Raro vs. Sandiganbayan

The special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information; the established remedy is to continue with the trial and appeal an adverse verdict. The Court held that an incomplete or absent preliminary investigation does not warrant the quashal of an information but necessitates a remand for the conduct or completion thereof. Furthermore, the Ombudsman's failure to personally examine the complainant under oath does not render the preliminary investigation constitutionally defective, as the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 authorize the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed in any form or manner. The filing of a counter-affidavit cures any defect in the form of the complaint.

Oscar G. Raro, a lawyer and Corporate Secretary of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), also served as Acting Manager of the Special Projects Department overseeing the experimental Small Town Lottery (STL). On May 20, 1988, Luis Abaño, the Provincial Manager of the STL operation in Camarines Norte, filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan alleging that Raro intervened in the STL operation for his financial benefit. Abaño charged Raro with causing the employment of Raro's relatives in the STL, bad faith in dismissing employees, and demanding over P100,000.00 as his share in the lottery proceeds, in violation of Sections 3(d), 3(e), and 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. The complaint was verified and subscribed before a notary public.

• The Complaint and NBI Investigation: Luis Abaño filed a complaint against Raro with the Tanodbayan, alleging nepotism, bad faith dismissal, and extortion. Ombudsman Colayco endorsed the complaint to the NBI. The NBI investigation yielded mixed findings: the charge of employment of relatives was not fully verified from ELMEC's owners, the charge of demanding P100,000.00 had no receipts and required further investigation, and the dismissal of employees was not yet covered. The NBI recommended further investigation.
• The Ombudsman's Review and Information: Graft Investigation Officer II Medialdea-Caraos recommended further NBI investigation, which Ombudsman Vasquez approved. After the NBI recommended prosecution in September 1990, GIO II Caraos directed Raro to file a counter-affidavit. Raro denied the charges, claiming he removed employees to prevent government injury and that it was impossible to demand bribe money via check. GIO II Caraos found a prima facie case for violation of R.A. 3019. Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera disapproved this, finding the evidence insufficient. However, SPO I Barreras-Sulit reviewed the records and found a prima facie case only for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving P116,000.00 on four occasions. The Ombudsman approved this, and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on July 2, 1992.
• The Motion to Quash: Raro filed a motion for reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan, alleging a four-year prejudicial delay, hasty preparation of the information (which was dated May 19, 1992, before the June 11, 1992 resolution), and denial of due process because he was not furnished the NBI report or the resolution before the information was filed. The Sandiganbayan granted the reinvestigation but found no indecent delay. SPO III Berbano denied the motion for reinvestigation on August 14, 1992, deeming the issues matters of defense for trial. Raro filed a motion for reconsideration on August 18, 1992, which was denied. Raro then filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan, arguing that the preliminary investigation was a sham, SPO III Berbano was pressured by complainant's letters and his judicial aspirations, and the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan failed to personally examine the complainant under oath. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

• Petitioner argued that the determination of probable cause was constitutionally defective because the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan failed to personally examine the complainant under oath before filing the information and issuing the warrant of arrest, respectively.
• Petitioner maintained that the preliminary investigation was hasty, malicious, and persecutory, pointing out that the information was dated before the resolution recommending its filing, and that SPO III Berbano denied his motion for reconsideration before it was even filed.
• Petitioner contended that the four-year delay in resolving the preliminary investigation, coupled with the reliance on manifestly false and politically motivated evidence, violated his constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of the case.
• Petitioner asserted that the complainant should be charged as a briber, and that the affidavits relied upon were hearsay and inadmissible.

• Respondents countered that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies to assail an interlocutory order denying a motion to quash; the correct remedy is to proceed to trial and appeal.
• Respondents argued that the Ombudsman did not abdicate its duty by referring the complaint to the NBI, as the referral was merely for fact-finding preparatory to the preliminary investigation.
• Respondents maintained that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan sufficiently determined probable cause based on the records, and that the Constitution and the law allow the Ombudsman to act on complaints in any form or manner.
• Respondents asserted that the delay in the investigation was justified by the need for thoroughness and the internal review processes, and that SPO III Berbano was presumed to have regularly performed his duties absent convincing proof of pressure.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioner's right to due process by failing to personally examine the complainant under oath before filing the information and issuing the warrant of arrest.
  • Whether the preliminary investigation was hasty, malicious, and based on inadmissible evidence.
  • Whether the four-year delay in the preliminary investigation violated the petitioner's right to the speedy disposition of his case.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies to assail the denial of a motion to quash, which is an interlocutory order. The established rule requires the accused to proceed with the trial and appeal an adverse verdict. Certiorari is only allowed in exceptions involving special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal, which were not present here. However, the Court resolved the substantive issues in the interest of justice.
• Substantive: The Court ruled against the petitioner on all substantive grounds.
• On the failure to personally examine the complainant, the Court held that Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 mandate the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner. The submission of affidavits is preferable but not mandatory or jurisdictional. Any defect in the form of the complaint was cured when the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit controverting the allegations. The referral to the NBI was a valid delegation of fact-finding, not of the preliminary investigation itself. For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the Court held that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant; personal evaluation of the prosecution's report and supporting documents suffices.
• On the allegation of a hasty and malicious investigation, the Court found that the premature dating of the information was a mere faux pas that did not violate substantive rights, as the filing had the imprimatur of the Ombudsman. The denial of the motion for reconsideration prior to its filing was explained by the fact that SPO III Berbano was resolving a different motion for reinvestigation. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applied to SPO III Berbano absent clear and convincing proof of pressure.
• On the right to speedy disposition, the Court found the delay justified. The period should be reckoned from the filing of the counter-affidavit on October 25, 1991. The 36 days taken to resolve the case thereafter, plus the time for internal review, did not constitute a violation. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly should not be mistaken for a hasty resolution at the expense of thoroughness and correctness. The Ombudsman's discretion in determining probable cause and what crime to charge is paramount and will not be interfered with by the Court.

• Remedy for Denial of Motion to Quash — A special civil action for certiorari or prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order denying a motion to quash an information. The proper course is to proceed with the trial and, if an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal. Certiorari is only allowed where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal.
• Complaints Filed in Any Form or Manner — Under Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials. The submission of sworn affidavits is preferable for speedier disposition but is not mandatory or jurisdictional. The failure of the Ombudsman to personally administer the oath to the complainant does not invalidate the finding of probable cause.
• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, intended to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused is guilty. It is not a trial on the merits and does not require the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence, but only such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief in the guilt of the accused.
• Determination of Probable Cause for Warrant of Arrest — In a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not required to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation or to personally examine the complainant. The judge must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution.
• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — In determining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the factors to be considered and weighed are: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reasons for such delay, (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The Ombudsman's duty to act promptly does not equate to a hasty resolution at the expense of thoroughness.

• "It must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy."
• "The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on Complaints brought before him. But such duty should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughness and correctness."

• Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan, 338 Phil. 290 (1997) — Followed. The Court cited this case to reiterate the doctrine that certiorari and prohibition are not proper remedies against interlocutory orders such as the denial of a motion to quash.
• Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101202, March 8, 1993 — Followed. The Court cited this case to support the validity of charges that were not made in writing or under oath, holding that the Solicitor General's sworn testimony was sufficient basis for investigation.
• Olivas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 102420, December 20, 1994 — Distinguished. The Court cited this case, which required the PCGG to reduce gathered evidence into affidavits, but clarified that the submission of affidavits is not mandatory or jurisdictional under the Ombudsman's rules.
• Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, June 27, 1994 — Followed. The Court cited this case to define the nature of a preliminary investigation as merely inquisitorial and not a trial on the merits.
• Camanag v. Guerrero, 335 Phil. 945 (1997) — Followed. The Court cited this case to affirm its policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's conduct of preliminary investigations and determination of probable cause.

• Article XI, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Mandates the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials. The Court applied this to hold that the Ombudsman's failure to personally examine the complainant under oath did not invalidate the proceedings.
• Article XI, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Vests the Ombudsman with the power to direct any public official to perform or expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse, and to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official at fault, including prosecution. The Court applied this to affirm that the referral to the NBI was a valid exercise of the Ombudsman's fact-finding function, not an abdication of its duty to conduct preliminary investigation.
• Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), Section 13 — Restates the constitutional mandate to act on complaints in any form, either verbal or in writing. The Court used this to support the validity of the proceedings despite the lack of a personally administered oath by the Ombudsman.
• Administrative Order No. 07, Rule I, Section 3 & Rule II, Section 4(a) — Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman stating that it is "preferable" that complaints be in writing and under oath, and providing for the submission of affidavits. The Court interpreted these provisions as directory rather than mandatory or jurisdictional.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr.