Quisumbing vs. Rosales

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only against tribunals, boards, or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, not against administrative bodies engaged in fact-finding investigations; the Commission on Human Rights, in issuing a show cause order to initiate an investigation against one of its commissioners and subsequently referring the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman, was not adjudicating rights but exercising its constitutional power to investigate human rights violations, rendering certiorari an improper remedy.

Commissioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) faced complaints from former employees alleging maltreatment, unauthorized salary deductions, document mismanagement, signature forgery, and ghost employment. On September 18, 2013, the CHR met to consider these complaints during the petitioner's absence on sick leave. Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Commissioners Ma. Victoria V. Cardona and Norberto dela Cruz were present. The meeting resulted in the issuance of a Show Cause Order requiring the petitioner to explain why she should not face administrative disciplinary action.

• The CHR Meeting: On September 18, 2013, the Commission on Human Rights convened a meeting attended by Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Commissioner Ma. Victoria V. Cardona, and Commissioner Norberto dela Cruz. The petitioner was on sick leave and Commissioner Jose Manuel S. Mamauag was away on official business.
• The Complaints: Former employees Ma. Regina D. Eugenio, Elizabeth Diego-Buizon, Alexander B. Fernandez, and Jesse Ayuste filed affidavits accusing the petitioner of: (1) seriously maltreating and inflicting mental abuse through unreasonable behavior and demands; (2) taking a cut from employees' salaries to form an office fund under her sole control; (3) repeatedly misplacing official documents requiring her action; (4) forging another commissioner's signature; (5) hiring employees who do not report for work; and (6) contracting consultancy work for another government agency.
• The Show Cause Order: On the same day as the meeting, the CHR issued Resolution CHR (IV) No. A2013-148 and a Show Cause Order dated September 18, 2013, through Chairperson Rosales. The order required the petitioner to submit within five days from receipt a written explanation why she should not be held liable for administrative disciplinary actions for alleged acts of malfeasance or misfeasance constituting misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, grave abuse of authority, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, in violation of Civil Service Laws and Rules and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The order was served at the petitioner's office on September 19, 2013.
• Subsequent Actions: On September 26, 2013, Commissioner Mamauag issued a Memorandum concurring with the September 18, 2013 resolution. On September 27, 2013, Chairperson Rosales transmitted letters to the President of the Philippines and the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the complaints, attaching copies of the Show Cause Order and CHR Resolution, and requesting the Ombudsman to act on the complaint in accordance with established procedures.
• Petitioner's Response: On October 4, 2013, the petitioner filed with the CHR Secretariat a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Show Cause Order, assailing its validity on due process grounds. Without waiting for the CHR to act, she filed the present petition on October 16, 2013.
• CHR's Position: On October 23, 2013, the CHR issued an Order stating it could no longer act on the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss since the case had been forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Jurisdiction and Grave Abuse: Petitioner maintained that the respondents acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering her to show cause why she should not be held liable for administrative disciplinary actions, and in filing charges with the President and the Office of the Ombudsman without due process of law.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner argued that the respondents gravely abused their discretion by issuing the Show Cause Order during a meeting held on September 18, 2013, knowing she was on sick leave and unable to attend, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to refute the allegations and participate as a member of the CHR.
• Collegial Nature of the CHR: Petitioner contended that the Show Cause Order appeared to have been issued by Chairperson Rosales alone without reference to other members, constituting usurpation of the authority of the collegial body which requires majority concurrence to validly arrive at a decision, citing GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.
• Vagueness of the Order: Petitioner claimed the Show Cause Order was insufficient to enable her to respond because it failed to specifically state: (1) the particular "acts of malfeasance or misfeasance" allegedly committed; and (2) the specific "civil service laws and rules" allegedly violated, thus denying her due process of law.
• Lack of Authority: Petitioner alleged that the CHR, as a body, was not empowered by law to act on disciplinary complaints against its own members, rendering the respondents without authority to issue the Show Cause Order.

• Improper Remedy: Respondent Office of the Solicitor General countered that certiorari was an improper remedy because it is available only when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; since the respondents were not engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial functions when issuing the Show Cause Order, the petition should be dismissed.
• Absence of Grave Abuse: Respondent argued that the petitioner failed to show that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion, emphasizing that aside from bare allegations of malice and bad faith, petitioner offered no convincing evidence proving that respondents exercised their power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
• Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: Respondent submitted that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to her under the law before instituting the petition, rendering the action premature.

• Availability of Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy to assail the Show Cause Order issued by the Commission on Human Rights.
• Mootness: Whether the petition has become moot and academic in light of the referral of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman.
• Due Process in Administrative Investigation: Whether the issuance of the Show Cause Order violated the petitioner's right to due process of law.
• Authority to Investigate: Whether the Commission on Human Rights has the authority to investigate complaints against its own members and refer the same to the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Mootness: The petition was dismissed as moot and academic because the subsequent referral of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate prosecutorial action rendered the issues raised in the petition moot insofar as the CHR was concerned; no practical relief could be granted to the petitioner by resolving the petition since the proceedings before the CHR had been terminated.
• Availability of Certiorari: Certiorari was held to be an improper remedy because the respondents, in their official capacities as Chairperson and Members of the CHR, were not engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial functions; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the investigation of the allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry was not a quasi-judicial proceeding where offenses were charged, parties were heard, and penalties were imposed, but at most an exercise of fact-finding investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of adjudication.
• Absence of Grave Abuse: No grave abuse of discretion was committed because the power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by the Constitution, specifically under Rule 3, Section 1(g) and (p) of the CHR Guidelines and Procedures.
• Due Process: There was no denial of due process where the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present her case; the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the chance to explain one's side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The petitioner was given ample opportunity to air her side on the allegations against her after being sufficiently apprised of the allegations, and was afforded the chance to submit her written explanation, which she failed to avail of, choosing instead to directly seek judicial intervention.
• Exhaustion of Remedies: The petition was premature because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to her under the law before filing the special civil action.

• Certiorari Limited to Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Functions — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Administrative agencies exercising purely administrative or ministerial functions are not subject to certiorari. In this case, the CHR was merely conducting a fact-finding investigation rather than adjudicating rights, rendering certiorari improper.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion must be shown to be arbitrary, despotic, or exercised by reason of passion or personal hostility. Mere allegations of malice and bad faith without convincing evidence are insufficient to establish grave abuse. The Court found that the CHR did not exercise its power arbitrarily in initiating an investigation and referring the matter to the Ombudsman, as these actions fell within its constitutional authority.
• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings — The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to be heard before any definitive action is taken. As long as parties are given the chance to explain their side or seek reconsideration, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. The issuance of a show cause order providing an opportunity to submit a written explanation satisfies this requirement.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — A party must exhaust all administrative remedies available under the law before seeking judicial intervention. Premature resort to courts is a ground for dismissal. The petitioner failed to await the CHR's action on her Motion to Dismiss and failed to utilize other administrative remedies before filing the petition for certiorari.
• Mootness — A case becomes moot and academic when no practical relief can be granted by the court. Where the administrative body has terminated its proceedings by referring the matter to another agency, the issues regarding its own proceedings become moot.

• "The power to initiate an investigation and to refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own distinct personality and is recognized by no less than the Constitution." — This passage establishes the constitutional basis for the CHR's authority to investigate complaints and refer them to appropriate agencies, even when the subject is one of its own members.
• "The inquiry was not a quasi-judicial proceeding, where offenses were charged, parties were heard and penalties were imposed. It was at most, an exercise of fact-finding investigation, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of adjudication." — This distinction determines the availability of certiorari and defines the nature of CHR investigations.
• "There can be no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his case." — This encapsulates the fundamental requirement for administrative due process.

• GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., 338 Phil. 507 (1997) — Cited by the petitioner for the principle that the act of a single member of a collegial body, though he may be its head, done without the participation of others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. The Court did not rule on this specific argument due to mootness but acknowledged the general principle.
• Manila Electric Company v. Atilano, G.R. No. 166758, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 112 — Cited for the distinction between quasi-judicial proceedings and fact-finding investigations; established that fact-finding investigations are distinct from adjudication.
• Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013, 709 SCRA 276 — Cited for the principle that there can be no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his case.
• Umali v. Executive Secretary Guingona, Jr., 365 Phil. 77 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the chance to explain one's side, or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
• Natividad v. Felix, G.R. No. 111616, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 680 — Cited for the principle that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers and employees is not exclusive and is concurrent with other government investigating agencies.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition; limits these remedies to acts of tribunals, boards, or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
• Rule 3, Section 1(g) and (p), Commission on Human Rights Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance — Paragraph (g) grants the CHR power to issue invitations, subpoenas, orders, or other processes requesting or directing any person to appear and testify; paragraph (p) authorizes the CHR to endorse its findings and recommendations to competent and relevant Government agencies for appropriate action.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions in the decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson, Second Division), Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen.