Ramos v. Court of Appeals

The negative testimony of subscribing witnesses who later deny due execution does not, by itself, overcome the presumption of regularity in the execution of a will; where the attestation clause is regular and the notary public and other competent evidence affirm due execution, the will may be admitted to probate despite such adverse testimony.

The case concerns the estate of Eugenia Danila, who was survived by private respondents claiming to be her adopted children and by petitioners claiming as instituted heirs or devisees under a will and codicil. The probate of testamentary instruments is governed by the formalities prescribed in Article 805 of the Civil Code, including attestation by instrumental witnesses and acknowledgment before a notary public. The dispute also involves the effect of a compromise agreement earlier approved by the probate court and later set aside.

Eugenia Danila died on May 21, 1966. Before her death, she executed a will dated March 9, 1963, marked as Exhibit H, and a codicil dated April 18, 1963, marked as Exhibit L. Adelaida Nista, claiming to be one of the instituted heirs, filed a petition for probate of the will and codicil before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch III, San Pablo City, praying that the instruments be allowed and that an administrator be appointed.

Buenaventura and Marcelina Guerra opposed the petition, claiming to be the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila. They alleged that the will and codicil were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities required by law had not been complied with; that the instruments did not express the free will of the testatrix; that Eugenia Danila had already executed a last will and testament on November 5, 1951, which had been duly probated and not revoked or annulled; and that the petitioner was not competent to act as administrator.

On November 4, 1968, Adelaida Nista and the oppositors entered into a Compromise Agreement. Among its terms, the parties acknowledged the oppositors as the legally adopted children of the deceased spouses, stated that Eugenia Danila had during her lifetime sold, donated, or disposed of her properties, and provided that the will and codicil submitted for probate were considered abrogated and set aside. The agreement also provided that any other property later discovered as undisposed of would belong exclusively to the adopted children, and that the parties waived further claims against each other. The lower court approved the compromise in a judgment dated November 5, 1968.

Thereafter, Rosario de Ramos and others filed a motion for leave to intervene as co-petitioners, alleging that they were instituted heirs or devisees with rights and interests to protect in the estate. They also filed a motion for new trial, re-hearing, or relief from judgment to set aside the compromise judgment. The lower court allowed the intervention, disapproved the compromise agreement except as regards the parties’ lawful rights, set aside the judgment on compromise, and ordered that the original petition and amended opposition stand. It also denied the motion for appointment of a special administrator. A motion for reconsideration was denied. On February 9, 1971, upon the death of Buenaventura Guerra on January 23, 1971, a motion for substitution of his heirs was filed and granted.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision dated July 6, 1971 allowing probate of the will and codicil. At the trial, two attesting witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, testified that they did not see the testatrix sign the will, but that the will was already signed by her when they affixed their own signatures. The trial court gave more weight to the testimony of Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public who assisted in the execution of the will, that the testatrix and the three instrumental witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other. With respect to the codicil, the same manner of execution was corroborated by Atty. Manuel Alvero, who was present during its execution. The trial court thus declared the will and codicil probated, holding that Eugenia Danila had testamentary capacity and that the instruments were duly signed and acknowledged in accordance with law.

The Court of Appeals, on May 12, 1975, ruled that the lower court correctly set aside the compromise judgment and allowed the intervenor-petitioners to participate in the probate proceedings. However, it disallowed probate on the ground that the evidence failed to establish that the testatrix signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witnesses in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses. The appellate court also relied on the absence of a photograph showing the testatrix signing the will, noting that photographs showed only the witnesses signing.

• Attestation Clauses as Admissions: Petitioners argued that the attestation clauses of the will and codicil, signed by the instrumental witnesses, are admissions of due execution and prevent those witnesses from later testifying against due execution.
• Weight of Notary Public Testimony: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the testimony of biased witnesses over their own attestation clauses and over the testimonial account of the Notary Public who was present during execution and before whom the deeds were acknowledged.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred in denying probate despite convincing evidence for the allowance of the will and codicil.
• Constitutional Nullity: Petitioners also insisted on constitutional grounds for the nullity of the Court of Appeals decision, but the Supreme Court deemed it needless to consider them.

• Negative Testimony of Subscribing Witnesses: Private respondents reiterated the declaration of the two surviving witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the will was not signed by the testatrix before their presence.
• Photographic Evidence: Private respondents argued that this declaration was strengthened by photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the act of signing, with no picture of the testatrix signing the will, which allegedly belied the notary public’s testimony that the testatrix and the witnesses signed in each other’s presence.
• Fraud and Undue Influence: In their opposition, private respondents alleged that the purported will and codicil were procured through fraud and undue influence and that the formalities required by law had not been complied with.
• Prior Probated Will: Private respondents also alleged that Eugenia Danila had already executed a last will and testament on November 5, 1951, which had been duly probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime.

• Due Execution Under Article 805: Whether the last will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, particularly Article 805 of the Civil Code, considering that two attesting witnesses testified against due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.
• Weight of Attestation Clauses and Notarial Testimony: Whether the attestation clauses and the notarial acknowledgment, together with the notary public’s testimony, should prevail over the negative testimony of the subscribing witnesses.
• Effect of Absence of Photograph: Whether the absence of a photograph showing the testatrix signing the will negates due execution and warrants disallowance of probate.

• Due Execution Under Article 805: Yes. The will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law; the attestation clauses, notarial acknowledgment, and notary public’s testimony established due execution.
• Weight of Attestation Clauses and Notarial Testimony: Yes. The attestation clauses and the notary public’s positive testimony prevailed over the negative testimony of the subscribing witnesses, which did not overcome the presumption of regularity.
• Effect of Absence of Photograph: No. The absence of a photograph of the testatrix signing did not negate due execution; photographs prove only what they show and cannot defeat other competent evidence.

• Due Execution Under Article 805: The evidence was found ample and satisfactory to show that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. The documents were prepared by Atty. Manuel Alvero, and their execution was supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. Each page of the will and codicil carried the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three attesting witnesses; the attestation clauses were properly signed; the witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix; and both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was present during execution. No evidence was presented to prove the alleged fraud and undue influence, and there was no showing that the lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. The Court of Appeals thus failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents.
• Weight of Attestation Clauses and Notarial Testimony: The presumption of regularity may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence, but not easily by the mere negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. Negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with positive assertion. The attestation clause is a separate memorandum of the facts surrounding execution; once signed by the attesting witnesses, it attests compliance with the indispensable legal formalities and contradicts any later pretense of undue execution by the attesting witnesses. Although all available attesting witnesses to a will must be called to prove it, they become “forced witnesses,” and their declaration derogatory to probate need not bind the proponent, who may present other proof of due execution. If any or all subscribing witnesses testify against due execution, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may nevertheless be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence that the will was executed and attested according to law. Here, Odon Sarmiento was contradicted by his own admission that he and the other attesting witnesses were present when Eugenia Danila signed the testament; Rosendo Paz was refuted by Atty. Barcenas, and his participation was passive, having been fetched from work and not knowing what document he signed. Atty. Barcenas, the Notary Public, was purposely present to oversee the execution and had no shown material interest. The intervention of a Notary Public in his professional capacity deserves grave consideration.
• Effect of Absence of Photograph: The absence of a photograph of the testatrix signing the will did not belie the probability that she also signed the will before the witnesses. Photographs are worthy only of what they show and prove, not of events they failed to capture. The failure to photograph all stages of execution had no persuasive effect and no evidentiary value to prove that a vital and indispensable requisite was not performed. Probate proceedings are not adverse in character, and courts should relax the rules on evidence so that nothing less than the best evidence susceptible is presented before a will is probated or denied probate. The probate court was satisfied that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with law, and no abuse of discretion was shown.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Execution of a Will — A will regular on its face and acknowledged before a notary public is presumed to have been executed in accordance with law. The presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, not by the mere negative testimony of subscribing witnesses. The Court applied this presumption because the will and codicil bore complete signatures and attestation clauses and were acknowledged before a notary public.
• Attestation Clause as Evidence of Due Execution — The attestation clause is a separate memorandum of the facts surrounding execution; when signed by the attesting witnesses, it attests not only to the testatrix’s signature but also to the proper execution of the will and compliance with legal formalities. It may contradict later claims of undue execution by the attesting witnesses. The Court relied on the attestation clauses in finding due execution.
• Forced Witnesses Rule — All available attesting witnesses to a will must be called to prove it, but they become “forced witnesses”; their testimony against probate does not bind the proponent, who may present other proof of due execution. If any or all subscribing witnesses testify against due execution, the will may still be allowed if the court is satisfied from other witnesses and all the evidence that it was executed and attested according to law. The Court applied this rule to allow probate despite the adverse testimony of two subscribing witnesses.
• Negative Testimony vs. Positive Assertion — Negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with positive assertion. When faced with the convincing appearance of a will, a negative statement that a witness did not see the testatrix sign must be examined with extra care. The Court held that the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz could not overcome the positive testimony of the notary public and the regularity of the documents.
• Notary Public’s Participation — The function of a notary public includes guarding against illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of a will. In the absence of self-interest, the intervention of a notary public in his professional capacity in the execution of a will deserves grave consideration. The Court gave weight to Atty. Barcenas’s testimony because he supervised the execution and had no shown motive to prevaricate.
• Evidentiary Value of Photographs — Photographs prove only what they show and not the events they failed to capture. The absence of a photograph of the testatrix signing the will does not prove that a required formality was not observed and cannot defeat other competent evidence of due execution. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the absence of such a photograph.
• Probate Proceedings Are Not Adverse — Probate is not an adverse proceeding, and courts should relax the rules on evidence to ensure that the best evidence susceptible is presented before a will is admitted or denied probate. The Court invoked this principle in assessing the evidence of execution.

• "The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the testatrix sign the will." — This passage states the evidentiary standard for overcoming the presumption of regularity and explains why the subscribing witnesses’ negative testimony was insufficient.
• "As a rule, if any or all of the submitting witness testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witness and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner by law." — This passage states the rule allowing probate despite adverse subscribing witness testimony.
• "In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution of a will deserves grave consideration." — This passage explains the weight given to the notary public’s testimony in the execution of the will.
• "We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the win does not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been acted on." — This passage rejects the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the absence of a photograph showing the testatrix signing the will.

• Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380 (1926) — Cited for the rule that in weighing the testimony of attesting witnesses, the statements of a competent attorney charged with seeing to the proper execution of the instrument are entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate, absent a motive to prevaricate.
• Junquera vs. Borromeo, L-18498, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 662 — Cited for the principle that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document are valuable factors in determining genuineness, and that subscribing witnesses may forget or be biased, while the document itself reveals the truth. Also cited on the credibility of subscribing witnesses.
• Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil. 419 (1936) — Cited for the rule that by signing a will, the witnesses impliedly testify to the truth of the facts that admit it to probate, including sufficiency of execution, capacity of the testatrix, and absence of undue influence; also cited on the notary public’s intervention deserving grave consideration.
• Cruz vs. Villasor, L-32213, November 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 31 — Cited for the function of a notary public to guard against illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of a will.
• Vda. de Prescilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538 — Cited for the principle that probate proceedings are not adverse in character and courts should relax the rules on evidence to ensure the best evidence is presented.
• Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 478; Corpuz vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527 (1941) — Cited on the solemnity surrounding the execution of a will and the intricacies involved.
• Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Cuyugan vs. Baron, 69 Phil. 639; Pascual vs. De la Cruz, L-24819, May 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 421 — Cited with Section 11, Rule 76, for the rule that all attesting witnesses to a will, if available, must be called to prove the will; the Court applied this rule while allowing other proof of due execution despite adverse testimony.

• Article 805, Civil Code — The Court of Appeals disallowed probate on the ground that the evidence failed to establish that the testatrix signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witnesses in accordance with Article 805. The Supreme Court found the formalities satisfied through the attestation clauses, the notary public’s testimony, and the presumption of regularity.
• Section 11, Rule 76, Rules of Court — Cited for the rule that all attesting witnesses to a will, if available, must be called to prove the will. The Court applied the rule by treating them as “forced witnesses” and allowing the proponent to present other proof of due execution despite their adverse testimony.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, and Fernandez, JJ.