Recto-Sambajon vs. Public Attorney's Office

A public officer's misconduct need not be directly related to the performance of official duties to constitute a grave administrative offense; when the act lacks such direct relation but tarnishes the image and integrity of the public office, it constitutes Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The disciplining authority has the right to appeal a Civil Service Commission decision that modifies or reduces the penalty originally imposed on an erring government employee.

Atty. Melita S. Recto-Sambajon was a Public Attorney IV at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), assigned to the PAO Legal Research Service - Central Office. She was later reassigned to the PAO Valenzuela City office, which triggered her adverse reaction. The PAO is a government office tasked with providing legal assistance to indigent litigants, and its employees are subject to administrative discipline under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). The case involves the administrative liability of a public attorney for threatening remarks made against her colleagues in the workplace.

Atty. Melita S. Recto-Sambajon was a Public Attorney IV at the Public Attorney's Office, assigned to the PAO Legal Research Service - Central Office. On 17 June 2009, Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta summoned her due to her reaction to her reassignment to the PAO Valenzuela City office. Initially, Atty. Recto-Sambajon denied reports that she had cried over her reassignment, but she was overcome by emotion and uttered in anger, "Yung mga naghahatid [ng] maling impormasyon kay Chief ay paduduguin ko ang mata." Her outburst was witnessed by Marilyn Boongaling, Ma. Ruby F. Florendo, Alma E. Dumago-Latos, and Tricia Larrissa Leofando, PAO personnel present at that time.

On 18 June 2009, Atty. Recto-Sambajon, together with Atty. Froilan Cabarios, Officer-in-Charge of the Field Operation and Statistics Office, went to the office of Atty. Amelia C. Garchitorena, head of the Special and Appealed Cases, and asked whether Herminia Polo, a SACS staff, told Chief Acosta that she had cried after learning of her reassignment. Atty. Garchitorena responded that she told Chief Acosta that Atty. Recto-Sambajon cried when she learned of her reassignment, and that during their conversation, Atty. Recto-Sambajon threatened "[w]hoever will feed any wrong information to the Chief, I will shoot them conjoined through the eyes."

On 22 June 2009, after the flag ceremony, Atty. Recto-Sambajon asked Nelson Acevedo, an administrative staff, where Boongaling was. When Acevedo told her that Boongaling was at the conference room, she responded, "[s]abihin mo sa kanya, pag may nangyari sa anak ko babarilin ko siya." While Acevedo was trying to pacify her, Boongaling emerged from the conference room and called Acevedo. After seeing Boongaling, Atty. Recto-Sambajon reiterated her threats and told her she would shoot her should anything happen to her child, as she was pregnant at the time. For fear that Atty. Recto-Sambajon would carry out her threats, Boongaling reported the incident to Chief Acosta on the same day.

In a Memorandum dated 25 June 2009, Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing ordered Atty. Recto-Sambajon to explain why she should not be administratively charged with Grave Misconduct. In her Memorandum dated 31 July 2009, Atty. Recto-Sambajon explained that she had uttered the threatening words to defend herself from false rumors spreading against her, and that she was in an unstable physical condition due to her pregnancy, having a history of miscarriage, which was known to her colleagues. On 17 August 2009, she was formally charged for Grave Misconduct and for being Notoriously Undesirable.

In the PAO's 8 December 2009 Decision, Atty. Mosing found her guilty of the offenses charged and dismissed her from the service, with Chief Acosta approving the decision. Atty. Mosing opined that there was substantial evidence to find her guilty, noting that her remarks were tantamount to Grave Threats punishable under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. He highlighted grounds supporting the finding that she was Notoriously Undesirable: her threatening remarks; her allegations of immaterial and irrelevant events in her memorandum; her act of filing a petition for injunction against her reassignment; and her resort to a media interview to assail her reassignment.

• Lack of Right to Appeal by PAO: Petitioner argued that the CSC resolution which reduced her offense from grave misconduct to simple misconduct cannot be appealed by the PAO, explaining that the pronouncements in Geronga vs. Varela are inapplicable because she was not exonerated of the charges; her offense and the corresponding penalty were merely downgraded.
• Respect for CSC Findings: Petitioner assailed that the PAO cannot challenge the decision of the CSC after the latter had submitted to its jurisdiction, and claimed that the CA should have respected the findings of the CSC because of its expertise in the matter.
• Absence of Grave Misconduct: Petitioner maintained that her hostile remarks did not amount to Grave Misconduct because it was not shown that she was tainted with a depraved and corrupt mind or that she intended to violate the law or exhibit a flagrant disregard of established rules.

• Right to Appeal Modified Decisions: The PAO pointed out that it only questioned the CSC's conclusions and findings and did not challenge the jurisdiction of the CSC to entertain Atty. Recto-Sambajon's appeal, asserting that decisions of the CSC either exonerating the government employee or modifying the penalty imposed may be appealed to the CA.
• Grave Misconduct Established: The PAO maintained that the grave threats uttered by Atty. Recto-Sambajon displayed a violent, dangerous, if not murderous, tendency towards her colleagues, and that the nature of her threats shows that it was not merely an error in judgment but motivated by wrongful intent.

• Jurisdiction/Right to Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 117768, the same not being available as a remedy of the Public Attorney's Office in assailing Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 100919 dated 17 May 2010 and Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 1100070 dated 11 January 2011.
• Findings of Fact: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in setting aside the assailed resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and in disregarding its findings of fact.
• Grave Misconduct and Notoriously Undesirable: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that herein petitioner is guilty of Grave Misconduct and of Being Notoriously Undesirable.

• Jurisdiction/Right to Appeal: No. The PAO had legal standing to appeal the CSC decision that modified its original decision of dismissal. Under Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RRACCS, the disciplining authority is a "party adversely affected" in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision, and procedural laws have retroactive application.
• Findings of Fact: No. While findings of fact made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are generally binding upon the Court, an exception exists when the findings are in disregard of the evidence on record. The CA did not err in disregarding the CSC's findings.
• Grave Misconduct and Notoriously Undesirable: No, with modification. Atty. Recto-Sambajon was not guilty of Grave Misconduct because the threats lacked direct relation to the performance of official duties, but she was guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, a grave offense under the RRACCS, and of Being Notoriously Undesirable.

• Jurisdiction/Right to Appeal: The Court examined Geronga vs. Varela, which addressed whether a CSC decision exonerating an erring government employee may be appealed by the disciplining authority, but did not answer whether a decision downgrading the offense and penalty may be appealed. The Court cited Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salavana, which ruled that decisions modifying the penalty imposed on erring government employees may be appealed by the disciplining authority. The Court reasoned that if all decisions by quasi-judicial bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant, and the quality of civil service would erode. The Court also applied the RRACCS, promulgated on November 18, 2011, which redefined "party adversely affected" to include the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision. Citing Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, the Court held that procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision, and since the right to appeal is remedial in nature, Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RRACCS applies in this case.
• Findings of Fact: The Court reiterated that while findings of fact made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are generally binding upon the Court, exceptions exist, such as when the findings are in disregard of the evidence on record, citing Japson vs. CSC. The PAO only questioned the CSC's conclusions and findings, not its jurisdiction, and the CA properly reviewed the case.
• Grave Misconduct and Notoriously Undesirable: The Court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behaviour or gross negligence by a public officer." It is qualified as grave when attended with corruption or wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Additionally, for an action to be deemed "misconduct," it must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties, amounting either to maladministration or wilful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. The Court agreed with the CA that the threats should not be treated lightly, but found that the remarks were not tantamount to Grave Misconduct because they lacked the element of direct relation to the performance of official duties. The threats were issued because of rumors spread against her, such as her allegedly crying after her reassignment. Instead, the Court held that her actions constituted Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, a grave offense under Rule 10, Section 46(B) of the RRACCS, which need not be related to or connected with the public officer's official function; it suffices that the act tarnishes the image and integrity of the public office. For Being Notoriously Undesirable, the Court applied a two-fold test: (1) whether it is common knowledge or generally known as universally believed to be true or manifest to the world that the employee committed the acts imputed against him; and (2) whether he had contracted the habit for any of the enumerated misdemeanors. The Court found that the threatening remarks were generally known, as she made them in the presence of several colleagues, and she manifested a predilection to be violent with her colleagues, having threatened them on several consecutive days, even in the presence of Chief Acosta. Since she was guilty of two grave offenses with different penalties, the Court applied Rule 10, Section 50 of the RRACCS, which provides that the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge, with the rest considered as aggravating circumstances, resulting in dismissal from service.

• Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service — Unlike Grave Misconduct, this offense need not be related to or connected with the public officer's official function; it suffices that the act in question tarnishes the image and integrity of the public office. It is broader as it encompasses all transgressions which may put a particular public office in a bad light. The Court applied this doctrine when it found that Atty. Recto-Sambajon's threatening remarks against her colleagues, made in the presence of Chief Acosta, stained the image and integrity of the PAO as a public institution.
• Grave Misconduct Requisites — Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behaviour or gross negligence by a public officer. It is qualified as grave when attended with corruption or wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. For an action to be deemed misconduct, it must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties, amounting either to maladministration or wilful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. The Court applied this doctrine to find that the threats lacked the element of direct relation to official duties.
• Being Notoriously Undesirable Two-Fold Test — The test employs two elements: (1) whether it is common knowledge or generally known as universally believed to be true or manifest to the world that the employee committed the acts imputed against him; and (2) whether he had contracted the habit for any of the enumerated misdemeanors. The Court applied this test and found both elements satisfied because the threats were made in the presence of several colleagues and were repeated on several consecutive days.
• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that effect. Rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I of the RRACCS, which defines "party adversely affected" to include the disciplining authority, applied to the case even though the RRACCS was promulgated during the pendency of the case.

• "The employer has the right 'to select honest and trustworthy employees.' When the government office disciplines an employee based on causes and procedures allowed by law, it exercises its discretion. This discretion is inherent in the constitutional principle that '[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.'" — This passage from Light Rail Transit Authority v. Salavana, quoted by the Court, establishes the basis for the disciplining authority's right to appeal decisions modifying penalties imposed on erring employees.
• "If all decisions by quasi-judicial bodies modifying the penalty of dismissal were allowed to become final and unappealable, it would, in effect, show tolerance to conduct unbecoming of a public servant. The quality of civil service would erode, and the citizens would end up suffering for it." — This passage articulates the public policy rationale for allowing disciplining authorities to appeal CSC decisions that modify original penalties of dismissal.
• "Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behaviour or gross negligence by a public officer. It is qualified as grave when it is attended with corruption or wilful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules otherwise the misconduct is only simple." — This passage defines the distinction between grave and simple misconduct, which was central to the Court's reclassification of the offense.
• "Unlike Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service need not be related to or connected with the public officer's official function as it suffices that the act in question tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public office." — This passage articulates the key distinction between Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which formed the basis of the Court's ruling.

• Geronga vs. Varela, 570 Phil. 39 (2008) — Cited as the case that addressed whether a CSC decision exonerating an erring government employee may be appealed by the disciplining authority, but which did not answer whether a decision downgrading the offense and penalty may be appealed.
• Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salavana, 736 Phil. 123 (2014) — Controlling precedent holding that decisions modifying the penalty imposed on erring government employees may be appealed by the disciplining authority; quoted extensively by the Court for the rationale behind this rule.
• Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery — Cited for the doctrine that procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision, and that the right to appeal is remedial in nature.
• Japson vs. CSC, 663 Phil. 665 (2011) — Cited for the exception to the general rule that findings of fact made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are binding upon the Court, specifically when the findings are in disregard of the evidence on record.
• Chavez vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 195054, 4 April 2016 — Cited for the definition of misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action.
• Government Service Insurance System vs. Mayordomo, 665 Phil. 131 (2011) — Cited for the requirement that misconduct must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties, and for the definition of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
• Escano vs. Manaois, A.M. No. 16-02-01-CTA, 15 November 2016 — Cited for the two-fold test employed in the administrative offense of Being Notoriously Undesirable.

• Section 4, paragraph (k), Rule I, RRACCS — Defines "party adversely affected" as referring to the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision. The Court applied this provision retroactively to give the PAO standing to appeal the CSC resolution.
• Rule 10, Section 46(A), RRACCS — Classifies Being Notoriously Undesirable as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service. The Court applied this provision to affirm the penalty of dismissal for this offense.
• Rule 10, Section 46(B), RRACCS — Classifies Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as a grave offense punishable by suspension of six months and one day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. The Court applied this provision to classify the petitioner's offense.
• Rule 10, Section 50, RRACCS — Provides that if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge, with the rest considered as aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision to impose dismissal since the petitioner was guilty of two grave offenses with different penalties.
• Article 282, Revised Penal Code — Cited by the PAO in its original decision as the basis for finding that the petitioner's remarks were tantamount to Grave Threats. The Court referenced this provision in recounting the PAO's findings.

Presbitero J. Velasco Jr. (Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, and Alexander G. Gesmundo concurred in the decision.