Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

A motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause does not bar the filing of the information or the arraignment of the accused, and the Sandiganbayan must proceed with arraignment within the period fixed by RA 8493 and Rule 116 unless one of the grounds for suspension under Section 11, Rule 116 exists.

Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired AFP officer with the rank of Brigadier General who served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998. The Sandiganbayan criminal cases against him arose from his role in AFP-RSBS and involved charges under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents. The present special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 tests the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure on motions for reconsideration against the Rules of Court and RA 8493 on arraignment.

At the time of the transactions involved, Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Brigadier General and was serving as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects. On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter of the property.

Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only ₱3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.

On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution, found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents. The Ombudsman named petitioner, Wilfredo Pabalan, and Nilo Flaviano as conspirators for 12 counts of falsification of public documents relative to the 12 unilateral deeds of sale, and named petitioner, Wilfredo Pabalan, and Nilo Flaviano for 12 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS. On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.

Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999, with a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999, of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order, the Sandiganbayan gave the prosecution 60 days from that date within which to evaluate its evidence and to do whatever was appropriate on the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion, and to inform the court within the period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman. In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property. The memoranda were forwarded for comment to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the OMB-OSP memorandum recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.

A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review, the panel found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. The panel posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of ₱3,000.00 per square meter. The panel concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum, the panel recommended setting aside the August 2002 approved recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and filing another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against Ramiscal and all the other accused for causing damage to the government when it caused the payment of ₱10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots when the actual amount should only be ₱3,000.00 per square meter. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.

Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration. In its 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for lack of merit.

• Probable Cause and Exclusion from Informations: Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations because there was lack of probable cause to indict him, considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against him.
• Reliance on Subordinates and Conspiracy: Petitioner claimed that heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should be grounds other than the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.

• Arraignment and Motion for Reconsideration: Respondent Sandiganbayan countered that it correctly denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment because petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended.
• Final Finding of Probable Cause: Respondent maintained that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Arraignment Pending Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Arraignment Pending Motion for Reconsideration: No. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules, a motion for reconsideration does not bar the filing of the information; neither does it bar arraignment, and no ground for suspension under Section 11, Rule 116 existed.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Arraignment Pending Motion for Reconsideration: The petition has no merit. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, allows only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution, filed within five days from notice with the Office of the Ombudsman or the proper Deputy Ombudsman, with corresponding leave of court where the information has already been filed; the filing of such a motion shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information. An arraignment is the stage where the accused is formally informed of the charges against him and enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. Under Section 7 of RA 8493, the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with arraignment within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later; Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court implements this by requiring arraignment within 30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The grounds for suspension of arraignment under Section 11, Rule 116 are limited to an unsound mental condition, a prejudicial question, and a pending petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution at the Department of Justice or the Office of the President, with the suspension not exceeding 60 days. Petitioner failed to show that any of these instances obtained, so the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with arraignment as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause; the Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, had already denied petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, which impugned for the first time the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II, petitioner could no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding, otherwise there would be no end to litigation. Petitioner’s defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best threshed out in the trial on the merits. Petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause is baseless because the OMB-Military memorandum recommending the dropping of the cases was effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, whose finding of probable cause prevails as the final word on the matter. The SC does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, as the Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives. Once the case has been filed with the Sandiganbayan, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case. Petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion, which exists when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Absent such a showing, the SC will not interfere with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it, and the Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with trial in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case. The SC also reminded respondent that under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the mere filing of a petition for certiorari does not by itself merit suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.

• Motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman’s probable-cause finding does not bar information or arraignment — Under Section 7, Rule II of the Ombudsman Rules, only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution is allowed, filed within five days from notice with the Office of the Ombudsman or proper Deputy Ombudsman, with leave of court if the information has already been filed; the filing shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information. The SC applied this by holding that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration did not bar the information or the arraignment.
• Grounds for suspension of arraignment are limited — Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court allows suspension only for (a) an unsound mental condition rendering the accused unable to fully understand the charge and plead intelligently, (b) a prejudicial question, and (c) a pending petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution at the Department of Justice or the Office of the President, with the suspension not exceeding 60 days from filing of the petition with the reviewing office. The SC applied this by finding that none of these grounds existed.
• 30-day arraignment period — Under Section 7 of RA 8493 and Section 1(g), Rule 116, arraignment must be held within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused appears before the court, whichever is later; the period is counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The SC applied this by holding that the Sandiganbayan was mandated to proceed with arraignment.
• Non-interference with Ombudsman’s probable-cause finding; Sandiganbayan control once filed — The SC ordinarily does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause because the Ombudsman has wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives; once the case is filed in the Sandiganbayan, however, the Sandiganbayan has full control of the case. The SC applied this by upholding the panel of prosecutors’ finding of probable cause and the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion to set aside arraignment.
• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion exists when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The SC applied this by finding no such abuse in the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion.
• Rule 65 petition does not suspend the principal case absent TRO or injunction — Under Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent. The SC applied this by reminding respondent that the Rule 65 petition did not suspend the Sandiganbayan proceedings.

• "If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information." — This is the ratio for holding that the pending second motion for reconsideration did not prevent petitioner’s arraignment.
• "Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493." — This applies the limited grounds for suspension of arraignment and affirms the Sandiganbayan’s action.
• "There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." — This is the SC’s canonical definition of grave abuse of discretion used to test the Sandiganbayan’s denial.
• "Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case." — This defines the shift of control from the Ombudsman to the Sandiganbayan once the information is filed.

• Alba vs. Nitorreda, 325 Phil. 229 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the SC consistently refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers.
• Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 725 — Cited for the rationale that judicial review of every Ombudsman probable-cause action would hamper the courts and flood them with petitions.
• Venus vs. Desierto, 358 Phil. 675 (1998) — Cited to support the SC’s ordinary non-interference with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause.
• Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Desierto, 445 Phil. 154 (2003) — Cited for the Ombudsman’s wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives.
• Nava vs. National Bureau of Investigation, 495 Phil. 354 (2005) — Cited for the rule that once the case is filed in the Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan has full control of the case.
• Fuentes, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 164865, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 779 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499 (2003) — Cited for the Sandiganbayan’s power to proceed with trial in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination.
• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 747 — Cited for the rule that a Rule 65 petition does not suspend the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued.

• Section 7, Rule II, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001 — Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution is allowed, filed within five days from notice with the Office of the Ombudsman or proper Deputy Ombudsman, with leave of court if the information has already been filed; the filing shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information. Applied: petitioner’s 26 January 2006 motion was a second motion for reconsideration and did not bar the information or arraignment.
• Section 7, Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) — Requires arraignment within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused appears before the court, whichever is later. Applied: the Sandiganbayan was mandated to proceed with arraignment.
• Section 1(g), Rule 116, Rules of Court — Requires arraignment within 30 days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Applied: the period is counted from the accused’s appearance, and no suspension was warranted.
• Section 11, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for suspension of arraignment: unsound mental condition, prejudicial question, and pending petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution at the Department of Justice or the Office of the President, with suspension not exceeding 60 days. Applied: none of these grounds existed.
• Section 7, Rule 65, Rules of Court — A petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus does not interrupt the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued. Applied: the SC reminded respondent that the Rule 65 petition did not suspend the Sandiganbayan proceedings absent such relief.