Raymundo vs. Court of Appeals

An action whose principal relief sought is not the recovery of a sum of money, but rather the enforcement of a restriction or the compulsion of a specific act, is incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, even if an incidental monetary claim such as attorney's fees is included in the complaint.

Nilo Raymundo was an owner/occupant of Unit AB-122 of the Galleria de Magallanes Condominium. The condominium was governed by a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions of the Galleria de Magallanes Association, Inc., which, under Article IV, Section 3 paragraph (d), prohibited any alteration to the original architecture, appearance, and specifications of the building, including its external facade. The dispute arose when Raymundo made an unauthorized installation of glasses at his balcony, prompting the association to seek judicial compulsion for removal.

On July 5, 1989, the administrator of the Galleria de Magallanes Condominium discovered that Nilo Raymundo, an owner/occupant of Unit AB-122, had made an unauthorized installation of glasses at the balcony of his unit. The installation violated Article IV, Section 3 paragraph (d) of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions of the association, which prohibited anything done or placed in any unit or common area that would impair the structural strength of the buildings or alter the original architecture, appearance, and specifications of the building, including the external facade.

The administrator reported the violation to the Board of Directors of Galleria de Magallanes Association, Inc. in a special meeting held on July 8, 1989. On July 12, 1989, the administrator sent a letter to Raymundo demanding that he remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at his unit. Raymundo refused.

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, the association filed a complaint for mandatory injunction against Raymundo with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-490. The complaint prayed that Raymundo be ordered to remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 within five days from receipt of the order, and included a claim for ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

On March 12, 1990, Raymundo filed a Motion for extension of time to file an Answer and a Motion for production of document, both of which were granted in an Order dated March 16, 1990. However, on March 23, 1990, instead of filing an Answer, Raymundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction, arguing that a complaint for mandatory injunction was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The Motion to Dismiss was denied on June 1, 1990, the trial court holding that under Section 21 of BP 129, the RTC had legal competence to issue a writ of mandatory injunction. Raymundo's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on June 29, 1990. On elevation to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition was dismissed on March 11, 1991, prompting the present recourse.

• Lack of Jurisdiction of the RTC: Petitioner maintained that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint for mandatory injunction because private respondent's sole pecuniary claim of ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees fell within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court as provided under Section 33 of BP 129.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over a complaint for mandatory injunction seeking the removal of an unauthorized condominium installation, where the only pecuniary claim is ₱10,000.00 in attorney's fees.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction because the principal action — enforcement of condominium restrictions and compulsion of removal of the unauthorized installation — is incapable of pecuniary estimation under Section 19(1) of BP 129, and the RTC may issue writs of injunction under Section 21(1) of the same law. The ₱10,000.00 attorney's fees claim is merely incidental and does not determine jurisdiction.

• Jurisdiction: The determinative criterion for whether an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is considered one where the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and is cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts. In this case, the question for resolution was whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions and, if so, whether he should be compelled to remove the unauthorized glass installation. That issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The ₱10,000.00 claim for attorney's fees was only incidental to the principal cause of action and therefore not determinative of jurisdiction. Section 33 of BP 129, which governs jurisdiction based on the amount of pecuniary claims, was inapplicable; instead, paragraph (1) of Section 19 and paragraph (1) of Section 21 of BP 129 controlled. The Court also noted that the trial court had erroneously treated the complaint as one for mandatory injunction — a provisional remedy — when the action was in substance an enforcement of condominium restrictions, though this mischaracterization did not affect the jurisdictional outcome.

• Criterion for Actions Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation — In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction depends on the amount claimed. Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is considered incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts. Applied in this case, the association's complaint sought enforcement of condominium restrictions and removal of an unauthorized installation, with attorney's fees merely incidental, placing the action within RTC jurisdiction.

• Incidental Monetary Claims Do Not Determine Jurisdiction — A claim for attorney's fees or other monetary relief that is merely incidental to the principal cause of action does not control the determination of jurisdictional amount. Jurisdiction is fixed by the nature of the principal relief sought, not by the amount of an incidental monetary claim.

• "In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought." — This passage articulates the controlling test for distinguishing actions capable of pecuniary estimation from those that are not, and is the ratio decidendi for the jurisdictional ruling.

• "However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now regional trial courts]." — This formulation, quoted from Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, establishes the rule that incidental monetary claims do not render an action capable of pecuniary estimation.

• "A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action." — This passage clarifies the nature of mandatory injunction as a provisional remedy, distinguishing it from the principal action, and explains why the trial court's characterization of the complaint as one for mandatory injunction was erroneous.

• Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 [1979] — Followed. The Court quoted this case as the source of the controlling criterion for determining whether an action is capable of pecuniary estimation, applying its rule that actions where the money claim is incidental to the principal relief are incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts.

• Section 19(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Grants Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Applied as the primary jurisdictional basis, since the association's action to enforce condominium restrictions and compel removal of the unauthorized installation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

• Section 21(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Grants Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction. Cited by the trial court as the basis for its jurisdiction, though the Supreme Court noted the complaint was mischaracterized as one for mandatory injunction when it was in substance an action to enforce condominium restrictions.

• Section 33, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Defines the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts based on pecuniary claims. Petitioner invoked this provision, but the Court held it inapplicable because the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation and the ₱10,000.00 attorney's fees claim was merely incidental.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Melo, JJ., concurred.