Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Board of Communications

The Board of Communications, as successor in interest to the Public Service Commission, is a creature of the legislature and not a court, and can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. The power to issue certificates of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of such certificates, and the Board cannot impose fines under Section 21 of the Public Service Act absent a charge of violation of the terms and conditions of a certificate or of any order, decision, or regulation of the Board.

The petitioner, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), is a public service entity engaged in radio communications, operating under certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Service Commission. The respondent Board of Communications is the successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, exercising the same powers, jurisdiction, and functions provided for in the Public Service Act. The statutory framework governing the Board's authority derives from Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1, with Section 21 of the Public Service Act providing for the imposition of fines on public services that violate or fail to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commission.

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) is a public service entity engaged in radio communications, operating under certificates of public convenience. Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio were private respondents who filed separate complaints before the Board of Communications seeking damages for the failure of RCPI to deliver telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives.

In BC Case No. 75-01-OC, Diego Morales claimed that while he was in Manila, his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974, from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife. The telegram, sent through RCPI, never reached him. He had to be informed personally about his wife's death and had to take a trip by airplane to Isabela to catch up with the burial. RCPI claimed in its answer that the telegram was transmitted from Santiago, Isabela, to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City, but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent, making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Morales allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prayed for damages.

In BC Case No. 75-08-OC, Pacifico Innocencio claimed that on July 13, 1975, Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, through RCPI's facilities, addressed to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna, to inform him of the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Despite the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message, the sender was not notified about its non-delivery. As a consequence, Pacifico Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. He allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences, for which he prayed for damages.

After hearing, the respondent Board held in both cases that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code and injury caused by quasi-delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications.

• Board Jurisdiction: The respondent Board held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed a disciplinary fine of P200 in each case pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, thereby asserting jurisdiction over the complaints.

• Jurisdiction of the Board of Communications: Whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent through petitioner RCPI.
• Power to Impose Fines: Whether the Board of Communications can impose disciplinary fines under Section 21 of the Public Service Act in the absence of a charge of violation of the terms and conditions of a certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision, or regulation of the Board.

• Jurisdiction of the Board of Communications: No. The Board of Communications, being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. Claims for damages arising from breach of contractual obligation through negligence or quasi-delict should be ventilated in the proper courts, not before the Board.
• Power to Impose Fines: No. The petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of a fine under Section 21 of the Public Service Act because this provision subjects to a fine every public service that violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commission, and the petitioner was not charged with any such violation.

• Jurisdiction of the Board of Communications: The Court ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction, and functions as provided for in the Public Service Act. One of these powers, under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificates of public convenience. However, this power does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificates of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. The complaints of respondents alleged that they were inconvenienced or injured by the failure of the petitioner to transmit telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives, which constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. These charges do not necessarily involve petitioner's failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision, or regulation of the respondent Board. The record clearly shows that petitioner was not charged with any violation or failure to comply with the terms and conditions of its certificates of public convenience or of any order, decision, or regulation of the respondent Board. If complainants allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications.
• Power to Impose Fines: The Court held that even assuming the respondent Board has the power or jurisdiction over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of a fine under Section 21 of the Public Service Act because this provision subjects to a fine every public service that violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commission. In the two cases before the Court, petitioner was not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision, or regulation of the respondent Board. The Court cited its ruling in Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI, where it was held that there can be no justification for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing fines in those petitions. The law cannot be any clearer: the only power it possessed over radio companies was to fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for negligence or misfeasance, as it was not vested with such authority. There is nothing in Section 21 which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion.

• Doctrine of Limited Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies — An administrative agency, being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Board of Communications, as successor to the Public Service Commission, has only limited and administrative functions and cannot take cognizance of damage claims arising from breach of contractual obligations or quasi-delict, which properly belong to the regular courts.
• Scope of Power to Issue Certificates of Public Convenience — The power to issue certificates of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of such certificates or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. The Court applied this principle to determine that the Board's regulatory authority does not extend to adjudicating negligence claims against public service entities.
• Limits on the Power to Impose Fines Under Section 21 of the Public Service Act — Section 21 of the Public Service Act subjects to a fine every public service that violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commission. The Court held that this provision cannot be invoked where the public service is not charged with any violation of the terms and conditions of its certificate or of any order, decision, or regulation of the Board.

• "The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, 'being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute.'" — This passage articulates the foundational doctrine of limited jurisdiction of administrative agencies, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.
• "The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity." — This quotation from the cited cases of Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI states the controlling principle that the Board lacks authority to penalize radio companies for negligence or misfeasance.
• "In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion." — This passage defines the limits of the fine-imposing power under Section 21 of the Public Service Act, holding that it does not authorize fines absent a violation of the terms and conditions of a certificate or of any order, decision, or regulation of the Commission.

• Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860 — Cited as controlling precedent for the doctrine that the Public Service Commission, being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute.
• Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service Commission, L-25994 and L-26004-26046, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1111 — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that the functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only such jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute.
• Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI, G.R. No. L-29236 and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI, G.R. No. L-29247 — Cited as directly controlling precedent, holding that the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications) had no justification for imposing fines on radio companies for negligence or misfeasance, as its only power over radio companies was to fix rates.

• Section 21, Commonwealth Act No. 146 (Public Service Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1 — This provision subjects to a fine every public service that violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commission. The Court held that this provision does not empower the Board to impose fines where the public service is not charged with any such violation.
• Section 129, Public Service Act — This provision governs the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board and grants the power to issue certificates of public convenience. The Court held that this power does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificates of public convenience.
• Article 1170, Civil Code — This provision makes those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, liable for damages. The Court noted that claims based on this provision should be ventilated in the regular courts, not before the Board.
• Article 2176, Civil Code — This provision governs quasi-delict or tort liability, obliging whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, to pay for the damage done. The Court held that such claims fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not the Board of Communications.

Justice Teehankee (Chairman), Justice Makasiar, Justice Muñoz Palma, Justice Fernandez, and Justice Guerrero concurred in the decision.