Punsalan vs. Mendoza

A provincial governor appointed Cabinet member and then chosen to sit in the Batasang Pambansa does not forfeit the governorship under Section 10, Article VIII, because that prohibition applies only to elective Batasan members and not to Cabinet members assigned to the Batasan ex officio; nor does an unaccepted resignation effective at the President’s pleasure, coupled with approved leave, amount to abandonment.

Punsalan and Mendoza were the KBL candidates elected Governor and Vice-Governor of Pampanga in the 1980 local elections. The case tests the constitutional rules governing an elective provincial governor who is appointed to the Cabinet and chosen to sit in the Batasang Pambansa, specifically Section 10, Article VIII; Section 4(1), Article XII-B; and Section 7, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution as amended.

In the 1980 local elections, the respondent and the petitioner were the official KBL bets for Governor and Vice-Governor of Pampanga and easily defeated the other aspirants, with Mendoza receiving 192,769 votes and Punsalan 186,919 votes. They took their oaths of office in due time and thereafter discharged the duties and responsibilities of Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively. In the 1984 national elections for provincial, city, and district representatives to the Batasan, three opposition candidates received the electorate’s blessings and the only KBL survivor placed fourth.

Apparently jolted by the results, Mendoza, who was KBL campaign manager, tendered on May 17, 1984 his resignation from the Governorship and his Cabinet post, effective at the President’s pleasure. On June 30, 1984, or about six weeks later, the President appointed him Minister of Justice and, on July 14, 1984, concurrently Member of the Batasang Pambansa. On July 13, 1984, Mendoza again tendered his resignation as Governor of Pampanga, effective at the pleasure of the President. On July 16, 1984, he sent a letter to the Minister of Local Government, Hon. Jose A. Roño, requesting that he be considered on leave of absence while the matter was pending consideration by the President; on July 20, 1984, he received the Minister’s reply approving his request.

On July 21, 1984, according to Mendoza, he advised Punsalan to assume temporarily the performance of the duties and functions of the Governor. Punsalan thereupon took his oath of office on July 23, 1984 before the Provincial Attorney as “Gobernador ng Pampanga” (not Acting Governor), relying on an alleged press release in the July 23, 1984 issue of Bulletin Today that the inhibition against Batasan Members from holding two elective positions is a constitutional provision that cannot be compromised but allows the holding of two positions if the Batasan Member is appointed Prime Minister or Member of the Batasan. Punsalan discharged all the powers and functions of Governor until the end of the year.

The controversy erupted on January 8, 1985, when Punsalan was informed by his wife at about 2:00 p.m., in Angeles City where he was guest speaker at the induction ceremonies of a rural bankers’ federation, that Mendoza unexpectedly appeared and occupied the governor’s office. Earlier, while inspecting an area razed by fire in Sexmoan, Pampanga, Punsalan learned by radio that soldiers had gathered at the Provincial Capitol grounds. He immediately denounced the takeover as a forcible entry coup d’etat style without prior notice to him. Mendoza avers in his comment that he reassumed the position of Governor peacefully and without the use of force or pressure and was welcomed by the employees, adding that it was an implementation of the KBL caucus recommendation approved by the President.

On January 7, 1985, soon after receipt of notice of the approval, Mendoza wrote Minister Roño to apprise him of his intention to reassume the governorship and to request that the Ministry’s Regional Director and Punsalan be advised accordingly. On the same day, the Minister wrote three letters to notify them and the intervenor that Mendoza would reassume the governorship on January 8. According to Punsalan, the letter addressed to him was received by his office on January 8, 1985 at 1:35 p.m. Mendoza resigned from his Batasan membership on January 8, 1985, and the President accepted the resignation two days later. Punsalan then filed the present petition for quo warranto and prohibition seeking Mendoza’s ouster from the governorship.

• Resignation and Implied Acceptance: Petitioner argued that Mendoza permanently vacated the Governor’s office as a result of his resignation and its implied acceptance by the President.
• Abandonment: Petitioner argued that Mendoza abandoned the office when he failed to discharge its duties and responsibilities from July 23, 1984 up to January 7, 1985.
• Usurpation and Right of Succession: Petitioner maintained that Mendoza’s reassumption was an unlawful usurpation of powers and functions already being exercised by Punsalan as Governor by right of succession.
• Incompatibility and Forfeiture: Petitioner argued that Mendoza forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted appointment as Minister of Justice and as an appointive Batasan Member because of the incompatibility of those positions with the Governor’s office under Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution.
• Broad Application of Section 10: Petitioner insisted that if a Cabinet member is appointed to the Batasan and becomes a member thereof, Section 10, Article VIII applies to him.

• Resignation Not Accepted: Respondent submitted that his resignation effective at the pleasure of the President was not accepted expressly or impliedly by the President and was implicitly rejected.
• No Abandonment; Approved Leave: Respondent argued that the alleged abandonment was predicated on the erroneous assumption that he left the Governor’s post without any leave of absence; he was granted such leave pending consideration of his resignation.
• No Absolute Relinquishment: Respondent maintained that he did not clearly intend to absolutely relinquish the governorship during his absence and that he asked petitioner merely to exercise temporarily the Governor’s duties and functions.
• Eligibility for Cabinet and Batasan: Respondent argued that as Governor he was eligible for appointment as Cabinet Member under Section 4(1), Article XII-B, and that as such Cabinet Member he could subsequently be chosen to serve in the Batasan under Section 2, Article VIII.
• Section 10 Inapplicable to Cabinet Members: Respondent argued that the provision cited by petitioner applies to an elective Batasan Member, not to a Cabinet Member whose membership in the Batasan is temporary in nature; the disqualifications of a Cabinet Member are those specifically mentioned in Section 7, Article IX, as amended, which no longer includes by reference Section 10, Article VIII.

• Resignation and Abandonment: Whether Mendoza permanently vacated the governorship by his resignation effective at the President’s pleasure and by his alleged abandonment of the office.
• Incompatibility under Section 10, Article VIII: Whether Section 10, Article VIII barred Mendoza, as a Cabinet member chosen to sit in the Batasan, from retaining or reassuming the governorship.

• Resignation and Abandonment: No. Mendoza’s resignation effective at the President’s pleasure was not accepted, and his approved leave of absence negated abandonment; the President later shelved the resignation and approved the KBL caucus recommendation for him to reassume.
• Incompatibility under Section 10, Article VIII: No. Section 10, Article VIII applies only to elective provincial, city, or district representatives, not to Cabinet members chosen to sit in the Batasan ex officio.

• Resignation and Abandonment: The SC held that neither implied acceptance nor abandonment had factual support. A resignation effective at the pleasure of the President is not meant to be effective immediately; acceptance is still necessary. Abandonment by the incumbent before acceptance of his resignation is punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Here, action on Mendoza’s resignation was held in abeyance; the President apparently needed more time to consider the validity of Mendoza’s view that, as Governor, he could be appointed Cabinet Minister and later assigned to the Batasan without forfeiting the governorship. When the President finally acted, he shelved the resignation and approved the KBL caucus recommendation for Mendoza to reassume. Abandonment could not be inferred. Punsalan claimed Mendoza failed to discharge the Governor’s duties for more than five months without any leave of absence, but the Local Government Minister had approved Mendoza’s request to be considered on leave while his resignation was pending. Punsalan’s claim that the approval was highly suspicious and dubious was neither proof nor a sufficient showing that it was spurious; good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty are presumed absent clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
• Incompatibility under Section 10, Article VIII: The SC held that Section 10, Article VIII’s prohibition may not be construed broadly. As Governor, an elective official, Mendoza was eligible for Cabinet appointment under Section 4(1), Article XII-B, which excepts appointment as Member of the Cabinet from the ban on appointing elective officials during their tenure. The Constitution divided Batasan membership into three categories: elective provincial, city, or district representatives; sectoral representatives elected or selected as provided by law; and those chosen from Members of the Cabinet. The prohibition in Section 10 does not extend to the third group. The second prohibition in Section 10 refers to the same “member” and speaks of “the term for which he was elected,” showing that both prohibitions deal with a member who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the electorate, with a fixed six-year term. The history of Section 10 confirmed this: the two prohibitions were intended by the framers of the 1973 Constitution to apply only to members of the National Assembly, an all-elective parliamentary body; Section 8 (now 7) of Article IX originally made Cabinet members subject to Sections 10 and 11 of Article VIII, but the 1981 amendment deleted the reference to Section 10 and added “such other disqualifications as may be provided by law.” Even earlier, a 1976 amendment provided that the Cabinet shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe, so Section 10 was not meant to apply ex proprio vigore to Cabinet Members assigned to the interim Batasan. The SC also noted the differences between Cabinet representatives and regular Batasan Members: elective representatives are voted for a fixed six-year term; the Speaker is elected from among elected representatives; a majority of Cabinet Members who are heads of Ministries must come from elective representatives; elective representatives do not vacate their Batasan seats upon resignation from Cabinet posts; and they are subject to certain prohibitions on appearing as counsel. Cabinet members with Batasan assignments, by contrast, do not serve for a fixed term but at the pleasure of the President, represent the Cabinet rather than a province, cannot qualify for the Speakership, belong to the minority of Cabinet Members who are heads of Ministries, ipso facto vacate their Batasan seats upon resignation or separation from their Cabinet posts, and cannot appear as counsel, manage business, or practice a profession, and are subject to such other disqualifications as may be prescribed by law. Reciprocal representation in the executive and legislative branches is a feature of the modified presidential or semi-parliamentary system. For purposes of the disqualification clause, a Cabinet Minister given a legislative assignment remains primarily a Cabinet Member who serves in the Batasan in an ex officio capacity or as a mere incident of Cabinet membership. The SC found it inadequate to rely on the broad connotation of “member” in the first prohibition; Mendoza, unlike elected representatives, sat in the Batasan not by electoral mandate but by reason of Cabinet membership, and one of a Cabinet Member’s duties is to serve in the Batasan if directed by the President. The SC traced the controversy to Punsalan’s oath as “Gobernador ng Pampanga” without waiting for formal acceptance of Mendoza’s resignation; Punsalan misread a press release that merely attributed to the President the statement that a Governor or City Mayor elected to the Batasan cannot hold two elective positions, which was the situation in Pacana vs. Adaza, not Mendoza’s.

• Resignation effective at the pleasure of the President — Such a resignation is not effective immediately; acceptance is still necessary. The SC applied this to hold that Mendoza’s resignation was not impliedly accepted and that he did not vacate the governorship before the President acted.
• Abandonment of office before acceptance of resignation — Abandonment by the incumbent before acceptance of his resignation is punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The SC held that no abandonment could be inferred where Mendoza was on approved leave and the President held his resignation in abeyance.
• Section 10, Article VIII does not apply to Cabinet members chosen to the Batasan — The prohibition on a Batasan member holding any other office except Prime Minister, Cabinet Member, or Deputy Minister applies only to elective provincial, city, or district representatives, not to Cabinet members assigned to the Batasan ex officio. The SC distinguished the latter from regular Batasan Members and held that a Cabinet Minister given a legislative assignment remains primarily a Cabinet Member serving in the Batasan as an incident of Cabinet membership.
• Constitutional provisions should be coordinated and harmonized — The SC construed Section 10, Article VIII with Section 4(1), Article XII-B and Section 7, Article IX so as to give effect to all of them and reconcile apparent conflicts.
• Presumption of regularity in official duty — Good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty are presumed absent clear and convincing proof to the contrary. The SC applied this against Punsalan’s claim that the approval of Mendoza’s leave was suspicious and dubious.

• "There was a tender of resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President." Obviously, it was not meant to be effective immediately; acceptance was still necessary." — The SC used this to reject implied acceptance and abandonment, since Mendoza’s resignation remained pending until the President acted.
• "It is our opinion that the prohibition in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet." — This is the core holding that Section 10, Article VIII does not cover Cabinet members chosen to sit in the Batasan.
• "Nonetheless, for purposes of the disqualification clause, Cabinet Minister given such legislative assignment remains primarily a Cabinet Member who serves in the Batasan in an ex officio capacity or as a mere incident of his membership in the Cabinet." — The SC explained why a Cabinet member’s Batasan seat does not make him an elective Batasan member subject to the prohibition.
• "The root cause of this controversy may be traced to the oath taking of the petitioner as "Gobernador ng Pampanga" (not Acting Governor) on July 23, 1984, without waiting for the formal acceptance of the respondent's resignation." — The SC identified Punsalan’s mistaken assumption that Mendoza had already vacated the governorship.

• Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1 — Cited by the SC for the rule that a resignation effective at the pleasure of the President is not effective immediately and acceptance is still necessary.
• Pacana vs. Adaza, 135 SCRA 431 — Distinguished; it involved a Governor who was elected Mambabatas Pambansa and qualified as such while wanting to retain his elective governorship, unlike Mendoza, who was not an elected Batasan member.

• Section 4(1), Article XII-B, 1973 Constitution (as amended) — No elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his tenure except as Member of the Cabinet. The SC applied this to hold that Mendoza, as Governor, was eligible for appointment as Minister of Justice.
• Section 10, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution — A Batasan member shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the Cabinet, or Deputy Minister; neither shall he, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office created or with emoluments increased while he was a member. The SC held that this prohibition applies only to elective Batasan members and not to Cabinet members chosen to sit in the Batasan.
• Section 7, Article IX, 1973 Constitution (as amended) — The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet are subject to Section 11, Article VIII and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body or participate in the management of any business or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualifications as may be provided by law. The SC used the deletion of the reference to Section 10, Article VIII to hold that the Section 10 prohibition does not extend to Cabinet members.
• Section 2, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution — The SC referred to the constitutional division of Batasan membership into elective provincial, city, or district representatives; sectoral representatives; and those chosen from Members of the Cabinet. The SC applied this to conclude that the Section 10 prohibition covers only the elective group.
• Article 238, Revised Penal Code — Abandonment by the incumbent of his office before acceptance of his resignation is punishable. The SC cited this to support its holding that abandonment cannot be inferred before acceptance of a resignation.

• Aquino, J. (Concurring) — Concurred on the ground that Mendoza did not cease to be Governor because his resignation was not accepted, and that his appointment to the Batasan did not disqualify him from continuing as Governor because Section 10, Article VIII applies only to elected Batasan members, not to appointive Members.

• Teehankee, J. (Dissenting) — Dissented on the ground that Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr. was controlling precedent holding that the Constitution creates an incompatibility between Batasan membership and the provincial governorship, so Mendoza’s assumption of the Batasan seat vacated the governorship. He argued that Section 10, Article VIII is clear and unambiguous; the President himself announced that Mendoza had to resign as governor to assume his Cabinet and Batasan positions; the distinctions between elected and appointed Batasan members are irrelevant because the Constitution makes no such distinction; acceptance of a second incompatible office vacates the first, and resignation from the second does not restore the first; and Mendoza’s physical reoccupancy without prior notice and legal process violated due process. He voted to grant the petition and declare Punsalan lawfully succeeded as Governor.
• Melencio-Herrera, J. (Dissenting) — Dissented on the ground that the insertion of the “Cabinet Clause” in Section 4(1), Article XII-B was never approved by the people. She argued that Resolution No. 110 proposed the amendment but BP Blg. 643 did not include it, and it was not in the plebiscite ballot or the COMELEC certificate of canvass; Question No. 2 did not mention the substitution of the EXECOM Clause by the Cabinet Clause. She concluded that Section 4(1) should revert to the original wording barring elective officials from appointment to any office during their term, so an elected provincial governor cannot be appointed to a Ministry. She voted to grant the petition and hold that Mendoza technically abandoned the governorship and cannot replace Punsalan.