Rebamonte vs. Lucero

A party is estopped by laches from questioning the jurisdiction of a court after actively participating in proceedings for an unreasonable length of time, where the party had full knowledge of the jurisdictional defect, sought affirmative relief, and failed to raise the objection despite ample opportunity, even though jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be bargained away.

Lot No. 1305-A, containing 47,817 square meters in Mamali II, Lambayong, Sultan Kudarat, was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-17712 in the name of respondent Guillermo Lucero. The property was previously owned by Guillermo's parents, Marcos Lucero and Tomasa Rebamonte. In 1970, the parents mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure a loan. After foreclosure and repurchase, Marcos and Tomasa sold the entire lot to Guillermo on November 14, 1980. Prior to this sale, three separate unregistered transactions covering three hectares of the lot were allegedly executed in favor of petitioner Lino Rebamonte, Tomasa's cousin: a private receipt dated February 5, 1976 evidencing the sale of one hectare by Tomasa; a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 29, 1976 for one hectare sold by Guillermo's sister Josefina Lucero-Oprecio; and another Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 17, 1980 for one hectare sold by another sister, Agripina Lucero-Reyes. Following Guillermo's registration of the entire lot in his name, petitioner Lino remained in possession of the three hectares, prompting Guillermo and his wife to file an action for recovery in 1990.

• Nature of the Action: The case originated from a complaint filed by respondents Spouses Guillermo and Genoveva Lucero against petitioners Spouses Lino and Teresita Rebamonte before the RTC of Tacurong City. The complaint sought recovery of real property, possession, quieting of title, damages, and attorney's fees concerning two hectares of Lot No. 1305-A allegedly occupied by petitioners without valid title.

• The Alleged Sales to Petitioner Lino: Three transactions were alleged to have transferred portions of Lot No. 1305-A to petitioner Lino Rebamonte prior to the sale of the entire lot to respondent Guillermo Lucero: (1) a private receipt dated February 5, 1976 evidencing the sale of one hectare by Tomasa Rebamonte (Guillermo's mother and Lino's cousin); (2) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 29, 1976 conveying one hectare by Josefina Lucero-Oprecio (Guillermo's sister); and (3) a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 17, 1980 conveying one hectare by Agripina Lucero-Reyes (another sister). These sales were unregistered, and petitioners claimed that Josefina and Agripina had received the portions as advance inheritance under Ilocano practice.

• Respondents' Position: Respondents contended that Josefina and Agripina had no right to convey any portion of the lot as their parents Marcos and Tomasa were still alive and had never authorized such sales. They argued that the Deeds of Absolute Sale were invalid and that the private receipt from Tomasa lacked the formalities of a valid contract.

• Procedural History and Participation: Petitioners filed an Answer and Amended Answer, and actively participated in all stages of the RTC proceedings, including pre-trial, trial presentation of evidence, and cross-examination of witnesses. They also filed a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief. After the RTC rendered an adverse judgment in 2012, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration and subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals. Following the CA's affirmance in 2017 and denial of reconsideration in 2018, they filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari in 2018.

• Novel Issues Raised on Appeal: For the first time before the Supreme Court, petitioners raised three procedural issues: (1) that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because the assessed value of the subject property (₱4,730.00 for two hectares, or ₱11,120.00 for the entire lot) fell within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court under BP 129; (2) that there was defective service of summons upon petitioner Teresita Rebamonte; and (3) that respondents failed to effect substitution for the death of Guillermo Lucero in September 2000, allegedly violating Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that pursuant to BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7691, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00. They maintained that since the assessed value of the subject two hectares was only ₱4,730.00 (and the entire lot was ₱11,120.00), the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

• Defective Service of Summons: Petitioners contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Teresita Rebamonte because the process server resorted to substituted service without complying with the requirements therefor.

• Failure to Effect Substitution: Petitioners argued that respondent Guillermo Lucero died in September 2000, yet his counsel failed to inform the court or effect substitution pursuant to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, rendering the RTC decision null and void.

• Validity of the Deeds of Sale: Petitioners maintained that Josefina and Agripina had valid rights over the subject portions as advance inheritance from their parents, and thus the Deeds of Absolute Sale they executed in favor of petitioner Lino were valid and binding.

• Estoppel by Laches: Respondents countered that petitioners were barred by estoppel by laches from raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time after 28 years of active litigation, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. They emphasized that petitioners had full knowledge of the assessed value from the complaint, filed responsive pleadings and a counterclaim, participated in trial, and sought appellate relief without ever questioning jurisdiction.

• Voluntary Appearance: Respondents argued that petitioners' voluntary appearance in the action, evidenced by their filing of answers, counterclaim, and active participation in trial, was equivalent to service of summons under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.

• Harmless Procedural Defects: Respondents maintained that mere failure to substitute a deceased party does not nullify a decision absent a showing of violation of due process, and that respondents were able to fully present their evidence despite the non-substitution.

• Nullity of the Deeds: Respondents argued that Josefina and Agripina had no legal capacity to sell the property as they were not owners and had no authorization from their parents, making the deeds null and void ab initio.

• Jurisdiction and Estoppel by Laches: Whether the petitioners are estopped by laches from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction over the subject matter despite the assessed value falling within MTC jurisdiction.

• Defective Service of Summons: Whether the alleged defective service of summons upon petitioner Teresita Rebamonte invalidates the proceedings, notwithstanding petitioners' active participation.

• Substitution of Deceased Party: Whether the failure to effect substitution for the death of respondent Guillermo Lucero in 2000 renders the RTC decision null and void.

• Validity of Deeds of Absolute Sale: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 29, 1976 and June 17, 1980 executed by Josefina and Agripina.

• Jurisdiction and Estoppel by Laches: The RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because the assessed value of the property (₱11,120.00 for the entire lot, or ₱4,730.00 for the two hectares in dispute) was below the ₱20,000.00 threshold for RTC jurisdiction under Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691. However, petitioners are estopped by laches from raising this defect after 28 years of active and participative litigation, including filing answers, a counterclaim, presenting evidence, and appealing to the CA. Applying the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the presence of all exceptional circumstances—statutory right to question jurisdiction, failure to invoke it despite full knowledge, unreasonable delay (28 years), and active participation seeking affirmative relief—bars petitioners from assailing jurisdiction for reasons of equity, fair play, and public policy.

• Defective Service of Summons: The argument fails. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Petitioners' filing of answers, counterclaim, participation in pre-trial and trial, and pursuit of appellate remedies constitute voluntary appearance that cured any defect in the service of summons.

• Substitution of Deceased Party: The contention lacks merit. Issues not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Moreover, mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient to nullify a decision absent proof of undeniable violation of due process. Respondents were not prejudiced in their right to be heard as they fully participated in the trial.

• Validity of Deeds of Absolute Sale: No reversible error was committed by the CA in affirming the nullity of the two deeds. Josefina and Agripina were not owners of the property and had no documentary evidence of authorization from their parents Marcos and Tomasa to sell the subject portions. Without legal capacity to transfer ownership, the deeds are null and void.

• Estoppel by Laches (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy Doctrine) — While jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be bargained away, a party may be barred by estoppel from raising lack of jurisdiction after an unreasonable lapse of time during which the party actively participated in the proceedings and sought affirmative relief. The doctrine applies when the following exceptional circumstances concur: (1) existence of a statutory right to question jurisdiction; (2) non-invocation of such right despite full knowledge; (3) lapse of an unreasonable length of time before raising the issue; and (4) active participation in the case and seeking affirmative relief. The Court clarified that this is not an exception to the rule on jurisdiction but a waiver based on equity.

• Voluntary Appearance as Equivalent to Service — Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action, evidenced by filing responsive pleadings, interposing counterclaims, and participating in trial, is equivalent to service of summons and validates the court's jurisdiction over the person.

• Non-Substitution of Parties — Mere failure to substitute a deceased party does not nullify a trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove an undeniable violation of due process. Where the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, and the party was able to present evidence, noncompliance with formal substitution rules does not affect the validity of the decision.

• "Because of the elementary rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law, jurisdiction cannot be bargained away by the litigant-parties. Otherwise stated, as a general rule, a party cannot be estopped in raising the ground of lack of jurisdiction. And such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, whether during trial or on appeal. Nevertheless, it is well-established in our jurisprudence that, upon the existence of certain exceptional circumstances, a party is deemed to have waived his or her right to raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction."

• "The edict in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is not an exception to the rule on jurisdiction. A court that does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case will not acquire jurisdiction because of estoppel. Rather, the edict in Tijam must be appreciated as a waiver of a party's right to raise jurisdiction based on the doctrine of equity."

• "The Court refuses to reward the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's lethargy and ineptitude by taking cognizance of their argument on lack of jurisdiction. Equity, fair play, and public policy prevent the Court from doing so."

• "The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of one's defense. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision."

• Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968) — Established the doctrine of estoppel by laches in jurisdictional challenges; controlling precedent followed and applied to bar petitioners' belated objection after 28 years.

• Amoguis v. Ballado, G.R. No. 189626, August 20, 2018 — Clarified that Tijam is not an exception to jurisdiction rules but a waiver based on equity; cited for the four exceptional circumstances required for estoppel to apply.

• Megan Sugar Corp. v. RTC, Br. 68, Dumangas, Iloilo, et al., 665 Phil. 245 (2011) — Cited for the principle that active participation and failure to object to jurisdiction constitutes invocation of that jurisdiction.

• Napere v. Barbarona, et al., 567 Phil. 354 (2008) — Cited for the rule that mere failure to substitute a deceased party is insufficient to nullify a decision absent due process violations.

• Section 33(3), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Defines the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00 (outside Metro Manila).

• Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court — Provides that a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.

• Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court — Governs the substitution of parties in case of death, with the deceased's legal representatives or heirs substituting the deceased party.

Carpio (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ.