Re: Ong

A judge's association with a litigant whose case was pending before his court, even after the case has been terminated, constitutes gross misconduct and impropriety when it creates the appearance of partiality and compromises public confidence in the Judiciary. The rule on propriety is not limited to pending and prospective litigations; judges must at all times be beyond reproach and avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.

The respondent was an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, the special graft court tasked with hearing corruption cases against public officials. In the middle of 2013, the "pork barrel scam" controversy erupted, involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus foundations sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund. During the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigation, whistle-blowers who were former employees of Janet Lim-Napoles, the alleged mastermind of the scam, identified respondent as Napoles' "contact" in the Sandiganbayan. The Court En Banc, pursuant to its power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary under Article VIII, Sections 6 and 11 of the 1987 Constitution, conducted a motu proprio investigation into the allegations.

The respondent, Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, was the Chairman of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, which handled Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769, known as the Kevlar helmet cases. These cases, filed in 2001, involved the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers owned by Janet Lim-Napoles. The prosecution alleged that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released payment although there was yet no delivery of the helmets, that the suppliers were mere dummies of Napoles, and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A. In a Decision promulgated on October 28, 2010, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division acquitted Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps, while convicting Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public Documents.

In the middle of 2013, the "pork barrel scam" controversy erupted, involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus foundations. During the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigation, whistle-blowers Benhur Luy and Marina Sula, former employees of Napoles, testified about respondent's involvement with Napoles. Luy, Napoles' second cousin and personal assistant, testified that Napoles told him she had a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan who would help her, and that this connect was respondent Justice Gregory Ong. Luy further testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, and that she was confident ("kampante") of her acquittal. Luy also narrated that in 2012, respondent visited Napoles' office twice, and on the first visit, Napoles arranged for respondent's ₱25.5 million BDO check to be deposited in her personal account, with eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 each issued to respondent as advanced interest.

Sula corroborated Luy's testimony, stating that she saw respondent at Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center in Ortigas, and that Napoles told her and other employees that respondent would help her clear the Kevlar case. Sula also testified that Napoles said she would "fix" the PDAF case in the Sandiganbayan, and when her employees jokingly mentioned respondent, Napoles retorted, "Ay huwag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

Aries Rufo, a reporter from Rappler, testified about a photograph showing respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada, which he published in an article entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice." Rufo testified that respondent was shocked when shown the photograph and explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Estrada.

In his defense, respondent vehemently denied the imputations. He claimed he never met Napoles during the pendency of the Kevlar case and could not have fixed the case, which was decided by a collegial body. He admitted visiting Napoles' office twice in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, but explained that the first visit was to thank her for arranging for him to wear the robe of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo, which he believed had healing power for his prostate cancer. He denied issuing a BDO check of ₱25.5 million and receiving eleven checks from Napoles. He also challenged the credibility of the whistle-blowers, claiming their testimonies were hearsay and conflicting.

The Investigating Justice, retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, found the testimonies of Luy and Sula credible, describing them as "candid, straightforward, and categorical" and their story as "untainted with bias and contradiction." She found that respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constituted gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. She also found respondent guilty of dishonesty for his disgraceful conduct and impropriety for violating Canon 4 on Propriety. She recommended respondent's dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any government branch or instrumentality.

• Hearsay Testimony: Respondent argued that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence, because they had no personal knowledge of the matters they testified about, which were merely told to them by Napoles.
• Collegial Decision: Respondent argued that he could not have fixed the Kevlar case because it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body, and the two other members, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, were independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced.
• No Bribery: Respondent argued that he never issued a BDO check of ₱25.5 million and did not receive eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 from Napoles, as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI and did not have any money deposited there.
• Legitimate Purpose of Visits: Respondent argued that his visits to Napoles' office were legitimate — the first to thank her for arranging access to the Black Nazarene's robe, and the second for a brief social conversation — and that there was nothing improper since the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
• Lack of Credibility of Whistle-blowers: Respondent argued that the whistle-blowers' testimonies were conflicting and therefore lacked credibility, pointing to Sula's testimony that Napoles said respondent's "talent fee" was too high, which contradicted the claim that he was her contact.
• Distinguishing Abundo vs. Mania, Jr.: Respondent cited Abundo vs. Mania, Jr. to argue that judges may socialize with persons who have cases before their court, and that the rule on propriety should be limited to pending and prospective litigations.

N/A — The case is an administrative matter initiated motu proprio by the Court En Banc; there is no separate respondent party with distinct arguments beyond the respondent's own defense, which is summarized above.

• Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case constituted gross misconduct.
• Dishonesty: Whether respondent was guilty of dishonesty for failing to disclose his visits to Napoles' office in his letter to the Chief Justice.
• Impropriety: Whether respondent's act of visiting Napoles at her office on two occasions and being photographed with her and Senator Estrada violated Canon 4 on Propriety of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Bribery and Corruption: Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against respondent.

• Gross Misconduct: Yes. Respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal constituted gross misconduct, notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the judgment.
• Dishonesty: Yes. Respondent was guilty of dishonesty for deliberately failing to disclose his visits to Napoles' office in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno, where he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.
• Impropriety: Yes. Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions and being photographed with her and Senator Estrada violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
• Bribery and Corruption: No. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against respondent, as both Luy and Sula had not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal.

• Gross Misconduct: The Court adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice, which were well-supported by the evidence on record. In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required — that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they were privy to her daily business and personal activities, and Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she had a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who would help "fix" the case. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. The Court found credible evidence of respondent's association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision, and the totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicated respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."

• Dishonesty: The Court found that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, was guilty of dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. The Court found that this was far from being a plain omission — respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan that respondent mentioned only one instance of visiting Napoles. Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Being a grave offense, dishonesty carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.

• Impropriety: The Court held that respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004. The Court rejected respondent's argument that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations, holding that judges must at all times be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety. The Court cited Sibayan-Joaquin vs. Javellana, which held that judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. The Court emphasized that it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge, because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, and the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. The Court distinguished Abundo vs. Mania, Jr., noting that Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent.

• Bribery and Corruption: The Court conceded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against respondent. Both Luy and Sula had not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case; Napoles had merely confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent. The Court cited the rule that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, and that the complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. However, the Court found that notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act, the credible evidence of respondent's association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision strongly indicated his corrupt inclinations.

• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Proceedings — In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required, defined as that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. The Court applied this standard in finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct based on the testimonies of Luy and Sula.

• Propriety and the Appearance of Propriety — Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[p]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Judges must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. The rule is not limited to pending and prospective litigations; judges must at all times be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that respondent's visits to Napoles' office and his photograph with her and Senator Estrada constituted impropriety.

• Credibility of Witnesses in Administrative Cases — The findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. The Court applied this doctrine in concurring with the Investigating Justice's assessment of the credibility of Luy and Sula.

• Quantum of Proof for Bribery Charges Against Judges — An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. The Court applied this doctrine in finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against respondent.

• "The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." — This epigraph, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, frames the Court's analysis of respondent's conduct in the context of the pork barrel scam controversy and the public scrutiny of the Judiciary.

• "We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant." — This passage articulates the controlling evidentiary standard in administrative cases, which the Court applied in finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct.

• "Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety." — This statement encapsulates the Court's holding that the rule on propriety is not limited to pending and prospective litigations, and that judges must maintain the appearance of impartiality at all times.

• "In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution." — This passage explains why respondent's visits to Napoles after the termination of the Kevlar case still constituted impropriety, as the public perception of partiality persisted.

• Camus, Jr. vs. Alegre, 583 Phil. 738, 749 (2008) — Cited for the definition of misconduct and "gross" misconduct, which the Court applied in finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct.

• Jallorina vs. Taneo-Regner, A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012, 670 SCRA 301, 307 — Cited for the substantial evidence standard in administrative proceedings, which the Court applied in evaluating the evidence against respondent.

• Atty. Velez vs. Judge Flores, 445 Phil. 54, 64 (2003) — Cited for the proposition that a judge who extorts money from a party-litigant commits a serious misconduct, and that such act corrodes respect for law and the courts.

• Ong vs. Rosete, 484 Phil. 102, 113 (2004) — Cited for the rule that an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, and that the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial.

• Caneda vs. Alaan, 425 Phil. 20, 26-27 (2002) — Cited for the rule that judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, and that they must conduct themselves in a manner that gives no ground for reproach.

• Abundo vs. Mania, Jr., 370 Phil. 850, 866-867 (1999) — Distinguished by the Court; the factual setting was not similar because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent.

• Sibayan-Joaquin vs. Javellana, 420 Phil. 584, 590 (2001) — Cited for the rule that judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality.

• De Vera vs. Rimas, 577 Phil. 136, 142-143 (2008) — Cited for the definition of dishonesty and the penalty of dismissal for this grave offense.

• Gacad vs. Clapis, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 534, 543 — Cited for the rule that findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court due to their opportunity to observe witnesses.

• Section 6, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This provision served as the basis for the Court's motu proprio investigation of respondent.

• Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Supreme Court En Banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations. This provision authorized the Court to impose the penalty of dismissal on respondent.

• Section 1, Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. The Court applied this provision in finding respondent guilty of impropriety for his visits to Napoles' office and his photograph with her and Senator Estrada.

• Section 2, Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The Court cited this provision in emphasizing the exacting standard of decorum demanded from judges.

• Canon 2, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. The Court cited this provision in finding respondent guilty of dishonesty.

• Canon 3, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides the standard of integrity for judges. The Court applied this provision in finding respondent guilty of dishonesty for failing to disclose his visits to Napoles' office.

• Section 11(A), Rule 140, Rules of Court — Provides the sanctions for serious charges against judges, including dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. The Court applied this provision in imposing the penalty of dismissal on respondent.

• Article 210, Revised Penal Code — Defines bribery, committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present received. The Court cited this provision in discussing the bribery charge against respondent.

The Decision was signed by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza filed separate concurring opinions. Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro and Arturo D. Brion took no part in the deliberations.

N/A — The provided case text does not include the content of the separate concurring and dissenting opinions, which are referenced only by title (Separate Concurring Opinion of Brion, J.; Separate Concurring Opinion of Jardeleza, J.; Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Bersamin, J.; Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Perez, J.; Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Reyes, J.; Concurring Opinion of Leonen, J.).