Rebultan vs. Spouses Daganta

A driver turning left at an intersection must yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle on the right; the statutory right of way is not absolute and does not relieve either driver of the duty to exercise reasonable prudence. The contributory negligence of a driver is not imputed to a passenger who exercised no control over the driver, and both negligent drivers are joint tortfeasors solidarily liable to the passenger's heirs.

Cecilio Rebultan, Sr. was a DENR employee who was provided a Kia Ceres service vehicle and was driven by Jaime Lomotos. Willie Viloria drove a passenger jeepney owned by Spouses Edmundo and Marvelyn P. Daganta. The dispute concerns liability for a vehicular collision under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, particularly its right-of-way and reckless-driving provisions, and the Civil Code rule presuming negligence from violation of traffic regulations.

On May 3, 1999, at about 6:30 in the morning, along the National Highway in Barangay Mabanglit, Cabangan, Zambales, Cecilio Rebultan, Sr., then 60 years old, and his driver Jaime Lomotos were on board a Kia Ceres on their way to report for work at the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Masinloc, Zambales. The Kia Ceres was traveling northbound to Iba, Zambales, while an Isuzu-powered passenger jeepney driven by Willie Viloria and owned by Spouses Edmundo and Marvelyn P. Daganta was traveling southbound to Cabangan, Zambales. The vehicles figured in a vehicular accident. The powerful impact caused serious physical injuries to Rebultan, Sr. and Lomotos and physical damage to both vehicles; Rebultan, Sr. later died from his injuries.

On February 15, 2000, the heirs of Rebultan, Sr. — Visitacion R. Rebultan, Cecilou R. Bayona, Cecilio Rebultan, Jr., and Vilna R. Labrador — filed a complaint for damages against Viloria and Spouses Daganta as owners of the jeepney. They prayed for compensation for the loss of life and earning capacity of Rebultan, Sr., actual and moral damages, attorney's and appearance fees, and other just and equitable reliefs. In their answer with counterclaims, respondents alleged that the driver of the Kia Ceres was negligent and should be responsible for Rebultan, Sr.'s death and the damages to the motor vehicles; they sought P123,550.00 for repair of the jeepney, P700.00 per day from May 3, 1999 as Viloria's lost income, P20,000.00 attorney's fees and P1,000.00 per hearing as appearance fees, and P5,000.00 miscellaneous expenses. Spouses Daganta later filed a third-party complaint against Lomotos, who denied liability and sought moral damages, appearance fees, and attorney's fees on his counterclaim.

According to petitioners, Viloria's testimony was conflicting and showed he had not yet made a left turn toward the barangay road. They relied on Lomotos's testimony that Viloria was racing a mini-bus and abruptly swerved to the left, corroborated by Traffic Accident Report No. 99002 dated May 3, 1999. Petitioners also asserted that the sketch relied upon by the CA was prepared by respondents' counsel and only to confirm the jeepney's location at the time of the accident; that the photographs were taken only after the collision when both vehicles were already on the same side of the highway and were not authenticated by the persons who took them; that the inconsistency in Viloria's testimony as to why he was turning left confirmed it was a mere afterthought to avoid the approaching Kia Ceres; and that the evidence showed Lomotos was driving along the proper lane while Viloria had overtaken a bigger vehicle in disregard of the law against reckless driving.

After trial, the RTC found Viloria negligent in driving the jeepney, concluding that his continuous driving even when turning left going to a street was the proximate cause of the accident. It held Spouses Daganta vicariously liable as Viloria's employers and solidarily liable with him to the heirs of Rebultan, Sr. for actual damages of P71,857.15, moral damages of P50,000.00, loss of earning capacity of P1,552,731.72, and attorney's fees of P50,000.00. The RTC dismissed the third-party complaint against Lomotos.

On appeal, the CA reversed and dismissed the complaint. It found that Lomotos, not Viloria, was negligent; that under Section 42(a) and (b), Article III, Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 4136, Viloria had the right of way as the driver of the vehicle on the right and because he had already turned toward the left of the intersection; that Caminos, Jr. vs. People was squarely applicable; and that Lomotos, being in violation of a traffic regulation, was presumed negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code. Because there was no negligence on Viloria's part, the CA held that Spouses Daganta's vicarious liability could not be imposed. It also noted that while respondents had filed a third-party complaint against Lomotos, it could not reverse the dismissal because respondents did not appeal the same.

• Negligence of Viloria: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in finding no negligence on the part of Viloria despite evidence that Viloria's conflicting testimony showed he had not yet made a left turn toward the barangay road.
• Lomotos's Testimony and Traffic Report: Petitioners maintained that Lomotos's testimony established that Viloria was racing a mini-bus and abruptly swerved to the left, which was corroborated by Traffic Accident Report No. 99002 dated May 3, 1999.
• Unreliable Sketch and Photographs: Petitioners argued that the sketch relied upon by the CA was prepared by respondents' counsel and only to confirm the jeepney's location at the time of the accident, and that the photographs were taken only after the collision when both vehicles were already on the same side of the highway and were not authenticated by the person or persons who took them.
• Inconsistent Testimony: Petitioners asserted that the inconsistency in Viloria's testimony as to the reason why he was turning left confirms that it was a mere afterthought to avoid the approaching Kia Ceres.
• Proper Lane and Reckless Overtaking: Petitioners argued that the evidence showed Lomotos was driving the Kia Ceres along the proper lane, while Viloria had overtaken a bigger vehicle in disregard of the law against reckless driving.
• Reply: Petitioners reiterated that the traffic accident report and the testimonial evidence show that Viloria was negligent when he recklessly overtook a mini-bus, and only maneuvered the jeepney to the left side of the road to avoid collision with the on-coming Kia Ceres.

• Adoption of Prior Arguments: Respondents manifested that there being no new matters raised by petitioners, they are adopting their previous arguments in their "Opposition" dated May 30, 2011 filed before the CA.
• Negligence of Kia Ceres Driver: In their answer with counterclaims, respondents alleged that it was the driver of the Kia Ceres who was negligent and who should be held responsible for the death of Rebultan, Sr. and the damages to the motor vehicles.
• Counterclaims: Respondents sought payment of P123,550.00 for repair of the jeepney; P700.00 per day beginning May 3, 1999 as lost income of Viloria; P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per hearing as attorney's and appearance fees; and P5,000.00 as miscellaneous expenses.

• Negligence of Viloria: Whether Viloria was negligent in driving the jeepney at the time of the collision.
• Right of Way and Lomotos's Negligence: Whether the CA correctly ruled that Lomotos was negligent and that Viloria had the right of way under Section 42(a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 4136.
• Recovery Despite Contributory Negligence: Whether the concurring negligence of Lomotos, as driver of the Kia Ceres, bars the heirs of Rebultan, Sr. from recovering damages from Viloria.
• Vicarious Liability of Spouses Daganta: Whether Spouses Daganta are vicariously liable as employers of Viloria.
• Liability of Lomotos: Whether judgment may be rendered against Lomotos despite the dismissal of the third-party complaint not having been appealed.

• Negligence of Viloria: Yes. Viloria was negligent; he failed to yield to the Kia Ceres and did not look to his right before turning left, in violation of Republic Act No. 4136.
• Right of Way and Lomotos's Negligence: The CA erred in holding that Viloria had the right of way. The Kia Ceres had the right of way, but Lomotos was also negligent for overspeeding.
• Recovery Despite Contributory Negligence: No. The contributory negligence of Lomotos does not bar the heirs from recovering from Viloria; both drivers are joint tortfeasors solidarily liable.
• Vicarious Liability of Spouses Daganta: Yes. As employers of Viloria, Spouses Daganta are vicariously liable; the RTC decision was reinstated.
• Liability of Lomotos: No. No judgment may be rendered against Lomotos because the dismissal of the third-party complaint was not appealed and he is not a party to the case before the Supreme Court.

• Negligence of Viloria: Under Section 48 of R.A. No. 4136, no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering width, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility, and other conditions, or so as to endanger property or the safety or rights of any person. Viloria admitted that he did not look to his right and continuously drove despite being required by law to give way, and that he did not bother to look at the south to see if there were other vehicles. Just a short distance from approaching the intersection, he overtook a mini-bus as evidenced by Traffic Accident Report No. 99002. The accident would have been avoided had Viloria carefully approached and made a left turn in the intersection with due regard to the right of way accorded in favor of Lomotos or anyone coming from the latter's direction. Regardless of whether Lomotos was overspeeding, Viloria ought to have exercised the prudence of a diligent driver in making a turn at a danger zone; his omission constituted negligence.
• Right of Way and Lomotos's Negligence: The CA relied on Section 42(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 4136 and Caminos, Jr. vs. People. Section 42(a) provides that when two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise provided, and a driver traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits any right of way. Section 42(b) provides that a driver approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of the first-mentioned vehicle, provided the left-turning driver has given a plainly visible signal. In Caminos, Jr., the Court interpreted these provisions to mean that the vehicle making a turn to the left is under the duty to yield to the vehicle approaching from the opposite lane on the right. The CA misconstrued Caminos, Jr. when it held that the driver turning left had the right of way. The Kia Ceres had the right of way, and the CA's conclusion that the jeepney was already at the intersection, making it the favored driver, was not supported by the records. Nevertheless, Lomotos was also negligent: Traffic Accident Report No. 99002 supported that he was guilty of "overspeeding," and his error was listed as driving "too fast," corroborated by respondents' witness Ronald Vivero, who relayed that the Kia Ceres was approaching fast and made a loud screech due to its brakes. Thus, the CA's conclusion that Lomotos was negligent at the time of the collision was affirmed.
• Recovery Despite Contributory Negligence: In Junio vs. Manila Railroad Co., the Court clarified that the contributory negligence of drivers does not bar passengers or their heirs from recovering damages from those who were at fault. The negligence of a driver who is guilty of contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he sustains no relation of master and servant; this rule is applied more strictly when hired cars or those engaged in public service are involved. As long as no control is exercised by the passenger in the concept of a master or principal, the driver's negligence cannot be imputed to the passenger and bar the latter from claiming damages. Lomotos acted as the designated driver of Rebultan, Sr. in his service vehicle provided by the DENR; thus, the real employer of Lomotos is the DENR, and Rebultan, Sr. was merely an intermediate and superior employee or agent. While it may be inferred that Rebultan, Sr. had authority to give instructions to Lomotos, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. Therefore, the concurring negligence of Lomotos did not foreclose the heirs from recovering damages from Viloria.
• Vicarious Liability of Spouses Daganta: Because Viloria was negligent, Spouses Daganta's vicarious liability as his employers can be imposed. The RTC found them solidarily liable with Viloria, and the Supreme Court reinstated the RTC Decision.
• Liability of Lomotos: Both drivers were negligent and are joint tortfeasors solidarily liable to the heirs of the deceased. However, since the dismissal of the third-party complaint against Lomotos was not appealed by respondents, and Lomotos is not a party to the case before the Supreme Court, the Court had no authority to render judgment against him.

• Right of way at intersections under Section 42(a) and (b), R.A. No. 4136 — When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left must yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise provided; a driver traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits any right of way. A driver approaching but not having entered an intersection must yield to a vehicle within the intersection or turning left across his line of travel, provided the left-turning driver has given a plainly visible signal. The rule has been liberally applied to vehicles approaching from directly opposite directions, so that the vehicle making a left-hand turn is under the duty of yielding to the vehicle approaching from the opposite lane on the right. In this case, the Kia Ceres had the right of way, and the jeepney making a left turn had the duty to yield.
• Right of way is not absolute — The statutory right of way is not a magic word that gives the favored driver unbridled discretion in driving and the opposite party the complete duty to be on the lookout. It does not relieve the favored driver from the obligation to exercise prudence with due regard to all circumstances and road conditions, and the favored driver cannot arbitrarily exercise the right. The Court applied this by holding that even if Lomotos was overspeeding, Viloria still had to exercise the prudence of a diligent driver in making a left turn at a danger zone.
• Reckless driving under Section 48, R.A. No. 4136 — No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility, and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger property or the safety or rights of any person or cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. Viloria violated this provision by failing to look to his right, continuously driving despite being required to give way, and overtaking a mini-bus near the intersection.
• Presumption of negligence from violation of traffic regulation — Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. The CA invoked this presumption against Lomotos, and the Supreme Court affirmed Lomotos's negligence because Traffic Accident Report No. 99002 showed he was overspeeding.
• Contributory negligence of driver not imputed to passenger — The negligence of a driver who is guilty of contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied more strictly when hired cars or those engaged in public service are involved. The Court applied it to hold that Lomotos's concurring negligence did not bar Rebultan, Sr.'s heirs from recovering damages from Viloria.
• Joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable — Both drivers were negligent when they failed to observe basic traffic rules designed for the safety of their fellow motorists and passengers, making them joint tortfeasors solidarily liable to the heirs of the deceased. However, no judgment could be rendered against Lomotos because the dismissal of the third-party complaint was not appealed and he was not a party before the Supreme Court.
• Vicarious liability of employers — Employers are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their employees. Because Viloria was negligent, Spouses Daganta, as his employers, were held vicariously liable, and the RTC Decision holding them solidarily liable was reinstated.

• "The provision [Section 42 (a) and (b) of R.A. No. 4136 governs the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same direction and one of them intends [to] make a turn on either side of the road. But the rule embodied in the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in the United States, has also been liberally applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach an intersection from directly opposite directions at approximately the same time on the same street and one of them attempts to make a left-hand turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his right, the vehicle making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the other." — This passage, quoted from Caminos, Jr. vs. People, states the controlling interpretation of the right-of-way rule and establishes that the left-turning vehicle must yield to the vehicle approaching from the opposite lane on the right.
• "Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection. Thus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to occur." — This excerpt defines the non-absolute nature of the statutory right of way and supports the holding that both drivers remained obligated to drive with prudence.
• "Although this question is, perhaps, raised in this jurisdiction for the first time, it is, nevertheless, a well recognized principle of law that the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he sustains no relation of master and servant." — This passage, quoted from Junio vs. Manila Railroad Co., is the ratio for allowing the heirs of Rebultan, Sr. to recover despite Lomotos's contributory negligence.
• "In sum, we hold that both drivers were negligent when they failed to observe basic traffic rules designed for the safety of their fellow motorists and passengers. This makes them joint tortfeasors who are solidarity liable to the heirs of the deceased." — This is the Court's summary conclusion on liability, establishing that both drivers were negligent and solidarily liable to the heirs, subject to the procedural bar against rendering judgment against Lomotos.

• Caminos, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 348 — The Court relied on this case to interpret Section 42(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 4136, holding that the vehicle making a left turn must yield to the vehicle approaching from the opposite lane on the right, and that the right of way is not absolute. The CA misconstrued this precedent.
• Junio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 58 Phil. 176 (1933) — The Court cited this as early authority that the contributory negligence of a driver cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control over the driver and no master-servant relation with him, thereby allowing the heirs to recover damages from Viloria despite Lomotos's negligence.
• Adzuara vs. Court of Appeals — Cited in the Court's quotation from Caminos, Jr. for the rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over one making a turn, but if the person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter is bound to give way.
• Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281 — Cited for the exceptions to the rule that the Court of Appeals' findings of fact are conclusive in a Rule 45 petition, including contradictory factual findings and manifestly mistaken inferences.
• Jayme vs. Apostol, G.R. No. 163609, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 41 — Cited for the principle that no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation, supporting the ruling that Lomotos's negligence was not imputed to Rebultan, Sr.
• Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Ching, G.R. No. 161803, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 560 — Cited in support of the conclusion that both negligent drivers are joint tortfeasors solidarily liable to the heirs of the deceased.

• Section 42(a) and (b), Article III, Chapter IV, Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) — Governs right of way at intersections. Section 42(a) requires the driver on the left to yield to the vehicle on the right when two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, and a driver traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits any right of way. Section 42(b) requires a driver approaching but not having entered an intersection to yield to a vehicle within the intersection or turning left across his line of travel, provided the left-turning driver has given a plainly visible signal. The Court applied these provisions to hold that the Kia Ceres had the right of way and the jeepney making a left turn had the duty to yield.
• Section 48, Republic Act No. 4136 — Defines reckless driving and prohibits operating a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility, and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger property or the safety or rights of any person or cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway. The Court applied it to Viloria, whose failure to look to his right, continuous driving despite the duty to give way, and overtaking near the intersection constituted negligence.
• Article 2185, Civil Code — Provides that a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. The CA invoked this presumption against Lomotos, and the Supreme Court affirmed Lomotos's negligence because Traffic Accident Report No. 99002 showed he was overspeeding.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari raising only questions of law. The Court acknowledged this limitation but reviewed the factual finding of negligence because the RTC and CA had contradictory factual findings and the CA made a manifestly mistaken inference from its findings.

Del Castillo, Tijam, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. Leonardo-De Castro, J., on official leave.