Ranada vs. Office of the President

A petition becomes moot when supervening events — such as the expiration of the official term of the executive officer whose directives were challenged — eliminate any practical value in judicial adjudication, and the Court will decline to rule on substantive constitutional questions where doing so would require resolving intertwined factual issues in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

Rappler, Inc. is an online media organization whose corporate existence was placed in jeopardy when the Securities and Exchange Commission revoked its Certificate of Incorporation on January 11, 2018, for alleged violation of constitutional and statutory foreign equity restrictions in mass media. Access to presidential events in the Philippines is governed by a layered accreditation system: the International Press Center issues Press IDs, the Malacañang Press Corps grants membership to reporters assigned to cover Malacañang, and the Media Accreditation Registration Office endorses media organizations to the MPC — all offices falling under the Presidential Communications Operations Office. Among the MPC's by-law requirements for membership is that a media organization be duly registered with the SEC. Petitioners-in-intervention include journalists, student journalists, academics, and a media foundation, all of whom joined the action out of concern that the prohibition against Rappler signaled a broader threat to press freedom.

On January 11, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission released a Decision revoking Rappler's Certificate of Incorporation for violating the constitutional and statutory foreign equity restrictions in mass media. Following the revocation, Rappler and its journalists were prohibited from attending presidential events — events where President Rodrigo Roa Duterte was in attendance. All IPC and MARO accreditations had expired on December 31, 2017, in line with the one-calendar-year validity period, including Rappler's, necessitating renewal for 2018.

Petitioners contend that on February 20, 2018, respondents commenced imposing a ban against Rappler and its affiliated journalists from covering newsworthy events involving the presence or participation of the President and his political party, PDP-Laban, including events held in public places accessible to the public. They attribute the ban to three verbal declarations by President Duterte: a January 16, 2018 media interview in which he declared Rappler a "fake news outlet"; a February 22, 2018 interview in which he invoked "executive action" based on the SEC ruling to bar Rappler from entering Malacañang or covering any presidential event; and a March 1, 2018 statement at the National SWAT Challenge in which he declared a broader order against Rappler. Petitioners assert that the ban arose from a manifest and hostile animus against them, and that the accreditation requirements cited by respondents are merely a pretextual cover.

Respondents, for their part, characterize the situation not as a "ban" but as a consequence of petitioners' failure to comply with accreditation requirements. They explain that for "special access" to cover the President, media entities must apply for accreditation with the IPC, which requires submission of an IPC Press Accreditation Form, and that local media entities must also be members of the MPC. The MPC by-laws require, among other things, that a media organization be duly registered with the SEC. The MARO accredits local and foreign media for covering Malacañang Palace and other presidential events, and requires both an IPC Press ID and MPC membership. Ranada, Rappler's Malacañang beat reporter, filed an application for renewal of her IPC Press ID in 2018 as an MPC member. However, because Rappler's SEC registration had been revoked, Ranada's application was denied by the IPC, her IPC Press ID was not renewed, and she was denied special access to Malacañang Palace.

Petitioners filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on April 10, 2019, seeking to prohibit respondents from implementing the ban and to declare it void. Three Petitions-in-Intervention were subsequently filed by journalists, student journalists and academics, and a media foundation. The parties disputed whether the prohibition constituted a ban or merely the denial of special access, whether it was based on the President's personal animus or on accreditation requirements, and the actual scope of the prohibition — including whether Rappler journalists were physically prevented from attending presidential events held in public places.

President Duterte's term ended at noon on June 30, 2022, when he was succeeded by President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. Based on a list of MPC members as of February 20, 2023, Bea Cupin of Rappler appears as an MPC Regular Member, and a Rappler opinion piece noted that President Marcos had made no move to exclude critical media from Palace coverages.

• Freedom of the Press: Petitioners contended that the ban abridges freedom of the press, as barring access to members of the press or restricting their ability to cover activities or events of the President contravenes their constitutional rights.
• No Government License Required: Petitioners asserted that a free press must not be dependent on any form of government license as a prerequisite to the exercise of press freedoms, and that journalists do not require prior approval or accreditation from a government agency to perform their functions or exercise editorial freedoms.
• Regulatory Creativity as End-Run: Petitioners argued that conditioning constitutional protection on accreditation or clearance from agencies such as the SEC or BIR would justify unwarranted governmental intrusion into press freedoms, rendering constitutional protection illusory if avoidable through "regulatory" creativity.
• Self-Regulation of the Press: Petitioners maintained that the media is self-governing and self-regulating, citing RA No. 4363 and PD No. 576, and that the prerogative to determine who are legitimate journalists and who has access to public venues to cover newsworthy events belongs to the self-regulating press and cannot be co-opted by the Government.
• Subsequent Punishment: Petitioners submitted that the ban was a form of subsequent punishment — retaliation for the content of their reporting — constituting punitive action against them.
• Strict Scrutiny: Petitioners contended that the ban does not pass the test of strict scrutiny, as no compelling state interest has been shown, and the ban has not been shown to be narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means.
• Procedural Due Process: Petitioners argued they were denied procedural due process, having received no formal written notice of the imposition of the ban and no opportunity to be heard.
• Equal Protection: Petitioners contended they were denied equal protection, having been arbitrarily, if not malevolently, singled out, with a disparate treatment effected against them.

• No Constitutional Issue: Respondents asserted that no constitutional issues are raised and no constitutional rights have been violated or implicated, as the denial of an entity whose legal existence is in serious doubt the ability to personally cover presidential events does not equate to a serious constitutional issue.
• Accreditation Requirements: Respondents maintained that petitioners' failure to comply with accreditation requirements is at the heart of the controversy, as a journalist or media entity must be accredited by the IPC, the MARO, and be a member of the MPC to cover presidential events.
• Privilege, Not Right: Respondents asserted that access to presidential events is akin to a privilege, not a right afforded under freedom of the press, and that the constitutional freedom of the press does not include the right to demand a special press pass, special accreditation, or special spot at any news conference or press briefing.
• No Prior Restraint: Respondents argued that the accreditation requirements cannot be considered a prior government license or prior restraint, as the IPC Press ID is required of all journalists and was not imposed specifically on Rappler, and petitioners were able to continuously report and publish articles despite their lack of accreditation.
• No Subsequent Punishment: Respondents stated that the prohibition cannot be considered subsequent punishment, as petitioners have not been sanctioned, and it is instead the constitutional issue regarding Rappler's ownership that has stripped it and its journalists of the privilege to cover the President.
• Limited Scope of Self-Regulation: Respondents contended that the right to self-regulation under RA No. 4363 and PD No. 576 is limited to ethical issues, and that the issue here revolves around the legal existence of Rappler, which is beyond the scope of self-regulation.
• Strict Scrutiny Inapplicable: Respondents contended that strict scrutiny should not apply as there is no infringement of fundamental rights, and that the lack of access is simply the result of lack of accreditation based on the January 11, 2018 SEC Decision.
• Due Process and Equal Protection Inapplicable: Respondents stated that a discussion on notice and hearing is not relevant as the issue is simply lack of accreditation, and that this lack justifies the difference in treatment as petitioners are not similarly situated with other journalists who possess accreditation.

• Mootness: Whether the petition has been rendered moot by the expiration of President Duterte's term on June 30, 2022, and the apparent restoration of Rappler's access to presidential events under the succeeding administration.
• Questions of Fact: Whether the case involves factual issues that cannot be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, thereby precluding a ruling on the substantive constitutional questions.
• Freedom of the Press: Whether the prohibition against Rappler and its journalists from covering presidential events constitutes an abridgment of freedom of the press under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
• Prior Restraint: Whether the accreditation requirements and denial of access constitute prior restraint.
• Subsequent Punishment: Whether the prohibition constitutes a form of subsequent punishment for the content of petitioners' reporting.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: Whether petitioners were denied procedural due process and equal protection of the laws.

• Mootness: Yes. The petition was dismissed as moot, President Duterte's term having ended on June 30, 2022, and Rappler appearing to have regained access to presidential events under the succeeding administration.
• Questions of Fact: Yes. The case presents factual issues — including the actual scope of the ban, Rappler's continuing MPC membership, and the true basis of the prohibition — that cannot be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, precluding a substantive ruling.
• Freedom of the Press: N/A. The Court declined to rule on this substantive issue due to mootness and the presence of unresolved factual questions.
• Prior Restraint: N/A. The Court declined to rule on this substantive issue.
• Subsequent Punishment: N/A. The Court declined to rule on this substantive issue.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: N/A. The Court declined to rule on this substantive issue.

• Mootness: The Court's power of judicial review requires an actual case or controversy — one that is definite, concrete, and touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A case becomes moot when supervening events render a declaration of no practical use or value. Here, the primary assertion of the petitioners was that the ban resulted from executive offices implementing the verbal directives of President Duterte, and that the accreditation issue was merely a pretext for his personal dislike. Because President Duterte's term ended on June 30, 2022, and because Rappler appears to have regained access to presidential events under President Marcos, Jr. — as shown by the MPC member list as of February 20, 2023, which includes Bea Cupin of Rappler as a Regular Member, and by a Rappler opinion piece noting that President Marcos had made no move to exclude critical media — there would no longer be any practical value in a judgment. The Court recognized well-established exceptions to the mootness doctrine (grave violation of the Constitution, exceptional character and paramount public interest, need for controlling principles, and capability of repetition yet evading review), but declined to apply them here, noting in particular that the fears of petitioners-in-intervention that the ban would expand to other media entities proved groundless, as no such expansion came to pass.

• Questions of Fact: The Court's original jurisdiction in extraordinary writs is properly invoked only for questions of law; the Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism. Several issues in this case would require factual determination: (1) whether Rappler remained an MPC member despite the SEC revocation of its COI, as petitioners insist the MPC never revoked Rappler's accreditation while respondents presented lists showing Rappler's absence therefrom; (2) the actual extent and coverage of the ban, as petitioners allege they were physically prevented from attending presidential events in public places while respondents admit only the denial of "special access"; and (3) the true basis for the prohibition, as petitioners claim personal animus while respondents cite accreditation requirements — though the Court noted that even President Duterte's cited statements largely hinged on the SEC revocation. Given these interlocking factual questions, the Court concluded that the interests of the public would not be adequately served by an attempt to rule on the substantive issues, particularly in a moot case where no actual relief would be afforded.

• Mootness Doctrine — A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication or declaration would be of no practical value or use. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such cases because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect. The Court applied this doctrine by dismissing the petition upon the expiration of President Duterte's term and the apparent restoration of Rappler's access under the succeeding administration.

• Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine — The Court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. The Court declined to apply these exceptions despite their seeming relevance, exercising judicial restraint given the factual questions and the absence of practical relief.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — While the Supreme Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and CA in the issuance of extraordinary writs, direct recourse to the Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court, as it is not a trier of facts. This doctrine operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism enabling the Court to focus on its fundamental tasks. The Court invoked this doctrine to decline ruling on substantive issues requiring factual determination.

• Actual Case or Controversy Requirement — The exercise of judicial review requires an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. An actual case deals with conflicting rights that are legally demandable and enforceable, involving definite facts and incidents to be appreciated, and laws to be applied. A constitutional question may not be presented at an inopportune time — when premature, the ruling becomes an advisory opinion; when belated, it no longer affects the parties.

• "A case is moot when it 'ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.'" — This passage states the controlling formulation of the mootness doctrine as applied to dismiss the petition, anchoring the Court's refusal to adjudicate in the absence of a persisting controversy.

• "Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for the Court's refusal to resolve factual issues in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, reinforcing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as a constitutional filtering mechanism.

• "The Court finds in this case the presence of a combination of factors that forestall it from rendering a judgment on the merits, and in particular, a meaningful one." — This passage encapsulates the Court's conclusion that both mootness and the presence of unresolved factual questions jointly preclude a substantive ruling, while signaling that the Court's restraint does not diminish the importance of press freedom.

• Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021 — Followed for the thorough discussion of the necessity of an actual case or controversy as a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial review, and the principle that a case is moot when supervening events render a declaration of no practical value.

• Angara vs. Electoral Commission — Cited within the Pangilinan discussion for the principle that judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies, and that any attempt at abstraction leads to barren legal questions and sterile conclusions.

• Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. vs. Sugar Regulatory Administration — Followed for the definition of moot and academic cases as those where adjudication would be of no practical value or use, and where no actual substantial relief would be entitled to by the petitioner.

• Timbol vs. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578 (2015) — Followed for the enumeration of the four recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine: grave violation of the Constitution, exceptional character and paramount public interest, need for controlling principles, and capability of repetition yet evading review.

• GIOS-Samar, Inc. vs. Department of Transportation and Communications, 849 Phil. 120 (2019) — Followed for the doctrine that the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, is not a trier of facts and that direct recourse is proper only for questions of law, reinforcing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Tulfo vs. People, 587 Phil. 64 (2008) — Cited for the proposition that freedom of the press remains "one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy."

• Article III, Section 4, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press. This provision was the constitutional basis invoked by petitioners in challenging the prohibition, though the Court declined to rule on its substantive application due to mootness and factual questions.

• Article VII, Section 4, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the term of the President ends at noon on June 30. The Court relied on this provision to establish that President Duterte's term expired on June 30, 2022, which was the supervening event rendering the case moot.

• Republic Act No. 4363 — Titled "An Act to Further Amend Article Three Hundred Sixty of the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners cited this as legal basis for the assertion that the press is self-regulating and that government interference in media regulation is invalid. Respondents countered that self-regulation under this law is limited to ethical issues.

• Presidential Decree No. 576 — Titled "Abolishing the Media Advisory Council and the Bureau of Standards for Mass Media and Authorizing the Organization of Regulatory Councils for Print Media and Broadcast Media." Petitioners cited this decree alongside RA No. 4363 to support the self-regulation argument; respondents maintained its scope is limited to ethical matters.

Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. Chief Justice Gesmundo was on official leave.

• Leonen, S.A.J. (Acting Chief Justice) — Dissented. Justice Leonen, designated as Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2990, indicated his dissent by reference to a separate opinion, the text of which is not included in the provided decision. Justice Lazaro-Javier joined Justice Leonen's dissent.