Prudential Bank and Trust Company vs. Clarita T. Reyes

A party that actively participates in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals, and raises lack of jurisdiction only after an adverse ruling, is estopped from challenging the labor tribunal's jurisdiction. Loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for dismissal only if substantial, not arbitrary, and founded on clearly established facts; an employer's bare reliance on a witness's assertion does not satisfy this standard. An employee illegally dismissed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989 is entitled to full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits from the time compensation was withheld up to finality, and to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement where reinstatement is no longer feasible.

Prudential Bank and Trust Company employed Clarita T. Reyes from July 14, 1963; she rose from accounting clerk to Assistant Vice President in the foreign department by 1982. Her duties included collecting checks drawn against overseas banks and ensuring collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including signing transmittal letters. The statutory backdrop included Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which vested the Securities and Exchange Commission (now the Regional Trial Court) with original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies, and Republic Act No. 6715, effective March 21, 1989, which governs backwages for illegally dismissed employees.

Clarita Tan Reyes was employed by Prudential Bank and Trust Company on July 14, 1963 as an Accounting Clerk. She rose to supervisor and in 1982 was appointed Assistant Vice President in the foreign department, a position she held until July 19, 1991. Her duties included collecting checks drawn against overseas banks payable in foreign currency and ensuring the collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including the signing of transmittal letters covering the same.

On April 6, 1989, the Bank received two checks: No. 011728-7232-146 in the amount of US$109,650.00 and No. 011730-7232-146 in the amount of US$115,000.00, drawn by Sanford Trading against Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Jurong Branch, Singapore, in favor of Filipinas Tyrom. On the same day, Reyes authorized the crediting of Filipinas Tyrom's account in the amount of P4,780,102.70 corresponding to the face value of the checks. The following day, Cecilia Joven, a remittance clerk then assigned in the Foreign Department, prepared transmittal letters to send the two checks for collection and asked Reyes to sign them, as it was Reyes who gave instructions directly concerning the transmittal of foreign bills purchased and all other transmittal letters were signed by Reyes. After Joven delivered the transmittal letters and checks to the Accounting Section, Reyes instructed her to withdraw them for the purpose of changing the addressee from American Express Bank to Bank of Hawaii under a special collection scheme. Joven complied and returned to Reyes for the latter to sign the new transmittal letters, but Reyes told Joven to hold on to the letters and checks and await further instructions; the new transmittal letters remained unsigned.

In June 1989, Joven was transferred to another department, and her duties, responsibilities, and functions, including responsibility over the two checks, were turned over to Analisa Castillo. When Castillo asked Joven about the two checks, Joven relayed Reyes's instruction. About fifteen months after the Bank received the checks, they were discovered in the course of an audit conducted by the Bank's auditors. Atty. Pablo Magno, the Bank's legal counsel, advised Reyes to send the checks for collection despite the lapse of fifteen months. According to the Bank, Reyes deliberately withheld Atty. Magno's advice from her superior, Senior Vice President Renato Santos, and falsely informed him that Atty. Magno advised that a demand letter be sent instead, thereby further delaying collection. On July 10, 1990, the checks were finally sent for collection but were returned on July 16, 1990 for the reason "account closed."

The Bank created a committee to investigate the auditors' findings. On March 8, 1991, the president of the Bank issued a memorandum to Reyes informing her of the findings and asking her to give her side. Reyes requested an extension of one week. In a subsequent letter dated March 14, 1991, she stated that because the Bank refused to furnish copies of the pertinent documents she requested and refused to grant her a reasonable period to prepare her answer, she was constrained to make a general denial of any misfeasance or malfeasance on her part and asked that a formal investigation be made. Reyes failed to attend and participate in the formal investigation conducted by the Committee on May 24, 1991 despite due notice; the Committee proceeded with its hearings and heard the testimonies of several witnesses. The Committee found that Reyes authorized the crediting of Filipinas Tyrom's account, instructed Joven to withdraw the transmittal letters to change the addressee, told Joven to hold the checks and await further instructions, that Joven later relayed the instruction to Castillo, that the checks were discovered after fifteen months, that Reyes withheld Atty. Magno's advice and falsely informed Santos that Magno advised a demand letter, and that the checks were finally sent on July 10, 1990 but returned for "account closed." After review, the Board of Directors resolved not to re-elect Reyes to the position of Assistant Vice President pursuant to the Bank's By-laws. On July 19, 1991, Senior Vice President Benedicto L. Santos informed Reyes of her termination. The letter stated that she deliberately held the clearing of the checks by instructing the collection clerk not to send them, causing their return for "Account closed" and leaving their value unpaid despite Filipinas Tyrom having been credited; that she tried to influence the decision of Atty. Pablo P. Magno by asking him to do something allegedly upon instructions of a Senior Vice President or else lose his job; and that she deliberately withheld from Mr. Santos the advice given by the Bank's legal counsel and relayed false advice, further delaying the sending of the checks. These findings gave rise to the Bank's loss of trust and confidence, serious misconduct, and monetary loss; the Board resolved not to re-elect her, her services were terminated effective immediately, and her monetary and retirement benefits were forfeited except those that had vested in her.

In her position paper, Reyes alleged that the real reason for her dismissal was her filing of criminal cases against the bank president, the vice president, and the auditors of the Bank, and that such filing was not a valid ground for dismissal. She alleged that it would be self-serving for the Bank to state that she was found guilty of gross misconduct in deliberately withholding the clearing of the two dollar checks. She further alleged that she was not afforded due process because she was not given the chance to refute the charges mentioned in the letter of dismissal, and hence she was illegally dismissed. The Bank argued that there were substantial bases for it to lose trust and confidence in Reyes and that it had just cause for terminating her services; it also sought moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees for the allegedly unfounded suit against its officers.

Labor Arbiter Linsangan found the evidence insufficient. The legality of the dismissal based on the first ground rose or fell on the credibility of Joven, the Bank's star witness; the testimonies of the Bank's other witnesses were all anchored on what Joven told them. The Labor Arbiter observed Joven's demeanor while testifying and was not impressed; her allegation that Reyes instructed her to hold the checks was extremely doubtful because the instruction would constitute a gross violation of the Bank's standard operating procedure and would greatly prejudice the employer, and Joven should have disobeyed it and reported the matter to management. Joven took eighteen months before explaining her side despite a November 15, 1989 confrontation at her residence. Reyes's actions were spontaneous: when informed by Castor and Castillo regarding the non-release of the checks sometime in November 1989, she immediately reported the matter to Vice President Santos and went to Joven's residence to confront her. The driver Celestino Bonito stated in his affidavit that Joven hesitatingly said "akala ko bouncing checks yon mga yon" and turned pale. The Bank reported the non-release to top management on November 15, 1989, but issued a memorandum to Reyes only on March 8, 1991, after a lapse of sixteen months, and dismissed her another four months later; the delay lent credence to Reyes's assertion that her dismissal was retaliation for the criminal complaints she filed against the Bank's top officials. The Labor Arbiter concluded that Reyes had no knowledge of, much less participation in, the non-release of the checks; Joven was solely responsible and was not even reprimanded by the Bank. The Labor Arbiter also found that the Bank failed to furnish Reyes the documents imputing loss of confidence, so she was not amply afforded the opportunity to prepare an intelligent answer; nothing confidential appeared in the auditor's report and Joven's affidavit. The conflict-of-interest issue was not covered by the investigation and was irrelevant. The Court of Appeals adopted these factual findings on Joven's credibility and Reyes's lack of participation.

• Jurisdiction of the SEC/RTC: Petitioner argued that the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court), not the NLRC, had original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving removal from office of corporate officers under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A; Reyes was a corporate officer, an elective Assistant Vice President under the Bank's by-laws, and her non-election was an intra-corporate controversy.
• Estoppel Cannot Lie: Petitioner maintained that estoppel could not bar the jurisdictional challenge because it had consistently asserted in all pleadings at all stages that Reyes held an elective position elected by the Board, which showed that her tenure was subject to the Board's discretion and that her non-reelection was a mere expiration of her term.
• Substantial Evidence of Misconduct: Petitioner argued that even assuming the NLRC had jurisdiction, there was substantial evidence of Reyes's misconduct justifying the Bank's loss of trust and confidence.
• Improper Award of Backwages: Petitioner argued that even assuming Reyes was entitled to backwages, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding unlimited and unqualified backwages beyond the labor arbiter's three-year limit, which Reyes herself sought to execute.
• Mitigation and Good Faith: Petitioner argued that its liability should be mitigated on account of its good faith and that Reyes was not entirely blameless.

• Real Reason for Dismissal: Reyes alleged in her position paper that the real reason for her dismissal was her filing of criminal cases against the bank president, the vice president, and the auditors of the Bank, and that such filing was not a valid ground for dismissal.
• No Gross Misconduct: She alleged that it would be self-serving for the Bank to state that she was found guilty of gross misconduct in deliberately withholding the clearing of the two dollar checks.
• Denial of Due Process: She alleged that she was not afforded due process because she was not given the chance to refute the charges mentioned in the letter of dismissal, and hence she was illegally dismissed.
• Lack of Documents and Time to Prepare: She maintained that the Bank refused to furnish copies of the pertinent documents she requested and refused to grant her a reasonable period to prepare her answer, constraining her to make a general denial and request a formal investigation.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal, or whether the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the removal of a corporate officer.
• Illegal Dismissal: Whether complainant Reyes was illegally dismissed.
• Backwages: Whether the amount of back wages awarded was proper.

• Jurisdiction: The Bank's jurisdictional challenge fails. It actively participated before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals and questioned jurisdiction only after the Court of Appeals ruled against it; under Bañaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, estoppel bars the belated objection.
• Illegal Dismissal: Yes. The dismissal was illegal; the loss-of-trust-and-confidence charge rested on Joven's testimony, which the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals found incredible, and the Bank failed to prove bad faith or malice by substantial evidence.
• Backwages: Yes. Because Reyes was dismissed on July 19, 1991, after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989, she was entitled to full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits from withholding up to finality, plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and attorney's fees.

• Jurisdiction: The Bank invoked Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, arguing that the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) had original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies because Reyes was a corporate officer and her non-election was an intra-corporate matter. The Court held that the Bank could no longer raise the issue under the principle of estoppel. The Bank participated in the proceedings from start to finish: it filed its position paper with the Labor Arbiter; when the Labor Arbiter's decision was adverse, it appealed to the NLRC; when the NLRC decided in its favor, it said nothing about jurisdiction; and even before the Court of Appeals, it never questioned the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It raised the issue only after the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes. While jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, that rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened. Quoting Bañaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, the Court reiterated that it has frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse; a party may thus be estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings. The Bank's claim that it consistently asserted Reyes's elective position in all pleadings was rejected: the records showed that such assertion was made only in the appeal to the NLRC and raised again before the Court of Appeals, not for purposes of questioning jurisdiction but to establish that Reyes's tenure was subject to the Board's discretion and that her non-reelection was a mere expiration of her term. The Court also found that Reyes was appointed Accounting Clerk on July 14, 1963, rose to supervisor, and was appointed Assistant Vice President in 1982, which position she occupied until her dismissal on July 19, 1991. The Bank's contention that she merely held an elective position and was not a regular employee was belied by the nature of her work and her length of service. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee and the usual trade or business of the employer; an employee is regular because of the nature of the work and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring. As Assistant Vice President of the Foreign Department, Reyes performed tasks integral to the operations of the Bank, and her 28 years of service confirmed her status as a regular employee entitled to security of tenure, meaning her services could be terminated only for a just or authorized cause.
• Illegal Dismissal: The Bank insisted that it had presented substantial evidence to prove breach of trust warranting Reyes's dismissal. The Court of Appeals disagreed and set aside the NLRC's findings that Reyes deliberately withheld the release of the two dollar checks, that she was guilty of conflict of interest, that she waived her right to due process for not attending the hearing, and that she was dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. The Court quoted the Court of Appeals' reasoning with approval. First, the Bank heavily relied on the testimony and affidavit of Remittance Clerk Joven, but Joven's allegation that Reyes instructed her to hold the two dollar checks fell short of the requisite proof; except for Joven's bare assertion, the Bank failed to adduce convincing evidence to prove bad faith and malice, and the Bank's other witnesses merely corroborated Joven. The rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of confidence, and that some basis for such loss is sufficient, is not absolute. The right of an employer to dismiss employees on the ground of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause; for loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work (Labor vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 183). Second, the Bank's charge of deliberate withholding found no support in the testimony of Atty. Jocson, Chairman of the Investigating Committee; on cross-examination, Atty. Jocson testified that the documents themselves did not show any direct withholding. Where witnesses conflict, the court must adopt the testimony it believes to be true (U.S. vs. Losada, 18 Phil. 90). Third, settled is the rule that when the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter are sufficiently substantiated by the evidence on record, they should be respected by appellate tribunals since he is in a better position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the contending parties (Ala Mode Garments, Inc. vs. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497). The Labor Arbiter found Joven's allegation extremely doubtful because the instruction would grossly violate the Bank's standard operating procedure and would greatly prejudice the employer; Joven should have disobeyed the instruction and reported the matter to management. Joven took eighteen months before explaining her side despite a November 15, 1989 confrontation at her residence. Reyes's actions were spontaneous: when informed by Castor and Castillo regarding the non-release of the checks in November 1989, she immediately reported the matter to Vice President Santos and went to Joven's residence to confront her. The driver's affidavit stated that Joven hesitatingly said "akala ko bouncing checks yon mga yon" and turned pale. The Bank reported the non-release to top management on November 15, 1989, but issued a memorandum to Reyes only on March 8, 1991, after sixteen months, and dismissed her four months later; the delayed action lent credence to Reyes's assertion that her dismissal was retaliation for the criminal complaints she filed against the Bank's top officials. The Labor Arbiter concluded that Reyes had no knowledge of, much less participation in, the non-release of the checks; Joven was solely responsible and was not even reprimanded. Fourth, the Bank failed to furnish Reyes the necessary documents imputing loss of confidence, so she was not amply afforded the opportunity to prepare an intelligent answer; nothing confidential appeared in the auditor's report and Joven's affidavit. Due process dictates that management accord employees every kind of assistance to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense, including legal representation. The conflict-of-interest issue was not covered by the investigation and was irrelevant. The Court upheld the Court of Appeals' findings that the dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence was without basis. The charge was predicated on Joven's testimony, and the Court deferred to the findings of the Labor Arbiter as confirmed and adopted by the Court of Appeals on Joven's credibility. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and will not weigh anew evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals (Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278).
• Backwages: The Bank questioned the award of full backwages and other benefits from July 19, 1991 up to the finality of the judgment, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement, and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the total award. The Bank argued that Reyes was not entitled to full backwages because she did not appeal that portion of the Labor Arbiter's judgment awarding back wages limited to three years. The Court held that Reyes filed a special civil action for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC, not an ordinary appeal. An ordinary appeal is distinguished from the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in that in ordinary appeals a party who did not appeal cannot seek affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. On the other hand, resort to judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is confined to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the Court of Appeals found that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that Reyes's dismissal was valid and reversed the same; corollary to that, the appellate court awarded backwages in accordance with current jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is clear on the amount of backwages recoverable in cases of illegal dismissal: employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989 are entitled to backwages up to three years without deduction or qualification, while those illegally dismissed after are granted full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Considering that Reyes was terminated on July 19, 1991, she was entitled to full backwages from the time her actual compensation was withheld from her up to the finality of the judgment, instead of reinstatement, because reinstatement was no longer feasible on account of the strained relations brought about by the litigation. Since reinstatement was no longer viable, she was also entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. Because she was compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal, she was likewise entitled to attorney's fees. There was no room to argue that the Bank's liability should be mitigated on account of its good faith and that Reyes was not entirely blameless; there was no showing that Reyes was partly at fault or that the Bank acted in good faith in terminating an employee of twenty-eight years. Article 279 of Republic Act No. 6715 clearly and plainly provides for full backwages to illegally dismissed employees.

• Estoppel to Question Jurisdiction — A party may be estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal or in a petition for review when it actively participated in the proceedings and accepted the possibility of an adverse judgment, raising the jurisdictional issue only after an unfavorable ruling. The Court applied this to the Bank, which filed its position paper, appealed to the NLRC, and participated before the Court of Appeals without questioning jurisdiction until after the Court of Appeals ruled against it.
• Regular Employment and Security of Tenure — The primary standard for regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee and the usual trade or business of the employer; an employee is regular because of the nature of the work and length of service, not the mode or reason for hiring. Reyes, who served 28 years and performed tasks integral to the Bank's foreign department, was a regular employee entitled to security of tenure and could be dismissed only for a just or authorized cause.
• Loss of Trust and Confidence as a Just Cause — Loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for dismissal only if it is substantial, not arbitrary, and founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant separation. The employer's right to dismiss on this ground is not absolute; proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, but a bare assertion or uncorroborated testimony does not suffice. The charge against Reyes rested on Joven's testimony, which the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals found incredible, so the dismissal was illegal.
• Due Process in Dismissal — Management must accord employees every kind of assistance to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense, including legal representation. The Bank's failure to furnish Reyes the documents imputing loss of confidence meant she was not amply afforded the opportunity to prepare an intelligent answer.
• Backwages Under Republic Act No. 6715 — Employees illegally dismissed before March 21, 1989 are entitled to backwages up to three years without deduction or qualification; those dismissed after that date are entitled to full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time compensation was withheld up to actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay equivalent to one month salary per year of service is awarded in lieu. Reyes, dismissed on July 19, 1991, was entitled to full backwages up to finality and separation pay.
• Certiorari Review of NLRC Decisions — Judicial review of NLRC decisions through a Rule 65 petition is confined to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A party who files certiorari, unlike one who fails to appeal, is not barred from seeking affirmative relief once the appellate court finds grave abuse of discretion. This allowed the Court of Appeals to award full backwages despite Reyes not appealing the Labor Arbiter's three-year limitation.

• "This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Here, the principle of estoppel lies. Hence, a party may be estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings." — This passage states the estoppel doctrine applied to the Bank's belated jurisdictional challenge and is the Court's controlling formulation for why the issue could no longer be raised.
• "For loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for an employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work (Labor vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 183)." — This defines the standard for loss of trust and confidence and is the basis for invalidating Reyes's dismissal.
• "Employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989 are entitled to backwages up to three (3) years without deduction or qualification, while those illegally dismissed after are granted full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement." — This states the backwages rule applied to Reyes, who was dismissed after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715.
• "As Assistant Vice-President of the Foreign Department of the Bank she performs tasks integral to the operations of the bank and her length of service with the bank totaling 28 years speaks volumes of her status as a regular employee of the bank. In fine, as a regular employee, she is entitled to security of tenure; that is, her services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause." — This passage establishes Reyes's status as a regular employee entitled to security of tenure, a key premise for the illegal dismissal ruling.

• Bañaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, 181 SCRA 599 (1990) — Quoted as controlling precedent for estoppel; a party may be barred from raising jurisdiction for the first time before the Supreme Court after failing to do so in the early stages of the proceedings.
• St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998) — Cited in the procedural referral of Reyes's petition to the Court of Appeals and in the rule that judicial review of NLRC decisions is initially lodged with the Court of Appeals.
• Labor vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 183 — Cited in the Court of Appeals' quoted reasoning for the standard that loss of trust and confidence must be substantial, not arbitrary, and founded on clearly established facts.
• Bernardo vs. NLRC, 310 SCRA 186 (1999) — Cited for the regular employment standard: the primary standard is the reasonable connection between the activity performed and the employer's usual trade or business; an employee is regular because of the nature of work and length of service.
• Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 278 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and will not weigh anew evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
• Bustamante vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 (1996) — Cited for the backwages rule distinguishing employees dismissed before and after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715.
• Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 (1992) — Cited for the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
• Asian Center for Career and Employment System and Services, Inc. (ACCESS) vs. NLRC, 297 SCRA 727 (1998) — Cited for the award of attorney's fees.
• Ala Mode Garments, Inc. vs. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497 — Cited for deference to the Labor Arbiter's factual findings and credibility assessments when sufficiently substantiated.
• U.S. vs. Losada, 18 Phil. 90 — Cited for the rule that where witnesses conflict, the court must adopt the testimony it believes to be true.
• Saltiga de Romero vs. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 180 (1999) — Cited for the distinction between ordinary appeal and certiorari, particularly that a party who did not appeal cannot seek affirmative relief other than those granted below.
• Secon Philippines, Ltd., vs. NLRC, 319 SCRA 685 (1999) — Cited for the rule that certiorari review of NLRC decisions is confined to want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.

• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A — Vested the Securities and Exchange Commission (now the Regional Trial Court) with original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. The Bank invoked it to argue that Reyes's non-election as a corporate officer fell within that jurisdiction, but the Court held the Bank estopped from raising the issue.
• Article 279, Republic Act No. 6715 — Provides that an employee unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time compensation was withheld up to actual reinstatement. The Court applied it to award Reyes full backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
• Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari. The Court distinguished it from ordinary appeal: review of NLRC decisions under Rule 65 is confined to want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, and it permitted the Court of Appeals to award full backwages after finding grave abuse of discretion.
• Republic Act No. 6715 — Effective March 21, 1989; governs the amount of backwages for illegally dismissed employees. Because Reyes was dismissed on July 19, 1991, after its effectivity, she was entitled to full backwages rather than the three-year limitation.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.