Quisay vs. People of the Philippines

An Information filed by a prosecutor without prior written authority or approval from the city prosecutor or duly authorized representative constitutes a jurisdictional defect subject to quashal at any stage of the proceedings, notwithstanding a self-serving certification in the Information claiming such authority, where no evidence of actual delegation or approval is shown.

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The Resolution, which recommended the filing of an Information, was prepared by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang. On January 11, 2013, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144. The Information bore the signature of ACP De La Cruz and contained a Certification stating that the filing was made with prior written authority from the City Prosecutor, but it did not bear the approval of SACP Hirang or any other authorized officer.

• The Charge: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City charged petitioner with violation of Section 10 of RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act).
• The Resolution Finding Probable Cause: On December 28, 2012, the OCP-Makati issued a Pasiya (Resolution) finding probable cause. ACP Estefano H. De La Cruz prepared the Resolution, and SACP Edgardo G. Hirang approved it. SACP Hirang was designated as a review prosecutor under OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which authorized division chiefs or review prosecutors to approve resolutions and informations.
• The Information: On January 11, 2013, ACP De La Cruz filed the Pabatid Sakdal (Information) before the RTC. The Information contained a Certification in Filipino stating that "the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor." However, the Information did not bear the signature or approval of SACP Hirang, the City Prosecutor, or any other officer authorized under Office Order No. 32 to approve informations.
• Motion to Quash: On April 12, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that ACP De La Cruz lacked authority to file the Information because neither the Resolution nor the Information showed prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor for ACP De La Cruz to file the same.
• Lower Courts' Rulings: The RTC denied the motion, finding the Certification sufficient. The CA affirmed, holding that SACP Hirang was authorized under RA 10071 and Office Order No. 32 to approve the Resolution, and that the Certification in the Information enjoyed the presumption of regularity.

• Lack of Authority: Petitioner argued that ACP De La Cruz had no authority to file the Information because Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires prior written authority or approval from the city prosecutor or authorized officer, and no such approval was shown in the records.
• Jurisdictional Defect: Petitioner maintained that the filing of an Information by an unauthorized officer constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, citing People v. Garfin.
• Insufficiency of Certification: Petitioner contended that the bare Certification by ACP De La Cruz was self-serving and insufficient to prove actual authority, as there was no showing that the City Prosecutor actually authorized him to file the Information.

• Delegation of Authority: Respondent countered that under Section 9 of RA 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor validly delegated authority to SACP Hirang to approve the Resolution finding probable cause.
• Presumption of Regularity: Respondent argued that the Certification in the Information stating that it was filed with prior written authority of the City Prosecutor enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, absent convincing evidence to the contrary.
• Sufficient Compliance: Respondent maintained that the Certification constituted sufficient compliance with Section 4, Rule 112, as it indicated that the filing was approved by the City Prosecutor.

• Authority to File Information: Whether the Information was validly filed where the Assistant City Prosecutor who signed it lacked prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor or duly authorized representative.
• Effect of Certification: Whether a certification in the Information claiming prior written authority suffices to cure the defect where no actual approval or delegation is shown in the records.

• Authority to File Information: The Information was defective and subject to quashal. While the Resolution finding probable cause was validly approved by SACP Hirang (who had delegated authority under Office Order No. 32), the Information itself was filed by ACP De La Cruz without showing that he was authorized to file it or that he obtained prior written approval from the City Prosecutor or any authorized review prosecutor. Section 4, Rule 112 requires such prior written authority, and Section 3(d), Rule 117 allows quashal on the ground that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
• Effect of Certification: The Certification did not cure the defect. Following People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo, the Court rejected similarly worded certifications as insufficient. The presumption of regularity does not apply where there is no evidence that the officer had authority to file the Information or sought approval from authorized superiors. The defect is jurisdictional and cannot be cured by silence, waiver, or acquiescence.

• Jurisdictional Defect in Unauthorized Filing — The filing of an Information by a prosecutor without prior written authority or approval from the provincial or city prosecutor, chief state prosecutor, or Ombudsman/deputy constitutes a jurisdictional defect that is not subject to waiver, acquiescence, or cure by express consent. Such defect may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
• Delegation of Prosecutorial Authority — Under Section 9 of RA 10071, a city prosecutor may delegate authority to investigate and file informations to subordinates through office orders designating review prosecutors or division chiefs. However, the delegation must be clear and specific, and the authority to approve must be actually exercised by the designated officer.
• Insufficiency of Bare Certification — A mere certification by the filing prosecutor claiming prior written authority from a superior officer does not suffice to validate the Information. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions does not apply to the act of filing itself where records disclose no evidence of actual authority or approval from the city prosecutor or duly authorized representative.

• "No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy." — Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
• "The filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent." — Citing People v. Garfin.
• "Aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati."
• "The CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before the RTC."

• People v. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176, March 29, 2004, 426 SCRA 393 — Controlling precedent establishing that filing an Information without requisite authority is a jurisdictional defect not subject to waiver or cure.
• Turingan v. Garfin, 549 Phil. 903 (2007) — Followed; rejected similarly-worded certifications as insufficient to prove authority.
• Tolentino v. Paqueo, 551 Phil. 355 (2007) — Followed; held that certifications do not cure the defect where actual authority is not shown.
• Villa v. Ibanez, 88 Phil. 402 (1951) — Cited in People v. Garfin regarding the jurisdictional nature of the defect.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires prior written authority or approval from the provincial/city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information; mandates that the investigating prosecutor certify under oath in the Information that he or an authorized officer has personally examined the complainant and found reasonable ground to believe the accused is probably guilty.
• Section 3(d), Rule 117, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Ground for motion to quash: that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) — Grants city prosecutors the power to investigate and cause informations to be prepared and filed, which may be delegated to subordinates.
• Section 10, Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) — The substantive law allegedly violated by the petitioner.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Jose Portugal Perez.