Quiñon vs. Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan is a “regular court” within the meaning of Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975, and thus possesses jurisdiction over criminal cases against members of the Philippine National Police for office-related offenses. An information for malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code need not allege in haec verba that the accused was the “custodian” or “in charge of safekeeping” of the property; it suffices that the facts show the property was received by reason of office, which gives rise to an implied duty to account. An accused who repeatedly fails to appear at trial without justifiable cause after due notice waives the constitutional and statutory right to be present and to present evidence, and certiorari will not lie against interlocutory orders denying a motion to reopen absent special circumstances.

Pablo G. Quiñon served as Station Commander of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police (later the PNP) in Calinog, Iloilo, and subsequently as Station Commander in Janiuay, Iloilo. On two separate occasions — once on or about March 14, 1988, and again on or about January 7, 1993 — government firearms were issued to him by reason of his official position. When the firearms could no longer be accounted for, two criminal complaints for malversation of public property were brought against him. The Office of the Ombudsman, after preliminary investigation, filed two separate informations before the Sandiganbayan. The first case (Criminal Case No. 16279) was filed on November 5, 1990; the second (Criminal Case No. 19561) was filed on August 2, 1993. In the earlier case, Quiñon consistently failed to appear for trial, offering medical certificates as justification and prompting a series of postponements. In the later case, he challenged the proceedings through a motion to quash. Both cases ultimately reached the Supreme Court through petitions for certiorari and prohibition, which were subsequently consolidated.

• Criminal Case No. 16279: On November 5, 1990, an information was filed in the Sandiganbayan charging Quiñon, then Station Commander of Calinog, Iloilo PC/INP, with malversation of public property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The indictment alleged that on or about March 14, 1988, in his official capacity, he came into possession of two pistols with magazines and one shotgun valued at P15,000, and being accountable for such public property by reason of his office, he applied and converted the firearms to his personal use, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Quiñon pleaded not guilty. Trial was repeatedly postponed at his instance: first due to his counsel’s appointment as Municipal Judge; later due to new counsel’s lack of preparation and other commitments. On November 14, 1991, Quiñon did not appear despite personal service of subpoena and notice through his bondsmen; his counsel appeared but could not contact him. The Sandiganbayan ordered his arrest and bond forfeiture, but later reconsidered after a medical certificate of hypertension dated November 8, 1991 was submitted. Despite several resetting, Quiñon again failed to appear on January 23, 1992, citing hypertension; the court ordered a medical examination. Further postponements followed, including one on June 9, 1992 when counsel sought to withdraw because he had been elected municipal councilor and claimed the Local Government Code prohibited him from practicing law. That motion was denied pending Quiñon’s conformity. On November 5, 1992, Quiñon appeared without counsel, claiming his lawyer had typhoid fever, and the case was reset to February 23‑24, 1993.

• On February 23, 1993, Quiñon did not appear. He submitted an affidavit asserting “severe dizziness” and a medical certificate dated February 19, 1993. The Sandiganbayan treated this as a request for postponement, noted the prosecution’s objection, observed that witnesses had traveled from Iloilo at great expense, found the excuses “flimsy and obviously designed to delay trial,” considered Quiñon’s presence waived, and allowed the prosecution to present evidence ex parte. After the prosecution rested, the Sandiganbayan set the defense evidence for July 22‑23, 1993. On July 22, 1993, neither Quiñon nor his counsel appeared. After waiting until 11:00 a.m., the court declared the case submitted for decision, ruling that Quiñon’s failure to appear despite notice constituted a waiver of his right to present evidence, ordered his arrest, and directed forfeiture of his bond. On October 8, 1993, represented by a new counsel, Quiñon moved for reconsideration, arguing denial of due process because his former counsel had not been notified, his absence was justified by illness, and he could not contact counsel. The motion was denied on January 18, 1994.

• Criminal Case No. 19561: On or about February 20, 1993, another criminal complaint was lodged against Quiñon. After preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman, an information was filed on August 2, 1993, charging him with malversation of two revolvers and one shotgun valued at P16,000, issued to him on or about January 7, 1993 by reason of his office as Station Commander of Janiuay, Iloilo. The information averred that once in possession, he malversed, misappropriated and converted the firearms to his personal use, with abuse of trust and confidence, causing damage to the government. Quiñon moved to quash, raising three principal grounds: (1) the information did not charge an offense because it did not allege he was an accountable officer with custody or charge of safekeeping; (2) the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction because the complaint originated with the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, which supposedly acquired exclusive jurisdiction; and (3) under Rule 112, only the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor could file the information. A supplemental motion added the ground that under Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975, only “regular courts” — and not the Sandiganbayan as a “special court” — had jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan denied the motions to quash on March 7, 1994, holding that the information sufficiently alleged an offense, that it possessed jurisdiction over the office-related offense, and that “regular courts” in R.A. No. 6975 were distinguished from military courts, not from the Sandiganbayan.

• Jurisdiction under R.A. No. 6975: Petitioner contended that Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 confers exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members to “regular courts,” and because the Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is excluded from the law’s coverage.
• Authority to file information: Petitioner argued that the complaint in Criminal Case No. 16279 was originally filed with the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, which thereby acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Ombudsman; consequently, only the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor could file the information, not the Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan.
• Sufficiency of informations: Petitioner maintained that neither information charged an offense of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, because neither characterized him as a public officer who was the custodian of the firearms or otherwise in charge of their safekeeping; at most, the facts alleged a violation of Article 218.
• Denial of due process / grave abuse of discretion: Petitioner claimed the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen Criminal Case No. 16279 and present evidence, insisting that his absences were justified by hypertension and dizziness, that his counsel had not been notified of certain trial dates, and that he had been denied due process.

• Jurisdiction: Respondents invoked the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211, where the Court held that “regular courts” in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts within the judicial system, which include the Sandiganbayan, as opposed to courts-martial.
• Authority to file information: Respondents emphasized the broad powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under R.A. No. 6770, its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and its authority to take over investigations at any stage; the filing by the Special Prosecutor was thus proper regardless of where the complaint originated.
• Sufficiency of informations: Respondents countered that the first information explicitly alleged all elements of malversation, and the second information, although omitting the phrase “accountable for public properties,” still stated that the firearms were issued by reason of office, which necessarily created a duty to account; the additional averment of conversion completed the charge.
• No abuse of discretion: Respondents pointed out that Quiñon repeatedly abused the trial process by securing postponements and failing to appear without valid justification; his absences were deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and the Sandiganbayan acted well within its discretion.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the Philippine National Police under Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975, given the claim that it is a “special” and not a “regular” court.
• Authority to file information: Whether the Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan had authority to file the information in Criminal Case No. 16279, considering the complaint was initially filed in the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office.
• Sufficiency of informations: Whether the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 16279 and 19561 sufficiently charge the offense of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, even though neither explicitly describes the accused as the custodian or the person in charge of safekeeping of the firearms.
• Grave abuse of discretion / denial of due process: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Quiñon’s motion to reopen the trial and present evidence in Criminal Case No. 16279, in light of his claims of illness and lack of notice to counsel.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Jurisdiction was properly vested in the Sandiganbayan. Applying the controlling precedent of Republic v. Asuncion, the term “regular courts” in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 was interpreted to mean civil courts within the judicial department, as distinguished from courts-martial that belong to the executive branch. The Sandiganbayan is expressly listed among the lower courts in the Administrative Code of 1987 and forms part of the Philippine judicial system; thus, it is a regular court with competence over PNP members accused of office-related felonies. The Court declined to re-examine Asuncion, finding no substantial new arguments.
• Authority to file information: The Special Prosecutor was fully authorized. Under Sections 11 and 15 of the Ombudsman Act (R.A. No. 6770), the Office of the Special Prosecutor possesses the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute cases within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to take over investigations at any stage. Department Circular No. 50 and Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 8 further confirm that the Ombudsman’s office controls the prosecution of Sandiganbayan-cognizable cases. Consequently, the fact that the complaint may first have reached the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office did not divest the Ombudsman or its Special Prosecutor of authority.
• Sufficiency of informations: Both informations adequately charge the offense of malversation. The first information (Criminal Case No. 16279) recited all elements: Quiñon was a public officer, accountable for public property by reason of his office, received the firearms in his official capacity, and converted them to personal use. The second information (Criminal Case No. 19561) omitted only the phrase “accountable for public properties,” but expressly stated the firearms were issued to him by reason of his office as Station Commander. This issuance necessarily and inescapably imposed upon him the duty to safely keep, properly use, and return the property — that is, the duty to account. The additional allegation of malversation and conversion completed the description of the crime. The absence of the specific words “custodian” or “safekeeping” was immaterial.
• Grave abuse of discretion / denial of due process: No grave abuse of discretion was shown. The undisputed record established that Quiñon had repeatedly sought postponements and failed to appear without justifiable cause, despite personal service of subpoena and notice through his bondsmen. The Sandiganbayan reasonably concluded that his excuses — hypertension and dizziness — were flimsy and intended to delay the proceedings. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court allow trial to proceed in the accused’s absence after arraignment when his failure to appear is unjustifiable, and deem such absence a waiver of the right to be present. The denial of the motion to reopen was consistent with these provisions and supported by the record. Furthermore, the challenged orders were interlocutory; the proper remedy was not an immediate petition for certiorari, but to proceed with the case and appeal from an adverse final judgment, barring exceptional circumstances that were not demonstrated here.

• Definition of “regular courts” under Section 46, R.A. No. 6975 — “Regular courts” in the context of the law that transferred jurisdiction over PNP criminal cases from courts-martial to the judicial branch means civil courts within the Philippine judicial system, including the Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, and all other courts established by law. The phrase is used in contradistinction to “courts-martial,” which are instrumentalities of the executive department and not part of the judicial department. The Court relied on Republic v. Asuncion to reaffirm that the Sandiganbayan is a regular court.
• Implied accountability in malversation — An information for malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code need not contain the specific averment that the accused was the “custodian” or “in charge of safekeeping” of the public property. When the information alleges that the public officer received government property by reason of his office, an implicit duty to account for the property arises — i.e., to safely keep it, use it for intended purposes, and return it upon termination of tenure or upon demand. Coupled with an allegation of misappropriation or conversion, these facts sufficiently charge the felony.
• Waiver of the right to present evidence by unjustified absence — Under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, an accused who has been arraigned and duly notified of the trial date may be tried in absentia and deemed to have waived the right to be present and to present evidence if the failure to appear is unjustifiable. A pattern of repeated postponements and reliance on flimsy medical excuses justifies a finding that the absence is deliberate and warrants proceeding with the trial.
• Certiorari and prohibition against interlocutory orders — The special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper remedies to challenge interlocutory orders, such as an order denying a motion to quash or an order declaring a waiver of the right to present evidence. The aggrieved party must continue with the proceedings in the lower court and, after an unfavorable final judgment, may appeal in the ordinary course. Certiorari may be availed of only when there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal, which the petitioner must establish.

• “The terms civil courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Committee and then by the Senate and House of Representatives, . . (hence,) the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purposes of the law is to remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our judicial system, i. e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular courts.” — The controlling rationale equating “regular courts” with the entire civilian judiciary, thereby including the Sandiganbayan.
• “The delivery to Quiñon, by reason of the duties of his office as PNP Station Commander, of the firearms belonging to the Government, necessarily and inescapably entailed the implicit obligation on his part to safely keep the firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were obviously entrusted to him, and to return them to the proper authority at termination of his tenure as commander, or on the demand by the owner; the duty, in other words to account for said firearms.” — The explanation of how accountability is implied from the fact of issuance by reason of office, rendering the information sufficient even without explicit language of custodianship.
• “It is very clear that the accused had asked for innumerable postponements of trial simply for purpose of delay posing a challenge to and defiance of, the Court’s authority. The accused had simply taken the Court for granted.” — The Sandiganbayan’s factual finding, adopted by the Supreme Court, underscoring the pattern of abuse and the justification for deeming the right to present evidence waived.
• “The established rule is that when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.” — The Court’s restatement of the general rule on the impropriety of certiorari against interlocutory orders, cited from Nierras v. Dacuycuy and Acharon v. Purisima.

• Republic v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, et al., 231 SCRA 211 (1994) — The controlling precedent directly on point, holding that “regular courts” in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 encompasses the Sandiganbayan. The Court followed and reaffirmed this ruling and refused to re-examine it.
• Pulido v. Lazaro, 158 SCRA 107 (1988) — Cited for the principle that there is no denial of due process where the party had many opportunities and adequate hearing to argue his case, which supported the finding that Quiñon’s absences were not excusable.
• Nierras v. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 (1990) and Acharon v. Purisima, 13 SCRA 309 — Cited for the well-settled rule that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against interlocutory orders; the aggrieved party must await final judgment and appeal.

• Article 217, Revised Penal Code — Defines the felony of malversation of public funds or property. The elements are: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of his office; (c) the funds or property are public and he is accountable therefor; and (d) he appropriates, takes, misappropriates, or through abandonment or negligence permits another to take them. The Court held both informations sufficiently alleged these elements.
• Section 46, Republic Act No. 6975 (Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990) — Provides that criminal cases involving members of the PNP shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts. Construed in Asuncion and here to mean civil courts, including the Sandiganbayan, as opposed to courts-martial.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to be present at trial but expressly allows trial to proceed in his absence after arraignment, provided he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Applied to sustain the Sandiganbayan’s treatment of Quiñon’s absences as a waiver.
• Section 1(c), Rule 115, Rules of Court — Reiterates the constitutional rule that the accused may waive his presence at trial pursuant to stipulations in his bail bond unless his presence is specifically ordered; absence without justifiable cause upon due notice is considered a waiver of the right to be present. Applied to justify the order submitting the case for decision without defense evidence.
• Sections 11 and 15, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Section 11 empowers the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Section 15 recognizes the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and its power to take over investigations at any stage. These provisions were applied to uphold the Special Prosecutor’s authority to file the informations.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.