Pundaodaya vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

To successfully effect a change of domicile for election purposes, a candidate must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or actual change of domicile; (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues. Moreover, establishing residence solely to meet election law requirements defeats the purpose of representation and is not allowed.

The case arose from the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections where residency qualifications for local officials were challenged. The dispute centered on whether a candidate who maintained business interests and property in one city while being a registered voter in another municipality had validly changed his domicile to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code.

• Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification (SPA No. 07-202) with COMELEC Second Division on April 3, 2007 against Noble's Certificate of Candidacy filed March 27, 2007
• COMELEC Second Division issued Resolution dated May 13, 2007 disqualifying Noble for lack of residency
• Noble filed Motion for Reconsideration and was proclaimed winner on May 15, 2007 despite pending MR
• Petitioner filed Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation
• COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution dated August 3, 2007 granting the MR and reversing the Second Division, declaring Noble qualified
• Petitioner filed instant petition for certiorari with the SC

• Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2007 elections
• Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 27, 2007 claiming 15 years residency in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental
• Pundaodaya alleged Noble actually resides in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City where he maintains OBERT Construction Supply, and never had physical presence in Kinoguitan
• Noble claimed he married Bernadith Go (daughter of Kinoguitan Mayor Narciso Go) on January 18, 1992, has been engaged in electoral activities since, and voted in Kinoguitan in 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections
• Noble presented voter registration records, marriage certificate, affidavits from Kinoguitan residents, water bill receipts since June 2003, and a Deed of Sale dated June 3, 1996
• Evidence showed Noble's domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City
• Counter-evidence included: Certification from Barangay Lapasan Kagawad stating Noble is a resident; Affidavit from Barangay Esperanza Kagawad stating Noble never resided there; photos and receipts showing residence/business in Lapasan; tax declarations of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City; Household Record of Mayor Narciso Go not including Noble or his wife

• COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Noble qualified to run despite clear evidence he lacks the required one-year residency
• COMELEC En Banc erred in failing to annul Noble's proclamation despite his disqualification
• COMELEC En Banc erred in refusing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the true winning candidate

• Noble claimed he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan
• He married a resident of Kinoguitan in 1992 and has participated in electoral activities since
• He voted in the municipality in the past three elections (1998, 2001, 2004)
• He owns property in Kinoguitan and pays water bills there
• (Note: Noble failed to file comment with SC despite orders, deemed to have waived filing)

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in declaring Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position despite lacking the required residency
  • Whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in failing to order the annulment of Noble's proclamation and refusing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the winning candidate

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • On Qualification: The COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in declaring Noble qualified. The SC found that Noble failed to prove he effectively changed his domicile from Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City to Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Voter registration and voting are merely presumptive, not conclusive, evidence of residence. The evidence showed Noble maintained his residence, business, and properties in Cagayan de Oro City, and his alleged change of domicile was effected solely for electoral purposes.
  • On Succession: The petition is granted regarding disqualification, but there is no basis to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya. Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, a permanent vacancy caused by disqualification is filled by the Vice-Mayor succeeding to the office, not by proclaiming the runner-up.

• Residence as Domicile — Under Section 39 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code), "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" or legal residence, defined as "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." (Japzon v. COMELEC)
• Three Requisites for Change of Domicile — To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of all three, the domicile of origin continues. (Domino v. COMELEC)
• Voting as Presumptive Evidence — While voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. Registration as a voter in one place is not proof that a person is not domiciled in another. (Domino v. COMELEC; Perez v. COMELEC)
• Residency for Electoral Purposes — Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. Such contrived residency is not allowed. (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC)
• Succession Upon Disqualification — When a winning candidate is disqualified, a permanent vacancy is created in the office. Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, the Vice-Mayor succeeds to the office of Mayor, not the candidate who received the second highest number of votes. (Limbona v. COMELEC)

• "To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode."
• "From the foregoing, we find that Noble's alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow."
• "Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community."

• Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009 — Established that "residence" in election law means "domicile" or legal residence, not mere dwelling or habitation
• Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798 (1999) — Defined the three requisites for change of domicile and held that voting is merely presumptive, not conclusive, evidence of residence
• Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999) — Held that voter registration in one district is not proof that a person is not domiciled in another; registration alone does not establish abandonment of domicile of origin
• Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000 — Explained that the one-year residency requirement aims to exclude outsiders from taking advantage of favorable circumstances for electoral gain; residency established merely to meet election requirements is invalid
• Limbona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008 — Applied Section 44 of the Local Government Code regarding succession by the Vice-Mayor when a permanent vacancy occurs due to disqualification

• Section 39, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Requires elective local officials to be residents of the area where they intend to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the election; defines residency requirements for local positions
• Section 44, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides that a permanent vacancy in the office of the mayor is filled by the vice-mayor succeeding thereto; defines permanent vacancy as including failure to qualify