Ramos vs. Spouses Alvendia

The dismissal of a complaint for failure to file a pre-trial brief — which under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court has the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial — is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sanction must not be imposed precipitately where the plaintiff was present at the pre-trial and his counsel appeared only minutes late. Whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the circumstances of a particular case or set aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial court, exercised with due regard to the nature of the case and the degree of non-compliance.

Petitioner Manigo K. Ramos and his brother Jose Orlando Ramos, Jr. were registered owners of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 336585, 33875 and 24162-A of the Las Piñas, Rizal Register of Deeds. Respondents Spouses Purita G. Alvendia and Oscar Alvendia were the persons in whose names titles over the same parcels were subsequently issued, while respondents Spouses Jose and Araceli Severino were the transferees to whom the Alvendias later conveyed the lots. The controversy reached the courts against the backdrop of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial, as amended by Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 and supplemented by Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, which governs the consequences of a party's failure to appear at the pre-trial and to file a pre-trial brief.

Petitioner Manigo K. Ramos and his brother Jose Orlando Ramos, Jr. (Orlando) were registered owners of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 336585, 33875 and 24162-A of the Las Piñas, Rizal Register of Deeds, the owners' copies of which were in the possession of Orlando. After Orlando died on December 25, 1987, the owners' copies of the titles could no longer be found. On the offer of Hermilina Calasan, a neighbor, petitioner allowed her to reconstitute them. Representing that funds were needed to pursue the reconstitution of the titles, Hermilina made petitioner sign documents which he was misled into believing were deeds of mortgage.

Petitioner claimed that Hermilina colluded with respondent Purita Alvendia by making it appear that petitioner and his deceased brother Orlando donated to Purita the parcels of land covered by the titles through two Deeds of Donation executed on November 13, 1995 and November 29, 1995. Purita and her co-respondent husband Oscar Alvendia thereafter caused the cancellation of the titles of petitioner and his brother over the lands and the issuance to them of titles in their names, and later transferred the parcels of land also by donation to respondent spouses Jose and Araceli Severino, who were subsequently issued Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 51342, 51343 and 51344 in their names.

Petitioner was thus prompted to file on April 24, 1997 a Complaint against respondents before the RTC of Las Piñas for, among other things, the cancellation of the titles of respondent spouses Severino and the reconveyance of the parcels of land. To the Complaint, petitioner attached as Annex "E," among other documents, a photocopy of a Report dated November 19, 1996 of Nedy L. Tayag, a Clinical Psychologist of the National Center for Mental Health, concluding that petitioner was not "competent enough to stand on his own" based on findings that his current level of intelligence fell along the Moderate Mental Retardation level (Imbecile) with a numerical rating of 52 and a mental age between 9 to 10 years old, that he could not perform complex tasks requiring analytical and logical reasoning, and that having low intelligence he tends to be gullible and easy prey to allurements of pleasure and satisfaction.

Respondent spouses Alvendia, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, claimed to have acquired the subject lots by Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by petitioner with the consent of his wife, in support of which they submitted photocopies thereof. The spouses Severino, for their part, claimed to have acquired the lots by purchase from the spouses Alvendia, in support of which they submitted photocopies of receipts of payment.

The pre-trial of the case was set on September 7, 1998, during which petitioner was present as well as the defendants spouses Severino, but it was reset to October 1, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning due to the absence of the defendant spouses Alvendia. On the rescheduled pre-trial on October 1, 1998, after petitioner's complaint was called in open court, the trial court issued an Order declaring petitioner non-suited for "failure of his counsel to appear" and to file a pre-trial brief, and accordingly dismissed the Complaint. Petitioner's counsel arrived at the premises of the trial court at 8:55 in the morning but was not allowed to enter the courtroom; when he succeeded in gaining entry, the judge shouted at him and ordered him to step out, and he learned only later, upon verification at the Office of the Branch Clerk of Court, that the case had been dismissed because he was not yet in court when the case was called and the pre-trial brief was not yet on file.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for the Reinstatement of the Case with Apology and Prayer for Compassion, explaining that counsel arrived at 8:55 a.m. although he had intended to arrive at exactly 8:30 a.m., having been prevented by unusually heavy traffic along the Baclaran/Coastal Road; that the pre-trial brief had been prepared on September 28, 1998 but the liaison officer tasked to file it, Mr. Juan Cantos, did not report for work; that the non-filing was discovered only in the afternoon of September 29, 1998; that upon discovery, counsel instructed his secretary, Ms. Cristina Enales, to mail the pre-trial brief to the other party, as shown by registry receipts; and that the non-filing was discovered late because there was a party in counsel's office as it was then his birthday.

The trial court found that petitioner's motion did not come forward with the most persuasive of reasons for the relaxation of Rule 18, and denied it, observing that under Section 5 of Rule 18 it is the failure of the plaintiff to appear during pre-trial when so required that is a cause for dismissal of the action, and that petitioner was already present in court, together with a care-giver, at the time the case was called. The Court of Appeals narrated that during the scheduled pre-trial conference on October 1, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning, the parties and counsel for the defendants were present while counsel for the plaintiff was not around, and that counsel arrived at the premises of the trial court at 8:55 in the morning but was not allowed to enter the courtroom.

• Reinstatement in the Interest of Justice: Petitioner pleaded that justice would be best served if the Complaint were reinstated, invoking Article 24 of the Civil Code, which provides that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
• Discretion of the Trial Court: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court had "no discretion" on the matter of a party's failure to file a pre-trial brief, contending that if the trial court has discretion to dismiss the case because of the plaintiff's failure to appear at pre-trial, it also has discretion to dismiss the case because of the plaintiff's failure to file the pre-trial brief.
• Excusable Non-Compliance: Petitioner's counsel explained that he arrived at 8:55 a.m. after being prevented by unusually heavy traffic along the Baclaran/Coastal Road, and that the pre-trial brief, already prepared on September 28, 1998, was not filed because the liaison officer tasked to file it did not report for work, the omission having been discovered only on September 29, 1998, after which the brief was mailed to the adverse parties.

• Acquisition by Sale: Respondent spouses Alvendia claimed in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim to have acquired the subject lots by Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by petitioner with the consent of his wife, in support of which they submitted photocopies of the deeds.
• Derivative Acquisition by Purchase: Respondent spouses Severino claimed to have acquired the lots by purchase from the spouses Alvendia, in support of which they submitted photocopies of receipts of payment.

• Discretion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief: Whether the dismissal of a complaint for failure to file a pre-trial brief is discretionary on the part of the trial court.
• Propriety of the Dismissal: Whether the dismissal of the complaint should be maintained under the circumstances of the case, petitioner having been present at the pre-trial and his counsel having arrived late.

• Discretion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief: Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, and whether the resulting order of dismissal should be maintained or set aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial court.
• Propriety of the Dismissal: No. The dismissal was too precipitate and not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by petitioner's counsel, warranting reversal and the reinstatement of the complaint for a full-blown trial.

• Discretion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Pre-Trial Brief: Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court mandates that parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party their pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial, and expressly provides that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. Under Section 5, Rule 18, the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required is a cause for dismissal of the action. From these provisions, the Court concluded that the dismissal of a complaint for failure to file a pre-trial brief is discretionary on the part of the trial court. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in ruling that the trial court had "no discretion" on the matter: if the trial court has discretion to dismiss the case because of the plaintiff's failure to appear at pre-trial, it likewise has discretion to dismiss the case because of the plaintiff's failure to file the pre-trial brief. Citing Republic vs. Oleta, the Court reiterated that whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial court.

• Propriety of the Dismissal: Although counsel's explanation for his failure to file the pre-trial brief may not be convincing, the Court held that the dismissal was too precipitate and not commensurate with the level of non-compliance, considering (a) petitioner's presence when the case was called for pre-trial, (b) the nature of the case, (c) the subject involved — real properties located in Las Piñas City, and (d) the eventual appearance in court of petitioner's counsel, whose claim that he was, on arrival, initially barred from entering the courtroom and was even shouted upon by the trial judge had not been disputed. The Court adopted the ruling in Calalang vs. Court of Appeals that the precipitate haste of the lower court in declaring the plaintiff non-suited was uncalled for and deserved a second look; that where counsel arrived for the pre-trial conference, though a bit late, the trial court should have called the case again, and an admonition to counsel to be more prompt would have sufficed instead of dismissing the complaint outright; and that unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end. The Court further noted the authority that an order dismissing a plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for failure of his counsel to appear at a pre-trial conference must be reversed as too severe a sanction to visit on a litigant where the record is devoid of evidence reflecting the litigant's willful or flagrant disregard for the Court's authority. While the phrase "in the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that would automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application; considering the circumstances attendant to the case, substantial justice would be best served if both parties were given the full opportunity to ventilate their respective claims in a full-blown trial. The Court also took note of petitioner's Manifestation dated May 22, 2006 before the appellate court that the case had been pending before the Court of Appeals for almost five years since August 2000; that a case of forgery and falsification of public documents, docketed as I.S. No. 05-2126, was pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor, in which respondent spouses Alvendia filed an Urgent Motion for Suspension of Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question; and that attached to the Manifestation was Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 128-05 concluding that the submitted specimen signature of petitioner and his purported signature in the documents involved "were not written by one and the same person." The records did not show whether the motion to suspend proceedings was granted, but what was clear was that the case had been unduly prolonged, hence the urgency of proceeding with it with utmost dispatch.

• Discretionary dismissal for failure to file a pre-trial brief — Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the parties must file with the court and serve on the adverse party their pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial, and failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. The dismissal of a complaint on this ground is not mandatory but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; whether the order of dismissal should be maintained or set aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial court under the circumstances of the particular case. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court had "no discretion" on the matter.
• Relaxation of pre-trial rules for the most persuasive of reasons — Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons, when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure. The Court acknowledged that counsel's explanation may not be convincing, yet found that the circumstances warranted relaxation in the interest of substantial justice.
• Lesser sanctions for non-appearance — Unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end. The Court applied this rule in holding that an admonition to counsel would have sufficed instead of dismissing the complaint outright.
• Inconsiderate dismissals do not solve court congestion — Inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets; while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to the records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.
• "In the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand — The phrase "in the interest of substantial justice" does not automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules, but exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. The Court applied this qualification while nonetheless concluding that the circumstances of the case warranted giving both parties the full opportunity to ventilate their claims in a full-blown trial.

• "Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thought[less]ness in not complying with the procedure" — Quoted by the Court from Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, this passage states the standard governing the relaxation of pre-trial rules and frames the Court's inquiry into whether petitioner's counsel's non-compliance warranted the outright dismissal of the complaint.
• "the dismissal of the case by the trial court had been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by petitioner's counsel with the order of the court" — This is the ratio decidendi of the decision, articulating the proportionality standard applied to the sanction of dismissal for procedural non-compliance.
• "Unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end." — Quoted by the Court from Calalang vs. Court of Appeals, this passage supplies the canonical formulation of the lesser-sanction rule for non-appearance at pre-trial.
• "The phrase 'in the interest of substantial justice' is not, of course, a magic wand that would automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules." — This passage cautions against reflexive invocation of substantial justice as a ground for suspending procedural rules, while the Court nonetheless recognized that exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application.

• Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 825 (2003) — Cited for the rule that pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed and should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons, when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure; the Court adopted the standard while finding that the circumstances warranted relaxation.
• Republic vs. Oleta, G.R. No. 156606, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 534 — Cited for the rule that whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial court; this citation anchors the Court's holding that the dismissal is discretionary.
• Calalang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103185, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 462 — Cited as instructive authority that the precipitate dismissal of a complaint where counsel arrived late was uncalled for, that the trial court should have called the case again and an admonition would have sufficed, and that lesser sanctions should be considered absent conduct so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to justify dismissal.
• KLT Fruits, Inc. vs. WSR Fruits, Inc., G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 713 — Cited, together with Landbank of the Philippines vs. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc., Villena vs. Rupisan, Susuki vs. De Guzman, and Bacarra vs. National Labor Relations Commission, for the proposition that the phrase "in the interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that would automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules.

• Section 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Requires the parties to file with the court and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs, in such manner as shall ensure receipt at least three days before the date of the pre-trial, and provides that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. The Court relied on this provision in holding that petitioner's failure to file the pre-trial brief was a ground for dismissal, but that the dismissal remained subject to the trial court's discretion.
• Section 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Provides that the failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the preceding section shall be a cause for dismissal of the action, with prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the court. The Court used this provision to establish that the trial court possesses discretion in dismissing the action, and the trial court likewise invoked it in noting that it is the plaintiff's failure to appear that is a cause for dismissal.
• Section 4, Rule 18, Rules of Court — Provides that it shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial, and that the non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown or if a representative appears in his behalf fully authorized in writing. This provision supplies the framework for the appearance requirement that petitioner's counsel failed to satisfy on time.
• Article 24, Civil Code — Provides that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. Petitioner invoked this provision in pleading that justice would be best served by reinstating the Complaint; the Court did not rest its disposition on this provision.
• Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989, and Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 — Cited as the issuances amending and supplementing Rule 18 on pre-trial, against which the trial court measured petitioner's motion for reconsideration and found that it did not come forward with the most persuasive of reasons for the relaxation of the rule.

• Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing
• Justice Dante O. Tinga
• Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
• Justice Arturo D. Brion