Regalado vs. Yulo

The second proviso of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, covers only present justices of the peace and auxiliary justices who had already completed sixty-five years of age when the Act took effect on November 16, 1931, and who were to cease office on January 1, 1933; it does not apply to a justice appointed before the Act who reached sixty-five thereafter. Courts cannot rewrite a statute by inserting omitted words or phrases to effectuate a supposed legislative intent.

Felipe Regalado had qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, on April 12, 1906, and Esteban T. Villar was the justice of the peace of Tabaco, Albay. The dispute implicated section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, which took effect on November 16, 1931 and established sixty-five as the retirement age for justices of the peace and auxiliary justices, with a further proviso governing present justices who had already reached that age. Earlier legislation and decisions had addressed whether such age limits applied prospectively to incumbents.

Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, on April 12, 1906. Esteban T. Villar was the justice of the peace of Tabaco, Albay. The dispute concerned the right to the Malinao office after Regalado reached the statutory retirement age.

On September 13, 1934, Regalado became sixty-five years of age. Shortly thereafter, the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance with instructions from the Secretary of Justice, designated Villar to act as justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest.

On December 17, 1934, Villar qualified as justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office. The parties stipulated the foregoing facts, and the controversy was brought to the Supreme Court as an original action of quo warranto to determine the respective rights of Regalado and Villar to the office.

• Plain Meaning: Petitioner Regalado insisted that the law is clear and needs no interpretation; according to him, only those justices of the peace and auxiliary justices who had completed sixty-five years of age on or before November 16, 1931, when Act No. 3899 took effect, ceased to hold office.
• Non-Applicability to Incumbents Reaching Sixty-Five After Effectivity: Petitioner maintained that because he was not sixty-five when Act No. 3899 took effect and did not reach that age until September 13, 1934, after the January 1, 1933 cessation date fixed by the proviso, he was not covered by the Act.

• Legislative Intent: The Solicitor-General, as attorney for respondents, admitted that the provisions of the second proviso added by Act No. 3899 were not very specific but argued that the real intention of the law was that all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices, whether appointed before or after the Act, who had completed sixty-five at the time of approval, and those who should complete that age thereafter, cease to hold office—the former on January 1, 1933, and the latter when they complete that age.
• “At” as “During”: The Solicitor-General argued that the Spanish term “al” is equivalent to “at” and that “at” can be construed as equivalent to “during,” thereby extending the proviso to those who reached sixty-five during the Act’s effectivity.
• Legislative History: The Solicitor-General invited attention to the history of the law and deduced from it a legislative intention to place justices of the peace and auxiliary justices on the same footing as regards cessation from office by reason of age.
• Practical Construction: The Solicitor-General pointed out that the Secretary of Justice had consistently interpreted the proviso to mean that all justices and auxiliary justices, no matter when appointed, who had completed sixty-five prior to approval and those who should complete that age thereafter, cease to hold office upon attaining that age, and that such practical construction by the executing department is entitled to great weight.

• Retirement Age Under Act No. 3899: Whether, under section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, justices of the peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act who reached sixty-five years of age after the Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching sixty-five.
• Judicial Interpretation of the Proviso: Whether the Court may construe the phrase “at the time this Act takes effect” as “during” or otherwise supply omitted words to effectuate the supposed legislative intent that all justices reaching sixty-five after the Act’s effectivity must cease to hold office.

• Retirement Age Under Act No. 3899: No. The second proviso covers only present justices and auxiliary justices who had completed sixty-five at the time Act No. 3899 took effect on November 16, 1931, and required them to cease on January 1, 1933; Regalado, who reached sixty-five on September 13, 1934, is not affected.
• Judicial Interpretation of the Proviso: No. The Court cannot construe “at the time this Act takes effect” as “during” or insert omitted words to reach a supposed legislative intent, because that would rewrite the law and usurp legislative power.

• Retirement Age Under Act No. 3899: The Spanish text of section 203, as amended, is controlling, though the English text may explain it. The second proviso states that present justices and auxiliary justices who “at the time this Act takes effect” have completed sixty-five shall cease to hold office on January 1, 1933. Act No. 3899 took effect on November 16, 1931; on that date Regalado was not sixty-five. The phrase “have completed sixty-five years of age” is in the past tense and cannot regularly be taken to contemplate the future. The date January 1, 1933 is also in the past, and Regalado had not yet reached sixty-five by then. Even if “at the time this Act takes effect” were given the unusual meaning “within the time this Act is effective,” Regalado would still have to have completed sixty-five within that period and cease on January 1, 1933; because he became sixty-five on September 13, 1934, he cannot be included under a law requiring justices sixty-five years of age to cease on January 1, 1933. Thus the natural and reasonable meaning of Act No. 3899 leaves no other deduction than that a justice appointed before the Act who reached sixty-five after its approval is not affected.
• Judicial Interpretation of the Proviso: The fundamental purpose of Act No. 3899—to correct the phraseology of the first proviso and place justices of the peace on the same footing as regards cessation by age—could not be effectuated if it required rewriting the law or inserting words or phrases not found in it. The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the statute; if legislative intent is not expressed in an appropriate manner, courts cannot speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology. The legislative history showed that the bill as introduced in the Senate contained the word “automaticamente” and may have had a retroactive purpose, but when the bill left the Legislature that word had been omitted and the phrase “el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y tres” had been inserted. The Court could not supply the omitted term. While the practical construction of a statute by the department charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, the Court is not bound by it, and the rule does not apply where the construction is not doubtful. The Secretary of Justice’s consistent interpretation therefore did not control. To adopt the Government’s construction would pass beyond the bounds of judicial power and usurp legislative power.

• Plain Meaning Rule — Where the law is clear, it needs no interpretation; the intent of the Legislature is the intent expressed in the words of the statute. The Court applied this to Act No. 3899, holding that the second proviso’s temporal language limited its application to present justices who had completed sixty-five at the time the Act took effect.
• Separation of Powers / Judicial Restraint in Statutory Construction — Courts may not rewrite a statute by inserting words or phrases not found in it, nor speculate as to legislative intent and supply a meaning not expressed, because doing so would pass beyond judicial power and usurp legislative power. Applied where the Government urged a construction that would have required adding omitted terms to the proviso.
• Prospective Operation of Statutes — A statute is generally construed prospectively and not as applying to persons or situations not clearly within its terms. In Segovia vs. Noel, the age-limit proviso added by Act No. 3107 was held prospective only and not applicable to justices appointed before it took effect. The Court relied on this history to reject an interpretation extending Act No. 3899 to a justice who reached sixty-five after its effectivity.
• Practical Construction by Executive Department — The construction of a statute by the department charged with its execution is entitled to great weight, but the courts are not bound by it, and the rule does not apply where the construction is not doubtful. The Court acknowledged the Secretary of Justice’s consistent interpretation but declined to follow it because the statute’s language was not doubtful.
• Spanish Text Prevails in Bilingual Legislation — Where a law is enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text prevails in interpretation, though the English text may be consulted to explain the Spanish. The Court applied this to Act No. 3899, noting English deficiencies such as the added word “automatically” and omitted word “office.”
• Legislative Intent Must Be Expressed — The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the statute; courts cannot assume a purpose not expressed and construe the statute to accomplish that supposed intention. Applied to reject the argument that the Act’s fundamental purpose was to place all justices on the same footing.

• "All are agreed that the language which should prevail in the interpretation of Act No. 3899 is Spanish, but that the English text may be consulted to explain the Spanish." — States the controlling rule for interpreting the bilingual statute and explains why the Spanish text of section 203 governed the Court’s reading of the second proviso.
• "The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is the intent expressed in the words of the statute. If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish this supposed intention." — Articulates the ratio decidendi on statutory construction and rejects the Government’s attempt to infer a broader legislative purpose beyond the enacted words.
• "But we cannot reach that result when to do so compels us to rewrite a law and to insert words or phrases not found in it. If the court should do that it would pass beyond the bounds of judicial power to usurp legislative power." — Defines the separation-of-powers limit on judicial interpretation and explains why the Court refused to supply omitted terms to Act No. 3899.
• "For the reasons given, we are of the opinion that the natural and reasonable meaning of the language used in Act No. 3899 leaves room for no other deduction than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the Act and who completed sixty-five years of age on September 13, 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on November 16, 1931, and who by the law was required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act." — States the ultimate holding that Regalado was outside the coverage of Act No. 3899 and therefore entitled to remain in office.

• Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329 — Cited as authority that Act No. 2347, requiring judges of first instance to serve until sixty-five and present judges to vacate on taking effect, was valid. The Court used it as part of the legislative history of age-limit laws.
• Segovia vs. Noel [1925], 47 Phil., 543 — Cited for the holding that the age-limit proviso added by Act No. 3107 should be given prospective effect only and was not applicable to justices and auxiliary justices appointed before it went into effect. This precedent informed the Court’s restrictive reading of Act No. 3899.

• Section 203, Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899 — The provision authorized appointment of justices of the peace and auxiliary justices, provided they shall be appointed to serve until they have reached sixty-five, and further provided that present justices and auxiliary justices who at the time the Act takes effect have completed sixty-five shall cease to hold office on January 1, 1933, with new appointments to cover vacancies. The Court construed the second proviso as limited to those who had already completed sixty-five on November 16, 1931, and held it did not apply to petitioner, who reached sixty-five on September 13, 1934.
• Act No. 3107 — Amended section 203 by adding the first proviso that justices and auxiliary justices shall be appointed to serve until they have reached sixty-five. In Segovia vs. Noel, it was held to have prospective effect only and not applicable to those appointed before it went into effect. The Court referenced this in tracing legislative history.
• Act No. 2347 — Provided that judges of first instance shall serve until sixty-five and that present judges of first instance vacate their positions on the taking effect of the Act. It was held valid in Chanco vs. Imperial. The Court cited it as background to the age-limit legislation.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concurred.