Re: Barrozo

Conviction by final judgment of direct bribery, a crime involving moral turpitude, constitutes a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and where the offender is a government lawyer who exploited his public office to extort money from a party-litigant, disbarment is the appropriate penalty.

Respondent Joselito C. Barrozo served as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan, a position with salary grade 27 or higher. Jennie Valeriano was a respondent in several estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases assigned to respondent for resolution. The disbarment proceeding was initiated by the Supreme Court motu proprio under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court after the Court became aware of respondent's final conviction for direct bribery and received an inquiry from a Hong Kong law firm, Wat & Co., questioning whether respondent remained qualified to practice law after signing a claim letter on behalf of a deceased domestic helper.

Jennie Valeriano was a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 assigned to respondent Joselito C. Barrozo in his capacity as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to Valeriano, respondent told her that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for ₱20,000.00. Valeriano reported the matter to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, who introduced her to agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). After being apprised of respondent's demand, the NBI agents planned and conducted an entrapment operation on February 15, 2005, during which respondent was caught red-handed receiving the amount of ₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.

A criminal case for direct bribery under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case was subsequently endorsed to the Sandiganbayan because respondent occupied a position with salary grade 27 or higher. The Sandiganbayan, in a Decision dated March 17, 2011, found the existence of all the elements of the crime and convicted respondent beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to nine years, four months and one day of prision mayor medium as maximum, a fine of ₱60,000.00, and special temporary disqualification. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 28, 2011.

Respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, which was denied in a Resolution dated December 14, 2011 for failure to show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error. Respondent thrice moved for reconsideration; the first two were denied, and the third was ordered expunged from the records. An Entry of Judgment was subsequently issued, stating that the Court's Resolution of denial had become final and executory on August 16, 2012.

In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter dated August 14, 2013 from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong, stating that its client in Hong Kong had received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," requesting long service payment from the employers of a deceased domestic helper, Anita G. Calub. Upon discovering online that the signatory had been convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. asked the OBC whether respondent was still qualified to practice law. The OBC inquired from the Department of Justice, which confirmed that respondent had resigned from his position effective May 3, 2005. On November 15, 2012, the OBC wrote to Wat & Co. confirming respondent's conviction by final judgment and noting that the Philippine courts had yet to rule on his disbarment. The Supreme Court, through a Resolution dated December 11, 2013, required respondent to comment on why he should not be suspended or disbarred. In his Comment, respondent framed the issue as whether he could engage in the practice of law despite his conviction, arguing that his act of signing the claim letter did not constitute practice of law because no monetary consideration was involved and no attorney-client relationship was established. The OBC thereafter evaluated the case and, in its February 20, 2015 Report and Recommendation, recommended respondent's disbarment.

• Practice of Law: Respondent argued that the issue was whether he could engage in the practice of law despite his conviction, and that his act of signing the claim letter on behalf of the claimants did not constitute practice of law.
• No Attorney-Client Relationship: Respondent averred that he signed the claim letter not for any monetary consideration but out of a sincere desire to help the claimants, and since no payment was involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the claimants, thereby negating practice of law on his part.

• Ground for Disbarment: Whether respondent should be suspended or disbarred by reason of his conviction by final judgment of the crime of direct bribery.
• Moral Turpitude: Whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude.

• Ground for Disbarment: Yes. Respondent's final conviction for direct bribery, a crime involving moral turpitude, is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and the circumstances warranted the supreme penalty rather than mere suspension.
• Moral Turpitude: Yes. Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as it involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, inferred from the offender's deliberate acceptance of a gift in exchange for committing an unjust act or refraining from an official duty.

• Ground for Disbarment: The Court clarified that the real issue was not whether respondent's act of signing a claim letter constituted practice of law, as respondent had argued, but whether he should be disbarred by reason of his final conviction for direct bribery. Under Section 27, Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for suspension or disbarment. While the Court acknowledged that conviction of such a crime does not automatically call for disbarment, as the determination involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion, the circumstances of this case constrained the Court to impose the supreme penalty. Respondent was an assistant public prosecutor at the time of the offense; his extortion of money from a party-litigant in a case he was handling violated the requirement that cases be decided on the merits and diminished public confidence in the rule of law. As a government lawyer, he was held to a higher standard of social responsibility and was expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. His conduct fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, particularly one occupying public office, warranting disbarment.
• Moral Turpitude: The Court applied the definition of moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a person owes to fellowmen or society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Drawing from Magno vs. COMELEC, the Court identified the four elements of direct bribery: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present; (3) such offer, promise, or gift is accepted or received with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an unjust act, or to refrain from performing an official duty; and (4) the act agreed upon or executed is connected with the performance of official duties. Moral turpitude was inferred from the third element: the offender's agreement to accept a promise or gift and deliberate commission of an unjust act or refrainment from performing an official duty in exchange for favors denotes malicious intent to renege on duties owed to fellowmen and society. The offender's exploitation of his office and position constitutes a betrayal of public trust—conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.

• Moral Turpitude — Defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a person owes to fellowmen or society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The Court applied this doctrine by inferring moral turpitude from the third element of direct bribery—the offender's deliberate acceptance of a gift to commit an unjust act or refrain from an official duty—which denotes malicious intent and betrayal of public trust. The four elements of direct bribery are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the offender accepts an offer, promise, gift, or present; (3) such is given in consideration of committing a crime, executing an unjust act, or refraining from an official duty; and (4) the act relates to the exercise of the offender's functions as a public officer.
• Judicial Discretion in Disciplinary Sanctions — The determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not automatically require the supreme penalty of disbarment; the Court may impose the less severe penalty of suspension. However, where the circumstances—particularly the offender's status as a government lawyer who exploited public office to extort money from a party-litigant—demonstrate conduct that undermines public confidence in the rule of law and falls short of the integrity required of members of the bar, disbarment is warranted.
• Heightened Responsibility of Government Lawyers — A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility than lawyers in private practice. Government lawyers are expected not only to refrain from acts that lessen public trust in government but also to uphold the dignity of the legal profession and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.

• "Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for classifying direct bribery as a crime involving moral turpitude, anchoring the finding on the third element of the crime.
• "A government lawyer is keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice." — This formulation states the heightened ethical standard imposed on government lawyers, which the Court relied upon to justify imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment rather than suspension.
• "The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the public at large] may repose confidence." — This passage defines the protective purpose of disbarment proceedings, frequently cited in subsequent legal ethics jurisprudence.

• Catalan, Jr. vs. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 352 — Applied as controlling authority confirming that direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, quoting the definition of moral turpitude and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• Magno vs. COMELEC, 439 Phil. 339 (2002) — Followed for the enumeration of the elements of direct bribery and the holding that moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element of the crime; the Court adopted its reasoning verbatim.
• Figueras vs. Atty. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014 — Cited for the principle that the determination of whether to disbar or merely suspend an attorney involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
• Ramos vs. Atty. Imbang, 557 Phil. 507 (2007) — Cited for the standard that a government lawyer bears a higher degree of social responsibility than lawyers in private practice.
• Soriano vs. Atty. Dizon, 515 Phil. 635 (2006) — Cited for the statement of the purpose of disbarment proceedings as protecting the administration of justice.
• Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 366 — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude as an act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended for, among other grounds, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court applied this provision to disbar respondent upon his final conviction for direct bribery, which it determined to be a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Section 1, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Authorizes the Supreme Court to institute disbarment proceedings motu proprio. The Court invoked this provision to take up the case against respondent on its own initiative.
• Article 210, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes direct bribery. The Court referenced the elements of this offense as enumerated in the provision and in jurisprudence to establish that the crime involves moral turpitude.

The decision was rendered per curiam by the En Banc. Justices who participated: Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (on official leave), Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-DeCastro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes (on official leave), Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, and Francis H. Jardeleza. No separate concurring opinions were written.