Ramos vs. Court of Appeals

A municipality cannot be represented by a private lawyer, but it may adopt that lawyer’s work in good faith if no injustice results to the adverse party and no compensation is paid; the provincial attorney may represent the municipality and adopt the proceedings, and a motion to withdraw the unauthorized appearance is non-adversarial and need not strictly comply with Rule 15.

Petitioners are individual market vendors and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc.; respondent Municipality of Baliuag is the local government unit whose legal representation became the central procedural question. The governing framework includes Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 2264, Republic Act No. 5185, the Administrative Code of 1987, and Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed on April 18, 1990 a petition before the RTC of Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 264-M-9, for the declaration of nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. On May 9, 1990, during the hearing on petitioners’ motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the RTC issued an order.

On May 3, 1990, the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer on behalf of respondent municipality. At the pre-trial conference on May 28, 1990, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date and on June 15, 1990, respectively, Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. Romanillos was also counsel on record of Kristi Corporation, which was sued with the municipality in the same case.

On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Romanillos; the Provincial Fiscal did not appear. Romanillos submitted the Reply to petitioners’ Opposition to respondents’ motion to dissolve injunction and, on July 17, 1990, a written formal offer of evidence for respondent municipality. During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners questioned Romanillos’s personality to appear as counsel for respondent municipality; they reiterated the opposition on August 15, 1990, and put it in writing in their August 20, 1990 motion to disqualify Romanillos and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in and undertaken by him.

Meanwhile, Romanillos and Regalado filed a joint motion dated August 22, 1990 stating that Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that Regalado, as collaborating counsel, was adopting the entire proceedings participated in or undertaken by Romanillos. On September 19, 1990, respondent Judge issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion to disqualify Romanillos and to declare the proceedings void, and granting Regalado’s motion to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 19, 1990. The RTC treated the disqualification motion as moot after Romanillos’s withdrawal and considered the proceedings a fait accompli, noting that petitioners had not questioned Romanillos’s appearance until after he made a formal offer of evidence.

• Private Counsel for a Municipality: Petitioners argued that a municipality cannot be represented in a suit against it by a private counsel, invoking Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, Section 3, paragraph 3(a) of Republic Act No. 2264, and Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
• Provincial Attorney’s Appearance: Petitioners argued that the CA violated the same provisions when it authorized Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado to appear as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag.
• Nullity of Romanillos’s Proceedings: Petitioners argued that the CA also violated those provisions and Article 1352 of the New Civil Code when it denied their motion to declare null and void the proceedings undertaken or participated in by Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos as private counsel of the municipality.
• Defective Joint Motion: Petitioners argued that the CA acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in granting the August 22, 1990 joint motion, which they characterized as a worthless piece of paper because it did not comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• Provincial Attorney’s Authority: Respondent municipality submitted that Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185 does not prohibit or prevent the Provincial Attorney from acting as legal adviser and legal officer for municipalities and municipal districts; since a province is composed of municipalities and municipal districts, they are deemed included, and limiting the Provincial Attorney’s authority to the province alone would be impractical and contrary to the spirit of the law.
• Adoption Cured Defect: Public respondent CA added that even assuming the proceedings participated in by Romanillos were legally objectionable, they were legally remedied by the formal adoption by Provincial Attorney Regalado, who was not disqualified from representing the Municipality of Baliuag in civil cases.
• Collaboration with Authorized Counsel: Public respondent CA also said that Romanillos had appeared as counsel for respondent municipality in collaboration with the Provincial Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney, as shown in the motion to dissolve injunction dated May 28, 1990, so the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in allowing him and Regalado to appear.
• Non-Adversarial Motion: Public respondent CA found that the joint motion did not partake of the nature of an adversarial motion, so noncompliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 was not fatal; petitioners had sought Romanillos’s disqualification, which was in fact achieved.

• Private Counsel for a Municipality: Whether a municipality may be represented in a civil suit against it by a private counsel.
• Provincial Attorney as Counsel: Whether the provincial attorney of a province may act as counsel of a municipality in a suit.
• Effect of Unauthorized Representation and Adoption: Whether proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counsel are void, and whether the provincial attorney may adopt those proceedings with legal effect.
• Compliance with Rule 15: Whether a motion for withdrawal of an unauthorized counsel and adoption of proceedings must comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• Private Counsel for a Municipality: No. Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney may represent a municipality; private counsel may be hired only in the exceptional instances enumerated by law, none of which was present.
• Provincial Attorney as Counsel: Yes. Under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185, the functions of the provincial fiscal as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the province, and corollarily of its municipalities, were transferred to the provincial attorney.
• Effect of Unauthorized Representation and Adoption: The provincial attorney’s adoption validated the proceedings. A municipality may adopt the good-faith work of a private lawyer if no injustice is caused to the adverse party and no compensation in any guise is paid by the municipality.
• Compliance with Rule 15: No. A motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is non-adversarial and need not comply with the notice requirement of Section 4 of Rule 15; technical rules may be relaxed to promote substantial justice.

• Private Counsel for a Municipality: The SC began with Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals, which settled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code mandates the provincial fiscal to represent the province and any municipality or municipal district in any court, except where original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or where the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or another municipality or municipal district in the same province; when the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council. Section 3, paragraph 3(a), of Republic Act No. 2264 complements this by making the municipal attorney the legal counsel of the municipality. The SC held that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality; private counsel may be hired only in exceptional instances, such as when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province, or when the provincial fiscal is disqualified because the original jurisdiction is in the Supreme Court, the municipality is adverse to the province or another municipality, or the fiscal, his wife, or child is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise. None of these exceptions was present. Atty. Romanillos was private counsel and was counsel of Kristi Corporation, which was sued with the municipality; his collaboration with the provincial prosecutor and provincial attorney did not legalize his representation because private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own or in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This rests on the principle that only accountable public officers may act for public entities and public funds should not be spent on private lawyers. Petitioners were not estopped from questioning his authority, because the legality of representation by unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage; elementary fairness protects parties unaware of the unauthorized representation, and an attorney is presumed to act under authority until the contrary is shown.
• Provincial Attorney as Counsel: The SC held that the provincial attorney may represent the municipality. Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185 transferred the functions hitherto performed by provincial and city fiscals as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the province and city to the provincial attorney and city legal officer. The SC read this to cover municipalities corollarily, and respondent municipality argued that a province is composed of municipalities and municipal districts, so they are included; limiting the provincial attorney’s authority to the province alone would be impractical and contrary to the spirit of the law. Thus Provincial Attorney Regalado was not disqualified from representing the Municipality of Baliuag in civil cases.
• Effect of Unauthorized Representation and Adoption: The SC held that although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it, it may adopt the work already performed in good faith by that lawyer when the work is beneficial to it, provided (1) no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) no compensation in any guise is paid by the municipality to the private lawyer. Unless expressly adopted, the private lawyer’s work cannot bind the municipality. The SC agreed with the CA that the adoption by Provincial Attorney Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Romanillos produced validity. It found no substantial prejudice to petitioners: they had cross-examined the witnesses presented by Romanillos on the motion to dissolve injunction and had started presenting their own witnesses, and requiring a trial anew to hear the same witnesses and admit the same evidence would not enhance the promotion of justice. Conferring legitimacy on Romanillos’s appearance would not cause substantial prejudice, and a new trial on the mere technicality that the municipality was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve justice.
• Compliance with Rule 15: The SC agreed with the CA that a motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that need not comply with Section 4 of Rule 15 on notice to the adverse party. Petitioners had sought Romanillos’s disqualification, and that relief was granted when he withdrew and the RTC allowed the motion; no notice directed to the parties and served at least three days before the hearing was needed because the motion was not contentious. The lack of authority was also remedied by Regalado’s adoption. The SC cited People vs. Leviste: while a motion that does not comply with Rule 15 should not be accepted and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, rigid application may be disregarded where it will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; litigations should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate justice, and when rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the SC is empowered to suspend their operation.

• Representation of municipalities by authorized legal officers — Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney may represent a municipality in lawsuits; private counsel cannot represent a municipality on its own or in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. The exceptional instances are: (a) original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court; (b) the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or another municipality or municipal district in the same province; (c) the provincial fiscal is disqualified because he, his wife, or child is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise; and (d) when the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council. Applied: Romanillos was private counsel, no exception was present, so his representation was unauthorized.
• Adoption of unauthorized private counsel’s work — A municipality may adopt work already performed in good faith by a private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it, provided (1) no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) no compensation in any guise is paid by the municipality to the private lawyer. Unless expressly adopted, the private lawyer’s work cannot bind the municipality. Applied: Regalado adopted the entire proceedings; no substantial prejudice to petitioners; retrial would not serve justice.
• Questioning unauthorized representation at any stage — The legality of an unauthorized counsel’s representation may be raised at any stage of the proceedings; parties unaware of the unauthorized representation are not estopped just because they did not question it on the spot. Applied: petitioners questioned Romanillos only after the formal offer of evidence; they were not estopped.
• Non-adversarial motions and Rule 15 — A motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is non-adversarial and need not comply with the notice requirement of Section 4 of Rule 15; rules of procedure are tools to facilitate justice and may be relaxed to avoid miscarriage of justice. Applied: the joint motion was granted; the disqualification petitioners sought was achieved.
• Presumption of authority of counsel — An attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent until the contrary is clearly shown. Applied in the SC’s discussion of why petitioners were not estopped from later questioning Romanillos’s authority.

• “private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.” — The SC used this settled rule from Municipality of Pililla to hold that Atty. Romanillos’s private representation of the municipality was unauthorized.
• “In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work cannot bind the municipality.” — This is the SC’s formulation of the adoption rule and its two conditions.
• “The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings.” — The SC used this to reject estoppel against petitioners, who questioned Romanillos’s authority only after the formal offer of evidence.
• “It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.” — The SC relied on this to excuse strict compliance with Rule 15 for the non-adversarial joint motion.

• Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 484 (1994) — Controlling precedent; set in clear-cut terms who may legally represent a municipality and held private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality.
• Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 728 (1981) — Followed; held a municipality may not be represented by a private law firm even in collaboration with the municipal attorney and fiscal.
• Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447 (1987) — Followed; reiterated that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality and that unauthorized representation may be questioned at any stage.
• Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 553 (1993) — Followed; enumerated the exceptional instances when a private counsel may be hired by a municipality.
• De Guia vs. The Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169 (1972) — Cited; held the municipality’s authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified.
• Enriquez, Sr. vs. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932 (1960) — Cited; enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent a municipality.
• People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996) — Followed; held that where rigid application of Rule 15 will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded.
• Buan vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424 (1994) — Cited; rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate justice and may be suspended when rigid application frustrates substantial justice.

• Section 1683, Revised Administrative Code — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district in any court, except where original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or the municipality is adverse to the provincial government or another municipality or municipal district in the same province; when the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the municipal council. Applied to hold that private counsel cannot represent the municipality absent the exception.
• Section 3, paragraph 3(a), Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) — The municipal attorney, as head of the legal division or office, shall act as legal counsel of the municipality. Applied with Section 1683 to limit representation to the provincial fiscal and municipal attorney.
• Section 19, Republic Act No. 5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967) — The functions hitherto performed by provincial and city fiscals as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the province and city were transferred to the provincial attorney and city legal officer. Applied to hold that Provincial Attorney Regalado could represent the Municipality of Baliuag.
• Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Section 4 requires notice of a motion to all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing; Section 5 requires the notice to state the time and place of hearing. Applied: a motion to withdraw unauthorized counsel is non-adversarial and need not comply with the notice requirement; technical rules may be relaxed.