Razonable, Jr. vs. Torm Shipping Philippines, Inc.

A seafarer's claim for total and permanent disability benefits under the 2010 POEA-SEC is compensable only upon substantial evidence that the illness is work-related and existed during the term of the employment contract; compliance with the conditions of compensability and the post-employment medical examination requirement must be proven, and judicial notice of seafarers' general working environment does not dispense with that burden.

Teodoro C. Razonable, Jr. was engaged as a Chief Engineer by Torm Shipping Philippines, Inc., acting for its foreign principal Torm Singapore Pvt., Ltd., under successive five-month employment contracts. His claim for total and permanent disability benefits is governed by the 2010 POEA-Standard Employment Contract, which defines compensable work-related illnesses, prescribes conditions for occupational diseases, and requires post-employment medical examination procedures. Respondents also invoked the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention, which they said provided a healthy dietary standard for the vessel.

In May 2014, Teodoro Razonable, Jr. was engaged as a Chief Engineer by Torm Shipping Philippines, Inc. on behalf of its foreign principal Torm Singapore Pvt., Ltd. On May 28, 2014, he was declared fit for sea duties after undergoing a Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). He was deployed on a five-month contract from July to December 2014. On January 20, 2015, he signed another five-month contract with respondents and boarded the vessel "Torm Almena" on January 26, 2015.

According to petitioner, his daily duties as Chief Engineer involved hard manual labor and strenuous activities; he sometimes had to stay beyond eight hours in the 40-degree-Celsius engine room; he had no choice but to eat the unhealthy food prepared by the vessel kitchen staff; and he was constantly exposed to varying extreme temperatures and harsh weather conditions, as well as to physical and emotional stress on board the vessel. Sometime in May 2015, while performing his usual duties in the engine room, he started experiencing chest pains and tightness, which he initially ignored. The pain persisted, prompting him to report to the ship captain on or about the last week of May 2015. Because his contract was about to expire in a couple of days, he alleged that he was not sent to a doctor abroad anymore.

On June 4, 2015, petitioner was signed off at a convenient port in Ghana as his contract had expired. He arrived in the Philippines on June 6, 2015. He claimed that he reported to respondents two days after arrival and requested medical assistance for his chest pains and tightness, but was allegedly advised to consult his own doctor as he was repatriated due to the expiration of his contract. He consulted Dr. Rogelio M. Martinez, who gave him medications—Isordil Sublingual and Celebrox—after examination. In July 2015, petitioner underwent another PEME with respondents' company-designated doctor supposedly for another deployment. He was found to be suffering from "concentric left ventricular hypertrophy with global hypokinesia." On November 14, 2015, he was subjected to the same tests, which gave the same results but with additional findings of "pulmonary hypertension" and "ischemic myocardium (interventricular septum) and stress-induced myocardial ischemia at risk (left ventricular free wall)." On December 5, 2015, another test revealed that he was also suffering from "complete right bundle branch block and left ventricular hypertrophy." Due to these diagnoses, he was declared unfit for sea duties. He was thereafter referred to another healthcare facility for another PEME, where he was diagnosed with "hypertensive cardiovascular disease and polycystic kidney disease." On April 14, 2016, an UNFIT Waiver was issued.

Unable to secure clearance for another deployment, petitioner claimed entitlement to full disability benefits, arguing that his condition was work-related and had existed during his employment with respondents. He further argued that he was already totally and permanently disabled because his medical conditions prevented him from landing another gainful employment as Chief Engineer for more than 240 days from his repatriation. Respondents, for their part, averred that petitioner completed his contract without any incident and was repatriated on June 4, 2015. According to respondents, there was no record of any medical complaint on the vessel or upon his arrival in the Philippines; petitioner did not report to the company-designated doctor for the mandatory post-employment medical examination; and it was only during his re-application that he was found to be suffering from cardiovascular and kidney diseases, hence he was not cleared for another deployment. Respondents maintained that petitioner was not entitled to disability benefits because he completed his contract without any incident and did not suffer any work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment. They also pointed out that his failure to submit himself to the required post-employment medical examination with the company-designated doctor forfeited his claim; that the vessel was covered by the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention, which provides for a healthy dietary standard; and that his claims were grounded upon mere allegations.

The RCMB found petitioner unfit to work and totally and permanently disabled, while the CA later found that he failed to provide an ounce of proof that his diseases were brought about or aggravated by his work as Chief Engineer. The dispute thus reached the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

• Work-Relatedness and Probability: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in ruling that he failed to prove his claims that his condition was work-related and that he contracted it during his employment with respondents; mere probability, not ultimate degree of certainty, is sufficient to prove that his cardiovascular and renal illnesses are work-related and contracted during the term of his employment to make his condition compensable.
• Post-Employment Medical Examination: Petitioner claimed that he requested to be subjected to a post-employment medical examination with respondents' company-designated doctor to no avail.
• PEME and Duration of Illness: Petitioner argued that hypertensive cardiovascular disease does not develop over a short period of time, which, together with his having passed his PEME before commencing employment with respondents, was sufficient proof that his cardiovascular illness existed during the term of his contract.

• Completion of Contract and No Incident: Respondents averred that petitioner completed his contract without any incident and was repatriated on June 4, 2015; there was no record of any medical complaint on the vessel or upon his arrival in the Philippines.
• Failure to Submit to Post-Employment Medical Examination: Respondents argued that petitioner did not report to the company-designated doctor for the mandatory post-employment medical examination, and that this failure forfeits his claim for disability benefits.
• No Work-Related Injury or Illness During Term: Respondents maintained that petitioner was not entitled to disability benefits because he did not suffer any work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment; his diseases were found only during his re-application for another deployment.
• Healthy Dietary Standard: Respondents argued that the vessel was covered by the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention, which provides for a healthy dietary standard.
• Mere Allegations: Respondents contended that petitioner's claims were grounded upon mere allegations.

• Work-Relatedness: Whether petitioner's cardiovascular and renal illnesses are work-related and compensable under the 2010 POEA-SEC.
• During Term of Contract: Whether the illnesses existed or were suffered during the term of petitioner's employment contract.
• Post-Employment Medical Examination: Whether petitioner complied with the requirement to submit to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated doctor within three working days from repatriation.
• Quantum of Proof: Whether mere probability, rather than ultimate certainty, suffices to establish work-relatedness and compensability, and whether substantial evidence supports the claim.

• Work-Relatedness: No. Petitioner failed to prove with substantial evidence a reasonable causal connection between his cardiovascular and renal illnesses and his work as Chief Engineer, as required by Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC.
• During Term of Contract: No. There was no substantial evidence that the illnesses were suffered or existed during the term of his employment contract; his repatriation was due to the expiration of his contract, not a medical reason.
• Post-Employment Medical Examination: No. Petitioner failed to comply with Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which requires submission to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated doctor within three working days from repatriation.
• Quantum of Proof: No. Mere probability is insufficient; substantial evidence, more than a scintilla, is required, and judicial notice of seafarers' general working environment does not dispense with the claimant's burden.

• Work-Relatedness: Under Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, an injury or illness is compensable only if two elements concur: it must be work-related, and it must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. A work-related illness is defined as any sickness resulting from an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions therein satisfied. Non-listed illnesses may also be compensable because they are disputably presumed work-related, but the seafarer must prove the correlation of the illness to the nature of his work and satisfy the conditions for compensability. Listing as an occupational disease does not mean automatic compensability; the general conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A and the specific conditions for the particular disease must be met. For cardiovascular diseases, Section 32-A, paragraph 2(11) requires, among others, proof of acute exacerbation precipitated by unusual strain, sufficient severity followed within 24 hours by clinical signs of cardiac insult, or symptoms and signs of cardiac injury during work that persisted. The claimant bears the burden of proving compliance with these conditions. Here, petitioner merely made unsubstantiated sweeping assertions about his tasks, the 40-degree-Celsius engine room, unhealthy food, extreme temperatures, and stress. The records lacked any description or proof of the scope of his job and actual daily tasks as Chief Engineer that would show a correlation between his work and the development or aggravation of his illnesses. Respondents denied his allegations. There was no proof that he experienced symptoms on board, notified the ship captain, or was ignored. The Court found it incredible that a ship captain would refuse medical attention to a crew member reporting serious chest pains merely because the contract was about to expire. Petitioner finished his contract without evidence of injury or health problem on board. Thus, work-relatedness was not established by substantial evidence.
• During Term of Contract: Petitioner was not medically repatriated; he was signed off because his contract expired. His cardiovascular and renal illnesses were diagnosed through a PEME after repatriation and before a supposed re-employment with respondents. The one-page handwritten certification dated June 10, 2015 issued by Dr. Martinez stated only that petitioner underwent treatment due to severe chest pains on June 8, 2015, was given medications, and was advised to rest and undergo further laboratory examinations; no clinical abstract was presented, and there was no showing that he subjected himself to further laboratory examination as advised, which may imply negligence. A PEME cannot be relied upon to reflect a seafarer's true state of health because it is not exploratory and may disclose only enough for employers to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment. There was no proven indication that petitioner was already suffering from an ailment at the time of the termination of his contract. It would be too presumptive to contemplate even the probability that he contracted his illnesses while on board the vessel. The burden was on him to prove entitlement, and he failed to show that the illnesses existed during the term.
• Post-Employment Medical Examination: Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC requires the seafarer to submit to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated doctor within three working days from repatriation. Petitioner did not report to the company-designated doctor for this mandatory examination. His claim that he requested the examination to no avail was supported only by general self-serving statements, not by evidence. The PEME he underwent in July 2015 was for another deployment, not the required post-employment medical examination. His failure to comply with the prescribed procedure forfeited his claim for disability benefits.
• Quantum of Proof: In labor cases and administrative proceedings, the required degree of proof is substantial evidence—that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla; it must be real and substantial, not merely apparent. The claimant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to the benefits provided by law. The Court acknowledged its prior statements taking judicial notice of the general working environment of seafarers, but clarified that such judicial notice is nothing more than an acknowledgment of the general perils encountered on board; it does not sufficiently prove work-relatedness of a particular illness or injury, much less entitlement to compensation. The Court never dispensed with the required substantial evidence. In prior cases such as Leoncio vs. MST Marine Services (Phils.), Inc., Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and/or Ikarian Moon Shipping Co. Ltd. vs. Lagne, Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. vs. Balasta, and Paringit vs. Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc., benefits were awarded because the claimants proved their specific tasks, symptoms on board, medical repatriation, and compliance with compensability requirements. Here, petitioner did not. The liberal construction in favor of seafarers cannot sanction an award in the face of evident failure to substantially establish compensability, lest the Court set a dangerous precedent of awarding benefits based on unsubstantiated general allegations and common knowledge. Thus, the CA did not err in ruling that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim.

• Compensability of Seafarer's Disability under the 2010 POEA-SEC — For an injury or illness to be compensable under Section 20(A), two elements must concur: the injury or illness must be work-related, and the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. A work-related illness is any sickness resulting from an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions therein satisfied. Non-listed illnesses may also be compensable because they are disputably presumed work-related, provided the seafarer proves the correlation of the illness to the nature of his work and satisfies the conditions for compensability. Listing as an occupational disease does not mean automatic compensability; the general conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A and the specific conditions for the particular disease must be met. Applied: petitioner failed to prove work-relatedness and that the illnesses existed during the term.
• Substantial Evidence in Seafarer Disability Claims — The claimant-seafarer bears the burden of proving entitlement to disability benefits by substantial evidence—that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla; it must be real and substantial, not merely apparent. Bare allegations and self-serving statements do not suffice. Applied: petitioner's sweeping assertions about work conditions and symptoms were uncorroborated and denied; no substantial evidence supported compensability.
• Judicial Notice of Seafarers' General Working Environment — Judicial notice of the general perils encountered by seafarers on board a vessel is nothing more than an acknowledgment of those general perils. It does not sufficiently prove work-relatedness of a particular illness or injury, much less entitlement to compensation, and it does not dispense with the required substantial evidence. Applied: despite the general acknowledgment, petitioner still had to prove his specific tasks and symptoms; he did not.
• PEME as Not Conclusive of Health Status — A PEME cannot be relied upon to reflect a seafarer's true state of health because it is not exploratory and may just disclose enough for employers to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment. Applied: petitioner's passing PEME before employment did not prove that his illnesses existed during the term of his contract.
• Post-Employment Medical Examination Requirement — Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC requires the seafarer to submit to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated doctor within three working days from repatriation. Failure to comply forfeits the claim for disability benefits. Applied: petitioner did not report to the company-designated doctor for the mandatory examination; his general claim that he requested it to no avail was not substantiated.
• Liberal Construction in Labor Cases — The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers; justice is for the deserving and must be dispensed in light of established facts, applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. Liberal construction in favor of seafarers must not be taken to sanction the award of compensation and disability benefits in the face of evident failure to substantially establish compensability. Applied: the claim was dismissed despite the liberal policy because compensability was not substantially established.

• "The validity of petitioner's claim for total and permanent disability benefits against respondents hinges mainly on whether or not his illnesses are work-related and suffered during the term of his contract. Under Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-Standard Employment Contract (SEC), for an injury or illness to be compensable, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the two-element test for compensability under the 2010 POEA-SEC and the central issue in the case.
• "In all these requirements, consistent with the basic standard in labor cases and administrative proceedings, the degree of proof required is substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent." — This defines the quantum of proof governing seafarer disability claims and explains why petitioner's bare allegations failed.
• "Such judicial notice, however, is nothing more than an acknowledgment of the general perils encountered by seafarers on board the vessel. It does not sufficiently prove work-relatedness of a particular illness or injury, much less, prove entitlement to compensation." — This clarifies the limited scope of judicial notice regarding seafarers' working conditions and rejects its use as a substitute for evidence of work-relatedness.
• "Such liberal construction in favor of seafarers must not be taken to sanction the award of compensation and disability benefits in the face of evident failure to substantially establish compensability, lest we set a dangerous precedent of awarding compensation and benefits based merely on unsubstantiated general allegations and common knowledge, tantamount to giving undue full coverage insurance to any and all circumstances that any seafarer may suffer." — This states the Court's caution against awarding benefits without substantial evidence, balancing the policy of protecting labor against the employer's interest.

• Status Maritime Corporation vs. Spouses Delalamon, 740 Phil. 175 (2014) — Cited for the rule that factual questions are generally outside Rule 45, and for the principle that the constitutional policy of full protection to labor is not a sword to oppress employers; also cited in relation to self-serving allegations.
• Apines vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., 799 Phil. 220, 238 (2016) — Cited as authority for the exception allowing the Court to re-examine evidence when the RCMB and the CA have divergent factual findings.
• Malicdem vs. Asia Bulk Transport, Inc., G.R. No. 224753, June 19, 2019 — Cited on non-listed illnesses being disputably presumed work-related, the substantial evidence standard, and the rule that liberal construction does not sanction awards absent proof.
• Manansala vs. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., 817 Phil. 84, 98 (2017) — Cited for the rule that listing as an occupational disease does not mean automatic compensability.
• Romana vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 816 Phil. 194, 205 (2017) — Cited for the requirement that the seafarer must show compliance with the conditions of compensability; failure results in dismissal of the claim.
• Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. vs. De Leon, 804 Phil. 279, 288 (2017) — Cited for the rule that the seafarer must prove a reasonable causal connection between illness and work, including actual work, nature of illness, and other factors; and must show that he experienced health problems while at sea.
• Pelayo vs. Aarema Shipping and Trading Co., Inc., 520 Phil. 896 (2006) — Cited in support of the Court's disbelief that a ship captain would refuse medical attention to a crew member reporting serious chest pains merely because the contract was about to expire.
• Leoncio vs. MST Marine Services (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 230357, December 6, 2017, 848 SCRA 305 — Distinguished; the claimant there proved by substantial evidence his right to disability benefits, including an existing condition known to the employer, repeated symptoms on board, and medical repatriation.
• Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and/or Ikarian Moon Shipping Co. Ltd. vs. Lagne, G.R. No. 217036, August 20, 2018 — Distinguished; the claimant was medically repatriated, enumerated his duties and responsibilities, and proved symptoms on board.
• Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. vs. Balasta, 728 Phil. 297 (2014) — Distinguished; the claimant alleged in detail and proved his specific tasks and symptoms, and the employer failed to refute his allegations.
• Paringit vs. Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc., G.R. No. 217123, February 6, 2019 — Distinguished; the grant of benefits was grounded on compliance with compensability requirements, including medical repatriation, post-employment medical examination, and the conditions under Section 32-A.
• Madridejos vs. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., 810 Phil. 704 (2017) — Cited for the rule that a PEME cannot be relied upon to reflect a seafarer's true state of health.
• Rosario vs. Denklav Marine Services Ltd., G.R. No. 166906, March 16, 2005 — Cited for the rule that there must be a proven indication that the seafarer was already suffering from an ailment at the time of termination; otherwise, it is too presumptive to contemplate even the probability that he contracted the illness on board.

• Section 20(A), 2010 POEA-Standard Employment Contract — Requires two elements for compensability: the injury or illness must be work-related, and the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. Applied: petitioner failed to establish both elements.
• Section 20(A)(3), 2010 POEA-SEC — Requires the seafarer to submit to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated doctor within three working days from repatriation. Applied: petitioner did not comply; his failure forfeited his claim.
• Section 32-A, 2010 POEA-SEC — Lists occupational diseases and the general conditions for compensability: (1) the seafarer's work must involve the risks described; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Specific conditions for cardiovascular diseases are provided under paragraph 2(11)(a) to (e). Applied: petitioner did not show compliance with the general or specific conditions.
• Number 17, Definition of Terms, 2010 POEA-SEC — Defines a work-related illness as any sickness resulting from an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions therein satisfied. Applied: petitioner's illnesses, even if listed, required proof of the conditions.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari; factual questions are generally outside the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Applied: the Court noted the factual nature of the controversy but re-examined the evidence because of the divergent findings of the RCMB and the CA.
• 2006 Maritime Labor Convention — Respondents invoked it as providing a healthy dietary standard for the vessel. The Court did not rely on it in resolving the compensability of petitioner's claim.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson); Caguioa (Working Chairperson); Lazaro-Javier; and Lopez, JJ., concurred.