Quisumbing vs. Ochoa

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately executory even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration, because under Rule III, Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, such decisions "shall be executed as a matter of course," and there is no difference between an appeal and a motion for reconsideration insofar as their effect on immediate execution is concerned.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is a constitutionally created independent office, but unlike the Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit), its chairperson and members are not impeachable officers and are therefore subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman, itself a constitutional body, is empowered under Article XI, Section 13(8) of the 1987 Constitution and Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act) to promulgate its own rules of procedure, including rules governing the finality and execution of its decisions. Section 27 of the same Act describes the binding effect of the Ombudsman's decisions. The Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure have been amended several times, most recently in 2003 by Administrative Order No. 17, which governs the finality and execution of decisions in administrative cases. Petitioner Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing was a Commissioner of the CHR at the time the administrative charges against her were filed.

On October 9, 2013, Cecilia Rachel V. Quisumbing, then a Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), was administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman with Direct Bribery, Grave Misconduct, violation of Sections 3(b), (c), and (e) of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), and violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 (the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). The charges were predicated on complaint-affidavits filed by several members of her staff: Ma. Regina D. Eugenio, Elizabeth Diego-Buizon, Alexander B. Fernandez, and Jesse K. Ayuste.

According to the complainants, Quisumbing was frequently cruel, imperious, and disrespectful toward her staff, screaming at them whenever she was addressed incorrectly or her instructions were not followed to the letter. She allegedly issued illegal or improper orders, including directing Eugenio to falsify the total number of undistributed T-shirts made for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ordering her staff to turn over their salary ATM cards to her. Eugenio further alleged that Quisumbing offered her a promotion on the condition that her responsibilities would remain the same and that Quisumbing would receive and keep the amount of the resultant salary differential as part of the "CRVQ Office Fund." Upon Quisumbing's orders, Eugenio drafted an agreement to that effect but did not sign it. The promotion pushed through, and Eugenio gave Quisumbing her salary differential for January to July 2013, as evidenced by acknowledgment receipts. Buizon, Fernandez, and Ayuste accused Quisumbing of additional office oppressions and irregularities, including shouting at staff for failing to buy her correct lunch order, sending staff on non-office-related errands, using government vehicles and chauffeurs for personal trips to dermatology clinics, social clubs, malls, and cinemas, falsifying daily time records, and hiring ghost employees.

On February 14, 2014, the Ombudsman placed Quisumbing on preventive suspension for six months pending investigation. Quisumbing filed her counter-affidavit, claiming that the allegations were fabrications by disgruntled staff members with a propensity for dishonesty and insubordination. She denied being cruel and oppressive, claiming she was merely reprimanding staff with justifiable bases, and attributed her increased irritability to a side effect of her treatment for fibromyalgia. She denied pocketing Eugenio's salary differential and taking staff salary ATM cards, but admitted to maintaining an office fund for the benefit of the whole office staff. After a further exchange of pleadings, the Ombudsman rendered its August 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, finding probable cause to indict Quisumbing for direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code, violation of R.A. No. 3019, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. On the administrative aspect, the Ombudsman found Quisumbing guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.

The Ombudsman's findings rested substantially on Quisumbing's own admission that she proposed and caused the execution of the written agreement stipulating that Eugenio's salary differential would be remitted to her as part of the "CRVQ Office Fund." This admission was corroborated by acknowledgment receipts showing that Quisumbing had received a total of ₱41,292.85 in salary differentials from Eugenio, the authenticity of which was not disputed. The Ombudsman found substantial evidence that Quisumbing demanded and received the salary differential, constituting a violation of R.A. No. 6713, Section 7(d) and tantamount to grave misconduct, as she used her office to obtain funds for her own personal benefit. The Ombudsman gave short shrift to Quisumbing's claim that the funds were for the benefit of her staff, noting her own admission that she kept the same in her office. The penalty of dismissal from government service was imposed, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government.

On September 15, 2014, Quisumbing filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Nine days later, on September 24, 2014, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa issued a Memorandum directing CHR Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales to dismiss Quisumbing from the service with imposition of all accessory penalties, in compliance with the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution. On October 1, 2014, Chairperson Rosales issued a Memorandum implementing the dismissal effective immediately. On October 14, 2014, Quisumbing filed the present petition. On November 11, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying Quisumbing's motion for reconsideration.

• Independence of the CHR: Quisumbing argued that the assailed memoranda constituted "undue executive control or interference" upon the constitutional independence of the CHR, citing Bautista vs. Salonga.
• Usurpation of Ombudsman's Prerogative: Quisumbing maintained that the assailed memoranda usurped the Ombudsman's "sole prerogative" to order the immediate implementation of its decisions, contending that the Ombudsman itself did not issue an order to implement its August 28, 2014 resolution.
• Immediate Executory Effect Limited to Appeals: Quisumbing asserted that under Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 17, the immediate executory effect of the Ombudsman's decisions applies only to appeals and not to motions for reconsideration, rendering the immediate implementation pending her motion for reconsideration an undue encroachment upon the Ombudsman's power to enforce its own rulings.

• Presidential Disciplinary Authority: Respondents countered that the assailed memoranda were issued pursuant to the President's disciplinary authority over the CHR, as the CHR, although constitutionally independent, was not placed on the same footing as the other Constitutional Commissions; its chairperson and members are not impeachable officers and are under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the direct disciplining authority of the President.
• No Distinction Between Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration: Respondents argued that under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and applicable jurisprudence, there is no difference between a motion for reconsideration and an appeal insofar as their effect on the immediate execution of the Ombudsman's decisions is concerned.
• Mootness: Respondents further argued that the issue had been rendered moot and academic by the Ombudsman's denial of Quisumbing's motion for reconsideration, from which the only remedy was an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which, as Quisumbing herself admitted, does not bar the immediate implementation of her dismissal.

• Immediate Executory Effect of Ombudsman Decisions: Whether a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case is immediately executory despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Executive Secretary and the CHR Chairperson committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they implemented Quisumbing's dismissal through the assailed memoranda despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Immediate Executory Effect of Ombudsman Decisions: Yes. Under Rule III, Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure as amended by A.O. No. 17, a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases "shall be executed as a matter of course," and the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay its immediate implementation, as clarified by Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. Since the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution was immediately executory, the respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed memoranda; they were simply following the law and giving due respect to the orders of the Ombudsman.

• Immediate Executory Effect of Ombudsman Decisions: The Ombudsman, a constitutional body, is empowered under Article XI, Section 13(8) of the 1987 Constitution and Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770 to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Pursuant to this power, the Ombudsman promulgated its Rules of Procedure, which were amended several times. The current version, as amended by A.O. No. 17, series of 2003, provides in Rule III, Section 7 that "[a] decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course." The phrase "matter of course" means something done as part of a routine process or procedure. Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006 further clarified that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of its decisions. This rule has been upheld in Villaseñor vs. Ombudsman, Cobarde-Gamallo vs. Escandor, and Lee vs. Sales, where the Court consistently ruled that a pending motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate execution of the Ombudsman's dismissal orders. There is no difference between an appeal and a motion for reconsideration insofar as their effect on the immediate implementation of the assailed order is concerned. The rationale is rooted in the Ombudsman's uniquely important function and wide-reaching powers: the immediate execution of its decisions is a protective measure, similar to preventive suspension, designed to prevent disciplined public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with records during the pendency of any motion or appeal. Moreover, no vested right is violated, as the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while the case is on appeal or reconsideration and, in the event of a favorable outcome, shall be paid the salary and emoluments not received by reason of the suspension or removal.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The assailed memoranda were based on the Ombudsman's August 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, which imposed the penalty of dismissal on Quisumbing. Quisumbing did not dispute the Ombudsman's jurisdiction over her position as CHR Commissioner. Since the Joint Resolution was immediately executory despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration, the respondents committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed memoranda. Contrary to Quisumbing's assertion, the Ombudsman need not issue a separate order for the implementation of its resolution, precisely because the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure already ordain the immediate implementation thereof. The respondents were simply following the law and giving due respect to the orders of the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the Ombudsman had already denied Quisumbing's motion for reconsideration via a Joint Order dated November 11, 2014, rendering the issue moot; her only recourse was an appeal under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals, a remedy that undisputedly does not bar the immediate implementation of the order of dismissal.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decisions in Administrative Cases — A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately executory even pending a motion for reconsideration or appeal. Under Rule III, Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure as amended by A.O. No. 17, such decisions "shall be executed as a matter of course." The filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay execution. This rule is rooted in the Ombudsman's constitutional mandate to preserve the integrity of public service and serves as a protective measure analogous to preventive suspension, preventing disciplined officers from influencing witnesses or tampering with records. No vested right is violated because the respondent is deemed under preventive suspension during the pendency of any motion or appeal and is entitled to back salaries and emoluments if ultimately exonerated.

• No Distinction Between Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration as to Executory Effect — There is no difference between an appeal and a motion for reconsideration insofar as their effect on the immediate implementation of an Ombudsman decision is concerned. Both remedies are available to the respondent, but neither operates to stay the execution of the Ombudsman's decision, which shall be executed as part and parcel of standard procedure regardless of the availment of remedies therefrom.

• Non-Interference with the Ombudsman's Rule-Making Power — The Court adopts a general policy of non-interference with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers, including the execution of its decisions. To not give deference to the Ombudsman's discretion in promulgating rules for the execution of its decisions would be to interfere with its constitutional power to promulgate its own rules.

• "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course." — This is the operative rule from Rule III, Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure as amended by A.O. No. 17, which the Court identified as the controlling provision establishing the immediate executory nature of Ombudsman decisions regardless of pending motions for reconsideration or appeals.

• "The jurisprudence is clear: a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of a dismissal order (or any decision in an administrative case for that matter) issued by the Ombudsman. There is no difference between an appeal and a motion for reconsideration insofar as their effect on the immediate implementation of the assailed order is concerned." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, synthesizing the Court's analysis of the Ombudsman Rules and prior jurisprudence to establish the equivalence of appeals and motions for reconsideration with respect to the stay of execution.

• "The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public service, and must be beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted a general policy of non-interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers. The execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which this Court gives deference." — This passage, quoted from Lee vs. Sales, states the constitutional rationale for deferring to the Ombudsman's rules on execution and for the policy of non-interference with its exercise of powers.

• "The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with records." — This passage explains the functional justification for the immediate executory rule, linking it to the protective purpose of preventive suspension and underscoring the public interest in shielding the civil service from potential interference by a disciplined officer during the pendency of remedies.

• Bautista vs. Salonga, 254 Phil. 156 (1989) — Cited by petitioner in support of her argument that the assailed memoranda constituted undue executive control or interference upon the constitutional independence of the CHR. The Court did not sustain this argument.

• Villaseñor vs. Ombudsman, 735 Phil. 409 (2014) — Controlling precedent followed. The Court held that a dismissal order from the Ombudsman is executory even pending reconsideration, because under Section 7 of Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure, a decision in administrative cases "shall be executed as a matter of course." No vested right is violated as the respondent is deemed under preventive suspension and entitled to back salaries if exonerated on appeal.

• Cobarde-Gamallo vs. Escandor, 811 Phil. 378 (2017) — Controlling precedent followed. The Court reiterated the rule from Villaseñor that a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of the Ombudsman's order of dismissal, and held that the CA cannot enjoin the implementation of Ombudsman decisions when the latter's rules clearly sanction immediate implementation.

• Lee vs. Sales, G.R. No. 205294, July 4, 2018 — Controlling precedent followed. The Court categorically held that a pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Office of the Ombudsman does not stay its immediate execution, and articulated the constitutional rationale for non-interference with the Ombudsman's rule-making power regarding execution of its decisions.

• Fabian vs. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998) — Cited in a footnote regarding the proper mode of appeal from Ombudsman decisions to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

• Article XI, Section 13(8), 1987 Constitution — Grants the Ombudsman the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or functions or perform such duties as may be provided by law." The Court relied on this provision to affirm the Ombudsman's authority to promulgate rules governing the finality and execution of its decisions.

• Section 18, R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Further specifies the Ombudsman's rule-making power. Cited as statutory basis for the Ombudsman's promulgation of its Rules of Procedure.

• Section 27, R.A. No. 6770 — Describes the binding effect of the Ombudsman's decisions. Cited as part of the statutory framework governing the finality and execution of Ombudsman rulings.

• Rule III, Section 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, series of 2003 — The controlling provision. It provides that a decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases "shall be executed as a matter of course" and that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. The Court applied this provision to hold that Quisumbing's motion for reconsideration did not stay the immediate implementation of her dismissal.

• Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006, Office of the Ombudsman — Clarifies that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of Ombudsman decisions, orders, or resolutions. The Court relied on this circular as explicit confirmation of the immediate executory rule.

• Section 7(d), R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Prohibits public officials and employees from soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan, or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by, the functions of their office. The Ombudsman found Quisumbing guilty of violating this provision for demanding and receiving her staff member's salary differential.

• Sections 3(b), (c), and (e), R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provisions under which Quisumbing was charged before the Ombudsman, alongside the charge of Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code.

Peralta, C.J., Caguioa, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred.