Quizon vs. COMELEC

A petition for mandamus is rendered moot by the supervening resolution of the underlying case by the respondent tribunal, and a candidate who places second in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner upon the subsequent disqualification of the winning candidate.

Florante S. Quizon and Roberto V. Puno were congressional candidates in the First District of Antipolo City for the May 14, 2007 elections. Quizon filed a petition for disqualification and cancellation of Puno’s certificate of candidacy (COC), alleging that Puno failed to meet the residency requirement and committed material misrepresentation by claiming residence in Antipolo City while actually residing in Quezon City. Quizon later supplemented the petition, asserting that Puno’s COC was invalid because it indicated he was running in the First District of the Province of Rizal rather than the First District of Antipolo City.

• The Disqualification Petition: Quizon alleged that Puno lacked the residency requirement for the congressional seat and committed material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his residence.
• The Supplemental Petition: Quizon asserted that Puno’s COC was fatally defective because it indicated he was running in the First District of the Province of Rizal, a separate and distinct legislative district from Antipolo City.
• The Mandamus Petition: Quizon sought to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case, claiming unreasonable delay deprived him of the right to be proclaimed the winner.
• The COMELEC Resolution: The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification petition, finding Puno to be a resident of the First District of Antipolo City and thus qualified to run.
• The Election Results: Puno won by an overwhelming number of votes.

• Unreasonable Delay: Quizon maintained that the COMELEC's unreasonable delay in resolving the disqualification petition deprived him of his right to be proclaimed the winning candidate.
• Stray Votes: Quizon argued that Puno’s votes should be considered stray due to his invalid candidacy, entitling Quizon, as the second highest vote-getter, to proclamation.

• Mootness: Puno and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the mandamus petition was mooted by the July 31, 2007 COMELEC Second Division Resolution resolving the disqualification case.
• Discretionary Duty: Puno argued that resolving a disqualification case involves the exercise of discretionary and quasi-judicial functions, not a ministerial duty subject to mandamus.
• HRET Jurisdiction: The OSG maintained that questions regarding Puno’s qualifications now pertained to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

• Mootness: Whether the petition for mandamus was rendered moot and academic by the COMELEC's resolution of the underlying disqualification case.
• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether the writ of mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to resolve a disqualification case.
• Stray Votes: Whether votes cast for a winning candidate may be considered stray absent a final judgment of disqualification before the election.
• Second Placer Rule: Whether the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner upon the subsequent disqualification of the winning candidate.

• Mootness: The petition was rendered moot by the COMELEC's supervening resolution. Because the act sought to be compelled had been accomplished, there was no practical use or value in issuing the writ. None of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine—grave constitutional violation, exceptional character and paramount public interest, need for controlling principles, or capability of repetition yet evading review—were present.
• Propriety of Mandamus: Mandamus lies only to compel the performance of ministerial duties, not to control the exercise of discretionary or quasi-judicial functions such as the denial or cancellation of a COC. Even if the Court could compel COMELEC to act, issuing the writ would serve no purpose because COMELEC had already decided the matter.
• Stray Votes: Votes cast for a candidate are not considered stray absent a final judgment of disqualification before the election. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the 15-day period for deciding disqualification cases is merely directory; a final judgment before election is required for votes to be considered stray.
• Second Placer Rule: A second-placer cannot be proclaimed the winner upon the subsequent disqualification of the winning candidate. The second placer lost the election and was repudiated by the plurality of voters. Furthermore, technicalities regarding the COC should not defeat the clear intention of the voter, especially when the winning candidate received an overwhelming number of votes.

• Doctrine of Mootness — A case ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, rendering any declaration thereof of no practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over moot cases, except when: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles; or (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. None of these exceptions applied here.
• Second Placer Rule — A candidate who loses an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the winning candidate is subsequently found ineligible. The second placer was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters.
• Stray Votes Doctrine — Votes cast for a candidate are not considered stray unless there is a final judgment of disqualification issued before the election. The 15-day period under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to resolve disqualification cases is merely directory.

• "The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate."
• "The second placer is just that, a second placer – he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters."

• Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886 — Followed. Held that the 15-day period in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for deciding petitions to cancel COCs is merely directory.
• Codilla Sr. v. De Venecia, 442 Phil. 139 (2002) — Followed. Held that a final judgment before the election is required for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray.
• Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 158466 — Followed. Held that a subsequent disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second-placer to be declared the winner.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) — Provides that petitions to deny due course or cancel a COC should be resolved not later than 15 days before the election. Applied as merely directory in conjunction with R.A. No. 6646.
• Section 6, R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Provides that a candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and votes cast for them shall not be counted. If no final judgment is declared before the election, votes for the winning candidate are not stray. Applied to hold that Puno's votes were valid absent a final pre-election disqualification judgment.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice), Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Ruben T. Reyes, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.