findings.

• "Thus, for falsification of a public document to be established, the following elements must concur: 1) that the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the aforementioned acts. Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case: the three-element test for falsification of public documents under Article 171 and the rule that neither gain nor intent to injure is an element of the offense.

• "Contrary to Mayor Regidor's submission, the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution as a requisite to its enforceability. Thus, this Court held that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the scope of the local chief executive's veto power under Section 180 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the basis for holding that Mayor Regidor took advantage of his official position.

• "A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention." — Quoted from Balderama vs. People and adopted by the Court, this passage supplies the doctrine on the evidentiary weight of affidavits of desistance and explains why the private complainants' recantations did not overturn the conviction.

• "It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is known as the 'threefold liability rule.'" — This passage articulates the threefold liability rule, which the Court used to dispose of petitioners' argument that the DILG's dismissal of the administrative complaint should have created reasonable doubt as to their criminal liability.

• De los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan, Third Division, G.R. No. 121215, November 13, 1997, 281 SCRA 631 — Cited as the source of the doctrine that the minutes are the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding and that the Court relies on them to ascertain the truth when confronted with conflicting claims; the Court expressly adopted the ruling and found no reason to deviate from it. The same case was also cited for the proposition that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence, not a mere flourish of the pen.
• Balderama vs. People, G.R. Nos. 147578-85 and G.R. Nos. 147598-605, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 423 — Cited as the controlling authority on affidavits of desistance and recantations, holding that they are viewed with suspicion and reservation and deserve only scant attention; the Court quoted the ruling at length and applied it to reject petitioners' reliance on the complainants' affidavits of desistance.
• Giron, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 145357-59, August 23, 2006, 499 SCRA 594 — Cited for the second element of falsification, that the offender took advantage of his official position because he had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of, the document, or had its official custody.
• Bernardino vs. People, G.R. Nos. 170453 and 170518, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 237 — Cited in support of the finding that the accused caused it to appear that persons participated in an act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate, under Article 171, paragraph 2.
• Lastrilla vs. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324 — Cited, together with Lumancas vs. Uriarte and People vs. Po Giok To, for the rule that in falsification of public or official documents it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person.
• Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 331 Phil. 531 (1996) — Cited for the settled doctrine that findings of fact of trial courts, particularly the Sandiganbayan, especially in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are binding upon the Court absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
• Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin vs. The Honorable Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161455, May 20, 2008 — Cited for the principle that the Court is not a trier of facts and defers to the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan, which had more opportunity and facilities to examine and evaluate the evidence presented.
• Gil vs. People, 177 SCRA 229 (1989) — Cited, together with Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan, as the source of the enumeration of the exceptions to the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are binding and conclusive on the Court.
• Lumancas vs. Uriarte, 347 SCRA 22 (2000) and People vs. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 (1955) — Cited in the chain of authorities supporting the rule that intent to gain or to injure is not an element of falsification of public documents.
• Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616 (1996); Velarma vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 406 (1996); Drilon vs. Lin, 235 SCRA 135 (1994); Pimentel vs. Garchitorena, 208 SCRA 122 (1992); Dizon vs. Tizon, 22 SCRA 1317 (1968); Subido vs. City of Manila, 108 Phil. 462 (1960) — Cited in De los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan as the line of cases underscoring the importance of the minutes taken in the pertinent proceeding.

• Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes falsification by a public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister, imposing prision mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00 upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by any of eight enumerated acts. The Court quoted the provision in full and applied paragraphs 2 (causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate) and 7 (issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original), holding that all the elements of the offense were present.
• Section 180, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code of 1983) — Provides that all ordinances, and any resolution or motion directing the payment of money or creating liability, enacted or adopted by the sangguniang panlungsod shall be forwarded to the mayor, who shall return the same with his approval or veto within ten days, failing which it shall be deemed approved; a vetoed ordinance repassed by a two-thirds vote of all the members shall take effect as provided in the Code, and the mayor may veto any particular item or items of an appropriation ordinance or of an ordinance, resolution or motion directing the payment of money or creating liability. The Court relied on this provision, which was in effect at the time the crimes were committed, to hold that Mayor Regidor's approval of the assailed resolutions was an exercise of the veto power and not a mere mechanical act of signing, thereby establishing that he took advantage of his official position.
• Rule 45, Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners. The Court noted the respondent's submission that it is not the function of the Court under Rule 45 to re-examine the pieces of evidence duly submitted by the parties, and reiterated that it is not a trier of facts, deferring instead to the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan.