Racca vs. Echague

Personal notice to designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees under Section 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Rules of Court is mandatory when their places of residence are known, and cannot be satisfied by publication of the notice of hearing under Section 3 alone; an order of general default under Section 3, Rule 9 has no application in probate proceedings.

Maria Lolita A. Echague filed a petition for the allowance of the notarial will of the late Amparo Ferido Racca, who died on September 9, 2015. The will bequeathed an undivided one-fourth portion of Amparo's estate, or 412.5 square meters of land, to her grandnephew Migdon Chris Laurence Ferido. Migdonio Racca and Miam Grace Dianne Racca are Amparo's surviving husband and daughter, respectively, and were named in the petition as Amparo's known heirs. The dispute centers on whether the probate court validly excluded them from the proceedings through an order of general default when they failed to appear at the hearing.

On March 28, 2017, Maria Lolita A. Echague filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 51, a petition for the allowance of the notarial will of the late Amparo Ferido Racca, who had died on September 9, 2015, and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The will bequeathed an undivided portion consisting of one-fourth of Amparo's estate, or 412.5 square meters, to Amparo's grandnephew Migdon Chris Laurence Ferido. In the petition, Echague named Migdonio Racca, Amparo's husband, and Miam Grace Dianne Racca, Amparo's daughter, as Amparo's known heirs, and provided their places of residence.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order on April 18, 2017 setting the case for hearing on June 21, 2017 at 8:30 a.m., and on the same date issued the corresponding Notice of Hearing. The notice of hearing was published for three consecutive weeks from May 6 to May 26, 2017 in Palawan Times, a newspaper of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City and the Province of Palawan. The hearing proceeded on June 21, 2017, but neither Migdonio nor Miam appeared, prompting the trial court to declare them in default.

On July 11, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion to Lift Order of General Default on the ground of excusable negligence. They alleged that Migdonio, who was 78 years old and not in perfect health, received a copy of the Notice of Hearing only on June 19, 2017 — two days before the scheduled hearing — and could not immediately act on the notice within such a short period. Miam, on the other hand, did not receive any notice at all. Due to ignorance of procedural rules and financial constraints, petitioners were unable to secure counsel in time. They also manifested that Amparo was mentally incapable of making a will, as evidenced by a medical certificate from her attending physician.

The RTC denied the motion in its August 16, 2017 Order, holding that the jurisdictional requirements of publication and posting of notices had been substantially complied with. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in the RTC's November 20, 2017 Order. Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, raising a pure question of law: whether known heirs of the testator are still entitled to personal notice under Section 4, Rule 76 despite the publication and posting of the notice of hearing, and whether the order of general default may be set aside.

• Right to Oppose Probate: Petitioners argued that as compulsory heirs, they have an interest in the probate of the will and clear grounds to question it, including that the subject of the devise is conjugal property and that the deceased was mentally incapable of making a will prior to her death.
• Publication Does Not Bar Lifting of Default: Petitioners maintained that posting and publication of the notice does not bar the lifting of the order of general default, which may be lifted upon a showing of good and reasonable cause.
• Excusable Negligence: Petitioners argued that their failure to appear at the jurisdictional hearing was due to excusable negligence, as Migdonio received the notice only two days before the hearing, was 78 years old and in poor health, and they lacked the financial means and legal knowledge to secure counsel promptly.
• Substantial Justice: Petitioners contended that substantial justice requires the relaxation of the procedural rules in their favor.

• Procedural Defects: Respondent contended that the petition should be expunged and dismissed on procedural grounds, arguing that the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping failed to refer to the issues in the petition or the probate proceedings, that the Explanation only mentioned service by registered mail, that the petition raises mixed questions of fact and law which should have been filed with the CA under the principle of hierarchy of courts, and that petitioners failed to cite sufficient reasons for the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Rule 45.
• Publication as Jurisdictional Requirement: Respondent maintained that the RTC's declaration of general default was in accordance with law and jurisprudence, as the Notice of Hearing had been published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. She argued that publication is a jurisdictional requirement while notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience, not a jurisdictional requisite.
• Property from Free Portion: Respondent asserted that Amparo's will clearly states that the property bequeathed to the devisee shall be taken from the free portion of her estate, which she can freely dispose of by will.
• Questionable Status as Compulsory Heir: Respondent alleged that Miam's status as a compulsory heir is questionable because her birth was registered after Amparo's death, or almost thirty-four years from Miam's alleged date of birth.

• Applicability of Order of General Default: Whether an order of general default under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court may validly be issued in probate proceedings.
• Mandatory Personal Notice to Known Heirs: Whether designated or known heirs of the testator are still entitled to personal notice under Section 4, Rule 76 despite the publication and posting of the notice of hearing under Section 3.
• Sufficiency of Notice to Migdonio: Whether the notice received by Migdonio complied with the procedural requirements of Section 4, Rule 76.
• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: Whether the assailed RTC orders are proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Applicability of Order of General Default: No. An order of general default under Section 3, Rule 9 applies only in litigious proceedings and cannot be validly issued in a special proceeding such as the probate of a will, which is not a contentious litigation.
• Mandatory Personal Notice to Known Heirs: Yes. Personal notice to designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees under Section 4, Rule 76 is mandatory when their places of residence are known, and cannot be satisfied by publication under Section 3 alone. The mandatory language "shall" in Section 4 compels strict compliance.
• Sufficiency of Notice to Migdonio: No. The notice received by Migdonio on June 19, 2017 fell short of the ten-day minimum period for personal service prescribed by Section 4, and there was no evidence of mailing at least twenty days before the hearing.
• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: Yes. The assailed orders of general default are final orders that bar petitioners from participating in the probate proceedings, and the issue raised is a pure question of law properly cognizable under Rule 45.

• Applicability of Order of General Default: Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides for the declaration of default when a defending party fails to answer within the time allowed. However, a careful reading of the provision reveals that an order of default avails only in litigious proceedings where a party is impleaded as a defendant and served with process. Probate proceedings are special proceedings, not contentious litigation; nobody is impleaded or served with process. The Court traced this principle to the early case of Riera vs. Palmaroli (1919), which clarified that a proceeding to probate a will is not a contentious litigation and that no order for judgment by default is ever entered. The Court emphasized that in probate proceedings, the court's inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will — testamentary capacity and compliance with formal requisites — and that Rule 76 does not expressly provide for the issuance of a default order. In the absence of contest, Section 5 of Rule 76 merely directs the court to grant allowance based on the testimony of a subscribing witness. Without legal support, the RTC could not validly issue an order of default.

• Mandatory Personal Notice to Known Heirs: Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 prescribe two modes of notification: publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Section 3) and personal notice to designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees at their places of residence, if known (Section 4). The Court traced the historical evolution of these provisions from Section 630 of Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901), which required only publication, through the 1940 Rules of Court, which first introduced the personal notice requirement in Section 4, to the 1964 and 1997 Rules. The Court surveyed the jurisprudential line: Joson vs. Nable (1950) characterized personal notice as "a matter of procedural convenience," but only because the heirs' residences were unknown; Suntay vs. Suntay (1954) recognized the mandatory nature of personal notice to interested parties whose residences were known; Perez vs. Perez (1959), Abut vs. Abut (1972), Alaban vs. Court of Appeals (2005), Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones (2006), and Leriou vs. Longa (2018) reiterated the "procedural convenience" characterization, but none of these cases properly applied Section 4 because they either involved unknown residences, oppositors who were not designated heirs, or intestate proceedings. The Court reverted to De Aranz vs. Judge Galing (1988), which squarely applied Section 4 and held personal notice to be mandatory. The Court emphasized that Section 4 uses the word "shall," which expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. The personal notice requirement was instituted to safeguard the right to due process of unsuspecting heirs who might otherwise be excluded from a proceeding affecting their successional rights. In the present case, Miam was indicated as a known heir in the petition with her residence provided; respondent's contention that notice to Migdonio redounded to Miam because they share the same residence was rejected, as Section 4 does not distinguish between heirs with the same address and those residing in different locations. Each known heir is entitled to individual service.

• Sufficiency of Notice to Migdonio: Section 4 requires that personal notice be either deposited in the post office with postage prepaid at least twenty days before the hearing, or personally served at least ten days before the hearing. Migdonio received the notice on June 19, 2017, only two days before the June 21, 2017 hearing. There was no evidence of mailing twenty days prior. Even assuming personal service, the two-day period fell short of the ten-day minimum. The Court further noted that Migdonio, an ailing 78-year-old unfamiliar with legal procedures, could not reasonably be expected to secure counsel and prepare an opposition within two days. His failure to attend was excused as excusable negligence — one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.

• Propriety of Rule 45 Petition: An order of general default, as explained in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Hon. Enriquez, causes the defaulted party to lose standing in court, barring participation, evidence presentation, and even appeal. The assailed orders effectively barred petitioners from participating in the allowance of Amparo's will, preventing them from raising doubts about its genuineness and authenticity. Such orders are final and proper subjects of a Rule 45 appeal. The issue raised — whether known heirs are entitled to personal notice under Section 4 despite publication — is a pure question of law, which the Court may entertain under Rule 45.

• Mandatory Personal Notice to Known Heirs in Probate Proceedings — Under Section 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Rules of Court, personal notice to designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees whose places of residence are known is mandatory. The use of the word "shall" in the provision expresses compulsion. Publication under Section 3 serves as constructive notice to the whole world by virtue of the in rem nature of probate proceedings, but it does not supersede the additional requirement of personal notice under Section 4 when the residences of the interested parties are known. The rule was instituted to safeguard the due process rights of heirs who might otherwise be excluded from proceedings affecting their successional rights. Personal notice is not required only when the places of residence of the heirs, legatees, or devisees are unknown.

• Inapplicability of Order of General Default in Probate Proceedings — An order of general default under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court applies only in litigious or contentious proceedings where a defending party is impleaded and served with process. Probate proceedings are special proceedings, not contentious litigation; no party is impleaded or served with summons. Rule 76 does not provide for the issuance of a default order. In the absence of contest, Section 5 of Rule 76 directs the court to allow the will on the testimony of a subscribing witness. A trial court cannot validly issue an order of default in probate proceedings.

• Two Modes of Notification in Probate — Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 prescribe two distinct modes of notification: (1) publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks (Section 3), and (2) personal notice — by mail at least twenty days before the hearing or by personal service at least ten days before the hearing — to designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees at their places of residence, if known (Section 4). Both modes must be complied with when the residences of the interested parties are known; one does not substitute for the other.

• "Personal notice to the heirs whose places of residence are known is mandatory. Trial courts cannot simply abdicate their duty under Section 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court by indiscriminately applying the rule on publication. To do so would render nugatory the procedure laid down in Sec. 4 and the purpose for which it was intended." — This is the opening pronouncement of the decision and encapsulates the core ruling: personal notice under Section 4 is mandatory and cannot be replaced by publication alone.

• "A default, such as is there intended, can only arise in contentious litigation where a party who has been impleaded as a defendant and served with process fails to appear at the time required in the summons or to answer at the time provided by the rules of the court. The proceeding to probate a will is not a contentious litigation in any sense, because nobody is impleaded [or] served with process." — This passage from Riera vs. Palmaroli (1919), quoted and adopted by the Court, establishes the foundational principle that orders of default have no place in probate proceedings.

• "The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province." — This statement from De Aranz vs. Judge Galing (1988), quoted by the Court as the controlling precedent, directly holds that publication alone does not satisfy the notice requirement when the residences of known heirs, legatees, and devisees are known.

• "It should be stressed that the rule on personal notice was instituted in Sec. 4 to safeguard the right to due process of unsuspecting heirs, legatees or devisees who, without their knowledge, were being excluded from participating in a proceeding which may affect their right to succeed in the estate." — This passage articulates the constitutional and policy rationale underlying the mandatory personal notice requirement: protection of due process and successional rights.

• Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105 (1919) — Controlling precedent for the proposition that probate proceedings are not contentious litigation and that no order of judgment by default may be entered therein. Quoted extensively by the Court.
• De Aranz vs. Judge Galing, 244 Phil. 645 (1988) — Controlling precedent for the mandatory nature of personal notice under Section 4, Rule 76. The Court reverted to this case as the one that "squarely applied" Section 4, distinguishing it from cases that treated personal notice as merely procedural convenience.
• Joson vs. Nable, 87 Phil. 337 (1950) — First case to characterize personal notice to individual heirs as "a matter of procedural convenience." Distinguished by the Court on the ground that the heirs' residences were unknown, so Section 4 did not apply.
• Alaban vs. Court of Appeals, 507 Phil. 682 (2005) — Cited by respondent for the proposition that personal notice is procedural convenience, not jurisdictional. Distinguished and held inapplicable because the oppositors therein were neither designated nor known heirs, legatees, or devisees, and thus not entitled to personal notice under Section 4.
• Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 (1954) — Recognized the in rem nature of probate proceedings and held that personal notice to interested parties whose residences are known is required for validity. The Court adopted this case's emphasis on the importance of Section 4.
• Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Hon. Enriquez, 490 Phil. 74 (2005) — Cited to explain the effects of an order of general default on the defaulted party, supporting the conclusion that the assailed RTC orders are final and proper subjects of a Rule 45 appeal.
• Perez vs. Perez, 105 Phil. 1132 (1959) — Held that failure to personally notify heirs did not affect jurisdiction but constituted a mere procedural error. Distinguished as not involving the proper application of Section 4.
• In re: Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 (1918) — Characterized probate proceedings as in rem, where the state determines the character of constructive notice to the world. Cited for historical context.
• Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co., 47 Phil. 938 (1925) — Held that the court acquires jurisdiction over all interested persons through publication of the notice. Cited for historical context on the publication requirement.
• Testate Estate of Murray, McMaster vs. Henry Reissmann & Co., 68 Phil. 142 (1939) — Addressed the effect of lack of personal notice in probate, holding that publication constitutes notice to the whole world. Cited for historical context.

• Section 4, Rule 76, 1997 Rules of Court — Requires the court to cause copies of the notice of the time and place of the hearing for proving a will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with postage prepaid at least twenty days before the hearing, if such places of residence are known. Personal service at least ten days before the hearing is equivalent to mailing. The Court held this provision to be mandatory, as evidenced by the use of "shall," and applied it to require individual personal notice to both petitioners, whose residences were known and stated in the petition.
• Section 3, Rule 76, 1997 Rules of Court — Requires publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the province for three consecutive weeks prior to the hearing. The Court held that compliance with Section 3 does not dispense with the additional requirement of personal notice under Section 4 when the residences of known heirs are known.
• Section 3, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Court — Governs the declaration of default in litigious proceedings when the defending party fails to answer. The Court held that this provision does not apply in probate proceedings, which are special proceedings, not contentious litigation.
• Section 5, Rule 76, 1997 Rules of Court — Provides that if no person appears to contest the allowance of the will, the court may grant allowance on the testimony of one subscribing witness. The Court cited this provision to show that Rule 76 does not provide for a default order but instead prescribes a different course when no opposition is presented.
• Section 1, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a petition for review on certiorari may be brought to the Supreme Court from a judgment, final order, or resolution of the RTC. The Court held that the assailed orders of general default are final orders properly subject to a Rule 45 petition, as they bar petitioners from participating in the probate proceedings.
• Articles 805 and 806, New Civil Code — Govern the formal requisites and solemnities for the valid execution of a will. Cited in connection with the Court's discussion of extrinsic validity in probate proceedings.

Perlas-Bernabe (Senior Associate Justice), Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concurred. Rosario, J., was on official leave.