Raquiza vs. Bradford

The writ of habeas corpus does not lie to release persons detained by military authorities pursuant to a Commander-in-Chief's wartime proclamation where the war has not been formally terminated by competent authority and the detaining army is stationed in the territory by agreement of the sovereign government, rendering it exempt from civil jurisdiction.

The petitioners were Filipino citizens detained by personnel of the United States Army Counter Intelligence Corps following the landing of American liberation forces in the Philippines. Their arrests were effected pursuant to a proclamation issued by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur on December 29, 1944, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, which declared his purpose to remove persons who had voluntarily given aid, comfort, and sustenance to the enemy from positions of political and economic influence, hold them in restraint for the duration of the war, and thereafter release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment. The Commonwealth Government had been restored on February 27, 1945, with General MacArthur formally turning over full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution to President Osmeña, but no treaty of peace had been signed and no congressional declaration terminating the war had been issued as of the date of the petition.

The petitioners — Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee, and Emma Link Infante — were Filipino citizens confined in the Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong. On March 13, 1945, Raquiza was arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the U.S. Sixth Army and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385, charged with "Espionage activity for Japanese." On February 25, 1945, Tee Han Kee was arrested by the same detachment and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 286, charged with "Active collaboration with the enemy." On April 10, 1945, Infante was arrested by the 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, charged with "Active collaboration with the Japanese," her previous association with the enemy being deemed a present security risk to the United States Armed Forces. Each commitment order authorized and directed the commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation to detain the person in custody until released by competent military authority.

All three arrests were made pursuant to the proclamation issued by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur on December 29, 1944, which premised its directives on two grounds: first, that evidence was before him that certain citizens of the Philippines had voluntarily given aid, comfort, and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and second, that military necessity required such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the security of military forces or the success of military operations. The proclamation declared MacArthur's purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines, hold them in restraint for the duration of the war, and thereafter release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.

On August 30, 1945, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, alleging that they had been and were being "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty, and praying that the respondents — Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC, U.S. Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead" — be directed to appear before the Court and produce the bodies of the petitioners and show cause why they should not be set at liberty. The respondents filed returns attaching the commitment orders, stating that the petitioners were detained by virtue of MacArthur's proclamation. Respondent Bradford alleged that after apprehension he had turned the petitioners over to the Provost Marshall at Bilibid Prison and had no further connection with them or with the Correctional Institution for Women. Respondent Capt. Caroline De Eason, who was in charge of the Women's Correctional Institution, invoked the authority of the commitment orders issued by Bradford.

No formal complaint or information charging the petitioners with any specific offense had been filed in any court or tribunal, no judicial writ or order for their commitment had been issued, and they had never been given a summary hearing. They had not been turned over to the Philippine Government for its judgment, and the respondents made no allegation or intimation in their returns as to whether and when they would release the petitioners to the Commonwealth Government. By the date of the decision, Japan had formally surrendered on September 2, 1945, aboard the battleship Missouri, but no treaty of peace had been signed and no congressional declaration terminating the war had been issued.

• Illegal Detention: Petitioners alleged that they had been and were being "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty without lawful basis, no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offense having been filed against them, nor any judicial writ or order for their commitment issued at any time.
• Absence of Martial Law: Petitioners maintained that there being no martial law in the Philippines and the civil government having been formally delivered to the authorities of the Commonwealth, with the Constitution in full operation, their confinement was illegal.
• Entitlement to Habeas Corpus: Petitioners invoked the writ of habeas corpus to recover their liberty, arguing that they had not been informed of the nature of the accusation against them, had never been given a summary hearing, and had not been turned over to the Philippine Government for judgment.

• Authority of the Proclamation: Respondents countered that the petitioners were lawfully detained by virtue of General MacArthur's proclamation of December 29, 1944, and the commitment orders issued thereunder, which authorized and directed the detention of persons deemed security risks until released by competent military authority.
• Lack of Connection to Detention: Respondent Bradford argued that immediately after apprehension, the petitioners were turned over to the Provost Marshall at Bilibid Prison, and that he had nothing further to do with them and no connection with the Correctional Institution for Women.
• Invocation of Procedural Bar: Counsel for respondents invoked Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court and the former Section 529 of Act No. 190, as amended by Acts Nos. 272 and 421, to maintain that the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition, as the petitioners were held by military authority.

• Termination of War: Whether the war had terminated within the meaning of that part of MacArthur's proclamation providing for the release of detained persons to the Philippine Government "for the duration of the war."
• Jurisdiction Over U.S. Army: Whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the respondents as members of the United States Army such that the writ of habeas corpus could be enforced against them.
• Status as Prisoners of War: Whether the petitioners, while under the custody of the United States military forces, could be considered prisoners of war.
• Availability of Civil Court Remedy: Whether the civil courts should interfere with the military authorities' determination that military necessity continued to require the petitioners' detention.

• Termination of War: No. The war had not legally terminated, as no formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it had been issued; the determination of when war is at an end is the province of the political department, not the judicial department, of government.
• Jurisdiction Over U.S. Army: No. The United States Army, stationed in the Philippines by agreement of the Commonwealth Government for the express purpose of liberation and prosecution of the war, was exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place, by analogy to the doctrine of waiver of territorial jurisdiction over a foreign army permitted to be stationed in a friendly country.
• Status as Prisoners of War: Yes, prima facie. The petitioners could be considered prisoners of war under the charges of espionage activity and active collaboration, as persons whose services were of particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government fall within the enumeration of civilians who may be made prisoners of war.
• Availability of Civil Court Remedy: No. The existence and continuance of military necessity was a question exclusively for the military authorities to determine as regards each person under detention, and civil courts should not interfere; the petitioners' recourse, if any, lay in making due representation to the proper military authorities.

• Termination of War: The Court relied on United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), which held that war, in the legal sense, continues until and terminates at the time of some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it, and that it is the province of the political department, not the judicial department, to determine when war is at an end. No such formal proclamation had been issued as of the date of the decision. Even if the war had terminated, the Court held that under the proclamation the petitioners would continue legally under military custody for a reasonable time thereafter, because the Commander-in-Chief, who declared his purpose to release detainees to the Philippine Government, should be the sole judge of how long that reasonable time should be. To hold otherwise would give the proclamation an irrational interpretation requiring immediate delivery of all detained persons upon termination of hostilities — a physical impossibility given the unknown number of detainees and the logistical requirements of proper transfer.

• Jurisdiction Over U.S. Army: The Court applied the doctrine from Coleman vs. Tennessee (97 U.S., 509) and The Schooner Exchange (7 Cranch, 139), under which a foreign army permitted to march through or be stationed in a friendly country by permission of its government or sovereign is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. The Court reasoned that the United States Army of liberation was present not merely by permission but at the express request and agreement of the Commonwealth Government, for the purpose of liberating the islands and prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion. With even greater reason, therefore, should that army be exempt from civil jurisdiction. By analogy, the agreement for the stationing of United States forces implied a waiver of all jurisdiction over their troops during the time covered by such agreement, permitting the allied commander to retain exclusive control and discipline. Any attempt by civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the army before the agreed period expired would violate the country's own faith.

• Status as Prisoners of War: The Court cited Hyde on International Law for the proposition that an army in the field may avail itself of the right to make civilians prisoners of war, including persons whose services are of particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, such as higher civil officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, and guides. The petitioners would prima facie come within this classification under the charges of "Espionage activity for Japanese," "Active collaboration with the Japanese," and "Active collaboration with the enemy."

• Availability of Civil Court Remedy: The Court held that the existence and continuance of the military necessity to which MacArthur's proclamation referred was a question exclusively for the military authorities to determine, as regards each and every person under detention. The fact that delivery of certain persons to the Philippine Government had already begun did not mean the war had legally terminated; such delivery was within the power of the military authorities to make even before formal termination. Civil courts should not interfere, and it was to be presumed that the military authorities had determined that military necessity no longer required the detention of those already delivered. The petitioners were not totally without remedy, as they could make due representation to the proper military authorities, who could be safely presumed not to deny any remedy available under military law and prevailing circumstances. The Court expressly declined to decide whether the doctrine laid down would be applicable to cases arising in time of peace.

• Termination of War — Political Question Doctrine — War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. The determination of when war is at an end is the province of the political department, not the judicial department, of government. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that, absent a formal proclamation of peace or congressional declaration, the war had not legally terminated, and the Commander-in-Chief's proclamation authorizing detention "for the duration of the war" remained operative.

• Exemption of Foreign Army from Civil Jurisdiction — A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. The sovereign is understood to cede a portion of territorial jurisdiction when allowing troops of a foreign prince to pass through or be stationed in its dominions. The Court applied this doctrine by analogy to the U.S. Army of liberation, holding that its presence by agreement of the Commonwealth Government implied a waiver of civil jurisdiction over its troops, rendering the writ of habeas corpus unenforceable against them.

• Military Necessity as Exclusive Military Determination — The existence and continuance of military necessity justifying detention under a Commander-in-Chief's wartime proclamation is a question exclusively for the military authorities to determine, as regards each person under detention. Civil courts should not interfere with that determination. The Court applied this principle to hold that the petitioners' recourse lay with the military authorities, not the civil courts.

• Prisoners of War — Civilian Classification — An army in the field may avail itself of the right to make civilians prisoners of war, including persons whose services are of particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, such as higher civil officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, and guides. The Court held that the petitioners would prima facie fall within this classification under the charges of espionage and collaboration.

• "War, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and not of the judicial department, of government to determine when war is at an end." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the question of legal termination of war, establishing that judicial determination of war's end is foreclosed absent a formal proclamation by the political department.

• "It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and the criminal jurisdiction of the place." — This quotation from Coleman vs. Tennessee, adopted by the Court, articulates the international law doctrine underpinning the holding that civil courts lack jurisdiction over the U.S. Army stationed in the Philippines by agreement.

• "The existence of the military necessity to which General of the Army MacArthur refers in his proclamation, as well as its continuance, is a question exclusively for the military authorities to determine, as regards each and every person under detention. For obvious reasons, the civil courts should not here interfere." — This passage defines the boundary between military and judicial authority in wartime detention, establishing the principle of non-interference that disposed of the petitioners' claim.

• "In conclusion, we hold that the petition should be dismissed." — The dispositive formulation of the majority's ruling.

• United States vs. Tubig, 3 Phil., 244, 254 — Followed as controlling authority for the proposition that war, in the legal sense, continues until a formal proclamation of peace by competent authority, and that determining when war ends is the province of the political department. The Court applied its holding to conclude that the war had not legally terminated.

• Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509 — Followed for the doctrine that a foreign army permitted to be stationed in a friendly country by permission of its government is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. The Court applied this doctrine by analogy to the U.S. Army of liberation in the Philippines. The dissent argued this case was distinguishable, as it involved a soldier's crime tried by court-martial in enemy-occupied territory, not civilians detained without trial in liberated territory.

• The Schooner Exchange, 7 Cranch, 139 — Cited through Coleman for Chief Justice Marshall's articulation of the doctrine of mutual waiver of jurisdiction between sovereigns, under which every sovereign is understood to waive a part of its complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction in certain cases. The Court relied on this rationale to support the waiver of civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines.

• Payomo vs. Floyd, 42 Phil., 788 — Cited in the dissenting opinions as authority for the proposition that Philippine courts have jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions against U.S. naval authorities detaining civilians. The dissent argued that the majority's refusal to exercise similar jurisdiction constituted a reversal of this Court's own prior doctrine.

• General MacArthur's Proclamation of December 29, 1944 — The operative instrument under which the petitioners were detained. It declared the purpose to remove persons who had given aid, comfort, and sustenance to the enemy from positions of political and economic influence, hold them in restraint for the duration of the war, and thereafter release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment. The Court interpreted "for the duration of the war" as requiring a formal proclamation of peace for termination, and implied a reasonable-time allowance for transfer of detainees even after such termination.

• Section 1, Article III, Philippine Constitution — Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Cited in the dissenting opinions as the constitutional basis for the petitioners' right to challenge their detention; the majority did not directly address this provision.

• Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. Cited in the dissent as the procedural basis for granting relief.

• Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Enumerates exceptions to the writ of habeas corpus: (1) custody under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction; (2) persons charged with or convicted of an offense who ought to be delivered to the executive power; and (3) persons suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. The dissent argued that none of these exceptions applied to the petitioners. Counsel for respondents invoked this provision to argue the Court lacked jurisdiction.

• Section 529, Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure), as amended by Acts Nos. 272 and 421 — Formerly provided that a certificate from a commanding general that a prisoner was held as a prisoner of war was a conclusive answer to a writ of habeas corpus against a military officer. The dissent noted that this provision was omitted when the Code was reenacted as Section 4 of Rule 102, and was therefore impliedly abrogated.

Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, and Pablo, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion.

• Ozaeta, J. (with Paras, J., concurring) — The dissent argued that the petitioners were entitled to due process of law under both the Philippine and United States Constitutions, and that their confinement without notice, hearing, or any form of judicial or military tribunal proceeding was illegal. The dissent rejected the majority's reliance on Coleman vs. Tennessee as inapplicable, distinguishing that case as involving a soldier tried by court-martial in enemy-occupied territory, not civilians detained without trial in liberated territory. It further argued that the U.S. Army was not a "foreign army" because the Philippines remained under U.S. sovereignty, and that the war had in fact ended with Japan's unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945, as evidenced by the CIC's own partial turnover of detainees to the Commonwealth Government. The dissent invoked Payomo vs. Floyd as authority that Philippine courts have jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus against U.S. military authorities detaining civilians, and argued that the omission of the former Section 529 of Act No. 190 from the present Rules of Court impliedly abrogated the bar to habeas corpus relief for military prisoners. The dissent would have ordered the petitioners' immediate discharge.

• Perfecto, J. — The dissent argued that the petitioners were political prisoners, not military prisoners, because MacArthur's proclamation declared his purpose merely to "hold them in restraint" — not to prosecute, try, or punish — and to release them to the Philippine Government for judgment, thereby placing their cases within the civil jurisdiction of ordinary courts. The dissent maintained that the war had ended as a matter of fact with Japan's unconditional surrender, rendering the detention authority under the proclamation exhausted, and that no formal treaty or congressional declaration was necessary to recognize this reality. The dissent further argued that the U.S. Army was not a "foreign army" but represented the same sovereignty under which the Philippines was placed, and that the privilege of extraterritoriality was limited to the internal matters of the army and could not override the substantial constitutional rights of Filipino citizens. The dissent invoked Ex parte Milligan for the principle that constitutional guaranties of personal liberty protect all classes at all times and under all circumstances, and Villavicencio vs. Lukban and Payomo vs. Floyd for the Court's prior jurisdiction over habeas corpus against U.S. military authorities. The dissent would have ordered the petitioners' immediate release.