Purcon, Jr. vs. MRM Philippines, Inc.

A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals; it may be filed only in the Municipal/Metropolitan or Regional Trial Court that rendered the judgment or final order. Relief will not be granted to a party whose loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or to a mistaken mode of procedure, and counsel's negligence warrants relief only where it amounts to a clear abandonment of the client's cause.

Petitioner Julio B. Purcon, Jr. was a seafarer engaged by respondent MRM Philippines, Inc., a manning agency, for service on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2, with respondent Miguel L. Rivera/Maritime Resources Management as the foreign principal. His claims for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance, and permanent disability benefits, with damages and attorney's fees, were lodged before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, the forum vested with original jurisdiction over money claims arising from the seafarer's employment. The case reached the Supreme Court through a petition for relief from judgment directed at the Court's own resolution denying a petition for review, raising the threshold question of whether such a remedy is procedurally available in the Supreme Court.

On January 28, 2002, respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired petitioner Julio B. Purcon, Jr. as a seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2 under a contract for three months at a monthly salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved day-to-day activity requiring the exertion of strenuous effort, and he often worked overtime due to the pressure of his work. His contract was extended for another three months.

In the second week of June 2002, petitioner felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia, and on June 26, 2002 he was repatriated on account of his ailment.

Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner was examined by Dr. Alegre, the company physician, who prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr. Alegre declared him fit to resume work. When petitioner reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be rehired for another contract, he was told that there was no vacancy for him. On September 17, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, an internist-cardiologist of the Philippine Heart Center, and on March 3, 2004, after a thorough medical examination and evaluation, he was diagnosed with EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFECTION WITH IMPEDIMENT GRADE XIV.

Respondents countered that petitioner's ailment, hernia, is not work-related, so that he is not entitled to disability benefit and related claims; that he was in fact declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the company-designated physician; that his ailment is not to be considered a permanent disability since it is easily correctable by simple surgery; and that, more importantly, petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release which was notarized.

Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance, and permanent disability benefits, with prayer for compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was fit to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002, his hernia being already cured or non-existent, and that he was in fact ready to resume work but was not accommodated due to lack of vacancy; the fact that he was not rehired by respondent did not mean that he was suffering from disability.

• Gross Mistake of the Labor Arbiter: Petitioner asserted that the Labor Arbiter committed a gross mistake in basing his decision on the fit-to-work certification issued by the company-designated physician and on the Quitclaim and Release executed by petitioner.
• Reliance on Irrelevant Jurisprudence: Petitioner argued that the Labor Arbiter further committed a gross mistake in adopting the irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the respondents in his decision.
• Affirmance of the Erroneous Decision: Petitioner maintained that the NLRC Third Division likewise committed a gross mistake when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the Labor Arbiter.
• Absence of Substantial Evidence: Petitioner contended that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were not based on substantial evidence and that their decisions were contrary to the applicable law and jurisprudence.
• Gross Mistake of Collaborating Counsel: Petitioner claimed that his collaborating counsel committed a gross mistake in filing defective pleadings to his prejudice, and pleaded for the Court's leniency on account of the negligence and inefficiency of his counsel, which resulted in the late filing of the petition for review and in the filing of defective pleadings before the Court.

• Non-Work-Related Ailment: Respondents countered that petitioner's ailment, hernia, is not work-related, and that he is therefore not entitled to disability benefit and related claims.
• Fit-to-Work Certification: Respondents argued that petitioner was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the company-designated physician.
• Absence of Permanent Disability: Respondents maintained that petitioner's ailment is not to be considered a permanent disability as it is easily correctable by simple surgery.
• Quitclaim and Release: Respondents emphasized that petitioner signed a Quitclaim and Release which was notarized.

• Availability of Rule 38 Relief in the Supreme Court: Whether petitioner may avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from the Supreme Court's resolution denying his petition for review.
• Excusable Negligence: Whether the late filing of the petition for review and the filing of defective pleadings by petitioner's counsel constituted excusable negligence warranting relief from judgment.

• Availability of Rule 38 Relief in the Supreme Court: No. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court, being outside the enumeration of original cases cognizable by the Court under Section 1 of Rule 56; Rule 38 relief lies only with the Municipal/Metropolitan or Regional Trial Court that rendered the judgment.
• Excusable Negligence: No. The late filing of the petition for review and the filing of defective pleadings did not amount to excusable negligence, a claim of counsel's gross negligence requiring nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause; relief is denied where the loss of the remedy at law was due to the party's own negligence or mistaken mode of procedure.

• Availability of Rule 38 Relief in the Supreme Court: Although Section 1 of Rule 38 provides that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, the rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court — only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court. A petition for relief from judgment is not included in that list. In Dela Cruz vs. Andres, the Court reiterated its pronouncement in Mesina vs. Meer that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, because under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, must be accompanied by affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, and, most importantly, must be filed with the same court which rendered the decision. Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts; as revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule, under which a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court had to be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition, a procedural change in line with Rule 5 prescribing a uniform procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial Courts and with the designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record. Third, the procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court, which may from time to time be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars; neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals. The procedure in the Court of Appeals under Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before that court — annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions under Rule 47, motion for reconsideration under Rule 52, and new trial under Rule 53 — and nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned. If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the Court of Appeals, with more reason that the remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court, which entertains only questions of law; a petition for relief raises questions of fact on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of the Court.

• Excusable Negligence: Even if the Court were to delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence, and petitioner's lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure, for otherwise the petition for relief would be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, the Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right, but this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioner squandered the various opportunities available to him at the different stages of the case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation, and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice. It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.

• Petition for Relief from Judgment as an Equitable and Exceptional Remedy — A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy, and may be availed of only after a judgment, final order, or other proceeding was taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The Court applied this character of the remedy in dismissing the petition, noting that petitioner had already been afforded several opportunities at the different stages of the case and that the judgment sought to be set aside had long attained finality.
• Rule 38 Relief Is Unavailable in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court — Although Section 1 of Rule 38 speaks of a judgment entered against a party "in any court," the phrase refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts; the petition must be filed in the same court which rendered the decision. This is because Section 1 of Rule 56 enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, and a petition for relief from judgment is not among them; neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides for the remedy in the Court of Appeals. The Court applied the doctrine in holding that the petition, directed at its own resolution denying a petition for review, was procedurally impermissible.
• Requisites and Limitations of Rule 38 Relief — Under the 1997 Rules, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside; must be accompanied by affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense; and must be filed with the same court which rendered the decision. The Court cited these requisites in explaining why the remedy is confined to the trial courts that rendered the judgment.
• Gross Negligence of Counsel as Excusable Negligence — For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown. The Court held that the late filing of the petition for review and the filing of defective pleadings did not meet this standard, so that petitioner remained bound by his counsel's conduct.
• Finality of Judgments and the Bar Against Reviving a Lost Appeal — Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of a judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or to a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief would be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost. Public interest demands an end to every litigation, and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality serves no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.

• "A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court." — This is the Court's direct answer to the threshold issue and the ratio decidendi of the resolution, disposing of the petition on procedural grounds before any consideration of the merits.
• "Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase 'any court,' it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts." — This passage supplies the canonical construction of the phrase "any court" in Section 1 of Rule 38, reconciling the rule with Rule 56 and confining the remedy to the trial courts that rendered the judgment.
• "For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown." — This states the standard for excusable negligence based on counsel's fault, which the Court applied in rejecting petitioner's plea for leniency arising from the late filing and defective pleadings.
• "If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court." — This a fortiori formulation completes the Court's reasoning on the unavailability of Rule 38 relief in the appellate courts, grounding it in the separate procedural regimes governing the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

• Dela Cruz vs. Andres, G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 585 — Controlling precedent reiterated by the Court for the pronouncement that a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and that the petition must be filed with the same court which rendered the decision.
• Mesina vs. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 625 — Earlier ruling, reiterated in Dela Cruz vs. Andres, to the same effect on the unavailability of Rule 38 relief in the appellate courts.
• Espinosa vs. Yatco, G.R. No. L-16435, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 78 — Cited for the settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of a judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or to a mistaken mode of procedure.

• Section 1, Rule 38, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, the party may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order, or proceeding be set aside. The Court construed the phrase "any court" as referring only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts, and the requirement that the petition be filed in the same court which rendered the decision as barring its invocation before the Supreme Court.
• Section 1, Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court: petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. Because a petition for relief from judgment is not included in this enumeration, the Court held that it cannot be filed originally with the Supreme Court.
• Section 2, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Fixes the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner's failure to observe this period was one of the grounds for the denial of his petition for review and the basis for the Court's finding that the late filing did not amount to excusable negligence.
• Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(c), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires the timely payment of docket and other fees and the deposit for costs. Petitioner's failure to comply was among the grounds for the denial of his petition for review.
• Section 4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs verification of pleadings. The insufficient or defective verification of petitioner's petition for review was one of the grounds for its denial.
• Section 1, Rule 5, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Prescribes uniform procedure for the Municipal Trial Courts and the Regional Trial Courts. The Court cited this provision as the rationale for the revision of Rule 38, which now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court that decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief.
• Republic Act No. 7691 (1994) — Cited, together with Regalado's Remedial Law Compendium, in support of the designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record, which underlies the procedural change in Rule 38.
• Rules 44 to 55, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Govern procedure in the Court of Appeals and identify the remedies available there — annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53) — none of which includes a petition for relief under Rule 38. The Court relied on this enumeration to hold that Rule 38 relief is unavailable in the Court of Appeals.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. No separate concurring opinions are reflected in the text.