Recabo, Jr. vs. COMELEC

A certificate of nomination and acceptance that, by its express terms, requires the joint signatures of two authorized party officers is invalid when only one officer has signed, and the COMELEC does not commit grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the certificate of candidacy premised on such defective nomination. A substitute candidate whose nomination is invalid cannot be deemed a valid party nominee; if treated as an independent, his certificate of candidacy filed beyond the independent-candidate deadline is likewise void.

Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr. and Francisco R. Reyes, Jr. both claimed to be the official LAKAS NUCD-UMDP candidate for vice-mayor of the Municipality of Mainit, Surigao del Norte in the May 11, 1998 elections. LAKAS NUCD-UMDP had issued an authorization designating two provincial-level party officers — Francisco T. Matugas and Robert Ace S. Barbers — to jointly nominate, sign, attest under oath, and issue official certificates of nomination. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977, promulgated January 15, 1998, prescribed the rules and regulations governing the filing of certificates of candidacy and substitution of candidates in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, including the periods for filing and the prohibition on substitution of independent candidates.

Candelaria B. Recabo filed her certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao del Norte on March 25, 1998, accompanied by a certificate of nomination and acceptance from LAKAS NUCD-UMDP signed only by Francisco T. Matugas, one of two party officers authorized to jointly issue such certificates; the signature space for the other authorized officer, Robert Z. Barbers, was left blank. Two days later, on March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr. filed his own certificate of candidacy for the same position, supported by a certificate of nomination and acceptance signed by no less than Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, Jr. as National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Candelaria Recabo withdrew her certificate of candidacy on March 31, 1998.

On April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy as substitute for his mother, Candelaria, for the same vice-mayoralty position. His certificate of nomination and acceptance, like his mother's, was signed only by Francisco T. Matugas. Reyes, Jr. filed a petition before the COMELEC seeking to cancel Recabo, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy, arguing that the certificate of nomination was invalid for lack of the joint signature required by its terms and by the party's own authorization. Recabo, Jr. countered that the single signature substantially complied with party requirements and that the COMELEC lacked jurisdiction to determine which candidate possessed a valid certificate of candidacy. He also alleged that Reyes, Jr.'s certificate of nomination was falsified, though he presented no evidence to support this claim.

The COMELEC First Division, in its resolution dated May 8, 1998, cancelled Recabo, Jr.'s certificate of candidacy. It found that the certificate of nomination, by its express wording — "WE, GOV. FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS and ROBERTO Z. BARBERS … hereby nominate" and "WITNESS OUR HANDS" — required two complete signatures for validity, and that only one had been affixed. The COMELEC further reasoned that to allow Recabo, Jr. to run would create an anomalous situation where a single political party could field multiple candidates for one elective position, putting the election process in mockery and disrepute. Recabo, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration on May 14, 1998, with a supplement on May 22, 1998, but the COMELEC en banc denied the motion on July 1, 1998.

Recabo, Jr. then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari, submitting certified lists of candidates and votes obtained to show that on election day, May 11, 1998, he had garnered 4,835 votes against Reyes, Jr.'s 3,733. Reyes, Jr., for his part, filed a motion before the Court seeking proclamation as winner in the event Recabo, Jr. were found unqualified, relying on the same certificate of votes to establish that he was the second highest vote-getter.

• Substantial Compliance: Petitioner maintained that the certificate of nomination and acceptance signed by only one of two authorized party officers substantially complied with the requirements for being an official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, and that his mother's certificate likewise substantially complied.
• Popular Will: Petitioner argued that the electorate of Mainit had spoken in his favor by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes, and that the popular will as expressed in the votes cast should prevail over formal defects in his certificate of candidacy.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that by cancelling his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available except the petition for certiorari.

• Validity of Single-Signature Nomination: Respondent Reyes, Jr. argued before the COMELEC that the certificate of nomination signed only by representative Matugas substantially complied with party requirements and was therefore valid as far as the party was concerned, making his nomination valid.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Respondent Reyes, Jr. maintained that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to rule on who between the two candidates had a valid certificate of candidacy.
• Alleged Falsification: Respondent Reyes, Jr. claimed that the certificate of nomination in favor of petitioner Reyes, Jr. (Annex A-1) was falsified because it was notarized in Mainit, Surigao del Norte at a time when the signatories Fidel Ramos and Jose de Venecia, Jr. were not in said place, though no evidence was presented to support this assertion.
• Proclamation as Second Placer: Before the Supreme Court, respondent Reyes, Jr. filed a motion seeking that, in the event the Court affirmed the non-qualification of Recabo, Jr., he should be proclaimed winner and assume the position of vice-mayor, counting on the certificate of votes to establish that he was the second highest winning candidate.

• Sufficiency of Election Results: Whether the certificate of votes and certified list of winning candidates submitted by petitioner are sufficient to establish the true and genuine results of the election.
• Validity of Certificate of Nomination: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling petitioner's certificate of candidacy on the ground that his certificate of nomination and acceptance was invalid for lack of the joint signature of both authorized party officers.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: Whether private respondent Reyes, Jr. should be proclaimed as the duly elected vice-mayor in the event petitioner is found disqualified or unqualified.

• Sufficiency of Election Results: No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are, pursuant to Sections 231, 233–236, and 238 of B.P. Blg. 881, and the certificate submitted did not conform to the requirements of Section 16 of R.A. 6646.
• Validity of Certificate of Nomination: No. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion; its findings were supported by documentary evidence and within its jurisdiction under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 2977.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: No. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified; the vacancy must be filled under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

• Sufficiency of Election Results: The Court resolved this issue first, as petitioner invoked the doctrine that technicalities cannot frustrate the people's will. That doctrine, however, finds no application where the election results have not been duly established. Under Section 17 of R.A. 6646, a certificate of votes is admissible only to prove tampering, alteration, falsification, or other anomalies in the election returns — not to establish the true results. Only election returns serve that function, pursuant to Sections 231, 233–236, and 238 of B.P. Blg. 881. The certificate of votes submitted by petitioner failed to conform to Section 16 of R.A. 6646, which requires that it state the number of votes in words and figures, the precinct number, the total number of voters who voted, the time issued, and that it be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board of election inspectors. The document was merely certified by an acting election officer and lacked these requisites. The certified list of winning candidates was likewise insufficient. Because the results of the election had not been duly established, the doctrine that mere technicality cannot frustrate the people's will was inapplicable.

• Validity of Certificate of Nomination: In certiorari proceedings, the central inquiry is whether the lower tribunal acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The Court found the COMELEC's findings neither whimsical nor capricious. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977, Section 5, requires that the certificate of nomination be duly signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general, or any other party officer duly authorized in writing. LAKAS NUCD-UMDP had issued an authorization designating two officers — Matugas and Barbers — to jointly nominate, sign, and attest certificates of nomination. The certificate's own language — "WE … hereby nominate" and "WITNESS OUR HANDS" — manifested the intent that both signatures were required for validity. Only Matugas signed; Barbers' space was blank. The COMELEC, as the source of the rule, was the best authority to interpret it. The chronology of events reinforced the cancellation: Candelaria Recabo filed on March 25, withdrew on March 31; Reyes, Jr. filed on March 27; Recabo, Jr. filed on April 2 as substitute. By the time Recabo, Jr. filed, Reyes, Jr. had already filed as the official LAKAS candidate, leaving no vacancy to be substituted. Allowing Recabo, Jr. to run would permit a single party to field multiple candidates for one position, mocking the electoral process. Furthermore, even if Recabo, Jr. were treated as an independent candidate due to the invalidity of his nomination, his certificate of candidacy would still be cancelled as filed out of time: Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 set the deadline for municipal positions at midnight of March 27, 1998, while Section 11 allowed substitute candidates to file up to mid-day of election day. Recabo, Jr. filed on April 2, 1998 — within the substitution period but well beyond the independent-candidate deadline. A certificate filed beyond the deadline is not valid.

• Proclamation of Second Placer: Reyes, Jr. sought proclamation as the second highest vote-getter, relying on the same certificate of votes. The Court rejected this on two grounds. First, the certificate of votes was insufficient to establish the true results, as already explained; a certificate of canvass based on election returns is required for proclamation. Second, it is settled that the disqualification or non-qualification of the winner does not justify proclaiming the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes. The second placer was repudiated by the electorate and cannot be presumed to have received the votes cast for the disqualified candidate. Accordingly, should Recabo, Jr. have obtained the plurality of votes, the vacancy caused by his ineligibility must be filled under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become the vice-mayor.

• Insufficiency of Certificate of Votes to Establish Election Results — A certificate of votes is admissible in evidence only to prove tampering, alteration, falsification, or other anomalies in the election returns, not to establish the true and genuine results of the election. Only election returns serve that purpose, pursuant to Sections 231, 233–236, and 238 of B.P. Blg. 881. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's attempt to prove his electoral victory through a certificate of votes that failed to conform to the formal requirements of Section 16 of R.A. 6646.

• Second Placer Rule — The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified or unqualified. The second placer lost the election and was repudiated by the electorate; it cannot be assumed that the votes for the disqualified candidate would have gone to the second placer. The Court applied this rule to deny Reyes, Jr.'s motion for proclamation and directed that any vacancy be filled under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

• COMELEC as Best Interpreter of Its Own Rules — The best authority to interpret a rule is the source of the rule itself; in this case, the COMELEC, which issued Resolution No. 2977 governing certificates of candidacy and nomination. The Court deferred to the COMELEC's interpretation that the certificate of nomination required joint signatures of both authorized party officers.

• Filing Deadline for Independent Candidates — A certificate of candidacy filed beyond the deadline prescribed by COMELEC rules is not valid. A substitute candidate whose nomination is invalid cannot retroactively claim independent status to cure a late filing, because the deadline for independent candidates had already lapsed.

• "A certificate of votes does not constitutes sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are, pursuant to Sections 231, 233-236, and 238 of B.P. Blg. 881." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for rejecting petitioner's attempt to establish election results through a certificate of votes rather than election returns.

• "To simplistically assume that the second would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters." — This quotation, adopted from Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, states the canonical formulation of the second-placer rule and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on disqualification and succession.

• "Disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery of our electoral process, which envisions one candidate from a political party for each position." — This passage explains the policy rationale behind the COMELEC's cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and the Court's affirmation thereof.

• Garay vs. Commission on Elections, 261 SCRA 224 (1996) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that a certificate of votes is not sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election, and that only election returns serve that function.

• Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 254 SCRA 514 — Followed. Cited for the settled doctrine that the second placer cannot be proclaimed upon disqualification of the winning candidate, as the second placer was repudiated by the electorate.

• Bocobo vs. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 576 — Followed. Cited for the principle that the COMELEC, as the source of its own rules, is the best authority to interpret them.

• Gador vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 431 — Followed. Cited for the well-settled rule that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the deadline is not valid.

• Bashier vs. Commission on Elections, 43 SCRA 238 — Followed. Cited for the principle that in special civil actions for certiorari, the main issue is jurisdiction — lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

• De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 — Distinguished. Petitioner cited this case for the doctrine that technicalities cannot frustrate the people's will, but the Court found it inapplicable because the election results had not been duly established.

• Section 5, COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 — Requires that the certificate of nomination by registered political parties of their official candidates be filed with the certificate of candidacy, duly signed and attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general, or any other party officer duly authorized in writing. Applied to determine that the certificate of nomination required the joint signatures of both authorized officers.

• Section 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 — Sets the period for filing certificates of candidacy for municipal positions (in areas other than the ARMM) from January 11, 1998 up to midnight of March 27, 1998. Applied to show that petitioner's April 2, 1998 filing was beyond the deadline for independent candidates.

• Section 11, COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 — Governs substitution of candidates in case of death, disqualification, or withdrawal, allowing the substitute to file up to mid-day of election day, and prohibiting substitution for independent candidates. Applied to determine that petitioner's filing was within the substitution period but that his mother, if deemed an independent candidate due to invalid nomination, could not be validly substituted.

• Section 69, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Authorizes the COMELEC, motu proprio or upon valid petition, to refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or demonstrating no bona fide intention to run. Applied to uphold the COMELEC's cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

• Section 16, R.A. 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987) — Prescribes the contents and authentication requirements of a certificate of votes, including that it be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board of election inspectors. Applied to find the certificate of votes submitted by petitioner deficient and insufficient to establish election results.

• Section 17, R.A. 6646 — Provides that a certificate of votes is admissible in evidence only to prove tampering, alteration, falsification, or anomaly in the election returns, when duly authenticated. Applied to limit the evidentiary value of the certificate of votes.

• Sections 231, 233–236, 238, B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Govern the canvass of election returns and the preparation of certificates of canvass as the basis for proclamation. Applied to establish that only election returns, not certificates of votes, are sufficient evidence of the true results of the election.

• Section 44, Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160) — Provides that a permanent vacancy in the office of vice-mayor shall be filled by the highest ranking sanggunian member. Applied to determine the proper manner of filling the vacancy caused by petitioner's ineligibility, rather than proclaiming the second placer.

• Section 4, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Empowers the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Cited as constitutional basis for the COMELEC's mandate to hold free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred. Puno, J., was abroad on official business. Panganiban, J., was on leave. Pardo, J., took no part.