Qui vs. People of the Philippines

Bail pending appeal may be denied where the convicted accused is a flight risk under Section 5(d), Rule 114, and the presumption of innocence and the constitutional right to bail end upon conviction by the trial court.

Petitioner Cyril Calpito Qui was the accused in two criminal cases for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The respondent is the People of the Philippines. The controversy concerns the availability of bail pending appeal under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure after conviction by the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner Cyril Calpito Qui was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610. In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96544, the Information alleged that on or about December 1999 in Quezon City, petitioner willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously committed acts of cruelty and child abuse upon Christian John Ignacio, a minor eight years of age, by angrily shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at him and threatening to knock down his head, acts prejudicial to the child's psychological and emotional development and degrading his intrinsic worth and dignity. In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96545, the Information alleged that on or about March 15, 2000 in Quezon City, petitioner committed similar acts by angrily shouting invectives and threatening to shoot the same minor, likewise prejudicial to his psychological and emotional development and degrading his dignity. Both charges were contrary to law.

On June 18, 2010, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94 in Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged. It sentenced her in each case to an indeterminate penalty of five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional in its maximum period as minimum, to seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor in its minimum period as maximum, and to pay costs. On July 1, 2010, petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With the perfection of her appeal and the elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed before the appellate court an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application, urging denial on the ground of petitioner's propensity to evade the law and that she was a flight risk, as she failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the issuance of three warrants for her arrest.

The RTC issued warrants for petitioner's arrest on August 24, 2005, February 20, 2006, and March 8, 2010. The March 8, 2010 RTC Order also directed the forfeiture of her bail bond. Petitioner did not deny these facts. She also failed to attend the March 8, 2010 hearing and gave the excuse that her father, Cirilo Calpito, was hospitalized on that day and that Cirilo died on March 24, 2010. The Death Certificate of Cirilo Calpito showed that he died on March 24, 2009, or a year before the March 2010 RTC hearing, and a Certification issued by Dr. Aniana Javier stated that Cirilo went to her clinic on March 9, 2009.

The RTC notice sent to petitioner's bonding company was returned with the notation "moved out," while the notice sent to petitioner's given address was returned unclaimed with the notation "RTS no such person according to Hesita Family," who were the actual occupants of petitioner's given address. The fact of transferring residences without informing her bondsman and the trial court was viewed as petitioner's inclination to evade court appearance, as indicative of flight, and an attempt to place herself beyond the pale of the law.

• Absence of Bail-Negating Conditions: Petitioner argued that there was a manifest absence of all the conditions justifying a denial of bail under Section 5 of Rule 114.
• Bailable Offense and Weak Evidence: Petitioner maintained that her conviction was for a bailable offense and that the evidence of guilt against her was not strong.
• Presumption of Innocence and Non-Final Conviction: Petitioner argued that because her conviction by the RTC was under appeal and therefore not yet final, she should be accorded the constitutional guaranty of innocence until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, which entitled her to bail.

• Flight Risk and Propensity to Evade the Law: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application and urged denial on the ground that petitioner had a propensity to evade the law and was a flight risk, as shown by her failure to attend several hearings before the RTC, which resulted in the issuance of three warrants for her arrest.

• Bail Pending Appeal: Whether petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal after her conviction by the RTC for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where the CA found her a flight risk under Section 5(d), Rule 114.
• Presumption of Innocence: Whether the constitutional presumption of innocence and right to bail continue after conviction by the RTC while the appeal is pending.
• Evidence of Guilt: Whether the strength of the evidence of guilt against petitioner is a proper matter for resolution in her application for bail pending appeal.

• Bail Pending Appeal: No. The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying bail pending appeal because the undisputed circumstances showed petitioner was a flight risk under Section 5(d), Rule 114.
• Presumption of Innocence: No. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence and the constitutional right to bail end.
• Evidence of Guilt: No. The strength of the evidence of guilt is not before the Court in a bail pending appeal proceeding; the matter before the Court is not the appeal of her conviction.

• Bail Pending Appeal: Section 5, Rule 114 provides that upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, the accused shall be denied bail, or bail cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of circumstances such as probability of flight under paragraph (d). The Court applied the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy: bail-negating conditions mandate denial or revocation, and allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons because the accused has been convicted. The CA denied bail on the ground that petitioner was a flight risk. The factual record supported this: petitioner failed to attend hearings before the RTC, causing the issuance of warrants for her arrest on August 24, 2005, February 20, 2006, and March 8, 2010; the March 8, 2010 order also directed forfeiture of her bail bond. Petitioner did not deny these facts. She also gave a false excuse for her non-appearance on March 8, 2010, claiming her father was hospitalized that day and died on March 24, 2010, when the death certificate showed he died on March 24, 2009, and Dr. Aniana Javier certified that he visited her clinic on March 9, 2009. Notices sent to her bonding company and given address were returned with notations "moved out" and "RTS no such person according to Hesita Family," indicating she transferred residence without informing her bondsman and the trial court. These circumstances indicated propensity to evade court processes and flight risk. The CA thus neither erred nor gravely abused its discretion. People vs. Fitzgerald supports denial based on prosecution evidence of any circumstances under Section 5, paragraphs (a) to (e).
• Presumption of Innocence: Petitioner's argument that she retained the constitutional right to bail and presumption of innocence was spurious. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it the constitutional right to bail, ends. The fact that the conviction was on appeal did not preserve the presumption for purposes of bail pending appeal. The Court cited Leviste vs. Court of Appeals, Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, and Yap vs. Court of Appeals.
• Evidence of Guilt: The strength of the evidence of guilt against petitioner was not a proper matter for the Court in resolving the bail application. What was before the Court was not the appeal of her conviction, let alone the evaluation of the weight of the evidence adduced against her. Thus, her claim that the evidence of guilt was not strong did not entitle her to bail pending appeal.

• Bail pending appeal is discretionary after RTC conviction for a non-capital offense — Under Section 5, Rule 114, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. If the penalty imposed exceeds six years, the accused shall be denied bail or bail cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution of any of the circumstances in paragraphs (a) to (e), including probability of flight. The Court applied this rule to petitioner, who was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding six years, and upheld the CA's denial of bail.
• "Tough on bail pending appeal" policy — The presence of bail-negating conditions mandates denial or revocation of bail pending appeal; those circumstances are deemed as grave as conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. The allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has already been convicted by the trial court. The Court relied on this policy in affirming the denial.
• Flight risk as a bail-negating circumstance — Under Section 5(d), Rule 114, the probability of flight if released on bail is a ground to deny or cancel bail pending appeal. The Court found this circumstance present from petitioner's failure to attend hearings, the issuance of three arrest warrants, the forfeiture of her bail bond, her false excuse for non-appearance, and her transfer of residence without informing her bondsman and the trial court.
• Termination of the presumption of innocence upon conviction — After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence and the constitutional right to bail end. The pendency of an appeal does not restore the presumption for purposes of bail pending appeal. The Court used this doctrine to reject petitioner's constitutional argument.
• Limited scope of bail pending appeal proceedings — The strength of the evidence of guilt is not reviewed in an application for bail pending appeal; the proceeding is not the appeal of the conviction. The Court thus declined to evaluate petitioner's claim that the evidence against her was weak.

• "Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited." — This passage states the Court's controlling policy on bail pending appeal and explains why bail-negating circumstances justify denial even for a bailable offense.
• "In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court." — This passage defines the standard governing the discretionary grant of bail pending appeal and was central to the Court's affirmance of the CA's denial.
• "Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends." — This passage rejects petitioner's constitutional argument that her pending appeal preserved her presumption of innocence and right to bail.
• "As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the. circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e) x x x." — Quoted from People vs. Fitzgerald, this passage supports the rule that bail may be denied upon proof of any bail-negating circumstance under Section 5, Rule 114.

• Leviste vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 648 — Cited for the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy and for the rule that after conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence and the constitutional right to bail end.
• Yap vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564, 573 — Cited for the principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been convicted by the trial court.
• Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 281 — Cited in Leviste for the same principle on the termination of the presumption of innocence and right to bail after conviction.
• People vs. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 573, 583 — Cited for the rule that an accused already convicted and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding six years may be denied or have bail revoked based on prosecution evidence of any of the circumstances under Section 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), Rule 114.

• Section 10(a), Article VI, Republic Act No. 7610 — The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act penalizes other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation, or other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, with prision mayor in its minimum period. Petitioner was charged with and convicted of two counts of violating this provision for acts against an eight-year-old minor.
• Section 5, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs bail when discretionary. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. If the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six years, the accused shall be denied bail or bail cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution of circumstances including probability of flight under paragraph (d). The Court applied this provision to deny petitioner's bail pending appeal.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno; Associate Justices Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.