Quijano vs. People

A conviction for frustrated murder requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the victim's wound would have been fatal without timely medical intervention; absent the testimony of the attending physician—or any physician—on the nature, extent, and gravity of the injury, the accused may only be convicted of attempted murder, the doubt as to the fatal character of the wound being resolved in favor of the accused.

Petitioner Beethoven Quijano and private complainant Atilano Andong were neighbors in Cebu City, their residences within walking distance of each other. Andong lived with his common-law wife Marilou Gamboa and their child. The two men allegedly had an altercation the day before the shooting incident. The case was prosecuted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation, and Article 6 of the same Code, which distinguishes among consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

At around 3:30 in the morning of June 21, 1997, Atilano Andong was sleeping at home with his common-law wife Marilou Gamboa and their child when Beethoven Quijano started banging on their door and shouting Andong's name. When Andong rose from the bed, he was surprised to see Quijano standing approximately 60 centimeters away, beaming a flashlight at him. Quijano then suddenly shot Andong on the right shoulder. Gamboa pleaded for Quijano to stop. Meanwhile, Andong's neighbors Chona Baguio and Rosemarie Barrellano heard a gunshot, went outside, and saw Quijano holding a handgun. Frightened, they rushed back inside and hid. Thereafter, they saw Andong blood-stained, with a wound on his right shoulder.

Andong was rushed to the Vicente Sotto Memorial Hospital, where he underwent an operation performed by Dr. Prudencio Manubag. He was confined for more than two weeks. During the trial, Dr. Arnold Richime submitted Andong's medical records and testified that Dr. Manubag was no longer connected with the hospital. The prosecution instead presented Dr. Roque Anthony Paradela as an expert witness, who testified that Andong's injury could have been fatal if not for timely medical intervention, including the application of a close tube or CPT. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Paradela's testimony on the fatal nature of the wound consisted of a single question and answer, with no elaboration on what a close tube or CPT is, how the procedure saved Andong's life, or Andong's condition prior to and during the operation.

Quijano denied the charge, claiming that on the evening prior to the incident he was at home drinking with co-workers, slept past 1:00 AM on June 21, 1997, and woke up at around 10:00 AM. The RTC rejected his defenses of denial and alibi, noting that his house was within walking distance of Andong's residence, making it not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene. Both the RTC and the CA found the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Quijano as the assailant credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction for frustrated murder, with the CA additionally admitting Dr. Paradela's testimony as expert opinion excepted from the hearsay rule.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were incredible and riddled with irreconcilable inconsistencies, particularly regarding whether he had companions and whether he uttered menacing words before shooting Andong, and that it was impossible for Baguio and Barrellano to have seen him shoot Andong given the location of their houses at the back of Andong's residence.
• Bias of Neighbors: Petitioner alleged that Baguio and Barrellano had an axe to grind against him because of an ongoing dispute with his family.
• Hearsay Expert Testimony: Petitioner averred that Dr. Paradela did not treat Andong, rendering his testimony hearsay evidence.
• Absence of Qualifying Circumstances: Petitioner contended that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation and treachery, arguing that his act of banging on the door and calling Andong's name forewarned the latter, and that a prior quarrel between them put Andong on guard.
• Alternative Liability: Petitioner alternatively pleaded that should he be found guilty, he could only be held liable for attempted homicide or frustrated homicide, given the prosecution's failure to establish treachery and evident premeditation.

• Dismissal for Mixed Questions of Fact and Law: Respondent, through the OSG, argued that the petition must be dismissed outright as it raised mixed questions of fact and law, with issues on witness credibility and circumstances surrounding the crime involving a review of evidence not proper under Rule 45.
• Admissibility of Expert Testimony: Respondent countered that Dr. Paradela was introduced as an expert witness whose testimony constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule, and that petitioner was barred from belatedly questioning this testimony because he had stipulated on the doctor's expertise and cross-examined him.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were so incredible or inconsistent as to warrant acquittal.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the attack notwithstanding petitioner's prior banging on the door, shouting of the victim's name, and alleged prior altercation with the victim.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the prosecution established evident premeditation.
• Stage of Felony — Fatal Nature of Wound: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the victim's wound would have been fatal without timely medical intervention, thereby warranting a conviction for frustrated murder rather than attempted murder.
• Admissibility and Probative Value of Expert Testimony: Whether Dr. Paradela's testimony was sufficient to establish the fatal nature of the victim's wound.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The purported inconsistencies pertained to collateral and trivial matters adequately clarified during trial, and the witnesses consistently testified on the occurrence of the crime and the identity of Quijano as the perpetrator.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was appreciated despite the alleged forewarning, the decisive factor being that the execution of the attack rendered the victim defenseless and unable to retaliate.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to prove when Quijano determined to commit the crime, and the alleged prior mauling was uncorroborated by any police blotter or barangay incident report.
• Stage of Felony — Fatal Nature of Wound: No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the wound would have been fatal without timely medical intervention, as the attending physician did not testify and the expert witness's opinion was too vague and conclusory.
• Admissibility and Probative Value of Expert Testimony: The testimony was admissible as expert opinion but insufficient in probative value. The stipulation on Dr. Paradela's qualification as an expert did not dispense with the prosecution's burden to prove each element of the crime, and the Court retained wide latitude to determine the weight of his opinion.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The assessment of witness credibility is best undertaken by the trial court, which has the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand. The trial court's assessment will not be disturbed on appeal unless facts or circumstances of weight were overlooked or misinterpreted. No such exception obtained here. The purported inconsistencies pertained to collateral and trivial matters that the witnesses adequately clarified during trial. They were subjected to grueling cross-examination, which they convincingly passed, and consistently testified on the occurrence of the crime and the identity of Quijano as the perpetrator. His defenses of denial and alibi falter against the witnesses' positive identification, especially since it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene, his house being within walking distance of Andong's residence.

• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms tending directly and specially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the victim's defense. The two requisites were satisfied: (i) Quijano's swift and unexpected attack at the dead of night, while Andong and his family were asleep, deprived Andong of any opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (ii) Quijano deliberately adopted this mode of attack, using a firearm and a flashlight from a position of relative safety. The Court clarified that treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was forewarned, so long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. The prior banging and shouting, and the alleged prior altercation, did not negate treachery because Andong was still caught off-guard and defenseless, the events unfolding in a rapid and successive sequence.

• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation requires proof of (i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (ii) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (iii) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. The prosecution failed to identify when Quijano decided to shoot Andong. Although Andong claimed Quijano mauled him a day prior, this was not sufficiently proven — it was unwitnessed, and Andong admitted during trial he could not produce a barangay incident report. Evident premeditation cannot be presumed in the absence of clear and positive evidence showing when and how the accused planned and prepared for the crime.

• Stage of Felony — Fatal Nature of Wound: The distinction between frustrated and attempted felony turns on whether the offender performed all acts of execution that would produce the felony. In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. The prosecution failed to present Dr. Manubag, the attending physician who treated Andong and administered the alleged life-saving procedure. The Medical Certificate alone, without Dr. Manubag's testimony, was inadequate proof of the nature and extent of the injury. Dr. Paradela's expert testimony was insufficient: his sole basis for concluding the wound was fatal was the general statement that "this kind of wound would kill the patient if no medical intervention like close tube or CPT is applied," without elaboration on what CPT is, how it saved Andong's life, or Andong's condition before and during the operation. Applying the standards in Serrano vs. People, there was a dearth of evidence regarding the extent of the injury, the form of the wound, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, and other crucial factors. The doubt created by this lack of evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused, warranting a conviction only for attempted murder.

• Admissibility and Probative Value of Expert Testimony: While Dr. Paradela's testimony was admissible as expert opinion, the stipulation on his qualification did not bind the Court to accord probative value to his testimony. Under Section 5, Rule 133 of the New Rules on Evidence, the Court has wide latitude in determining the weight of expert opinion, considering whether it is based on sufficient facts or data, whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and whether the witness reliably applied those principles to the facts. Dr. Paradela's statement was so curt and wanting in essential details that he failed to furnish sufficient facts and data relevant to the charge. The CA's reliance on the expert opinion did not bind the Supreme Court, especially in light of facts warranting a different conclusion.

• Treachery Despite Forewarning — Treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was forewarned of the attack. The decisive factor is that despite the warning, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. A prior warning does not negate treachery if it did not diminish the suddenness of the attack and the victim remained helpless. Applied here: Quijano's banging on the door and shouting Andong's name, and the alleged prior altercation, did not negate treachery because Andong was still caught off-guard and defenseless.

• Requisites of Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires: (i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (ii) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (iii) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution, to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act. Evident premeditation cannot be presumed absent clear and positive evidence showing when and how the accused planned and prepared for the crime. Applied here: the prosecution failed to identify when Quijano decided to shoot Andong, and the alleged prior mauling was uncorroborated.

• Fatal Nature of Wound as Element of Frustrated Murder — In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound inflicted would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. Without the testimony of the attending physician — or any physician — as to the fatal nature of the victim's wounds, the accused may not be convicted of frustrated homicide or murder. The Medical Certificate alone, absent the testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated the victim, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of the injury. Where nothing in the evidence shows the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt, which must be resolved in favor of the accused, warranting conviction only for attempted murder. Applied here: Dr. Manubag did not testify; Dr. Paradela's testimony was too vague and conclusory; conviction downgraded to attempted murder.

• Weight of Expert Opinion — Under Section 5, Rule 133 of the New Rules on Evidence, the Court has wide latitude in determining the weight to be given to expert opinion, considering: (a) whether the opinion is based upon sufficient facts or data; (b) whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods; (c) whether the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts; and (d) such other factors as the court may deem helpful. A stipulation on an expert's qualification does not dispense with the prosecution's burden to prove each element of the crime.

• "When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated, homicide." — This passage, quoted from Serrano vs. People, articulates the controlling doctrine on the distinction between frustrated and attempted homicide when the fatal nature of the wound is unproven, and is the ratio decidendi for downgrading Quijano's conviction.

• "In a long line of cases, the Court clarified that treachery shall still be appreciated even if the victim was forewarned of the attack. The decisive factor is that despite the warning, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." — This formulation defines the doctrine that treachery survives a prior warning when the attack's execution nonetheless renders the victim defenseless, directly refuting Quijano's argument that his banging and shouting negated treachery.

• "Evident premeditation cannot be presumed in the absence of evidence showing when and how the accused planned, and prepared for the crime, and that a sufficient amount of time had lapsed between his determination and execution." — This states the rule that evident premeditation requires positive evidence of planning and reflection, not mere inference or presumption, explaining why the qualifying circumstance was struck down.

• Serrano vs. People, 637 Phil. 319 (2010) — Controlling precedent on the requirement that the fatal nature of the wound must be proven to sustain a conviction for frustrated homicide or murder; the attending physician's testimony is indispensable, and absent such proof, the crime is only attempted. Followed and applied to downgrade the conviction.
• People vs. Labiaga, 714 Phil. 77 (2013) — Cited for the distinction between frustrated and attempted felonies: in frustrated felony, the offender performs all acts of execution; in attempted felony, the offender does not perform all acts of execution. Followed.
• People vs. Ortiz, Jr., 638 Phil. 521 (2010) — Cited for the proposition that treachery exists even if the victim was aware of the threat to his life, so long as the victim had no inkling he would actually be attacked and the attack rendered him defenseless. Followed.
• People vs. Abendan, 395 Phil. 619 (2000) — Cited for the rule that treachery exists even if the victim sensed his life was in danger, provided the warning did not diminish the suddenness of the attack. Followed.
• People vs. PFC Malejana, 515 Phil. 584 (2006) — Cited for the principle that a warning shot prior to the attack does not negate treachery when the swift unfolding of events placed the victim in a position where he could not effectively defend himself. Followed.
• People vs. Aquino, 348 Phil. 395 (1998) — Cited for the holding that knocking on the door before attacking the victim did not negate treachery where the assailant still suddenly fired successive shots. Followed.
• People vs. Lacaden, 620 Phil. 807 (2009) — Cited for the rule that without the testimony of the attending physician on the fatal nature of the victim's wounds, the accused may not be convicted of frustrated murder but only of attempted murder. Followed.
• Etino vs. People, 826 Phil. 32 (2018) — Cited for the rule that the medical certificate alone is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of the injury, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Followed.
• Gemenez vs. People, G.R. No. 241518, March 4, 2020 — Cited for the proposition that where the physician who treated the victim's fatal wounds did not testify, and the testifying physician's knowledge was limited to non-fatal injuries, the conviction must be modified to attempted homicide. Followed and closely analogous on facts.
• People vs. Rodolfo Grabador, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018 — Cited for the enumeration of the three requisites of evident premeditation. Followed.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Applied to distinguish frustrated from attempted murder: a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which would produce the felony but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator; there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals in an attempt to commit a felony. Applied to determine the penalty for attempted murder as prision mayor, two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua to death for consummated murder.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder, prescribing reclusion perpetua to death when committed with treachery or evident premeditation. Applied to identify the qualifying circumstances alleged and to determine the base penalty from which the penalty for attempted murder was derived.
• Section 5, Rule 133, New Rules on Evidence — Governs the weight to be given to the opinion of an expert witness, enumerating factors the court may consider: whether the opinion is based on sufficient facts or data, whether it is the product of reliable principles and methods, whether the witness reliably applied those principles to the facts, and such other factors as the court may deem helpful. Applied to hold that the Court retained wide latitude to discount Dr. Paradela's opinion despite the stipulation on his expertise.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires that the maximum of the sentence be that which could properly be imposed in view of attending circumstances, and the minimum be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC. Applied to fix Quijano's indeterminate penalty at six years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor medium as maximum.

Peralta, C. J., Caguioa, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred.