Prudencio De Guzman y Jumaquio vs. People of the Philippines

A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void; a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for purposes of remarriage. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage solely on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to establish the existence of a marriage, as the certified true copy of the Marriage Certificate is sufficient for such purpose.

The petitioner and Arlene De Guzman were married on April 8, 1994 before Branch 106 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with the marriage solemnized by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo under Marriage License No. 1031606. The Family Code, particularly Article 40, governs the requirement of a judicial declaration of nullity before a person may remarry. The case implicates the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

Prudencio De Guzman and Arlene De Guzman were married on April 8, 1994 before Branch 106 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with the marriage solemnized by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo under Marriage License No. 1031606 issued on April 6, 1994. In 2007, Prudencio abandoned his wife and children. In December 2009, a friend informed Arlene that Prudencio had contracted a second marriage with a certain Jean Basan on December 17, 2009 at the Immaculate Church in Las Piñas City. On January 8, 2010, Arlene went to the Immaculate Church and confirmed the second marriage, thereafter securing a copy of Prudencio and Basan's marriage contract at the City Civil Registrar's Office.

Arlene filed a Complaint for bigamy before the Office of the City Prosecutor, and an Information was subsequently filed charging Prudencio with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that Prudencio, being legally married to Arlene, a marriage still existing and not legally dissolved, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Jean Basan, which second marriage had all the essential and formal requisites for validity. On arraignment, Prudencio pleaded not guilty, and trial on the merits ensued.

In his defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because the copy of their Marriage Contract secured from the National Statistics Office did not bear the solemnizing officer's signature. The trial court did not give weight to this defense, explaining that the discrepancy was inadvertent, as a copy of the same Marriage Contract in the Local Civil Registrar bore the solemnizing officer's signature. The trial court also found that marriage photos, along with Prudencio's own admission in his Counter-Affidavit, were enough evidence to establish the marriage. The trial court concluded that Prudencio could not unilaterally declare his marriage void, as only courts have the power to do so, and ruled that the prosecution had shown all the elements of bigamy: (1) the marriage between the accused and the private complainant was still existing; (2) it had not been legally declared dissolved; (3) the accused contracted a subsequent marriage with Jean Basan while his first marriage was still subsisting; and (4) the second marriage had all the essential requisites for its validity.

Prudencio appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Arlene executed an Affidavit of Desistance praying that the case be dismissed after she had reconciled with Prudencio. In his appeal, Prudencio reiterated his previous arguments and added that the case should be dismissed in view of the Affidavit of Desistance. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal, affirming the conviction and modifying the penalty. Prudencio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that the issuance of a Certificate of No Marriage Record by the National Statistics Office made him believe there was no legal impediment to remarry. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration, prompting Prudencio to file the Petition before the Supreme Court.

• Void Marriage: Petitioner argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because the copy of their Marriage Contract secured from the National Statistics Office did not bear the solemnizing officer's signature.
• Lack of Marriage License: Petitioner claimed that the prosecution's failure to offer a copy of the marriage license was fatal to its case.
• Affidavit of Desistance: Petitioner argued that the case should be dismissed in view of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Arlene after the parties had reconciled.
• Good Faith Reliance on Certificate of No Marriage Record: Petitioner claimed that the issuance of a Certificate of No Marriage Record by the National Statistics Office made him believe that there was no legal impediment for him to remarry.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the respondent's arguments beyond the prosecution's position as reflected in the trial court's findings and the Court of Appeals' rulings.

• Judicial Declaration of Nullity: Whether a person may unilaterally declare his marriage void and remarry without a final judgment of a competent court declaring the previous marriage void.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Marriage: Whether the prosecution's failure to present the marriage license and the absence of the solemnizing officer's signature in the National Statistics Office copy of the Marriage Certificate are fatal to the prosecution's case for bigamy.
• Effect of Affidavit of Desistance: Whether the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainant after conviction warrants the dismissal of the case.

• Judicial Declaration of Nullity: No. A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a final judgment of a competent court declaring the previous marriage void is indispensable before a person may remarry.
• Sufficiency of Evidence of Marriage: No. The presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to establish the existence of a marriage; the certified true copy of the Marriage Certificate is sufficient. The absence of the solemnizing officer's signature in the National Statistics Office copy was merely inadvertent, as the Local Civil Registry copy bore the signature.
• Effect of Affidavit of Desistance: No. Affidavits of desistance executed after judgments of conviction are generally received with extensive caution and cannot prove the nonexistence of all the elements of bigamy.

• Judicial Declaration of Nullity: The Court cited Article 40 of the Family Code, which provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage solely on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Citing Teves vs. People, the Court noted that the Family Code has settled conflicting jurisprudence on the matter, and a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The Court further held that the petitioner could not claim good faith in assuming there was no legal impediment to remarry based merely on the Certificate of No Marriage Record, since the Marriage Certificate and photos of the wedding ceremony established that he and Arlene were married on April 8, 1994.

• Sufficiency of Evidence of Marriage: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to establish the existence of a marriage, as the certified true copy of the Marriage Certificate is sufficient for such purpose. Regarding the absence of the solemnizing officer's signature, the Court noted the trial court's finding that the discrepancy was merely inadvertent, since a copy of the Marriage Certificate under the Local Civil Registry had been signed. The trial court had observed that the two marriage contracts contained the same details of the civil wedding ceremony, and even the signatures of the parties and their witnesses had a striking resemblance to the naked eye. The only logical explanation was that the duplicate original forwarded by the local civil registry to the National Statistics Office was not signed by the solemnizing officer, while the other duplicate original on file with the local civil registry was duly signed.

• Effect of Affidavit of Desistance: The Court held that the Affidavit of Desistance could not prove the nonexistence of all the elements of bigamy. Citing People vs. Dela Cerna, the Court noted that an affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her complaint, and that jurisprudence attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The Affidavit of Desistance was executed 13 months after the petitioner's conviction in the trial court, and as the Court of Appeals held, an afterthought merits no probative value.

• Judicial declaration of nullity as a prerequisite to remarriage — Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage solely on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void; only a competent court can issue such a declaration. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the petitioner's claim that his first marriage was void and that he could remarry without a judicial declaration.

• Elements of bigamy — The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (1) the offender is legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or the absent spouse has not been declared presumptively dead; (3) the offender contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage has all the essential and formal requisites for validity. The Court applied these elements, as summarized by the trial court, to affirm the conviction.

• Affidavit of desistance as afterthought — An affidavit of desistance executed after a judgment of conviction has been promulgated is generally received with extensive caution and carries no persuasive value, especially when executed as an afterthought. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the private complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which was executed 13 months after the trial court's judgment of conviction.

• "A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void. The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case: the requirement of a judicial declaration of nullity before a person may remarry, as provided under Article 40 of the Family Code.

• "Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void." — This quotation from Teves vs. People, adopted by the Court, articulates the controlling doctrine that a final judgment of nullity is the only acceptable basis for contracting a second marriage free from legal infirmity.

• "The presentation of the marriage license is not a sine qua non requirement to establish the existence of a marriage as the certified true copy of the [M]arriage [C]ertificate is sufficient for such purpose." — This passage, quoted from the Court of Appeals, disposes of the petitioner's claim that the prosecution's failure to present the marriage license was fatal to the case.

• "An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case, that he or she is discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought." — This quotation from People vs. Dela Cerna supports the Court's rejection of the Affidavit of Desistance as having no probative value.

• Teves vs. People, 671 Phil. 825 (2011) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity as the sole basis for invoking the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes of remarriage.
• People vs. Dela Cerna, 439 Phil. 394 (2002) — Cited for the doctrine that courts attach no persuasive value to an affidavit of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.
• People vs. Antonio, 596 Phil. 808 (2009) — Cited for the principle that affidavits of desistance executed after judgments of conviction are generally received with extensive caution.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy: the penalty of prision mayor is imposed upon any person who contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. This is the crime for which the petitioner was convicted.
• Article 40, Family Code — Provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage solely on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The Court applied this provision to reject the petitioner's claim that he could unilaterally declare his first marriage void.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the Court of Appeals in modifying the penalty imposed by the trial court, resulting in an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, absent any attendant circumstances.

Peralta (Chairperson), Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.