Quizon vs. Baltazar

The six-month prescriptive period for oral defamation under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code is computed as 180 days, with the first day excluded and the last day included, in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code, which defines a month as 30 days for general application in the interpretation of laws. The offense of oral defamation prescribes in 180 days, not in six calendar months, and the period commences from the day following the commission or discovery of the crime.

The petitioners, Federico Quizon and Profitisa Quizon, were charged with serious oral defamation in separate criminal complaints filed before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. The private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, filed the complaints with the assistance of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary investigation. The case involved the interpretation of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which govern the prescription of offenses, in relation to Article 13 of the Civil Code, which defines how months are computed for legal purposes. The dispute centered on whether the prescriptive period for oral defamation should be computed as six calendar months or as 180 days, and how the first and last days of the period should be counted.

Petitioners Federico Quizon and Profitisa Quizon were charged with serious oral defamation in two separate criminal complaints filed on May 11, 1964, before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. The complaints, filed by private respondent Cecilia Sangalang with the assistance of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, alleged that the offense was committed on the same day, November 11, 1963. When called for arraignment, petitioners filed a written motion to quash, contending principally that the offense charged had already prescribed as of May 9, 1964.

In support of their motion, petitioners argued that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, oral defamation prescribes in six months, and relying on People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67, they computed the six-month period as follows: from November 12 to 30, 1963, there were 19 days; December 1963 had 31 days; January 1964 had 31 days; February 1964 had 29 days; March 1964 had 31 days; April 1964 had 30 days; and from May 1 to 9, 1964, was a matter of 9 days, totaling 180 days from November 12, 1963, to May 9, 1964.

The respondent court overruled the motion, reasoning that Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code speaks of "month" as the basic unit in reckoning the duration of prescription, and that under Article 13 of the new Civil Code, when laws speak of months, a month is understood to be of 30 days, unless the month is designated by its name, in which case it is computed by the number of days it has in the calendar. Applying this formula, the respondent court computed the period as follows: from November 12 to 30, 1964, there are 19 days; December, January, February, March, and April are each given 30 days; and from May 1 to 11, 1964, there are 11 days, totaling 180 days from November 12, 1963, to May 11, 1964. The respondent court believed this formula was more squarely in accordance with the mode adopted in People vs. Del Rosario.

The Supreme Court found the respondent court's ratiocination plainly erroneous, noting that in People vs. Del Rosario, the Court had clearly held that the term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day month, and that the period of prescription should be counted by excluding the first day and including the last day. The Court also rejected the respondents' contention that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari or prohibition, stating that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the offense charged has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust, and the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period: Petitioners argued that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, oral defamation prescribes in six months, and relying on People vs. Del Rosario, the six-month period should be computed as 180 days, excluding the first day, from November 12, 1963, to May 9, 1964, when the period expired.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners charged that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the construction of the pertinent legal provisions by the Supreme Court in People vs. Del Rosario.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Petitioners maintained that the denial of a motion to quash on the ground of prescription may be assailed through certiorari and prohibition, as the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate when the offense charged has indisputably prescribed.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period: Respondents insisted that the factual situation in this case is substantially different from that in People vs. Del Rosario, and that the mode of computation submitted by the public prosecutor was correct, treating designated months by their calendar length and undesignated months as 30-day months.
• Procedural Objection: Respondents contended that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari or prohibition, and that petitioners should have pursued the ordinary remedy of appeal.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period: Whether the six-month prescriptive period for serious oral defamation under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be computed as 180 days, excluding the first day, in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code and People vs. Del Rosario.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Whether the denial of a motion to quash on the ground of prescription may be assailed through certiorari and prohibition, notwithstanding the availability of appeal as an ordinary remedy.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period: Yes. The six-month prescriptive period for oral defamation is computed as 180 days, with the first day excluded and the last day included, in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code, which defines a month as 30 days for general application in the interpretation of laws. The offense charged in the complaints had already prescribed when the complaints were filed on May 11, 1964.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: Yes. To allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the offense charged has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust, and the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate in such circumstances.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period: The Court applied the ruling in People vs. Del Rosario, which held that the term "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day month, not the solar or civil month, in view of the express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code. The Court also applied the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included, as provided in Article 13 of the Civil Code and as consistently applied in Philippine jurisprudence. The respondent court's insistence that the factual situation in this case was substantially different from that in Del Rosario was found to be too tenuous to merit consideration, and no ponderous reason was shown to depart from the established rulings. The respondent court's computation, which treated designated months by their calendar length and undesignated months as 30-day months, was plainly erroneous and constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition: The Court held that although the denial of a motion to quash is generally not a ground for certiorari or prohibition, to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate, and certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period for Oral Defamation — The six-month prescriptive period for oral defamation under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code is computed as 180 days, with the first day excluded and the last day included. The term "month" in Article 90 is understood to mean the 30-day month, not the solar or civil month, in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code, which provides a general rule for the interpretation of laws.
• Exclusion of the First Day and Inclusion of the Last Day — In computing the period of prescription of offenses, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included, as provided in Article 13 of the Civil Code and as consistently applied in Philippine jurisprudence, including People vs. Del Rosario and Surbano vs. Gloria.
• Certiorari and Prohibition as Remedies for Denial of Motion to Quash — Although the denial of a motion to quash is generally not a ground for certiorari or prohibition, these remedies are proper when the offense charged has been indisputably shown to have already prescribed, as the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate, and to require the accused to undergo trial would be unfair and unjust.

• "The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of the Month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be understood as containing 30 days; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that month means the civil or calendar month and not the regular 30-day month (Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil., 334). With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). This provision of the new Civil Code has been intended for general application in the interpretation of the laws." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Del Rosario, establishes the controlling rule that the term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code means a 30-day month, not a calendar month.
• "We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Del Rosario, demonstrates the application of the rule excluding the first day and including the last day in computing the prescriptive period.
• "As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari or prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been indisputably, shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust, for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate." — This passage states the Court's rationale for allowing certiorari and prohibition as remedies despite the general rule that the denial of a motion to quash is not a ground for these writs.

• People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67 — Controlling precedent. The Court applied this case's rulings that the term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code means a 30-day month, and that the first day is excluded and the last day included in computing the prescriptive period.
• Surbano vs. Gloria, 51 Phil. 415 — Followed. Cited in People vs. Del Rosario for the rule that in computing a period, the first day is excluded and the last day included.
• Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334 — Cited in People vs. Del Rosario for the proposition that under the Revised Administrative Code, "month" means the civil or calendar month, a concept later modified by the Civil Code.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed prescribe in six months. The Court interpreted "six months" as 180 days, or six 30-day months.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. The Court applied the rule that the first day is excluded and the last day included in computing this period.
• Article 13, Civil Code — Provides that when the laws speak of months, it shall be understood that a month is of 30 days each, and that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. The Court applied this provision to interpret the term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 18, Civil Code — Provides that any deficiency in a special law must be supplied by the provisions of the Civil Code. The Court noted that the Revised Penal Code is deficient in not explicitly defining how the prescriptive period is to be computed, so resort must be had to Article 13 of the Civil Code.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concurred. Concepcion Jr., J., took no part. Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.