Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation

A search warrant is void where probable cause is not established by facts personally known to the complainant or witnesses, but rests on hearsay, conclusions, or mere suspicion; where the warrant does not identify one specific offense consistent with the evidence to be seized; and where the search and receipt of seized property violate the Rules of Court.

Eduardo Quintero was a delegate of the first district of Leyte to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; the respondents were the National Bureau of Investigation, Judge Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and City Fiscal Jose Flaminiano of Pasay City. The search warrant was issued under the 1935 Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which then governed the requisites for issuing and executing search warrants. The controversy unfolded against the 1971 Constitutional Convention and the "payola" disclosures made in that body.

On 19 May 1972, Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, delivered a privilege speech at a plenary session. He disclosed that, on different occasions, certain persons had distributed money to some delegates, apparently to influence them in the discharge of their functions. As an offshoot of the disclosure, Quintero delivered to the Convention the aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received, P11,150.00 in cash, preserved intact for delivery to the proper officials of the Convention. He did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money and begged not to be made to name names.

Pressure mounted on Quintero to reveal the identities of the people behind the "payola" scheme. On 30 May 1972, the day after he returned from Tacloban City where he had attended the funeral of his brother, Quintero released from his hospital bed at San Juan de Dios Hospital, where he was hospitalized due to an indisposed condition, a sworn statement addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Convention. The statement named the persons who gave him the "payola" and listed eighteen amounts, including references to the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, among others. Hours after Quintero's statement was made public, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos went on the air and on television to denounce Quintero, stating that he "shall not rest until I have unmasked this pretender, his master-minds and accomplices." The following day, 31 May 1972, Marcos made a statement reported in the 1 June 1972 issue of the Bulletin, saying that he had taken up the matter with his legal counsel and was preparing a "meticulous, circumspect and legal" case against Quintero.

In the evening of the same day that Marcos issued that statement, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation raided Quintero's house at 2281 Mayon Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, on the basis of Search Warrant No. 7 issued also on 31 May 1972 by Judge Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the raid, the NBI agents claimed to have found and seized bundles of money amounting to P379,000.00. On 1 June 1972, the NBI filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Quintero, and the fiscal immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation. On 5 June 1972, Quintero availed of the present recourse. On 6 June 1972, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the use in any proceeding of the objects seized from the Quintero residence.

The questioned search warrant was issued upon application of NBI agent Samuel Castro. The application was accompanied by an affidavit of Congressman Artemio Mate, allegedly made before Judge Asuncion. The interrogation of Castro showed that he knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to show that Quintero had committed any offense. Castro stated that the facts were gathered from his investigation of Congressman Mate, who declared that he had seen Quintero receive bribe money from two men as consideration for signing a statement submitted to the Committee on Privileges, and that he had reason to believe the bribe money was kept in Quintero's residence. Mate's sworn statement recounted that on the evening of 29 May 1972, while at San Juan de Dios Hospital to greet Quintero on his birthday, he saw two persons at Quintero's bedside, overheard one say that "half of the amount" promised would be delivered immediately if Quintero agreed to sign the statement he was holding, saw a suitcase containing bundles of money, and saw Quintero place a folder under his pillow while nodding as if saying "yes." Mate also recounted an antecedent conversation in Tacloban with Mrs. Quintero, who allegedly told him that if his group could match the P1,000,000.00 offered by Pio Pedrosa and the Liberals, Quintero would agree not to proceed with the expose. Mate stated that he believed the money was now in Quintero's residence because he heard Mrs. Quintero say she would bring the suitcase there.

The search warrant delivered to the occupant of the searched premises, Generoso Quintero, nephew of petitioner, was issued in connection with the offense of "grave threats" and not "direct bribery," which was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero with the respondent fiscal. The copy of the warrant remaining in the respondent judge's file had been changed to indicate direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code; the change was effected by deleting, in ink, the typewritten words "grave threats" and superimposing, in ink, the figures "210" over the typewritten figures "282." Respondents claimed that these changes were made at the time the warrant was issued and not after the search. Respondents admitted that the warrant was prepared beforehand by the NBI in an NBI form, pre-filled by the applicant before it was presented to the respondent judge, and that it stated only the name of the crime charged but did not contain any description of the acts constituting the crime charged. Respondent judge claimed that when the warrant was presented to him he saw that the crime charged was "grave threats," but after his interrogations he found that the proper charge should be "Direct Bribery," so he caused the changes, though he inadvertently failed to make the proper changes in the sole copy presented by the NBI agents to Generoso Quintero, while the copy retained by the NBI agents had been corrected. Petitioner claimed that the changes were made after the search. According to petitioner, his counsel, Atty. Ordonez, who was present during the latter part of the raid, questioned the materiality of the property being seized to the offense stated on the warrant, "grave threats," and the raiding party kept silent, thereby negating their later pretenses.

The two occupants of the house who witnessed the search, Generoso Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where a search was being made by a member of the raiding party, while the other NBI agents were left to themselves in other parts of the house, where no members of the household were in a position to watch them. The receipt issued by the seizing party showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz, a policeman from the Manila Metropolitan Police who accompanied the NBI agents during the search.

• Validity of Search Warrant: Petitioner sought to annul and declare as void and without legal effect Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge Elias Asuncion, as well as all acts and proceedings taken thereunder.
• Alteration of Warrant: Petitioner claimed that the changes in the questioned search warrant were made after the search was made; his counsel, Atty. Ordonez, who was present during the latter part of the raid, questioned the materiality of the property being seized to the offense stated on the warrant, "grave threats," and the raiding party kept silent, thereby negating their later pretenses that the copy in their possession had been corrected before the search.

• Alteration of Warrant: Respondent judge claimed that the changes were made at the time the warrant was issued and not after the search; he saw that the crime charged was "grave threats," but after conducting his interrogations he found that the proper charge should be "Direct Bribery," so he caused the changes, though he inadvertently failed to make the proper changes in the sole copy presented by the NBI agents to Generoso Quintero, while the copy retained by the NBI agents had been corrected.
• Pre-filled NBI Form: Respondents admitted that the warrant was prepared beforehand by the NBI in an NBI form, pre-filled by the applicant before it was presented to the respondent judge, and that it stated only the name of the crime charged but did not contain any description of the acts constituting the crime charged.

• Probable Cause: Whether Search Warrant No. 7 was issued upon probable cause based on facts personally known to the complainant and witnesses, rather than hearsay, conclusions, or mere suspicion.
• One Specific Offense and Warrant Alteration: Whether the warrant was valid where it was issued in connection with "grave threats" while the evidence ordered seized and the criminal complaint concerned "direct bribery," and where the warrant was pre-filled by the NBI and later altered.
• Manner of Search: Whether the search conducted by the NBI agents complied with the requirement that it be made in the presence of at least one competent witness resident of the neighborhood.
• Receipt of Seized Property: Whether the receipt for the seized property complied with Rule 126, Section 10, where the attesting witness was a member of the raiding party.

• Probable Cause: No. The warrant was void for lack of probable cause; Castro had no personal knowledge, and Mate's statement was hearsay, conclusions, and inferences, not facts personally known.
• One Specific Offense and Warrant Alteration: No. The warrant was issued for "grave threats" while the complaint and evidence concerned "direct bribery"; the pre-filled NBI form and alterations cast doubt on the judge's impartiality.
• Manner of Search: No. The search violated Rule 126, Section 7, because the available witnesses were closeted in one room while other agents searched unaccompanied.
• Receipt of Seized Property: No. The receipt did not comply with Rule 126, Section 10, because the attesting witness was a member of the raiding party.

• Probable Cause: Under Article III, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant may issue only upon probable cause, defined as such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Castro's statement had no weight because he lacked personal knowledge of any offense committed by petitioner. Mate's statement was replete with conclusions and inferences and suffered from material omissions: it was not shown that the document inside the folder was the very statement Quintero released to the Committee on Privileges; it was not shown that Quintero signed whatever was inside the folder; and it was not shown that the money supposedly given was payment for the signing of the statement. The only link was the alleged statement of Mrs. Quintero, which was hearsay as to petitioner and could not bind him. An application for a search warrant based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance. Affiants must set forth facts they know personally, not conclusions or beliefs. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief; the facts must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that perjury may be assigned if false. The respondent judge should have asked searching questions instead of leading questions and a general examination, and should have been alert to the delay in reporting the alleged 29 May 1972 incident and to possible ulterior motives, considering that Congressman Mate's wife was one of those implicated in Quintero's expose. No probable cause existed.

• One Specific Offense and Warrant Alteration: Section 3, Rule 126 requires probable cause in connection with one specific offense and prohibits a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The warrant delivered to Generoso Quintero was issued in connection with "grave threats," not "direct bribery," which was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero. The offense charged or labelled in the warrant had no relation at all to the evidence ordered to be seized, "half a million pesos, Philippine currency." The copy in the respondent judge's file had been changed in ink from "grave threats" to "210" over "282." Respondents claimed the changes were made at issuance, but they admitted the warrant was prepared beforehand by the NBI in an NBI form and pre-filled by the applicant before presentation to the judge. The Court considered the act of entertaining a pre-filled search warrant irregular and casting doubt upon the judge's impartiality. The respondent judge's explanation for the difference in copies could not be given weight, for no presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions can be invoked by a public officer when he himself undertakes to justify his acts. Petitioner's claim that the changes were made after the search was supported by the silence of the raiding party when petitioner's counsel questioned the materiality of the seizure to the offense stated in the warrant. The warrant was thus invalid.

• Manner of Search: Section 7, Rule 126 provides that no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the neighborhood. The two occupants who witnessed the search, Generoso Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where a search was being made by a member of the raiding party, while the other NBI agents were left to themselves in other parts of the house, where no members of the household were in a position to watch them. Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law.

• Receipt of Seized Property: Section 10, Rule 126 requires the officer seizing property under the warrant to give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found or, in the absence of any person, to leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property in the presence of at least one witness. The receipt issued by the seizing party showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz, a policeman from the Manila Metropolitan Police who accompanied the NBI agents during the search. The requirement that a witness should attest to the making of the receipt was not complied with; the requirement was rendered nugatory when the one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was himself a member of the raiding party.

• Probable Cause for Search Warrant — A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause, defined as such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It must be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses. An application based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance; affiants must set forth facts personally known, not conclusions or beliefs. Applied: Castro had no personal knowledge, and Mate's statement was hearsay and inference; no probable cause existed.
• One Specific Offense — Rule 126, Section 3 requires probable cause in connection with one specific offense and prohibits a search warrant for more than one specific offense. Applied: the warrant delivered to the occupant stated "grave threats," while the evidence ordered seized and the criminal complaint concerned "direct bribery"; no relation existed between the offense and the evidence.
• Execution of Search Warrant Before Competent Witness — Rule 126, Section 7 requires that no search of a house, room, or other premises be made except in the presence of at least one competent witness resident of the neighborhood. Applied: the available witnesses were closeted in one room while other NBI agents searched other parts of the house unaccompanied; violation of the spirit and letter of the law.
• Detailed Receipt of Seized Property — Rule 126, Section 10 requires the seizing officer to give a detailed receipt to the person on whom or in whose possession the property was found or, in the absence of any person, to leave a receipt in the place in the presence of at least one witness. Applied: the receipt was attested by Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz, a policeman who accompanied the raiding NBI agents, so the witness requirement was not complied with.
• No Presumption of Regularity When Officer Justifies Own Acts — A public officer cannot invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions when he himself undertakes to justify his acts. Applied: the respondent judge's explanation for the altered warrant was not given weight.
• Leading Questions and General Examination — As held in Nolasco vs. Pano, leading questions to the deponent and a general manner of examination do not satisfy the requirements for a valid search warrant; the questions must be sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Applied: the respondent judge asked leading and general questions and did not probe the delay or possible ulterior motive.
• Ulterior Motive in Application — An ulterior motive in an application for a search warrant should alert the judge to possible misrepresentations. Applied: Congressman Mate's wife was one of those implicated in Quintero's expose.

• "Under the aforequoted provisions, a search warrant may issue only upon the finding of the judge of “probable cause,” and the latter has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.”" — States the controlling definition of probable cause for search warrants and frames the standard against which the affidavits in this case were measured.
• "The respondent judge should have known this before he issued the questioned search warrant. As held by the Court, an application for search warrant, if based on hearsay, cannot, standing alone, justify the issuance of a search warrant." — States the ratio decidendi on hearsay: the warrant could not stand because its factual basis was not personally known to the affiants.
• "Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. The facts recited in an affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant must be stated with sufficient definiteness, so that, if they are false, perjury may be assigned on the affidavit." — Articulates the definiteness requirement for affidavits supporting search warrant applications.
• "Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law," — Defines the violation of the witness requirement during search execution and supports the finding of irregularity.

• Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, No. L-64161, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 813 — Cited for the rule that an application for a search warrant based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance, and that persons swearing to or supporting the application must set forth facts they know personally, not conclusions or beliefs.
• Roan vs. Gonzales, No. L-71410, November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 694 — Cited for the rule that an ulterior motive in an application for a search warrant should alert the judge to possible misrepresentations.
• Mata vs. Bayona, L-50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 391 — Cited for the rule that no presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions can be invoked by a public officer when he himself undertakes to justify his acts, and that affidavits alleging conclusions of law or fact are insufficient.
• Nolasco vs. Pano, L-69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 163 — Cited for the rule that leading questions to the deponent and a general manner of examination do not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.

• Article III, Section 1(3), 1935 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Applied: the warrant failed because probable cause was not established.
• Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Provides that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. Applied: the warrant was issued for "grave threats" while the evidence and complaint concerned "direct bribery," and probable cause was absent.
• Section 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Provides that no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the neighborhood. Applied: the witnesses were closeted in one room while other NBI agents searched other parts of the house unaccompanied.
• Section 10, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Requires the officer seizing property under the warrant to give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found or, in the absence of any person, to leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property in the presence of at least one witness. Applied: the receipt was attested by Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz, a member of the raiding party, so the requirement was not complied with.
• Article 210, Revised Penal Code — Defines Direct Bribery. Referenced as the offense indicated in the altered copy of the warrant and in the criminal complaint filed against Quintero. Applied: the warrant copy was changed to indicate Article 210 over the original Article 282.
• Article 282, Revised Penal Code — Defines Grave Threats. Referenced as the offense stated in the warrant delivered to the occupant of the searched premises. Applied: the offense stated in the served warrant had no relation to the evidence ordered seized or to the criminal complaint for direct bribery.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred. Yap, C.J., took no part.