Recebido vs. People of the Philippines

The ten-year prescriptive period for the falsification charged, punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, runs from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, authorities, or their agents; registration of the forged deed may be constructive notice, but only from the time registration could have occurred. Possession of a forged deed by the person who alone stands to benefit from it raises a presumption that he is the material author of the falsification, dispensing with direct proof of authorship.

Private complainant Caridad Dorol and petitioner Aniceto Recebido are cousins. The property involved is a 3,520-square-meter agricultural land in San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon. The charge is Falsification of Public Document under the Revised Penal Code, based on a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 13, 1979 allegedly executed by Dorol in Recebido’s favor.

On September 9, 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin, petitioner Aniceto Recebido, at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon to redeem her property, an agricultural land with an area of 3,520 square meters located at San Isidro, Bacon, Sorsogon, which she had mortgaged to petitioner sometime in April 1985. Petitioner and Caridad Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage; Caridad Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 (Exhibit “A”) executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol. In that confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property on his claim that she had sold it to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between them involving her property was a mortgage.

Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon that there existed on its file a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 (Exhibit “J”), allegedly executed by Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner, and that the property was registered in the latter’s name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other documents (Exhibits “K” to “K-10”) with that of the signature of Caridad Dorol on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas found that the latter signature was falsified (Exhibits “L-1” to “L-2”). Thereafter, Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against petitioner Aniceto Recebido with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Legaspi City, and its Questioned Documents Division conducted an examination of the original copy of the Deed of Sale in question allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed thereon. Mr. Magboja’s report was approved by the Chief of the Questioned Documents Division, Arcadio Ramos, and the Deputy Director of Technical Services, Manuel Roura, both of the NBI. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information indicting petitioner for Falsification of Public Document with the RTC, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. The information alleged that on or about August 13, 1979, in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, petitioner, a private individual, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to defraud, falsified and/or imitated the signature of Caridad Dorol and/or caused it to appear that she signed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in his favor, notarized as Doc. No. 680; Page No. 54; Boon No. XIV and Series of 1979 of the Registry of Notary Public Dominador S. Reyes, when he knew that Caridad Dorol did not execute the document, to her damage and prejudice. Upon arraignment petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”

As narrated by the CA, petitioner contends that the land in question was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of Caridad, on February 25, 1977 and was subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983 although it was made to appear that the deed of sale was executed on August 13, 1979. It was also on the said date that Recebido gave Caridad the amount of P1,000.00 in addition to the P2,600.00 mortgage price given to Juan Dorol, which culminated in the execution of the Deed of Sale signed by Caridad.

The trial and appellate courts found that the deed of sale was forged, and petitioner admitted that the deed of sale in his possession is a forged document as found by the trial and appellate court. The questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for examination; the falsified deed of sale was in petitioner’s possession, not Caridad Dorol’s, who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor’s Office of Sorsogon. The prosecution established that Dorol did not sell the subject land to petitioner at any time, and the private offended party had no actual knowledge of the falsification prior to September 9, 1990.

• Prescription: Petitioner argued that the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed, on the view that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed.
• Authorship of Forgery: Petitioner argued that even admitting the deed of sale in his possession was forged, there was no proof that he authored the falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction.
• Jurisdiction and Possession: Petitioner argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order him to vacate the land because the crime charged was falsification; that the civil aspect of the criminal case referred to civil damages recoverable ex delito; and that he was entitled to possession as mortgagee since private complainant had not properly redeemed the property.

• Authorship/Possession: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, argued that the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the NBI requested it for examination; the falsified deed of sale was in petitioner’s possession, not Caridad Dorol’s, who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor’s Office of Sorsogon.

• Prescription: Whether the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed.
• Authorship of Forgery: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining petitioner’s conviction despite the absence of direct proof that he authored the forgery.
• Order to Vacate and Possession: Whether the CA committed grievous error in affirming the trial court’s order for petitioner to vacate the land, considering that the crime charged was falsification and petitioner claimed possession as mortgagee.

• Prescription: No. The ten-year period under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code ran from Dorol’s discovery of the falsification on September 9, 1990, not from the commission or registration of the deed; the information was filed in 1991.
• Authorship of Forgery: No. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion; possession of the forged deed by the person who alone stood to benefit from it raised a presumption that petitioner was the material author, so direct proof was unnecessary.
• Order to Vacate and Possession: No. The forged deed was not a valid basis for possession, and as mortgagee petitioner was not entitled to possession as against the mortgagor; his possession became unlawful when he unjustly refused Dorol’s offer to redeem.

• Prescription: The SC first held that although petitioner raised prescription only in his motion for reconsideration before the CA, he did not waive the defense. Under the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert the ground of extinction of the offense in a motion to quash is not deemed a waiver; by prescription the State loses the right to prosecute the crime or demand service of the penalty, so prescription may be invoked on appeal even if not raised at trial. On the merits, the SC held that the crime had not prescribed. The penalty for the falsification charged was prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00; under the Revised Penal Code both the penalty and the fine were correctional, so the offense prescribed in ten years. The reckoning point, however, was not necessarily the commission of the crime. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period begins to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The SC cited People vs. Reyes for the rule that registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world and constructive notice of its contents. The prosecution established that Dorol did not sell the land to petitioner and that she learned of the falsification only on September 9, 1990, when she went to redeem the land. Even on petitioner’s version that the land was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol on February 25, 1977 and sold to him on August 13, 1983, although the deed was made to appear executed on August 13, 1979, the alleged sale could not have been registered before 1983, the year the alleged deed was executed. The crime could not have been discovered by the offended party before 1983, and constructive notice by registration of the forged deed could not have occurred before 1983. Even if the deed was executed, delivered, and registered on August 13, 1983, the ten-year period had not elapsed when the information was filed in 1991. The crime had not prescribed.
• Authorship of Forgery: The SC held that direct proof of authorship was unnecessary. Petitioner admitted that the deed of sale in his possession was a forged document, as found by the trial and appellate courts, but argued that there was no proof he authored the forgery or directed it. The SC rejected this because the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the NBI requested it for examination; the falsified deed was in petitioner’s possession, not Dorol’s, who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor’s Office of Sorsogon. Since petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale purporting to transfer the land from Dorol to him, and was the only person who stood to benefit from the falsification, he was presumed to be the material author of the forgery. The CA therefore did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the conviction.
• Order to Vacate and Possession: The SC found petitioner’s arguments specious. Petitioner based his claim to possession on two alternative titles: the forged deed of sale and his status as mortgagee. The forged deed could not be a valid basis of possession. Neither could his status as mortgagee justify possession, because in a contract of mortgage it is the mortgagor who is entitled to possession of the property; the SC noted the practice in the provinces that in giving realty as collateral, possession usually goes with it. Even assuming petitioner had a right to possess the land, his possession became unlawful when Dorol offered to redeem the property and petitioner unjustly refused. Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his crime. The trial court therefore did not commit any error in ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property.

• Prescription of offenses; discovery rule — Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The SC applied this to falsification of a public document: Dorol discovered the falsification only on September 9, 1990, and even on petitioner’s version the forged deed could not have been registered before 1983; the information filed in 1991 was timely. The defense is not waived by failure to raise it in a motion to quash and may be invoked on appeal.
• Registration as constructive notice — Registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world and constructive notice of the document’s contents; all persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. The SC used this rule to test whether the prescriptive period could have started earlier through registration of the forged deed, but found that registration could not have occurred before 1983 on either version.
• Presumption of authorship of forgery from possession and benefit — A person in possession of a forged document who is the only person who stands to benefit from the falsification is presumed to be the material author of the forgery; direct proof of authorship is not required. The SC applied this to Recebido, who submitted the forged deed to the NBI and claimed title under it.
• Mortgagor’s right to possession; mortgagee cannot profit from crime — In a contract of mortgage, the mortgagor is entitled to possession of the property. Even if a mortgagee had possession, it becomes unlawful when the mortgagor offers to redeem and the mortgagee unjustly refuses; the mortgagee cannot profit from the effects of his crime. The SC used this to uphold the order to vacate.

• “Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall ‘commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,……’” — The SC used this discovery rule to reject petitioner’s claim that the ten-year period began at the time of the crime; Dorol discovered the falsification only on September 9, 1990.
• “Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery.” — The SC applied the presumption because petitioner possessed the forged deed and was the only person who stood to benefit from it.
• “Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.” — This states the benefit-and-possession basis for the presumption of authorship.
• “Petitioner cannot profit from the effects of his crime.” — The SC used this to uphold the order to vacate after petitioner unjustly refused Dorol’s offer to redeem the land.

• People vs. Reyes — Cited for the rule that registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world and constructive notice of its contents; the SC used it to test when the prescriptive period could have begun through registration of the forged deed.

• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The SC applied it to reckon the ten-year period from Dorol’s September 9, 1990 discovery, not from the 1979 deed date.
• Revised Penal Code penalty for the falsification charged: prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 — The SC treated both the penalty and the fine as correctional, making the offense prescribe in ten years.
• Rules of Court on motion to quash — Failure of the accused to assert the ground of extinction of the offense in a motion to quash is not deemed a waiver. The SC applied this to allow petitioner to raise prescription on appeal despite raising it only in his motion for reconsideration before the CA.