Punzalan vs. Dela Peña

The Secretary of Justice does not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he directs the withdrawal of criminal informations based on his assessment that the evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause, provided such assessment is supported by the records. The Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the filing of an information against an offender.

The Punzalan and Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. The case arose from a series of counter-charges filed by both families following a violent altercation on August 13, 1997. The Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of prosecutors under the Revised Administrative Code, which includes the authority to approve, revise, or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials. The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor, who is vested with discretion in determining whether to prosecute.

The Punzalan and Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?" Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako." Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted, "Yariin na 'yan!" Thereafter, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.

While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas' family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara, and Plata ran towards the latter's house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas' house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo d'yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!" Dela Peña, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.

As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara, and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief, and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21). In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.

Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho." In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory statements.

On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, holding that Cagara failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not actionable. The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because complainant Dela Peña's claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier against the latter.

Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution by ordering, among others: (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats. The Secretary directed the City Prosecutor to file information for three counts of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two counts of other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit; and information for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and John Does.

Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier, and Randall Punzalan, together with their co-respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to prove that Rainier, Randall, and his companions intended to kill him. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 11, 2000.

On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin. On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment granting the petition and setting aside the questioned Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 insofar as they directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents, while affirming the resolution insofar as it directed the withdrawal of information for two counts of other light threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Court of Appeals: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave and serious reversible error in setting aside the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000, which directed the withdrawal of the informations against them.
• Insufficient Evidence for Slight Oral Defamation: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that there is sufficient evidence to show that, more likely than not, slight oral defamation had been committed by petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan, given that the investigating prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice both found the evidence insufficient.
• Lack of Intent to Kill: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the allegations of respondents and their witnesses are sufficient to prove intent to kill such that petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan must be prosecuted for attempted homicide.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Probable Cause: Respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong should be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin, contending that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause for these charges.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against Randall and Rainier Punzalan.
• Probable Cause for Slight Oral Defamation: Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation.
• Probable Cause for Attempted Homicide: Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. The Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender.
• Probable Cause for Slight Oral Defamation: No. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed, and the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor. The City Prosecutor, as the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable cause.
• Probable Cause for Attempted Homicide: No. The Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge, and the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. Dela Peña failed to prove that Rainier, Randall, and his companions intended to kill him.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court cited Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished lack of jurisdiction from excess of jurisdiction: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction. Citing Meat Packing Corp. vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.
• Probable Cause for Slight Oral Defamation: The Court noted that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals stated the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed, and the Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.
• Probable Cause for Attempted Homicide: The Court noted that the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997, making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of respondent Dencio Dela Peña should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of petitioner Rainier Punzalan. The Court cited Samson, et al. vs. Guingona for the rule that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.

• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. The Court applied this standard in determining whether the Secretary of Justice's dismissal of the charges constituted reversible error, finding that the Secretary's actions were supported by the records and within his authority.
• Prosecutorial discretion in determining probable cause — The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
• Non-interference in preliminary investigations — The Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender. The findings of the prosecutor are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.

• "A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner." — This passage from Hegerty v. Court of Appeals, quoted by the Court, articulates the principle that prosecutors have discretion not to prosecute when evidence is insufficient, and it supports the Court's conclusion that the Secretary of Justice acted within his authority.
• "We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor." — This statement establishes the constitutional separation of powers principle underlying the Court's refusal to interfere with prosecutorial determinations absent grave abuse of discretion.
• "It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender." — This passage states the controlling doctrine of judicial non-interference in preliminary investigations, which formed the basis for reversing the Court of Appeals decision.

• Meat Packing Corp. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103068, June 22, 2001, 359 SCRA 409 — Cited as controlling authority defining the standard of grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
• People vs. Peralta, G.R. No. 121234, August 8, 2002, 387 SCRA 45 — Cited for the rule that the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what, and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors best appreciated by prosecutors.
• Hegerty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154920, April 15, 2003 — Cited for the principle that a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented.
• Samson, et al. vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 123504, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 32 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, leaving to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence for probable cause.
• People vs. Chavez, 411 Phil. 482 (2001) — Cited for the distinction between certiorari and appeal, holding that where the error is in the judge's findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact, appeal is the remedy.
• Aurillo, Jr. vs. Rabi, G.R. No. 120014, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 595 — Cited for the proposition that under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of prosecutors.
• Joaquin, Jr. and BJ Productions vs. Drilon, et al., 361 Phil. 900 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the findings of the prosecutor are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.

• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this provision in determining whether the Court of Appeals properly took cognizance of respondents' petition for certiorari against the Secretary of Justice's resolutions.
• Revised Administrative Code — Under this code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of prosecutors. "Supervision and control" includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise, or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units. The Court relied on this provision to affirm the Secretary of Justice's authority to direct the withdrawal of the informations.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.