Re: Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.

An attorney who acts as a conduit and conspirator in a judge's extortion of his own clients commits gross misconduct warranting disbarment, as such conduct demonstrates utter disregard of the lawyer's oath, the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, and the high moral standards required of members of the bar.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) SOCSARGEN Chapter, by Board Resolution No. 1 dated March 7, 1998, referred to the IBP Board of Governors a purported anomaly involving Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr. of RTC, General Santos City, Branch 37, and Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. The referral was transmitted to the Office of the Court Administrator on March 24, 1998. The matter involving Judge Dizon was docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-98-1426 and resolved by a per curiam decision promulgated on January 31, 2006, whereby the Court dismissed him from the service with forfeiture of benefits. In that same decision, the Court reiterated its October 21, 1998 resolution directing the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to investigate the actuations of Atty. Barrios and to render its report and recommendation.

Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr. and Lolita B. Rafols were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6209 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in General Santos City, Branch 37, presided by Judge Teodoro Dizon Jr., wherein they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. They engaged Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. as their counsel and paid him P15,000.00 as acceptance fee. The events giving rise to the administrative case began on December 22, 1997, when the respondent visited the complainants at their residence and informed Manuel that the judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. The respondent and Manuel proceeded to the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop, where Judge Dizon was waiting. The respondent introduced Manuel to the judge, who assured Manuel that he would resolve the case in their favor and guarantee success up to the Court of Appeals if they could deliver P150,000.00 to him. Manuel told the judge he would try to produce the amount, and the judge stated he would wait until noon. Manuel and the respondent left the coffee shop and went to a lending institution, accompanied by Allan Rafols, but only P50,000.00 could be released the next day. They then went to the complainants' shop to look for Ditas Rafols, Allan's wife, who offered to withdraw P20,000.00 from her savings account. On the way to the bank, they dropped off the respondent at the hotel to assure the judge that the money was forthcoming. Ditas and Manuel withdrew P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 respectively and returned to the hotel, where they saw the judge and his driver beckoning them toward the judge's Nissan pick-up parked along the highway. Manuel personally handed the money to the judge, who said the amount was not enough. Manuel then entered the coffee shop and informed the respondent that he had already handed the money to the judge.

Two days later, on December 24, 1997, at about 6:00 a.m., the respondent again visited the complainants, this time on board the judge's Nissan pick-up driven by the judge's driver. The respondent relayed that the judge needed the balance of P100,000.00 to complete the construction of his new house in time for his daughter's wedding reception. The complainants managed to raise only P80,000.00, which they delivered to the respondent on that same day. On January 20, 1998, Judge Dizon called the complainants' residence and instructed their son to request his parents to return his call, leaving his cell phone number. When Manuel returned the call the next day, the judge instructed him to see him in his office. During their meeting in his chambers, the judge demanded the balance of P30,000.00. Manuel clarified that his balance was only P20,000.00 because P80,000.00 had already been given, but the judge insisted on P30,000.00 and even suggested that the complainants borrow to raise the amount. On January 22, 1998, the judge called again to inquire whether the P30,000.00 was ready. After Manuel confirmed, the judge and his driver arrived on board the Nissan pick-up, and the complainants followed it to inside the Doña Soledad Estate in Espina, General Santos City. There, Manuel handed P30,000.00 to the judge, who then persuaded the complainants to give money also to the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the perpetuation of testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made, warning that they should not blame him for the outcome if they did not.

The complainants gave money to the judge out of fear that he would be biased against them, but when they ultimately sensed they were being fooled, they consulted their mediamen friend Larry Sevilla and narrated all the facts and circumstances. The exposé was published in the Newsmaker, a local newspaper. Thereafter, the respondent and Judge Dizon made several attempts to appease the complainants by sending gifts and offering to return a portion of the money, but the complainants declined. The respondent also demanded P25,000.00 from the complainants as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City, and requested them to borrow P60,000.00 from the bank so he could redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf and give P11,000.00 to his nephew who was leaving for work abroad.

For his part, the respondent confirmed that he introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon inside the East Royal Hotel's coffee shop on December 22, 1997, but claimed he stayed at a distance because he did not want to hear their conversation. He stated that Manuel later gave him P2,000.00 in appreciation of the introduction. Two days later, the respondent admitted receiving P80,000.00 from the complainants, which he claimed was being borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. He further admitted that the judge told him to keep P30,000.00 as a token of friendship, and that he and the judge's driver went to Davao City to redeem the judge's wristwatch for P15,000.00 from a pawnshop, with the driver bringing the remaining P35,000.00 to the judge's home. On January 27, 1998, the respondent executed an affidavit at the judge's request, denying that the judge asked money from the complainants and stating he did not see the complainants handing money to the judge. He admitted requesting the judge to personally collect unpaid attorney's fees from the complainants with respect to a previous terminated case. On February 24, 1998, the respondent went to the NBI and PNP Regional Offices in Davao City to request investigation of the matter, which the OBC later characterized as an afterthought to anticipate the complainants' moves against him and the judge.

• Denial of Knowledge: Respondent argued that he had no knowledge of the illegal transaction between the complainants and Judge Dizon, claiming he stayed at a distance during the meeting at the coffee shop and was never told what transpired between Manuel and the judge.
• Characterization as a Loan: Respondent maintained that the money given by the complainants to the judge was a loan for the judge's swimming pool, not extortion in exchange for a favorable decision.
• Token of Friendship: Respondent claimed he kept P30,000.00 of the P80,000.00 only because the judge instructed him to do so as a token of friendship, not as part of any corrupt scheme.
• Good Faith Request for Investigation: Respondent argued that his request for NBI and PNP investigation demonstrated his good faith and innocent intent.
• Motion to Dismiss: Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint and re-affirmed the contents of his verified comment dated March 22, 2006.

• Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is guilty of gross misconduct in conspiring with Judge Dizon to extort money from his own clients.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the proper penalty is suspension, as recommended by the OBC, or disbarment.

• Gross Misconduct: Yes. The respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, having arranged the meeting between his clients and the judge, relayed the judge's extortionate demands, and personally received and retained part of the extorted money, all in violation of his lawyer's oath and fiduciary duties.
• Proper Penalty: Disbarment. The supreme penalty was imposed because the respondent conspired with the disgraced judge against his own clients, a sanction on par with the judge's dismissal from the service.

• Gross Misconduct: The burden of proof in disbarment proceedings rests on the complainant, and an attorney enjoys the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties. However, the complainants successfully overcame these presumptions with substantial, uncontradicted evidence. First, the respondent's denial of knowledge of the transaction was implausible and unsubstantiated — it was he who introduced the complainants to the judge, and his act of arranging the meeting at the coffee shop strongly implied awareness of the judge's illegal purpose. Second, his insistence that he did not see the complainants hand money to the judge was belied by his own admission that he received P80,000.00 from the complainants and kept P30,000.00 of that amount pursuant to the judge's instruction. Third, his explanation that the money was a loan confirmed his awareness of the gross impropriety of the transaction, for as the complainants' attorney in the case pending before the judge, he could not but know that for the judge to borrow money from his clients was highly irregular and unethical; had he been innocent, he should have desisted from any participation. Fourth, his request for NBI investigation was an afterthought designed to anticipate the complainants' moves against him. His denials were worthless and unavailing against uncontradicted evidence, as a denial is evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.

• Proper Penalty: The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions, and the attorney is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but a very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. The respondent did not measure up to these exacting standards. For monetary gain, he disregarded his vow to "delay no man for money or malice" and to conduct himself with fidelity to the courts and to his clients. He violated the explicit command not to accept compensation in connection with his client's business except from the client or with the client's knowledge and approval. He ignored the highly fiduciary, delicate, exacting, and confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. His conduct constituted gross misconduct — improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character and implying wrongful intent. The conclusion that the respondent and Judge Dizon were conspirators against the complainants was inevitable, and being conspirators, both deserved the highest penalty. Disbarment was in order because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon from the service.

• Objective of Disbarment Proceedings — The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. The Court applied this principle to justify imposing disbarment rather than the OBC's recommended three-year suspension.

• Burden of Proof in Disbarment — The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant, who must establish the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties. The Court found that the complainants successfully overcame these presumptions with substantial, uncontradicted evidence.

• Nature of Denials as Evidence — Any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, because a denial is evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the respondent's denials as worthless and unavailing.

• Fiduciary Character of Attorney-Client Relationship — The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character. The respondent violated this doctrine by conspiring with the judge against his own clients for monetary gain.

• Gross Misconduct as Ground for Disbarment — Gross misconduct is improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others and is a ground for suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for admission to and continuance in the practice of law.

• "The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar." — This passage states the Court's framing of the purpose of disbarment proceedings, establishing that the sanction serves both punitive and protective functions.

• "The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against the former's own clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to make in this administrative case. And, being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for imposing disbarment rather than suspension, equating the respondent's conspiracy with the judge's dismissed misconduct.

• "It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need derives from the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters." — This passage states the doctrinal basis for rejecting the respondent's denials, a principle frequently cited in subsequent administrative cases against lawyers.

• "The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions." — This canonical formulation of the nature of the legal profession is frequently cited in Philippine legal ethics jurisprudence to underscore that admission to the bar is not a right but a conditional privilege.

• Rivera vs. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002, 384 SCRA 1 — Cited at the outset for the principle that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor.

• Arma vs. Montevilla, A.C. No. 4829, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 1 — Cited for the rule that the burden of proof in disbarment proceedings rests on the complainant and that an attorney enjoys the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties.

• Rafols, Jr. vs. Dizon, A.M. RTJ-98-1426, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 92 — The companion case against Judge Dizon, in which the Court dismissed the judge from the service. The factual findings and testimony from that proceeding were relied upon in the present case, and the disbarment penalty was calibrated to be on par with the judge's dismissal.

• Cham vs. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 1 — Cited for the principle that an attorney must maintain a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, and that any violation justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty including suspension and disbarment.

• Dumadag vs. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 513 — Cited for the proposition that the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.

• Whitson vs. Atienza, A.C. No. 5535, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 10 — Cited for the definition of gross misconduct and the principle that gross misconduct in professional or private capacity is a ground for suspension or disbarment.

• Barnachea vs. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1 — Cited for the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship as highly delicate, exacting, and confidential.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Governs disbarment and suspension of attorneys, enumerating the grounds including deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, violation of the lawyer's oath, willful disobedience of lawful court orders, and corruptly appearing as attorney without authority. The Court applied this provision to find that the respondent's conduct constituted gross misconduct and violation of his lawyer's oath.

• Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. The Court found the respondent violated this rule by participating in the extortion scheme against his own clients.

• Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession, whether in public or private life. The Court applied this rule to the respondent's conduct in arranging the corrupt meeting and retaining extorted funds.

• Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility — Enjoins an attorney to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. The respondent's conspiracy with the judge against his own clients violated this canon.

• Section 20(e), Rule 138, Rules of Court — Commands an attorney to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from the client or with the client's knowledge and approval. The respondent violated this provision by retaining P30,000.00 of the extorted money upon the judge's instruction.

• The Lawyer's Oath — The attorney's declaration to "delay no man for money or malice" and to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." The respondent disregarded this oath for monetary gain.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.