Rabuco vs. Villegas

The subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of a municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional authorization does not constitute an infringement of the due process clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property.

The case arose from a dispute over Lot 21-B, Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, located in San Andres, Malate, with an area of 10,198 square meters. The lot was reserved as communal property and titled in the name of the City of Manila. Petitioners, numbering over a hundred individuals, had built their homes on the lot and claimed status as tenants or bona fide occupants. On June 17, 1961, Congress enacted Republic Act 3120, which converted the lot (along with another lot in Malate) into disposable or alienable land of the State, to be placed under the administration of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots and sale on installment to tenants and bona fide occupants.

• Original Filing: Petitioners filed a petition for injunction and mandamus with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case No. 56092) to enjoin demolition and ejectment and to compel implementation of RA 3120.
• Lower Court Decision: The CFI Manila dismissed the petition, ordered petitioners' ejectment, and held that their houses were public nuisances constructed in violation of city ordinances. The court sidestepped the constitutional issue.
• Appeal: Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 35453, docketed as L-24916). They also filed a separate petition for injunction directly with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 35269, docketed as L-24915) to forestall demolition.
• SC Action: The CA consolidated the cases, found that the constitutionality of RA 3120 was the dominant issue over which it had no jurisdiction, and certified the cases to the SC. Petitioners also filed a petition directly with the SC (L-24661) for continuation of the writ of preliminary injunction. The SC gave due course and consolidated all three cases.

The petitioners in these consolidated cases were more than one hundred individuals who had built their homes and dwellings on Lot 21-B, Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, a parcel of land with an area of 10,198 square meters located in San Andres, Malate. The lot was reserved as communal property and titled in the name of the City of Manila. The petitioners claimed status as tenants or bona fide occupants of the land, having resided there for an extended period.

On June 17, 1961, Congress enacted Republic Act 3120, which expressly declared that Lot 21-B, Block 610 (along with Lot 62, Block 573) was "reserved as communal property" and converted it into "disposable or alienable lands of the State, to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration." The Act directed the Land Tenure Administration to subdivide the property into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters each, fix the price of each lot, and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof. Section 2 of the Act expressly prohibited ejectment proceedings against tenants or bona fide occupants and directed that any demolition order against them shall be dismissed.

Despite the enactment of RA 3120, respondent city officials, through the City Mayor and City Engineer of Manila, sought to demolish petitioners' houses and eject them from the premises. The city officials issued a demolition order set for January 30, 1965 at 8:00 a.m. Petitioners filed a petition for injunction and mandamus with the CFI of Manila to enjoin the demolition and ejectment and to compel the Land Tenure Administration to implement RA 3120. The CFI dismissed the petition, ordered petitioners' ejectment, and held that their houses were public nuisances constructed in violation of city ordinances. The trial court refused to pass upon the constitutionality of RA 3120, stating that the principal question was whether the houses were public nuisances.

Petitioners appealed to the CA and also filed a separate petition for injunction directly with the CA to forestall the demolition. The CA consolidated the cases and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Finding that the constitutionality of RA 3120 was the dominant and inextricable issue over which it had no jurisdiction, the CA certified the cases to the SC. Petitioners also filed a petition directly with the SC for continuation of the writ of preliminary injunction, which the SC granted on August 17, 1965, upon a P1,000 bond, enjoining respondents from demolishing the houses or interfering with petitioners' possession.

In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the Malate area, including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes. Respondents city officials then took over the lot and prevented petitioners from reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners' instance, the SC issued a temporary restraining order on June 17, 1970, enjoining respondents from interfering with petitioners' possession of the lot as safeguarded under the subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965.

The respondents city officials challenged the constitutionality of RA 3120, arguing that it deprived the City of Manila of the lots in question and provided for their sale to bona fide occupants without payment of just compensation, in violation of the due process clause and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that RA 3120 expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of their homes and that they were entitled to the remedies of injunction and mandamus to enforce their rights under the Act.

• Petitioners are entitled to the remedies of injunction and mandamus, being vested with lawful possession over Lot 21-B, Block 610, granted by law under Republic Act 3120.
• Civil Case No. 56092 has not been barred by any prior judgment.
• Ejectment and demolition against petitioners are unlawful and clearly prohibited by Section 2 of Republic Act 3120, which provides that upon approval of the Act, no ejectment proceedings against any tenant or bona fide occupant shall be instituted, and any demolition order directed against them shall be dismissed.
• The constitutionality of RA 3120 is not necessary to decide the case because the Act expressly prohibits ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes.

• Republic Act 3120 is invalid and unconstitutional for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
• The Act deprives the City of Manila of the lots in question and provides for their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation.
• Even if petitioners were already the owners of the land on which their houses are erected, the respondent city officials could cause the removal thereof as they were constructed in violation of city ordinances and constitute public nuisance.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals properly certified the cases to the Supreme Court on the ground that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was the dominant and inextricable issue over which it had no jurisdiction.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Republic Act 3120 is unconstitutional for depriving the City of Manila of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
  • Whether the subdivision of communal land titled in the name of the City of Manila and the conveyance of the resulting lots to bona fide occupants constitutes an exercise of the power of eminent domain requiring just compensation.
  • Whether petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for, implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of their houses.

• Procedural: The SC upheld the CA's certification of the cases. The CA correctly found that the constitutionality of RA 3120 was the dominant and inextricable issue in the appeal, over which it had no jurisdiction. The SC gave due course to the petitions and consolidated the cases.

• Substantive: The SC ruled that RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control, as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation. The Act expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small lots to bona fide occupants. The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.

  The SC relied on Salas vs. Jarencio, which upheld the constitutionality of RA 4118, a law identical in terms to RA 3120, converting another city lot in Malate reserved as communal property into disposable land of the State for resale to bona fide occupants. The SC reaffirmed the general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether for governmental or proprietary purposes. The municipality holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, as the municipality is but a subdivision or instrumentality of the State for purposes of local administration. The legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.

  The SC held that RA 3120 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless. It was not intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation but simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right and power to deal with state property.

  Since the challenge against the constitutionality of RA 3120 failed, the provisions of the Act must be enforced, and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for, implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of their houses.

• Regalian Doctrine / Trust Character of Municipal Property — Land titled in the name of a municipal corporation, if not acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, is held in trust for the State. The municipality holds such land subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same. The legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use. The SC applied this doctrine to hold that Lot 21-B, being communal property titled in the name of the City of Manila but not acquired with its private or corporate funds, was public property over which Congress had absolute control.

• Legislative Control Over State Property — The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts. The SC applied this doctrine to uphold RA 3120 as a valid exercise of legislative power to convert communal land into disposable land for distribution to bona fide occupants.

• Social Justice / Land for the Landless — Legislation intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless is not an exercise of eminent domain requiring just compensation but a manifestation of the legislature's right and power to deal with state property. The SC applied this doctrine to hold that RA 3120 was constitutional.

• Due Process and Eminent Domain in State Property — The due process clause and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution do not apply to the State's disposition of its own public property. The deprivation of property without due process and without just compensation is not violated when the legislature disposes of state property, as the municipality holds such property merely as an agent of the State.

• Section 1, subsection (2), Article III, 1935 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. The SC held that this provision was not violated by RA 3120 because the lots in question were public property, not private property, and the Act was a valid exercise of legislative control over state property.

• Republic Act No. 3120, Sections 1 and 2 — Section 1 converted Lot 62, Block 573 and Lot 21-B, Block 610 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila into disposable or alienable lands of the State, to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision and sale on installment to tenants or bona fide occupants. Section 2 prohibited ejectment proceedings against tenants or bona fide occupants and directed that any demolition order against them shall be dismissed. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the Act and ordered its implementation.

• None.