Ramos vs. National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

The NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA over claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples arises only when such claims or disputes are between or among parties who belong to the same ICC/IP. When the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs or when one party is a non-ICC/IP, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the proper courts of justice, not the NCIP.

The petitioners are among the 133 beneficiaries, or the legitimate heirs of the said beneficiaries, of the 399 hectares of land awarded under the 1957 Amended Decision of the Office of the President. The private respondents are minors who are members of the Egalan-Gubayan clan of the Tagacaolo tribe of Malalag, Davao del Sur, who were issued a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT) over the disputed land. The land at issue has a long history of dispute, having been the subject of a lease in favor of Orval Hughes in the 1920s, and later the subject of various court actions, including G.R. No. L-62664 and G.R. No. 162109.

The subject of the controversy is a land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On October 12, 2003, Bae Lolita Buma-at Tenorio filed with the NCIP an application for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title over the subject land as ancestral land of her grandparents Datu Egalan and Princess Gubayan. On November 12, 2004, the NCIP issued CALT No. Rl 1-MAL-1104-000045 in favor of the Egalan-Gubayan clan, covering 845.5278 hectares. An amended CALT was later issued to exclude existing property rights from the coverage of any issued CALT pursuant to Section 56 of Republic Act No. 8371. On September 22, 2005, the Egalan-Gubayan clan was issued CALT No. Rll-MAL-0905-000049 covering the reduced area of 701.1459 hectares and later reduced further to 645 hectares.

In the 1920s, the 716 hectares of land covered by the CALT was the subject of a lease in favor of Orval Hughes. After Hughes' death, his heirs filed individual sales application of the leased land, which was opposed before the Office of the President by a group of 133 persons. On August 20, 1957, the OP, in an Amended Decision, awarded 399 hectares to the 133 oppositors, while the remaining 317 hectares were to be divided among the Hughes heirs. After said Amended Decision became final and executory, the Hughes heirs instituted various actions in different courts to challenge the same or to delay its enforcement, with the fifth action becoming the subject of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. L-62664, which ruled that the Hughes heirs were guilty of forum shopping. The petitioners in the present case are among the 133 beneficiaries or the legitimate heirs of the said 133 beneficiaries of the 399 hectares of land awarded under the 1957 Amended Decision.

The 317 hectares awarded to the Hughes heirs became the subject of another dispute when Maximo Estita, et al., members of the Davao Del Sur Farmers Association who claimed to be tenants of the Hughes heirs, filed a case for forcible entry, reinstatement, nullification of affidavits of quitclaims, relinquishment, waiver and any other documents on disposition of lands against, among others, the Hughes heirs, and Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Digos, Davao del Sur. The case eventually reached the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162109. In a Decision dated January 21, 2005, the Court denied Lapanday's petition for review on certiorari and upheld the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform over the 317 hectares of land owned by the Hughes heirs. The Court affirmed the CA, which in turn affirmed the DARAB's ruling in DARAB Case No. 8117 which ordered, among others: (1) the Hughes heirs to vacate the premises of the 399 hectares awarded to the 133 awardees and turn over the peaceful possession thereof to the said 133 awardees or their heirs; and (2) Lapanday and the Hughes heirs to restore Estita, et al., to their respective farm lots within the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes heirs.

The present controversy arose when, on December 19, 2008, Atty. Roland Manalaysay, OIC-Executive Director of the DARAB Secretariat, issued a Writ of Execution in DARAB Case No. 8117. Pursuant to this Writ, DARAB Sheriff Buenaventura issued a Notice to Vacate Premises commanding the Heirs of Egalan-Gubayan, and all agents, representatives, assigns, and all other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the entire premises of the 399 hectares pertaining to the 133 awardees and the 317 hectares pertaining to Maximo Estita, et al., and to all the members of the Davao Del Sur Farmers Association and now Malalag United Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative. On February 20, 2009, the private respondents, then minors who are members of the Egalan-Gubayan clan of the Tagacaolo tribe of Malalag, Davao del Sur, filed a case for Injunction with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or WPI before the NCIP-RHO in order to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate issued by the DARAB, in representation of their generation and future generations.

Prior to the present controversy, the dispute over the land also spawned other cases: (1) On January 24, 2006, the Heirs of Egalan-Gubayan clan filed before the RTC of Digos City a case for Quieting of Title, Injunction/Prohibition, Specific Performance, Recognition of Ownership, Accounting, Damages, Attorney's Fees, with Very Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Civil Case No. 4680) against Estita, et al.; (2) On November 15, 2006, the NCIP, through Commissioner Felecito L. Masagnay, filed with the CA a petition for prohibition, mandamus and injunction against the DAR/DARAB (CA-G.R. SP. No. 01377), seeking to prohibit the DAR/DARAB from exercising its jurisdiction over the ancestral land of the Heirs of Egalan-Gubayan clan and to comply with Section 52(i) of the IPRA; and (3) On July 31, 2007, the Heirs of Egalan-Gubayan clan filed another case (Civil Case No. 4818) before the RTC of Digos City for the declaration of nullity of the Order dated July 31, 2007 of then DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Forum Shopping: Petitioners argued that the NCIP committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that respondents are not guilty of deliberate forum shopping.
• Jurisdiction — Supervening Event: Petitioners argued that the NCIP acted beyond its jurisdiction when it ruled that the IPRA of 1997 is a supervening event which rendered ineffective the Supreme Court Decision in Minister of Natural Resources and Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes.
• Jurisdiction — Ouster: Petitioners argued that the NCIP acted with manifest illegality when it maintained it has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case despite being a party-movant to another case involving the same issues, parties and subject matter before the Court of Appeals.
• Injunctive Relief: Petitioners argued that the NCIP acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it pronounced that respondents are entitled to an injunctive relief.
• Procedural Remedy: Petitioners cited Fortich vs. Corona and maintained that similar to the said case, the NCIP's decision is a patent nullity and issued beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion as it reversed the final and executory decision in G.R. No. L-62664, justifying their resort to a petition for certiorari and prohibition despite the availability of an appeal.
• Binding Effect of Prior Ruling: Petitioners contended that the ruling in G.R. No. L-62664 should bind respondents, claiming that Dalia/Victorina, Bae Tenorio's mother, is also an heir of Princess Gubayan like the Hughes heirs.

• Premature Filing: Public respondent NCIP argued that the present petition was prematurely filed since petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration, and the proper remedy against the assailed Decision is to file a petition for review to the CA, which was lost when petitioners failed to pay the full docket fees as required by the Rules.
• No Forum Shopping: The NCIP argued that there is no forum-shopping as there is no identity of parties in the present case and Civil Case No. 4680, since the private respondents, as minors, should be accorded separate personality to sue distinct and separate from their elders.
• Supervening Events: The NCIP argued that the passage of the IPRA and the subsequent confirmation by the NCIP of the native title of the Heirs of Egalan-Gubayan through the issuance of the CALT are supervening events which rendered the execution of the award in favor of the 133 awardees unenforceable.
• No Ouster of Jurisdiction: The NCIP argued that it cannot be said to have been ousted of its jurisdiction by filing the injunction case against the DAR/DARAB before the CA as it only performed its public function to compel the DAR to comply with Section 52(i) of R.A. No. 8371 and require the latter to terminate its jurisdiction over the ancestral land of the Heirs of Egalan-Gubayan.
• Entitlement to Injunctive Relief: The NCIP argued that respondents are entitled to injunctive relief granted by the NCIP.
• Private Respondents' Comments: Private respondents filed two separate Comments forwarding arguments similar to those of the NCIP in support of their prayer for the dismissal of the present petition.

• Jurisdiction of the NCIP: Whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the action filed by the private respondents for injunction to restrain the implementation of the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate issued by the DARAB.
• Procedural Infirmities: Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition may prosper despite the availability of an appeal, the failure to file a motion for reconsideration, and the direct resort to the Supreme Court in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

• Jurisdiction of the NCIP: No. The NCIP has no jurisdiction over the action filed by the private respondents. Under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arises only when such claims or disputes are between or among parties who belong to the same ICC/IP. Since the parties in this case do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the proper courts of justice.
• Procedural Infirmities: The petition was not dismissed despite the procedural infirmities. The Court deemed it prudent to resolve the case on the merits in order to write finis to the controversy, finding that the question of whether the NCIP committed grave abuse of discretion in affording injunctive relief is one of law which the Court may properly resolve.

• Jurisdiction of the NCIP: The Court applied the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint. Citing Unduran vs. Aberasturi, the Court held that the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA arises only when claims or disputes are between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. The qualifying provision requiring exhaustion of customary law remedies and certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders can only be complied with when both parties belong to the same ICC/IP. If the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs or one party is a non-ICC/IP member, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice. The Court also noted that the NCIP has primary jurisdiction under Sections 52(h), 53, 54, and 62 of the IPRA even when one of the parties is not an ICC/IP, but the present case does not fall under any of those provisions as the injunction prayed for is for the purpose of restraining the implementation of the Notice to Vacate and the Writ of Execution issued by the DARAB. The Court applied the ruling in Unduran despite the earlier ruling in City Government of Baguio vs. Masweng, explaining that the latter's description of the NCIP's jurisdiction was an obiter dictum, a mere expression of opinion with no binding force, and that Unduran did not overturn or reverse a prior doctrine. The Court applied the general rule that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed.
• Procedural Infirmities: The Court noted that petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition despite the availability of an appeal, filed the petition without first filing a motion for reconsideration, and filed the petition directly before the Court instead of the CA in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. However, the Court deemed it prudent not to dismiss the petition on account of such lapses, and instead resolved the case on the merits to write finis to the controversy. The Court found that the question of whether the NCIP committed grave abuse of discretion in affording injunctive relief is one of law which the Court may properly resolve, as it does not require review of the truth or falsity of alleged facts.

• NCIP Jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with the condition precedent through certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. When claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice.
• Obiter Dictum — A statement made without argument or full consideration of the point is an obiter dictum, which is a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata and does not embody the determination of the court. The Court applied this doctrine in declining to follow the "implicit affirmation" in City Government of Baguio vs. Masweng of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties is not an ICC/IP.
• Prospectivity of Judicial Interpretations — A judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject to the qualification that when a doctrine of the Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. The Court applied this doctrine in applying Unduran to the present case despite the earlier ruling in City Government of Baguio.
• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — Direct resort to the Court in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is a sufficient cause for dismissal of the complaint. The Court noted this doctrine but deemed it prudent to resolve the case on the merits to write finis to the controversy.

• "A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP." — This passage from Unduran vs. Aberasturi, quoted in the decision, articulates the controlling interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA and is the ratio decidendi for the Court's ruling that the NCIP lacked jurisdiction.
• "Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the NCIP's limited jurisdiction under Section 66 and is the basis for dismissing the private respondents' complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
• "Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines." — This passage from Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, cited in the decision, explains the nature of judicial interpretations and supports the Court's application of Unduran to the present case.

• Unduran vs. Aberasturi, 771 Phil. 536 (2015) and 808 Phil. 795 (2017) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA, holding that the NCIP's jurisdiction arises only when the parties belong to the same ICC/IP, and that the NCIP has primary jurisdiction under Sections 52(h), 53, 54, and 62 of the IPRA.
• City Government of Baguio vs. Masweng, 597 Phil. 668 (2009) — Distinguished. The Court held that the description of the NCIP's jurisdiction in this case was an obiter dictum, a mere expression of opinion with no binding force, and did not embody the determination of the court.
• Fortich vs. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998) — Cited by petitioners to justify their resort to a petition for certiorari and prohibition despite the availability of an appeal.
• Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479 Phil. 768 (2004) — Cited for the rule that a petition for certiorari, not being a substitute for a lost appeal, cannot prosper if an appeal is available even when the ground is grave abuse of discretion.
• People vs. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418 (1989) — Cited for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, explaining that the concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application for the writs will be directed.
• Gios Samar, Inc. vs. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019 — Cited for the clarification that it is the nature of the question raised by the parties, not the presence of one or more "special and important reasons," which is the decisive factor in deciding whether to permit the invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction.
• Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875 (1996) — Cited for the principle that judicial interpretations form part of the law as of the date of effectivity of the said law, subject to the exception when a doctrine is overturned or reversed.
• Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on Audit, 821 Phil. 144 (2017) — Cited for the same principle of prospectivity of judicial interpretations.

• Section 66, Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision granting the NCIP jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, subject to the conditions of exhaustion of customary law remedies and certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders. The Court interpreted this provision to limit the NCIP's jurisdiction to disputes between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
• Section 52(h), Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision on the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domain Office to deny applications for Certificates of Ancestral Domain Titles, in relation to Section 62, regarding the power of the NCIP to hear and decide unresolved adverse claims. The Court noted this as one of the provisions where the NCIP has primary jurisdiction even when one of the parties is not an ICC/IP.
• Section 53, Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications for Certificates of Ancestral Land Titles and on the NCIP's power to grant meritorious claims and resolve conflicting claims. The Court noted this as one of the provisions where the NCIP has primary jurisdiction.
• Section 54, Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision on the power of the NCIP to resolve fraudulent claims over ancestral domains and lands. The Court noted this as one of the provisions where the NCIP has primary jurisdiction.
• Section 62, Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision on the resolution of conflicts where there are adverse claims within ancestral domains. The Court noted this as one of the provisions where the NCIP has primary jurisdiction.
• Section 67, Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision stating that decisions of the NCIP shall be appealable to the CA by way of a petition for review. The Court cited this provision in discussing the procedural infirmities of the petition.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — The provision requiring that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law before a petition for certiorari may be filed. The Court cited this provision in discussing the procedural infirmities of the petition.
• Section 69(d), Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) — The provision granting the NCIP the power to enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it. The NCIP relied on this provision in issuing the injunction, but the Court held that the NCIP had no jurisdiction over the case.
• Section 55, Republic Act No. 6657 (CARL) — The provision prohibiting courts in the Philippines from issuing any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies. The NCIP ruled that this provision does not apply since the present case is not a case arising from the application of the CARL.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concurred.