Re: Letter of DOH Secretary Duque III re: Spec. Pro. Case No. R-MNL-19-12843-SP

A judge who issues a writ of preliminary injunction that interferes with the prior ruling of a court of concurrent jurisdiction on the same matter—while disregarding clear information about that prior ruling—commits gross ignorance of the law and procedure, particularly where the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished and the refiling of the petition constitutes forum shopping.

The administrative matter originated from a letter dated March 9, 2020 by DOH Secretary Francisco T. Duque III addressed to Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, calling the attention of the Supreme Court to the alleged improper issuance of a preliminary injunction by RTC Manila, Branch 27 (Judge Teresa Patrimonio-Soriaso) in Spec. Pro. Case No. R-MNL-19-12843-SP, notwithstanding the denial of the same application in an earlier case before RTC Manila, Branch 12 (Judge Renata Z. Enciso), docketed as Civil Case No. 19-09240-SC. The underlying dispute concerned the DOH's blacklisting of JBros Construction Corporation arising from the "Barangay Health Stations Project," a government infrastructure program governed by Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act), the implementing contracts of which incorporated an arbitration clause pursuant to Section 59, Article XVIII of that statute.

JBros Construction Corporation (JBROS) entered into two contracts with the Department of Health (DOH) for the construction of Barangay Health Stations under a project designed to provide a functional health station in every barangay using public elementary school sites. Both contracts were executed pursuant to Section 59, Article XVIII of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act), which provided that disputes arising from contract implementation would be submitted to arbitration in the Philippines. The first contract, covering Phase I of the project, was executed on January 22, 2016 and eventually became the subject of an arbitration case between the parties.

The second contract, covering Phase II, was executed in March 2016. Under the agreement, the DOH had until March 30, 2016 to give possession of all 2,500 sites to JBROS. JBROS contended that completion of Phase II was contingent on the DOH completely delivering the identified sites. In a letter dated May 16, 2016 addressed to then DOH Secretary Janette Garin, JBROS cited various reasons for the delay, including the undue delay in determining replacement school sites and the fact that DOH Regional Directors had not been informed of the project, preventing JBROS from commencing work. The DOH suspended the second contract on May 31, 2016, by which time JBROS claimed to have accomplished at least 14.37% of the works. JBROS requested the DOH to lift the suspension, but the request went unheeded.

With Phase II suspended for almost three years, JBROS sent a Notice of Termination dated January 25, 2019 pursuant to R.A. No. 9184, which granted the contractor the right to terminate a contract suspended for at least sixty days. The DOH had thirty days from receipt to resolve the grounds for suspension or lift it; otherwise, the contract would be deemed terminated by operation of law. When the DOH failed to act, the contract was deemed terminated on February 24, 2019. JBROS was then surprised to receive a Notice of Termination from the DOH dated March 1, 2019, accompanied by a verified report dated February 21, 2019 detailing alleged irregularities committed by JBROS relative to Phase II. JBROS countered with a letter demanding payment of its claims arising from the termination. The DOH issued an Amended Notice of Termination on April 4, 2019 with a Supplemental Verified Report alleging the same grounds. JBROS, in a letter dated April 23, 2019, insisted that Phase II was terminated due to the DOH's fault.

On May 20, 2019, approximately three months after JBROS terminated the contract, the DOH issued a decision declaring the contract terminated, denying JBROS's demand for payment, blacklisting the contractor for engaging in unlawful acts relative to the contract, and demanding the return of the mobilization fee in the amount of ₱551,233,333.33. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the DOH on July 15, 2019. On July 24, 2019, the DOH issued the formal Blacklisting Order disqualifying JBROS from participating in all government procurement projects from August 28, 2019 to August 28, 2020. The Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) confirmed JBROS's inclusion in the Consolidated Blacklist Report on August 30, 2019.

Questioning the blacklisting order, JBROS filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Ante Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC, Manila. The petition was raffled to Branch 12, presided by Judge Renata Z. Enciso. In an Order dated September 26, 2019, Judge Enciso denied the prayer for preliminary injunction, reasoning that the acts sought to be enjoined had already been performed or completed prior to the filing of the petition, leaving nothing to be enjoined. She directed the parties to file their respective memoranda. JBROS then moved to dismiss the case without prejudice on October 3, 2019, claiming it could still dismiss as a matter of right since no responsive pleading had been filed. Judge Enciso granted the dismissal on October 14, 2019.

JBROS refiled the case, this time designating it as a "Petition for Interim Measure of Protection in Aid of Arbitration under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (R.A. No. 9285)" with an urgent motion for ex parte issuance of a 20-day Temporary Restraining Order of Protection (TROP). The case was raffled to Branch 27, presided by Judge Teresa Patrimonio-Soriaso. Pairing Judge Lily Joy Labayo-Patria issued the 20-day TROP on December 19, 2019. The DOH moved for reconsideration, but Judge Soriaso denied the motion in an Order dated January 20, 2020, on the ground that the 20-day TROP had already expired. Judge Soriaso then proceeded to hear the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, in an Order dated January 20, 2020, issued the writ directing the DOH to desist from implementing the termination of the contract, recall the blacklisting order, and submit a Delisting Order to the GPPB notifying it of the delisting of JBROS. The DOH, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Inhibition and a Motion for Reconsideration. DOH Secretary Duque III thereafter wrote to the Chief Justice calling attention to the alleged improper issuance of the preliminary injunction, prompting the Supreme Court to refer the matter to the OCA for investigation.

• Improper Issuance of Preliminary Injunction: The DOH, through Secretary Duque, called the attention of the Supreme Court to the alleged improper issuance of a preliminary injunction by Judge Soriaso, noting that the same application had been denied in an earlier case before RTC Manila, Branch 12 presided by Judge Enciso.
• Violation of the Doctrine of Judicial Stability: The OCA found sufficient grounds to make Judge Soriaso administratively liable when she issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the earlier dismissal order of Judge Enciso, in violation of the doctrine of judicial stability.
• Erroneous Issuance of Injunction: The OCA noted that the issuance of the writ was erroneous because the acts sought to be restrained had already been executed prior to any judicial intercession.
• Failure to Recognize Forum Shopping: The OCA observed that Judge Soriaso failed to recognize that JBROS had committed forum shopping when it moved for the dismissal of the case pending before Judge Enciso after receiving an unfavorable ruling and thereafter filed a similar petition hoping for a more favorable outcome.

• No Forum Shopping: Judge Soriaso disavowed liability for the charge of violation of forum shopping, claiming that the two petitions—one filed before Judge Enciso and the other in her sala—were two different cases that did not preclude one another, and thus no violation was made.
• No Violation of Judicial Stability: Judge Soriaso argued she did not violate the doctrine of judicial stability when she took cognizance of the special proceeding, because the civil case before Judge Enciso had already been dismissed and no outstanding order was contradicted by her grant of the writ of preliminary injunction.
• Good Faith: Judge Soriaso raised good faith, asserting she did not know of the existence of the case filed before the sala of Judge Enciso, and that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was based on the facts presented during the hearing.

• Doctrine of Judicial Stability: Whether Judge Soriaso violated the doctrine of judicial stability when she issued a writ of preliminary injunction despite a prior ruling by a court of concurrent jurisdiction denying the same relief.
• Forum Shopping: Whether Judge Soriaso failed to recognize that JBROS committed forum shopping by refiling a similar petition after receiving an unfavorable ruling from another branch.
• Propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction: Whether Judge Soriaso erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction when the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished and the underlying contract had been extinguished.
• Administrative Liability and Penalty: Whether Judge Soriaso is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure and for violating Administrative Circular No. 7-99, and what penalty should be imposed.

• Doctrine of Judicial Stability: Yes. Judge Soriaso violated the doctrine of judicial stability by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that interfered with the prior order of Judge Enciso, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, which had denied the same relief.
• Forum Shopping: Yes. The circumstances constituted a textbook example of forum shopping, as both cases involved the same parties, sought the same outcome, and required the same evidence.
• Propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction: No, the writ was improperly issued. The acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished, and the contract had long been extinguished, precluding any right to be protected by injunction.
• Administrative Liability and Penalty: Yes. Judge Soriaso was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure (fine of P40,000.00) and of the less grave offense of violating Administrative Circular No. 7-99 (additional fine of P10,000.00), with a warning against repetition.

• Doctrine of Judicial Stability: The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference provides that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over a case and renders judgment has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents. No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought. Judge Soriaso's issuance of the writ caused confusion as to which order the parties should follow—the initial decision of Judge Enciso denying the application or her subsequent decision granting it. Had she heeded the information provided by the DOH regarding the earlier ruling of Judge Enciso, she would have been more circumspect and recognized the ruse propagated by JBROS to obtain a favorable judgment.

• Forum Shopping: The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. Here, while the nomenclature used was different—one captioned as a Petition for Certiorari and the other as a Petition for Interim Measure of Protection in Aid of Arbitration—both cases sought the same outcome: to thwart the blacklisting of JBROS. Both cases involved the same parties, and the same evidence was required to prove both cases. Judge Soriaso cannot feign ignorance of the earlier ruling of Judge Enciso since she was informed by the DOH of the same. Her failure to recognize this pattern constituted gross ignorance of the law.

• Propriety of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction: Judge Soriaso failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 7-99, which directs judges to exercise utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of TROs and writs of preliminary injunction. The contract between JBROS and the DOH had long been extinguished and could not be the source of any right to be protected by injunction. Moreover, as Judge Enciso correctly ruled, the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished. The settled rule is that an injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli—an accomplished or consummated act. Judge Soriaso erroneously issued the writ despite two glaring warning signs she would have taken into consideration had she not taken a nonchalant attitude toward Judge Enciso's earlier decision.

• Administrative Liability and Penalty: While not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law, and errors committed in good faith do not warrant administrative sanction, this principle applies only within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence; ignorance by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. Due to the gravity of the infractions—violating both the doctrine of judicial stability and the rule on forum shopping, as well as Administrative Circular No. 7-99—the Court rejected the OCA's recommended penalty as insufficient and instead imposed a fine of P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the rules of procedure and P10,000.00 for violating Administrative Circular No. 7-99.

• Doctrine of Judicial Stability (Non-Interference) — The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. A court that acquires jurisdiction over a case and renders judgment has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with that judgment. No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The Court applied this doctrine to find Judge Soriaso administratively liable for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that contradicted the prior ruling of Judge Enciso of a coordinate court.

• Forum Shopping — The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The Court found that JBROS's refiling of its petition before Judge Soriaso after withdrawing from Judge Enciso's court constituted a textbook example of forum shopping, as both cases involved the same parties, sought the same outcome, and required the same evidence, notwithstanding the difference in nomenclature.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law — While not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law, and errors committed in good faith do not warrant administrative sanction, where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

• Injunction Against Accomplished Acts — An injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli—an accomplished or consummated act. The Court applied this principle to find that Judge Soriaso erred in issuing the writ because the DOH's termination and blacklisting acts had already been accomplished, and the underlying contract had long been extinguished and could not serve as a source of any right to be protected by injunction.

• "Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law." — This passage articulates the standard for when judicial error crosses the threshold into administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law, distinguishing tolerable misjudgment from inexcusable ignorance.

• "No court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine of judicial stability as applied to injunctions, central to the Court's finding of administrative liability against Judge Soriaso.

• "The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought." — This states the controlling tripartite test for forum shopping, applied to find that JBROS's successive petitions before two RTC branches—though differently captioned—constituted forum shopping.

• "An injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli - an accomplished or consummated act." — This establishes the principle that injunction cannot remedy completed acts, which Judge Soriaso failed to observe when she issued the writ despite the DOH's blacklisting and termination having already been accomplished.

• Atty. Amante-Descallar vs. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21 (2009) — Cited for the principle that while not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law, and errors committed in good faith do not warrant administrative sanction, gross ignorance exists where the law is straightforward and the facts evident. Followed as controlling authority on the standard for administrative liability of judges.

• First Gas Power Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines, 717 Phil. 44 (2013) — Cited for the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, including its rationale founded on the concept of jurisdiction. Followed as the doctrinal basis for finding Judge Soriaso's violation.

• Atty. Cabili vs. Judge Balindong, 672 Phil. 398 (2011) — Cited for the principle that no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought. Followed as direct authority supporting the finding against Judge Soriaso.

• Dy vs. Yu, 763 Phil. 491 (2015) — Cited for the test determining forum shopping: whether there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. Followed in applying the test to the two petitions filed by JBROS.

• Belongilot vs. Cua, 650 Phil. 392 (2010) — Cited for the rule that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli. Followed in finding Judge Soriaso's issuance of the writ erroneous.

• Section 59, Article XVIII, Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) — Provides that any dispute arising from the implementation of a contract entered into under the Act shall be submitted to arbitration in the Philippines. The contracts between JBROS and the DOH incorporated this arbitration provision, which JBROS invoked when it refiled its petition as a "Petition for Interim Measure of Protection in Aid of Arbitration."

• Administrative Circular No. 7-99 (Re: Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence and Judiciousness in the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders and the Grant of Writs of Preliminary Injunction, June 25, 1999) — Directs judges to exercise utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of TROs and the grant of writs of preliminary injunction. Judge Soriaso was found to have violated this circular by issuing the writ despite the contract having been extinguished and the acts sought to be enjoined having been accomplished.

• Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act) — JBROS refiled its petition under this statute, designating it as a "Petition for Interim Measure of Protection in Aid of Arbitration" to distinguish it from the earlier Petition for Certiorari before Judge Enciso, though the Court found both cases sought the same outcome.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred.