Recaña vs. Court of Appeals

A special statute governing a particular class of cases is not repealed by a subsequent general law unless the intent to repeal is expressly manifested, and a repurchase of tax-delinquent property within the five-year period under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 by one co-heir constitutes a redemption that inures to the benefit of all co-owners.

Petitioner Ester Recaña and private respondents Aurora Padpad, Lucila Arboleda, Enrique Arboleda, and the heirs of Ernesto Arboleda are all children and heirs of Macario Arboleda, who acquired Lot 6, Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land from the Land Tenure Administration pursuant to Republic Act No. 1597, a special law enacted on June 16, 1956 governing the subdivision and sale of the Tondo Foreshore Land to lessees and bona fide occupants. The deed of sale between Arboleda and the Land Tenure Administration incorporated the proviso in Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 granting the original purchaser or his legal heirs a five-year repurchase right from the date of any conveyance. The property was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 7676 issued on February 1, 1962. Presidential Decree No. 464, the Real Property Tax Code, took effect on June 1, 1974, and governs the collection of real property taxes and the redemption of tax-delinquent properties generally.

Lot 6, Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land was sold by the Land Tenure Administration to Macario Arboleda pursuant to Republic Act No. 1597, and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 7676 issued on February 1, 1962 in his name. The deed of sale between Arboleda and the Land Tenure Administration contained several conditions, including that every conveyance of the lot would be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within five years from the date of conveyance, that the contract would be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of the parties, and that the repurchase condition would be annotated as an encumbrance on the certificate of title. Petitioner Ester Recaña and private respondents Aurora Padpad, Lucila Arboleda, Enrique Arboleda, and the heirs of Ernesto Arboleda are all children and heirs of Macario Arboleda.

For many years, realty taxes on the lot remained unpaid both before and after Arboleda's death. On August 26, 1980, the City Treasurer of Manila auctioned the lot for sale due to tax delinquency under Presidential Decree No. 464. Spouses Cirilo and Miguela Montejo purchased the lot at the public auction and were issued a transfer certificate of title. On April 25, 1984, the Montejos sold the property to petitioner-spouses Timoteo and Ester Recaña, who refunded the amount equivalent to the delinquent taxes paid and other expenses entailed. Petitioners became the owners of the subject lot, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1464015.

On March 5, 1991, private respondents filed Civil Case No. 91-56327 for declaration of co-ownership and partition against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They claimed co-ownership of the subject lot with petitioners, asserting that the repurchase by the latter redounded to their benefit as co-heirs and co-owners, invoking both the conditions in the original deed of sale and the rule that redemption by a co-owner of auctioned property arising from foreclosure inures to the benefit of all co-owners. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents, declaring the lot as owned-in-common with equal shares by all heirs and ordering the cancellation of petitioners' TCT. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, adding a requirement that appellees reimburse petitioners for repurchase expenses proportionate to their respective pro-indiviso shares.

• Applicability of P.D. No. 464 over R.A. No. 1597: Petitioners contended that Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, which provides a one-year redemption period for properties foreclosed due to tax delinquency, should govern rather than the five-year repurchase period under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, because their repurchase occurred beyond the one-year period and was therefore outside the ambit of a redemption of foreclosed property.
• Voluntary vs. Involuntary Conveyance: Petitioners argued that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 refers only to voluntary alienations, conveyances, and encumbrances made within fifteen years from issuance of the certificate of title, whereas the conveyance in this case was an involuntary one resulting from tax delinquency, not covered by Section 4.
• Express Repeal by P.D. No. 464: Petitioners maintained that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 was expressly repealed and abrogated by P.D. No. 464 through its repealing clause (Section 111), which repealed all acts, laws, or decrees inconsistent with the Code, and that the inconsistency between the five-year period in R.A. No. 1597 and the one-year period in P.D. No. 464 warranted repeal.
• Both Laws Are Special: Petitioners stressed that R.A. No. 1597 is a special law for the Tondo Foreshore Lands and P.D. No. 464 is likewise a special law governing real property tax collection, and that P.D. No. 464 makes no distinction on the nature or source of the tax-delinquent property.

• Five-Year Repurchase Period Applies: Respondents argued that since petitioners repurchased the property from the Montejo spouses well within the five-year period specified in the deed of sale and in Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, they are deemed to have redeemed the property for all co-owners, themselves included.
• Redemption by Co-Owner Inures to Benefit of All: Respondents invoked the rule that redemption by a co-owner of auctioned property arising from foreclosure redounds to the benefit of all co-owners.

• Applicable Redemption Period: Which of the two laws — Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 or Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 — should apply to the redemption period of the subject property?
• Repeal of R.A. No. 1597: Whether Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 was already repealed by Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, such that the latter provision governs the redemption period.
• Voluntary vs. Involuntary Conveyance: Whether Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 applies only to voluntary conveyances and not to involuntary conveyances such as tax delinquency foreclosures.

• Applicable Redemption Period: Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 governs. The five-year repurchase period applies to the subject property, which was acquired from the Tondo Foreshore Land under that special law.
• Repeal of R.A. No. 1597: No. Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 was not repealed by P.D. No. 464, the latter being a general law that cannot impliedly repeal a special statute absent express legislative intent.
• Voluntary vs. Involuntary Conveyance: No. Section 4 makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary conveyances, and where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

• Applicable Redemption Period: R.A. No. 1597 is a special law enacted specifically to govern all incidents of the subdivision of the Tondo Foreshore Land, while P.D. No. 464 is a law of general application covering all real property titled to individuals who become delinquent in paying real estate tax. The deed of sale between the Land Tenure Administration and Macario Arboleda expressly incorporated the proviso of Section 4, including the five-year repurchase right and the binding effect upon heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns. Even assuming Section 4 were deemed superseded, the Court held that where a contract is entered into on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of that law does not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the rights of the parties thereunder — a rule that applies even if one of the contracting parties is the government. The stipulations in Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the deed being integral parts of the original contract, the five-year redemption period becomes decisive. Petitioners' repurchase within that period is a redemption by a co-owner inuring to the benefit of all co-owners.

• Repeal of R.A. No. 1597: A general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law unless expressly so stated. The doctrine holds that a special statute provided for a particular case or class of cases is not repealed by a subsequent general statute unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, even if the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. P.D. No. 464's repealing clause (Section 111) specifically mentions Commonwealth Act No. 470, the pertinent provisions of city charters, and Section 2092 of the Revised Administrative Code, but R.A. No. 1597 was not specifically mentioned. An express repeal requires identification of the particular law by number and title; all other repeals are implied. Implied repeals are not favored, as laws are presumed passed with deliberation and full knowledge of existing laws. No irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists between Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 and Section 78 of P.D. No. 464, as the former is of special and exclusive application to Tondo Foreshore lots and the latter is of general application.

• Voluntary vs. Involuntary Conveyance: Petitioners' distinction between voluntary and involuntary conveyances is of no moment. Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, concerning encumbrances and alienations, makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary conveyances. Applying the principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos — where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish — the provision applies regardless of the nature of the conveyance.

• General Law Does Not Repeal Special Law Absent Express Intent — A special statute provided for a particular case or class of cases is not repealed by a subsequent statute general in its terms, provisions, and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, even if the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that P.D. No. 464, a general real property tax law, did not repeal Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, a special law governing Tondo Foreshore Lands, because P.D. No. 464's repealing clause did not specifically mention R.A. No. 1597 and no irreconcilable inconsistency existed between the two provisions.

• Implied Repeal Not Favored — Repeals by implication are not favored, as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.

• Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debemos — Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The Court applied this maxim to reject petitioners' argument that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 applied only to voluntary conveyances, holding that the provision made no distinction between voluntary and involuntary conveyances.

• Non-Impairment of Contractual Obligations Upon Repeal of Underlying Law — Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right of the parties thereunder. This rule applies even if one of the contracting parties is the government. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the stipulations in the deed of sale between Arboleda and the Land Tenure Administration — incorporating the five-year repurchase right — remained binding notwithstanding any potential repeal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597.

• Redemption by Co-Owner Inures to Benefit of All Co-Owners — A repurchase of foreclosed or auctioned property by one co-owner within the applicable redemption period inures to the benefit of all co-owners, who are entitled to equal pro-indiviso shares subject to reimbursement of the redeemer's expenses proportionate to their respective shares.

• "Basic in statutory construction is the rule that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law unless expressly so stated." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the non-repeal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597, articulating the controlling doctrine on general-versus-special law repeal.

• "Well-settled in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that a 'special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law.'" — This is the canonical formulation of the special-law-survives-general-law doctrine as applied in this case, frequently cited in subsequent statutory construction jurisprudence.

• "Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos." — This passage applies the ubi lex non distinguit maxim to reject the voluntary-involuntary conveyance distinction petitioners attempted to read into Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597.

• "where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the contract, nor impair the right of the parties thereunder." — This passage establishes the independent contractual basis for preserving the five-year repurchase right, reinforcing the holding even assuming arguendo that Section 4 had been superseded.

• Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42 (1995) — Cited as controlling authority for the doctrine that a special statute is not repealed by a subsequent general statute unless the intent to repeal is manifest.
• Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500 (1992) — Cited for the distinction between express and implied repeal, holding that a repealing clause identifying a particular law by number and title constitutes express repeal, while all other repeals are implied.
• City Government of San Pablo, Laguna vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353 (1999) — Cited for the principle that repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
• Intia, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, 306 SCRA 593 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that implied repeals are not favored and that a law cannot be deemed repealed unless the legislative intent is clearly manifest, and that the failure to include a specific repealing clause indicates no intent to repeal absent irreconcilable inconsistency.
• Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946) — Cited for the maxim that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
• Insular Government vs. Frank, 13 Phil. 236 (1909) — Cited for the doctrine that the repeal or amendment of a law does not affect contracts entered into on the basis of that law, nor impair the rights of the parties thereunder, even if one of the contracting parties is the government.
• Mariano vs. CA, 222 SCRA 736 (1993) — Cited by private respondents for the rule that redemption by a co-owner of auctioned property arising from foreclosure redounds to the benefit of all co-owners.

• Section 4, Republic Act No. 1597 — Governs lands acquired under the Act, prohibiting encumbrance or alienation within fifteen years except in favor of the government or legally constituted banking corporations, and providing that every conveyance shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within five years from the date of conveyance. Applied as the controlling provision establishing the five-year repurchase right binding upon petitioners and all co-heirs.
• Section 78, Presidential Decree No. 464 — Provides a one-year redemption period for real property sold due to tax delinquency, allowing the delinquent taxpayer or his representative, or any person holding a lien or claim, to redeem by paying the total amount of taxes, penalties, costs, and interest. Held inapplicable to the subject property because R.A. No. 1597, as the special law, was not repealed by P.D. No. 464.
• Section 111, Presidential Decree No. 464 — The repealing clause of the Real Property Tax Code, specifically repealing Commonwealth Act No. 470, pertinent provisions of city charters, Section 2092 of the Revised Administrative Code, and all acts inconsistent with the Code. Held insufficient to constitute an express repeal of R.A. No. 1597, which was not specifically mentioned.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.