Rabor vs. People of the Philippines

Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated unless the prosecution establishes (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act; a threat unsupported by other evidence of the accused's true criminal state of mind is a mere casual remark and will not supply the second requisite. Where the wounds inflicted are shown by medical testimony to have been fatal but for timely medical intervention, the felony is frustrated; absent any qualifying circumstance, the crime is frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder.

Hikaru Miyake, a Japanese national, resided with his Filipina wife and children in Gem Village, Ma-a, Davao City, about fifty meters from the house of petitioner Solomon Rabor. Rabor was employed to bring the Miyake children to school, while Rabor's wife gave the Miyake children piano lessons, an arrangement that placed the two households in regular and cordial contact.

Hikaru Miyake, a Japanese national, resided with his Filipina wife and children in Gem Village, Ma-a, Davao City, about fifty meters from the house of Solomon Rabor. Rabor was hired to bring the Miyake children to school, while Rabor's wife gave them piano lessons. The cordial relationship between the two households abruptly ended when their respective wives quarreled over a sum of money that Mrs. Miyake had loaned to Mrs. Rabor, after which Rabor became hostile toward the Miyakes. On one occasion Rabor threw stones at the Miyake house, and that same afternoon Miyake went to Rabor's house to try to patch things up. On account of the strained relations, Miyake terminated the services of Rabor and his wife. Thereafter, Rabor would stop in front of the Miyake residence while riding his motorcycle and shout, "I want to fight and I will kill you," threats that Miyake ignored to avoid trouble.

At around nine o'clock in the evening of 17 August 1981, Miyake was taking his usual "Japanese-style" bath in a drum behind his house. As he soaked his body in the drum filled with warm water, he heard a sound and turned toward it; sensing that something was wrong, he hurriedly got out of the drum. He then saw Rabor about one and a half meters away, rushing toward him with a bolo. Rabor attacked Miyake, who fought and grappled with him for possession of the weapon. The struggle lasted about two minutes, and Rabor fled when he lost possession of the bolo. Miyake's security guard arrived to give assistance to his employer and saw Rabor flee toward the direction of his house. Miyake was immediately brought to the Brokenshire Hospital, where he was confined for ten days.

The Information filed against Rabor charged frustrated murder, committed with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, and alleged that he attacked, assaulted, and hacked Miyake with a bolo, inflicting (a) an incised wound on the left posterior temporal area, 1.5 cm. long and 2–3 mm. deep; (b) an incised wound on the left suprascapular area, 12 cm. long and 5–6 cm. deep; (c) an incised wound at the back of the neck, 10–11 cm. long and 4–5 mm. deep; (d) an incised wound on the left lumbar region, 6 cm. long and 4–5 mm. deep; (e) an incised wound on the right lumbar area, 8 cm. long and 3 mm. deep; and (f) an incised wound on the posterolateral aspect of the left elbow, 6 cm. long and 3–4 cm. deep, with a chip fracture of the lateral epicondyle of the left humerus. The Information further alleged that the accused performed all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder but that the same did not produce it by reason of a cause independent of his will, namely, the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to Miyake. At his arraignment, Rabor pleaded not guilty.

Rabor interposed alibi. He claimed that at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 17 August 1981, while buying a newspaper at the corner of Bolton and San Pedro Streets in Davao City, he met Vicente Panes, who asked him to accompany him to Sigaboy, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental to get coconut seedlings. After obtaining permission from his wife, Rabor went with Panes, and they arrived in Sigaboy at around nine o'clock that evening. From there they traveled another thirty kilometers by motorcycle to the place of Fernando Perez in Luzon, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, where they were supposed to get the seedlings. Perez was not around, so they decided to stay and wait for him; he arrived only on 30 August 1981, and Rabor and Panes returned to Davao City that same day at around three or four o'clock in the afternoon. Panes testified for the defense and substantially corroborated the alibi, as did Emma Rabor, petitioner's wife.

Dr. Bernardo Adolfo, who together with Dr. Virgilio S. Durban, Jr. attended to Miyake at the Brokenshire Hospital after the hacking incident, testified that the first, third, fourth, and fifth wounds may not have been fatal, but that the second wound, at the back left side, could be fatal and the sixth wound, at the posterior left elbow with a chip fracture of the lateral epicondyle of the left humerus, was fatal, such that if no medical treatment had been applied the victim could have died. Miyake, for his part, identified Rabor in a categorical, straightforward, and consistent manner, testifying that he clearly saw Rabor's face during the attack and informed the police that Rabor had hacked him.

• Stage of Execution: Petitioner maintained that the wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal; hence, the crime committed was merely attempted, not frustrated.
• Evident Premeditation: Petitioner argued that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven in this case.
• Proper Offense: Petitioner contended that the crime should be homicide and not murder.
• Hearsay — Medical Certificate: Petitioner raised as an issue whether the medical certificate presented by the prosecution is hearsay.
• Alibi: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals, in disregarding his alibi, decided questions of substance not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
• Suppression of Evidence: Petitioner claimed that the prosecution was guilty of suppression of evidence for failing to present Sammy Babael and one Mr. Tan, whom Miyake had named as the persons who brought him to the hospital, and whose testimonies petitioner deemed vital to the case.

• Non-Presentation of Witnesses: The Office of the Solicitor General observed that, assuming the testimonies of Babael and Tan were material and relevant, nothing could have prevented petitioner from presenting them as his own witnesses in order to discredit the testimonies of those who testified for the prosecution.

• Stage of Execution: Whether the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioner guilty of frustrated murder is contrary to law.
• Hearsay: Whether the medical certificate presented by the prosecution is hearsay.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in the application of evident premeditation in the instant case is a finding grounded on speculation, surmises, and conjectures, and is manifestly mistaken.
• Alibi: Whether the Court of Appeals, in disregarding the alibi of the petitioner, has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
• Suppression of Evidence: Whether the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence.

• Stage of Execution: Partly. The wounds inflicted were fatal and the offense was correctly placed at the frustrated stage, but the crime is frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder, no qualifying circumstance having been established.
• Hearsay: Not separately resolved. The Court discussed the first three issues jointly as interrelated, and the fatal character of the wounds was established through the testimony of Dr. Bernardo Adolfo.
• Evident Premeditation: Yes. Evident premeditation was erroneously appreciated, none of its three requisites having been established by the evidence.
• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of petitioner as the person who attacked him.
• Suppression of Evidence: No. The matter of whom to present as witnesses lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor, and the presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply where the evidence is equally accessible or available to the defense.

• Stage of Execution: Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines a felony as frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." Dr. Adolfo's testimony established that the second wound, at the back left side, could be fatal and that the sixth wound, at the posterior left elbow with a chip fracture of the lateral epicondyle of the left humerus, was fatal, such that the victim could have died if no medical treatment had been applied. Given that testimony that Miyake could have died if not for the timely medical treatment, the trial court correctly held that the stage of execution of the crime was frustrated. The erroneous appreciation of evident premeditation, however, and the absence of any other qualifying circumstance established during trial, reduced the offense to frustrated homicide. On penalty, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes reclusion temporal for homicide, and under Article 50 the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law; frustrated homicide is thus punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere within the range of six months and one day to six years of prision correccional, while the maximum should be taken from the medium period of prision mayor under Article 64, paragraph 1, ranging from eight years and one day to ten years. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of frustrated homicide, the Court imposed an indeterminate prison term of one year and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
• Hearsay: The first three issues were treated as interrelated and discussed jointly, all pertaining to petitioner's contention that he was wrongly convicted of frustrated murder. The resolution of the fatality of the wounds rested on the testimony of Dr. Bernardo Adolfo, who attended to the victim at the Brokenshire Hospital, and not on the medical certificate whose admissibility petitioner questioned.
• Evident Premeditation: For evident premeditation to be properly considered in imposing the proper penalty, three requisites must be established: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. None of these requisites can be inferred from the facts. The records do not show the time when petitioner resolved to commit the crime, and the date and, if possible, the time when the offender determined to commit the crime is essential because the lapse of time for purposes of the third requisite is computed from that date and time. Absent the first requisite, evident premeditation was incorrectly appreciated. The second requisite is likewise wanting: the fact that petitioner was heard to shout at Miyake, "I want to fight and I will kill you," does not necessarily prove evident premeditation without a showing that he performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination. Such a threat, unsupported by other evidence disclosing his true criminal state of mind, is construed only as a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor, not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation. The Court of Appeals, for its part, had merely stated cursorily that the trial court considered evident premeditation and not treachery, without elaborating on the bases for appreciating that qualifying circumstance.
• Alibi: The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of petitioner as the person who attacked him. Miyake could not have been mistaken about petitioner's identity, as he was no stranger to the former and they knew each other quite well. Miyake identified petitioner in a categorical, straightforward, and consistent manner, testifying that he clearly saw petitioner's face during the attack and informed the police that he had been hacked by Solomon Rabor.
• Suppression of Evidence: The non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense, and the matter of whom to present as witnesses lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case. Assuming that the testimonies of Babael and Tan were material and relevant, nothing could have prevented petitioner from presenting them as his own witnesses in order to discredit the testimonies of those who testified for the prosecution. The presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply when the same is equally accessible or available to the defense.

• Frustrated Felony (Article 6, Revised Penal Code) — A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The Court applied the definition through the testimony of Dr. Adolfo that the second and sixth wounds could have been fatal and that the victim could have died absent medical treatment, thereby placing the offense at the frustrated rather than the attempted stage.
• Evident Premeditation — Requisites — Evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The Court held that none of the requisites was inferable from the record, the date and time of the determination being essential because the lapse of time for the third requisite is computed from it.
• Threat as Casual Remark — A threat unsupported by other evidence disclosing the accused's true criminal state of mind is construed only as a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor, not as a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation. The Court applied this to petitioner's shouted threat, "I want to fight and I will kill you," holding that it did not supply the second requisite of evident premeditation.
• Alibi vis-à-vis Positive Identification — The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the accused where the victim knew the accused well and identified him in a categorical, straightforward, and consistent manner. The Court applied this rule in rejecting petitioner's claim that he was in Sigaboy, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental at the time of the attack.
• Suppression of Evidence — The presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply when the evidence is equally accessible or available to the defense. The Court applied this rule in holding that petitioner could himself have presented Babael and Tan, and that the choice of whom to present as witnesses lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law Applied to Frustrated Homicide — Homicide under Article 249 is punishable by reclusion temporal; under Article 50, the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower, so frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor. The minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law falls within the range of six months and one day to six years of prision correccional, and the maximum is taken from the medium period of prision mayor under Article 64, paragraph 1, ranging from eight years and one day to ten years.

• "A felony is 'frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.'" — The Court's statement of the statutory definition of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, applied to hold that the fatal character of the wounds placed the offense at the frustrated stage.
• "In order that evident premeditation may be properly considered in imposing the proper penalty, the following requisites must be established: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act." — The canonical formulation of the three requisites of evident premeditation, the controlling test whose non-satisfaction reduced the conviction to frustrated homicide.
• "Petitioner's threat, unsupported by other evidence which would disclose his true criminal state of mind, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation." — The ratio for rejecting the prosecution's reliance on petitioner's shouted threat as proof of the second requisite of evident premeditation.
• "The presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply when the same is equally accessible or available to the defense." — The rule disposing of petitioner's claim that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Babael and Tan.

• People vs. Espina, G.R. No. 123102, 29 February 2000 — Cited with People vs. Gutierrez, Jr. and People vs. Realin as authority for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643, 644 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Realin, 301 SCRA 495, 513 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Fuentesuela, 73 Phil. 553, 554 (1942) — Cited for the rule that a threat unsupported by other evidence of the accused's criminal state of mind is a mere casual remark and not proof of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Bermudez, 309 SCRA 124, 135 (1999) — Cited with People vs. Alshaika and People vs. Balamban for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive identification of the accused.
• People vs. Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637 (1996) — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619 (1996) — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. De los Santos, 295 SCRA 583, 604 (1998) — Cited with People vs. Pabalan for the rule that the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense and that the choice of witnesses lies in the prosecutor's sound discretion.
• People vs. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574 (1996) — Cited for the same rule on the prosecutor's discretion in selecting witnesses.
• People vs. Martinez, 205 SCRA 666, 674–675 (1992) — Cited with People vs. Araja for the rule that the presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply when the evidence is equally accessible or available to the defense.
• People vs. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 (1992) — Cited for the same rule on suppression of evidence.
• Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book One 385 (13th ed., 1993) — Cited as the treatise authority for the proposition that the date and time when the offender determined to commit the crime is essential because the lapse of time for the third requisite of evident premeditation is computed from that date and time.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines a frustrated felony as one where the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Applied to hold that the fatal wounds, which could have caused death but for timely medical treatment, placed the offense at the frustrated stage.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Applied as the base penalty from which the penalty for frustrated homicide was derived after evident premeditation was discarded.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Applied to fix frustrated homicide as punishable by prision mayor.
• Article 64, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Governs the determination of the maximum period of the penalty. Applied to take the maximum from the medium period of prision mayor, ranging from eight years and one day to ten years, no aggravating or mitigating circumstance having attended the commission of the crime.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum penalty within the range of six months and one day to six years of prision correccional, and the maximum from the medium period of prision mayor.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.