Quingwa vs. Puno

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, including sexual intercourse under a promise of marriage that is later refused to be fulfilled, as such conduct demonstrates the absence of the good moral character required for the practice of law. The statutory enumeration of grounds for disbarment is not exclusive, and the Court's inherent power over its officers cannot be restricted.

Flora Quingwa was a public school teacher who had been in a romantic relationship with Armando Puno, a member of the Philippine Bar. The parties were engaged to be married at the time of the incident complained of. The case arose under Section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court, which enumerated the grounds for disbarment or suspension, and the respondent raised as a special defense that the allegations against him did not fall under any of those enumerated grounds.

Flora Quingwa and Armando Puno became sweethearts in June 1955 until November 1955, when they broke off following a quarrel. They later reconciled and were sweethearts again in 1958. On June 1, 1958, Puno invited Quingwa to attend a movie, but on the way, he suggested they take refreshment first. He instead brought her to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila, where he proposed that they go to one of the rooms upstairs, assuring her that "anyway we are getting married." With reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by her love for the respondent and his promise of marriage, Quingwa acquiesced. Puno registered and signed the hotel registry book as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno." The hotel register showed that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at the hotel on June 1, 1958, at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Once inside the room, someone locked the door from outside, and Puno proceeded to undress himself. Quingwa begged him not to molest her, but Puno insisted, telling her "anyway I have promised to marry you" and "you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you." He pulled her to the bed, removed her panty, placed himself on top of her, and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed. Two sexual intercourses took place from 3:00 until 7:00 that same evening, after which they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together. After that sexual intimacy, Puno repeatedly proposed to have more, but Quingwa refused, saying they had better wait until they were married.

Feeling that she was already pregnant, Quingwa repeatedly implored Puno to comply with his promise of marriage, but he refused. Quingwa last saw Puno on July 5, 1958, when he left for Zamboanga City to practice law. In August 1958, she sent him a telegram telling him she was in trouble, and she wrote him letters in September and October of that year telling him she was pregnant and requesting him to come. Receiving no replies, she went to Zamboanga City in November 1958, where she met Puno and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her. Puno admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July 1958 and that he and Quingwa met there in November 1958. The fact that she sent him a telegram and letters was admitted in Puno's letter to Quingwa dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which he duly identified as his.

Quingwa gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital, as supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila and a certificate of admission issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital. Quingwa testified that she gave money to Puno whenever he asked, which was corroborated by witness Maria Jaca and shown in Puno's letter dated November 3, 1958. The fact that the parties reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 was established by the testimony of Fara Santos, Puno's letter to Quingwa dated November 3, 1958, and Puno's own testimony. The lengthy cross-examination to which Quingwa was subjected by Puno himself failed to discredit her testimony. Puno denied taking Quingwa to the Silver Moon Hotel and having sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date.

• Gross Immorality and Misconduct: The complainant charged that respondent's act of having carnal knowledge of her through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill constituted conduct showing he was devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity expected of members of the Philippine Bar.
• Promise of Marriage: The complainant alleged that she submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of his promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.

• Denial of the Acts: The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, specifically denying that he took the complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel, that he signed the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and that he had sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage.
• Special Defense — Grounds Not Enumerated: The respondent averred as a special defense that the allegations in the complaint do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under Section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
• Limited Relationship: The respondent averred that he and the complainant were sweethearts only up to November 1955, implying no continuing relationship in 1958.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the respondent had sexual intercourse with the complainant under a promise of marriage.
• Grounds for Disbarment: Whether the acts complained of constitute a ground for disbarment notwithstanding that they may not fall under the statutory enumeration in Section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The evidence established that respondent took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signed the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage, resulting in the birth of a child on February 20, 1959.
• Grounds for Disbarment: Yes. The statutory enumeration of grounds for disbarment is not a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer, and "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court reviewed the evidence produced before the Solicitor General, where the respondent had the opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses. The complainant was an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years, and her testimony was corroborated by the hotel register showing "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M. The birth certificate and hospital admission certificate supported her claim of giving birth on February 20, 1959. The respondent's own letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) admitted that complainant sent him a telegram and letters, and showed that he used to ask for money from her. The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit her testimony. The Court was convinced that the facts were as stated in the complaint. The complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of his promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion, citing Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966. The respondent denied the charges but did not present evidence to show where he was on June 1, 1958. Citing United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the Court noted that an accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself, and if he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him.

• Grounds for Disbarment: The Court held that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. The Court cited In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, which held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The Court noted that "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Under the circumstances, the Court was convinced that the respondent committed a grossly immoral act and disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Members of the legal profession must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality, as stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

• Good moral character as a continuing requirement for the practice of law — One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the respondent's grossly immoral conduct demonstrated that he no longer possessed the moral fitness required to continue practicing law.

• Non-exclusivity of statutory grounds for disbarment — The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. An attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.

• Burden of proof on the respondent lawyer in disbarment proceedings — When a lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the complainant and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. The respondent's failure to present evidence of his whereabouts on the date of the alleged incident weighed against him.

• "When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him." — This passage establishes the burden of proof on a respondent lawyer in disbarment proceedings, requiring more than mere denial when faced with evidence of misconduct.

• "The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine that the Court's disciplinary power over lawyers is not limited by the enumerated statutory grounds.

• "Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality." — This passage states the Court's conclusion that the respondent's conduct constituted gross immorality warranting disbarment and articulates the high standard of morality required of lawyers.

• Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963 — Cited for the rule that failure of the respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence.
• Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966 — Cited to support the finding that the complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of his promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or voluntariness and mutual passion.
• Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963 — Cited for the proposition that good moral character, being a condition precedent to admission to the Bar, is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.
• In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 — Cited for the rule that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
• United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 — Cited for the principle that an accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself, and if he fails to meet that obligation, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him.
• Balinon vs. de Leon, Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954 — Cited in support of the rule that the statutory enumeration of grounds for disbarment is not a limitation on the court's inherent power.
• Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956 — Cited in support of the rule that the statutory enumeration of grounds for disbarment is not a limitation on the court's inherent power.

• Section 25, Rule 127, former Rules of Court — The respondent invoked this provision as a special defense, arguing that the allegations in the complaint did not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under its enumeration. The Court held that this statutory enumeration is not a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer.
• Section 2, Rule 127, old Rules of Court (now Section 2, Rule 138) — This provision requires all applicants for admission to the Bar to produce satisfactory evidence of good moral character. The Court applied this to hold that this qualification is essential during the continuance of the practice of law.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — This provision lists "grossly immoral conduct" as one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. The Court noted this provision in concluding that the respondent's conduct fell within the grounds for disbarment.
• Section 6, Rule 139, Rules of Court — This provision allowed the Court to consider the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where the respondent had the opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses.
• Paragraph 29, Canons of Judicial Ethics — The Court quoted this provision, which states that the lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in moral character or education, and should strive to uphold the honor and maintain the dignity of the profession.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concurred.