Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares vs. Onofre A. Villaluz

A lawyer who enters into a marriage with full knowledge that a prior marriage has not yet been annulled with finality, and who subsequently contracts another marriage after falsely stating that the previous marriage had been annulled, is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and deceit warranting suspension from the practice of law. The defense that the marriage was a mere "sham" arranged to help a colleague in an administrative case does not excuse the misconduct, because all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under the Family Code were present, and a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong.

The complainant was the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while the respondent was a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals serving as a consultant at the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). The parties first met in 1977 when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares, and respondent thereafter became a close family friend. The complainant had been widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, and had obtained a judicial declaration that he was presumptively dead after an absence of sixteen years.

Complainant Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares, Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, and respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Court of Appeals Justice and consultant at the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, were married in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994, before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite. The marriage was the culmination of a long engagement that began when the parties met in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares, after which respondent became a close family friend.

On the evening of the wedding, after the reception at a German restaurant in Makati, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and they reached his condominium unit two hours later. When complainant answered the phone, a woman at the other end of the line offended her with insulting remarks. When complainant confronted respondent about the caller's identity, he remarked that "it would have been just a call at the wrong number." A heated exchange followed, during which respondent called complainant a "nagger," saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko. Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Complainant left the place of their would-be honeymoon in haste, and the parties have lived separately since then, as respondent never got in touch with her or apologized.

Several months later, at a Bible Study session, complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar that he had solemnized a marriage between respondent and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Complainant thereafter gathered evidence and filed the instant complaint for disbarment on June 6, 1995. On August 7, 1995, she executed a Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification upon discovering another incriminatory document. The marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE. Complainant also presented the marriage contract between her and respondent, the order declaring her first husband presumptively dead, and the affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano.

Respondent gave a different version, claiming that what he entered into with complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely a "sham marriage." He explained that he agreed to sign the marriage contract in an effort to help Judge Mijares in an administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place, his marriage with Librada Peña, his first wife, was still subsisting because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, as it had not yet been published as required by the Rules, service of summons upon Librada Peña having been made by publication.

• Gross Immorality and Bigamy: Complainant charged that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage with Lydia Geraldez on May 10, 1994, while his marriage to complainant was subsisting, and that he distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE in the marriage contract.
• Falsification: Complainant alleged that respondent resorted to falsification to distort the truth, as shown in his Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification, by falsely declaring that his previous marriage had been annulled.

• Sham Marriage Defense: Respondent argued that his marriage to complainant was merely a "sham marriage" entered into to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.
• Subsisting First Marriage: Respondent theorized that when he married complainant, his marriage with Librada Peña, his first wife, was still subsisting because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, as it had not yet been published as required by the Rules, service of summons having been made by publication.

• Validity of the Marriage: Whether the marriage between complainant and respondent on January 7, 1994 was valid despite respondent's claim that it was a mere "sham marriage."
• Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent's actuations in contracting the marriage with complainant while his first marriage had not yet been annulled with finality, and in subsequently marrying Lydia Geraldez after falsely stating that his previous marriage had been annulled, constitute gross misconduct warranting disciplinary action.
• Sham Marriage Defense: Whether respondent's defense that the marriage was a "sham" arranged to help complainant in an administrative case absolves him from liability.

• Validity of the Marriage: Yes. The marriage between complainant and respondent was valid, as all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied with, including legal capacity, consent freely given, authority of the solemnizing officer, a valid marriage license, and a marriage ceremony with the personal declaration of the contracting parties before not less than two witnesses of legal age.
• Gross Misconduct: Yes. Respondent is guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity, by entering into a marriage with complainant while his first marriage had not yet attained finality, and by marrying another woman four months later after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled.
• Sham Marriage Defense: No. The defense that the marriage was a "sham" is unavailing. Regardless of respondent's intention, all the ingredients of a valid marriage were present, and a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. Respondent could have testified in complainant's favor in the administrative case instead of resorting to a sham marriage.

• Validity of the Marriage: The Court adopted the findings of Investigating Justice Purisima that respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a marriage contract with complainant before a judge competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied: legal capacity of the contracting parties, consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer, authority of the solemnizing officer, a valid marriage license, and a marriage ceremony with the personal declaration of the contracting parties before not less than two witnesses of legal age. The theory that the marriage was a "sham" was deemed too incredible to deserve serious consideration.

• Gross Misconduct: The Court found respondent undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He himself asserted that at the time of his marriage to complainant, the decision annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to complainant, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Even assuming that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Peña had not attained complete finality due to non-publication, that circumstance alone only made the subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and respondent void. Furthermore, respondent is precluded by the principle of estoppel from claiming that his first marriage was subsisting and unannulled, having stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Peña had been annulled when he took Lydia Geraldez as his wife.

• Sham Marriage Defense: The Court rejected respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to complainant was just a "sham" marriage. Even if the marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values, especially considering that he is a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot have been unaware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites. Being a lawyer, respondent is conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he felt duty bound to help complainant, he could have testified in her favor in the administrative case instead of resorting to a sham marriage. The Court emphasized that no one can make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage and perform a sham marriage with impunity.

The Court further held that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character, and this qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law but also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and the commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, considering respondent's declining years, his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation probably ascribable to advanced age, and his years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court felt that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty, and a suspension of two years would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

• Moral fitness as a continuing requirement for membership in the bar — The qualification of good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that respondent's grossly immoral conduct and deceit demonstrated his failure to meet the standard of moral fitness required of a lawyer.

• Sham marriage defense — A party cannot avoid liability for entering into a marriage with all the legal requisites by claiming that the marriage was a "sham" or a mere pretense. Regardless of the intention of the party in saying "I do" before a competent authority, if all the ingredients of a valid marriage are present, the marriage is valid, and the party cannot use the sham defense to absolve himself from liability for gross misconduct.

• Estoppel — A party who has stated under oath that his previous marriage had been annulled is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that his first marriage was subsisting and unannulled when he contracted a subsequent marriage. The Court applied this principle to prevent respondent from claiming that his marriage to complainant was void because his first marriage was still subsisting.

• Wrong cannot be righted by another wrong — A lawyer cannot justify an immoral or unlawful act by claiming that it was done to help another person in an administrative case. The Court held that respondent could have testified in complainant's favor in the administrative case instead of resorting to a sham marriage.

• "He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and dignity." — This passage states the core basis for the Court's finding of gross misconduct, emphasizing the sanctity of marriage as a social institution that lawyers, as officers of the court, must respect.

• "Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values." — This passage rejects the sham marriage defense and highlights the Court's view that respondent's conduct was inexcusable, particularly given his position as a former judge and appellate justice.

• "The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the continuing requirement of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession, which is frequently cited in subsequent disciplinary cases.

• "To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a 'sham' marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege." — This passage states the Court's emphatic rejection of the sham marriage defense and its view of the gravity of respondent's misconduct.

• Pangan vs. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 1 — Cited for the proposition that a lawyer who makes a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity, is guilty of gross misconduct.
• Pomperada vs. Jochico, Bar Matter No. 68, November 21, 1984, 133 SCRA 309 — Cited in connection with the standard of conduct expected of a lawyer, particularly one who has held judicial office.
• People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 682 — Cited for the doctrine that the qualification of good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law but is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

• Articles 2 and 3, Family Code — These provisions enumerate the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage. The Court applied them in finding that the marriage between complainant and respondent was valid, as all the requisites — legal capacity, consent freely given, authority of the solemnizing officer, a valid marriage license, and a marriage ceremony with the personal declaration of the contracting parties before not less than two witnesses — were satisfied.
• Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — This rule provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court applied this provision in finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and deceit.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — This provision identifies the grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers, including the commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit. The Court applied this provision in imposing the penalty of suspension.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concurred. Narvasa, C.J., took no part. Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., were on leave.