Re: Draft DOJ-NPS Rules on Preliminary Investigations and Inquest Proceedings

The Department of Justice possesses the authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings, the conduct of preliminary investigation being an executive rather than a judicial function, and the pertinent provisions of Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with the DOJ-NPS Rules are deemed repealed, without prejudice to the Court's promulgation of its own procedural rules on the matter.

The Court's Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure received from one of its members from the DOJ a copy of the draft DOJ Circular on the proposed Rules on Preliminary Investigation and Inquest Proceedings in the National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS Rules). Because the Court's own rules on preliminary investigation under Rule 112 were among those slated for revision under the Proposed Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sub-Committee solicited comments from the members of the En Banc to ensure harmony between the DOJ's conduct of preliminary investigations and existing court procedures. The Chief Justice thereafter transmitted the En Banc's comments to the DOJ for consideration, and the DOJ adopted several of them in its final version of the DOJ-NPS Rules. The Chief Justice then urged the En Banc to recognize the DOJ's authority to promulgate the same, noting that this would entail the repeal of affected provisions under Rule 112.

The matter arose from the Court's Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which received from one of its members from the DOJ a copy of the draft DOJ Circular on the proposed Rules on Preliminary Investigation and Inquest Proceedings in the National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS Rules). The Sub-Committee, chaired by Justice Zalameda with Justices Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh as members, was then in the process of revising the Court's own rules on criminal procedure, including Rule 112 on Preliminary Investigation. To ensure harmony between the DOJ's conduct of preliminary investigations or inquest proceedings and existing court procedures, the Sub-Committee solicited comments from the members of the En Banc.

By a Letter dated October 27, 2023 addressed to Undersecretary Raul T. Vasquez, Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo transmitted the En Banc's comments to the DOJ for its consideration. Through a Letter dated January 22, 2024, Usec. Vasquez highlighted the matters adopted by the DOJ from the Court's comments in its final version of the DOJ-NPS Rules, attaching a complete copy of the same. The Chief Justice then wrote a letter dated February 7, 2024 addressed to the En Banc, urging its members to recognize the authority of the DOJ to promulgate the DOJ-NPS Rules, consistent with jurisprudence that the conduct of preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings is not a judicial function but part of the prosecution's job — a function of the executive. The Chief Justice further stated that this would entail the repeal of the affected provisions under Rule 112 of the current Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The Court undertook a historical survey of the rules on preliminary investigation, tracing the evolution from the 1940 Rules of Court through the 1964 Rules, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 2005. Under the 1940 and 1964 Rules, the authority to conduct preliminary investigation was shared among justices of the peace, municipal judges, city fiscals, provincial fiscals, and municipal mayors. The 1985 Rules expanded the enumeration to include provincial or city fiscals and their assistants, judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, national and regional state prosecutors, and other officers authorized by law. The 2000 Rules maintained this enumeration, but in 2005, judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts were removed from those authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, marking the shift toward exclusivity in favor of public prosecutors.

• DOJ Authority to Promulgate Rules: Whether the Department of Justice has the authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings.
• Repeal of Rule 112: Whether the pertinent provisions of Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with the DOJ-NPS Rules should be repealed.

• DOJ Authority to Promulgate Rules: Yes. The DOJ has the authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation, the conduct of which is an executive, not a judicial, function, and the Court adheres to a policy of non-interference in the public prosecutor's conduct thereof.
• Repeal of Rule 112: Yes. The pertinent provisions of Rule 112 inconsistent with the DOJ-NPS Rules are deemed repealed, without prejudice to the Court's promulgation of its own new rules touching upon preliminary investigation, consistent with the DOJ-NPS Rules.

• DOJ Authority to Promulgate Rules: The Court traced the historical evolution of preliminary investigation rules from the 1940 Rules of Court through the 2000 Rules, as amended in 2005, demonstrating a paradigm shift from a function shared by judges and prosecutors to one of exclusivity in favor of public prosecutors. As early as 1986 in Salta vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function" but "a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive." This was reiterated in People vs. Navarro in 1997, where the Court stressed that a prosecutor is primarily responsible for ascertaining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of this shift, the Court adopted a policy of non-interference in the public prosecutor's conduct of preliminary investigations, as articulated in Chan y Lim vs. Secretary of Justice, which held that findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. Considering the executive nature of preliminary investigations and this policy of non-interference, the Court recognized the DOJ's authority to promulgate its own rules, holding that it is within the DOJ's prerogative to direct and control the conduct of preliminary investigations, and the Court will not interfere so long as it is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Repeal of Rule 112: The Court acknowledged that the promulgation of the DOJ-NPS Rules would not ipso facto repeal Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules. Citing Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo, the Court reaffirmed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is within its exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments; only the Court could repeal Rule 112. Nevertheless, to remove the impediment that the present Rule 112 imposes upon the promulgation and implementation of the DOJ-NPS Rules, and in recognition of the DOJ's authority, the repeal of the pertinent provisions under Rule 112 inconsistent with the DOJ-NPS Rules was warranted. The repeal was declared without prejudice to the Court's promulgation of its own new rules, as the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure had proposed a new version of Rule 112 containing definitions of preliminary investigation and inquest, an acknowledgment that the conduct of preliminary investigation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DOJ, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Commission on Elections, and other officers as may be authorized by law, and other provisions not inconsistent with the proposed DOJ-NPS Rules.

• Executive Nature of Preliminary Investigation — Preliminary investigation is not a judicial function but part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive. The Court first articulated this in Salta vs. Court of Appeals (1986) and reiterated it in People vs. Navarro (1997). The doctrine underpins the shift from a shared judiciary-executive function to exclusivity in favor of public prosecutors, and serves as the basis for recognizing the DOJ's authority to promulgate its own rules on preliminary investigation.

• Policy of Non-Interference in Preliminary Investigations — Courts generally adhere to a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by public prosecutors. Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion. A trial court cannot directly order an assistant prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation over the objections of the latter's superiors, as this would authorize the court to meddle in the executive and administrative functions of the prosecutor. The Court applied this doctrine to support its recognition of the DOJ's authority to promulgate and implement its own rules.

• Exclusive Power to Promulgate Rules of Procedure — The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is within the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court and is no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments, as held in Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo. The Court applied this doctrine to establish that only the Court could repeal Rule 112, and accordingly exercised that power to remove impediments to the DOJ-NPS Rules.

• "The preliminary investigation pm per se, therefore, not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive." — This passage, quoted from Salta vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the foundational doctrine that preliminary investigation is an executive function, which the Court relied upon to recognize the DOJ's authority to promulgate its own rules.

• "Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor." — This passage, quoted from Chan y Lim vs. Secretary of Justice, states the policy of non-interference that the Court invoked to justify its deference to the DOJ's rule-making authority over preliminary investigations.

• "It must be stressed that the promulgation of the DOJ-NPS Rules would not ipso facto repeal Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules." — This passage clarifies the legal mechanics of the repeal, emphasizing that the DOJ's promulgation alone could not repeal the Court's own rules, and that the Court itself had to act to remove the inconsistency.

• People vs. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640 (1998) — Discussed the historical evolution of the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation, noting the shift from prima facie evidence to evidence sufficient to "engender a well-founded belief" as clarified by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court.

• Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216 (1941) — Cited for the proposition that the purpose of preliminary investigation is to determine probable cause, requiring only such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty.

• Salta vs. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 213 (1986) — Controlling precedent establishing that preliminary investigation is an executive, not a judicial, function. The Court quoted this case at length as the doctrinal foundation for recognizing the DOJ's authority.

• People vs. Navarro, 337 Phil. 122 (1997) — Followed and reiterated the doctrine from Salta, further holding that a trial court cannot order a prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation over the objections of the prosecutor's superiors, as this would constitute meddling in executive functions.

• Chan y Lim vs. Secretary of Justice, 572 Phil. 118 (2008) — Followed for the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, holding that findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion.

• Estipona vs. Hon. Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 789 (2017) — Controlling precedent on the Court's exclusive power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure, establishing that only the Court could repeal Rule 112, which the Court then exercised.

• Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), as amended — The Court's own rules on preliminary investigation, the pertinent provisions of which were deemed repealed to the extent inconsistent with the DOJ-NPS Rules. The Court traced the evolution of Rule 112 from its origins in the 1940 Rules of Court (Rule 108) through the 1964, 1985, and 2000 versions, and the 2005 amendment removing MTC and MCTC judges from those authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.

• Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828 (Judiciary Act of 1948) — Provided justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities the authority to conduct preliminary investigation for offenses cognizable by Courts of First Instance, reflecting the historical shared authority of the judiciary.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Authorized judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts (except those in the NCR), Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to conduct preliminary investigation of crimes cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.

• Republic Act No. 732 (Amendment of the Revised Administrative Code) — Gave provincial fiscals the authority to conduct investigation into any crime or misdemeanor and prepare the necessary information or complaint.

• Republic Act No. 5180, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 77 and 911 (Uniform System of Preliminary Investigation) — Required preliminary investigation before filing of information for offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance, tasking the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor to determine probable cause.

• Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) — Expressly provided the mandate of the National Prosecution Service to be primarily responsible for the conduct of preliminary investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violation of penal laws.

• A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (August 30, 2005) — Amended the 2000 Rules by removing judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts from those authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, marking the shift toward exclusivity in favor of public prosecutors.

• Supreme Court Circular No. 12-87 — Discussed the mandate of judges under the 1987 Constitution to personally determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, stating that the judge may rely on the fiscal's certification or require supporting affidavits.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ. — all concurred in the resolution. No separate concurring opinions were noted in the text.