Puguon, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines

A search warrant that authorizes the seizure of items falling under two separate special penal laws—one a new law that expressly repealed provisions of an earlier decree, the other a mere amendment of that same decree—violates the "one specific offense" requirement, but the defect is severable: the warrant remains valid as to items covered by the law properly cited in the warrant, while the portion covering items under the other law is void and all evidence seized pursuant thereto is inadmissible.

Petitioner Jimmy B. Puguon, Jr. was the subject of a search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, authorizing the seizure of firearms, ammunition, and hand grenades from his residence. The legal framework at issue involves two special penal laws: Republic Act No. 10591, the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, enacted in 2013 as an entirely new law that expressly repealed Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1866; and Republic Act No. 9516, enacted in 2008, which merely amended certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 concerning explosives and incendiary devices. The dispute centers on whether these two statutes, despite their distinct legislative lineages, can be treated as belonging to the same class of offenses such that a single search warrant may validly cover items penalized under both.

On July 2, 2019, Presiding Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, issued Search Warrant No. 0015-2019 against Jimmy B. Puguon, Jr. The warrant was applied for by Police Major Michael DG Bautista, Provincial Officer of the CIDG in Quirino Province, and was issued after examination under oath of the applicant and three deponents—Patrolman Aldrin Joy D. Pantigan, Jerry Dominguez y Valdez, and Jun Marquez y Felix. The warrant's body stated that probable cause existed to believe that Puguon had violated Republic Act No. 10951 (erroneously citing the number for Republic Act No. 10591, the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act) and authorized the seizure of one M16 rifle, one cal. .45 pistol, one cal. .38 revolver, two hand grenades, and ammunition for the described firearms from his house in Barangay Rizal, Diffun, Quirino.

Upon execution of the search warrant, two separate Informations were filed against Puguon, giving rise to Criminal Case No. 3901-2019 for violation of Republic Act No. 10591 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition) and Criminal Case No. 3902-2019 for violation of Republic Act No. 9516 (illegal possession of explosives). On August 8, 2019, Puguon filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion to Quash Search Warrant, to Suppress Evidence and to Dismiss Criminal Informations, contending that the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures because it covered two separate and distinct offenses penalized under different special laws. Puguon argued that all evidence retrieved was inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree and prayed for dismissal of both criminal cases with prejudice.

Prosecutor Joselito G. Fajardo opposed the motion, invoking the ruling in People vs. Pastrana, which in turn cited Prudente vs. Dayrit, arguing that illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of explosives are related offenses belonging to the same species, both originating from Presidential Decree No. 1866, and thus could be covered by a single search warrant. The RTC denied Puguon's motion on September 6, 2019, reasoning that since the offenses belonged to the same class, they could be the subject of one warrant. Puguon's Joint Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC on November 21, 2019.

Puguon elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that Republic Act No. 10591 expressly repealed Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 through its Section 45 repealing clause, making the offenses under it separate and distinct from those under Republic Act No. 9516. The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the warrant was not a scatter-shot warrant, reiterating that both laws originated from Presidential Decree No. 1866 and involved related offenses. The CA denied the petition on June 30, 2021, relying on Prudente and holding that the two laws merely changed penalties without changing the nature of the offenses, and that the crimes shared the same elements. Puguon thereafter filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Scatter-Shot Warrant: Puguon argued that Search Warrant No. 0015-2019 was a scatter-shot warrant that violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures because it covered two separate and distinct offenses penalized under different special laws—Republic Act No. 10591 for firearms and ammunition, and Republic Act No. 9516 for explosives.
• Express Repeal of PD 1866: Puguon maintained that Republic Act No. 10591 is a new and special law, as evidenced by its Section 45 repealing clause expressly repealing Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, making the offenses under it separate and distinct from those under Republic Act No. 9516.
• Inapplicability of Prudente: Puguon contended that Prudente vs. Dayrit was inapplicable because that case involved violations of different provisions of the same statute (Presidential Decree No. 1866), whereas his case involved two separate special laws.
• Inadmissibility of Evidence: Puguon argued that all evidence collected pursuant to the void search warrant was inadmissible in court as the proverbial fruits of the poisonous tree, warranting dismissal of both criminal cases.

• Common Statutory Origin: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that Search Warrant No. 0015-2019 was not a scatter-shot warrant because Republic Act No. 10591 and Republic Act No. 9516 both originate from Presidential Decree No. 1866 and involve related offenses belonging to the same species—crimes involving illegal possession of items destructive of life and property.
• Applicability of Prudente: The OSG invoked Prudente vs. Dayrit, arguing that while illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of explosives are penalized under different provisions, they are related offenses subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, and explosives under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
• Same Nature of Offenses: The OSG maintained that the two laws merely changed the penalties for the crimes they cover without changing the nature of the offenses, and that the crimes of unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition and unlawful possession of explosives have the same elements.

• Validity of Search Warrant: Whether Search Warrant No. 0015-2019, which authorized the seizure of items covered by two separate special penal laws (Republic Act No. 10591 and Republic Act No. 9516), violated Puguon's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures as a scatter-shot warrant.
• Common Statutory Origin: Whether Republic Act No. 10591 and Republic Act No. 9516 can be considered as originating from the same law (Presidential Decree No. 1866) such that a single search warrant may validly cover offenses under both.
• Applicability of Prudente: Whether the ruling in Prudente vs. Dayrit, which allowed one search warrant to cover violations of different provisions of the same statute, applies to this case involving two separate special laws.
• Severability: Whether the defect in the search warrant, if any, warrants total invalidation or only partial invalidation.

• Validity of Search Warrant: Yes, in part. The warrant was defective as a scatter-shot warrant because it covered items falling under two separate special penal laws, but the defect was severable, and the warrant remained valid as to the firearms and ammunition.
• Common Statutory Origin: No. Republic Act No. 10591 is an entirely new law that expressly repealed provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, while Republic Act No. 9516 merely amended the same decree; the two statutes do not share a common statutory origin that would permit a single warrant to cover both.
• Applicability of Prudente: No. Prudente involved violations of different provisions of the same statute, whereas this case involves two separate special laws with distinct legislative lineages.
• Severability: Yes. The invalid portion of the warrant (authorizing seizure of hand grenades) is severable from the valid portion (authorizing seizure of firearms and ammunition), pursuant to the doctrine of partial invalidation established in People vs. Salanguit and PLDT vs. Alvarez.

• Validity of Search Warrant: The "one specific offense" requirement under Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules of Court mandates that a search warrant shall issue only upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. This requirement is intended to prevent scatter-shot warrants, which are completely null and void. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority for a fishing expedition to seize any and all kinds of evidence. Here, while the warrant's body stated it was issued for violation of Republic Act No. 10591, the enumeration of items to be seized—including hand grenades—squarely fell within the purview of two separate special penal laws. The firearms and ammunition are covered by Republic Act No. 10591, while the hand grenades fall under Republic Act No. 9516. The warrant thus violated the "one specific offense" guideline.

• Common Statutory Origin: The Court rejected the OSG's theory that both laws originate from Presidential Decree No. 1866. Republic Act No. 9516 clearly amends Presidential Decree No. 1866, as shown by its title and its three sections, which amend Sections 3 and 4 and insert new sections into the decree. In contrast, Republic Act No. 10591 does not expressly amend any provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866; its only reference to the decree is in its repealing clause, which expressly repealed Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7. A side-by-side comparison of the repealed provisions and the corresponding provisions in Republic Act No. 10591 showed similar phraseology but no legislative intent to treat the latter as a mere continuation of the former. The sponsorship speech of former Senator Honasan highlighted the objective of enacting "a new comprehensive law" regulating firearms, making no mention of Presidential Decree No. 1866. Congress could have provided that Republic Act No. 10591 is an amendment or supplement of the decree, but it did not. Republic Act No. 10591 is an entirely new law that must be read on its own.

• Applicability of Prudente: In Prudente, the accused was charged with violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the same statute, Presidential Decree No. 1866, and the Court ruled that one search warrant suffices to cover violations of different provisions of the same statute. In the present case, the items sought to be seized are covered by two separate special laws with distinct legislative lineages. While Republic Act No. 9516 is a mere amendment of Presidential Decree No. 1866, Republic Act No. 10591 is a completely new law that supersedes the decree. Prudente is therefore not on all fours with the case at bar.

• Severability: Applying the doctrine of severability recognized in People vs. Salanguit and PLDT vs. Alvarez, the Court held that it would be a drastic remedy to invalidate a warrant in toto simply because the judge erred in authorizing a search for items not supported by the evidence. The invalid portions of a warrant are severable from the valid authorization. The defect in Search Warrant No. 0015-2019 pertained only to the particulars of the items to be seized—the inclusion of hand grenades. This defect was remedied by partial, not total, invalidation. The warrant remained valid as to the firearms and ammunition, and Criminal Case No. 3901-2019 stood. However, Criminal Case No. 3902-2019, prosecuting the alleged violation of Republic Act No. 9516, was ordered dismissed, and all evidence collected in relation thereto was deemed inadmissible pursuant to the constitutional principle that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

• One Specific Offense Rule — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense, as mandated by Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. This requirement is intended to prevent scatter-shot warrants, which are warrants that cover multiple offenses and are completely null and void. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize any and all kinds of evidence relating to a crime.

• Scatter-Shot Warrant — A search warrant that violates the "one specific offense" guideline is a scatter-shot warrant and is completely null and void. A warrant covering items falling under two separate special penal laws—one a new law that expressly repealed provisions of an earlier decree, the other a mere amendment of that same decree—constitutes a scatter-shot warrant because the offenses are penalized under distinct statutes with different legislative lineages.

• Severability of Search Warrants — The invalid portions of a search warrant are severable from the valid authorization relating to items properly described and supported by probable cause. It would be a drastic remedy to invalidate a warrant in toto merely because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence. Partial invalidation is the appropriate remedy, as established in People vs. Salanguit and PLDT vs. Alvarez, citing Aday vs. Superior Court. However, the Court recognized the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but meet the requirement of particularity as to minor items, and cautioned that such abuse of the warrant procedure could not be tolerated.

• Distinction Between New Laws and Amendments — A statute that expressly repeals provisions of an earlier decree through a repealing clause, without amending any of its provisions, and whose legislative sponsors describe it as "a new comprehensive law," is an entirely new law that must be read on its own—not as a continuation of or amendment to the earlier decree. This contrasts with a statute whose title and body expressly state that it amends specific provisions of the earlier decree, which is properly considered as originating from that decree.

• "A search warrant that violates the 'one specific offense' guideline is a scatter-shot warrant and is completely null and void." — This passage states the controlling rule on scatter-shot warrants, defining the consequence of violating the "one specific offense" requirement under Rule 126, Section 4.

• "It would be an egregious error to declare that Republic Act No. 10591 originates from Presidential Decree No. 1866. Congress could very well have provided that the former is an amendment or supplement of the latter, but it did not. It was never its legislative intent to do so. Republic Act No. 10591 is an entirely new law which must be read on its own." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for distinguishing Republic Act No. 10591 from Republic Act No. 9516, establishing that express repeal without amendment indicates a new law, not a continuation of the prior statute.

• "It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Salanguit, defines the doctrine of severability as applied to search warrants, justifying partial rather than total invalidation.

• Prudente vs. Dayrit, 259 Phil. 541 (1989) — Distinguished. The Court ruled in Prudente that one search warrant suffices to cover violations of different provisions of the same statute (Presidential Decree No. 1866). The present case was distinguished because it involves two separate special laws with distinct legislative lineages, not different provisions of the same statute.

• People vs. Pastrana, 826 Phil. 427 (2018) — Distinguished. Pastrana cited Prudente in support of the proposition that illegal possession of firearms and explosives are related offenses under Presidential Decree No. 1866. The Court found this inapplicable because Republic Act No. 10591 is a new law that superseded the decree.

• People vs. Salanguit, 408 Phil. 817 (2001) — Followed. The Court applied the doctrine of severability recognized in Salanguit, which held that the invalid portions of a search warrant are severable from the valid authorization, citing Aday vs. Superior Court.

• Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Alvarez, 728 Phil. 391 (2014) — Followed. The Court relied on PLDT vs. Alvarez for the proposition that a search warrant may be upheld in part while invalidating items listed therein that fall outside the scope of the offense contemplated by the warrant.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision enshrining the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Applied as the constitutional basis for scrutinizing the validity of Search Warrant No. 0015-2019.

• Section 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense, to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The "one specific offense" requirement was the central provision applied in determining that the warrant was defective for covering offenses under two separate special laws.

• Section 45, Republic Act No. 10591 — The repealing clause of Republic Act No. 10591, expressly repealing Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8294, and all other laws inconsistent therewith. Applied to demonstrate that Republic Act No. 10591 is an entirely new law, not an amendment of Presidential Decree No. 1866, thereby distinguishing it from Republic Act No. 9516.

• Republic Act No. 9516 — Entitled "An Act Further Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended," its title and body (Sections 1, 2, and 3 amending Sections 3 and 4 and inserting new sections into Presidential Decree No. 1866) demonstrate that it originates from and merely amends the decree. Applied to contrast with Republic Act No. 10591 and establish that the two laws do not share a common statutory origin permitting a single search warrant.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred.